This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 000366 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA DAS ROBERT DANIN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR KPAL KWBG IS ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS GOI EXTERNAL PEACE PROCESS
SUBJECT: ISRAELI NSC SAYS CLARITY NEEDED ON HAMAS IN NEW 
PALESTINIAN GOVERNMENT 
 
 
Classified By: DCM Gene A. Cretz.  Reasons:  1.4 (b, d). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (C) During their January 25 meeting at Israel's National 
Security Council, NSC Director MGEN (Ret.) Giora Eiland and 
his deputy, Eran Etzion, told NEA DAS Robert Danin the 
following: 
 
-- USG, GOI and Quartet statements on a HAMAS presence in the 
new Palestinian government need to be clear and consistent. 
Israel will not accept any former or current HAMAS members 
serving in any cabinet or sub-cabinet position.  HAMAS will 
have to limit its role to the parliament, or Israel will be 
forced to react as it deems appropriate.  The GOI believes 
that Palestinian Authority (PA) Chairman Mahmud Abbas does 
not understand this, and that HAMAS will use any ambiguity to 
press for a presence in the new government. 
 
-- Two issues need to be addressed in the immediate term: 
(a) expectations about the new Palestinian government's 
behavior need to be clear.  Israel is concerned that the EU 
will apply "weak standards" in defining this, and that this 
will encourage the Palestinians to "play games."  Israel 
wants the U.S. to ensure that the EU raises the bar; (b) 
performance benchmarks for the new Palestinian government 
need to be pegged against a short timeline.  Because of 
perceived gains by Hizballah in the new Lebanese government, 
the GOI believes that the Palestinians must be presented with 
realizable performance benchmarks pegged to a timeline 
ranging between a few weeks and a few months.  These 
benchmarks should be reasonable so that PA Chairman Abbas can 
succeed in implementing them.  The benchmarks should put 
HAMAS in a difficult situation.  (NOTE: Neither Etzion nor 
Eiland elaborated on how to make the situation difficult for 
HAMAS.  END NOTE.) 
 
-- The NSC believes that the Egyptians and Saudis could 
influence HAMAS in a positive direction, if the U.S. were to 
ask them to play a more significant role than they have to 
date.  Cairo and Riyadh should be asked to pressure HAMAS to 
accept certain conditions -- including recognition of the 
state of Israel, renunciation of terrorism, and disarmament 
-- as a price for joining a Palestinian coalition government. 
 
-- The NSC believes that any expectation of further 
unilateral withdrawals by Israel from the West Bank is 
unrealistic.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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CLEAR AND CONSISTENT POSITION ON HAMAS NEEDED 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Eiland and Etzion said that the USG, GOI and the 
Quartet should issue a coordinated, clear and consistent 
statement that no former or current HAMAS members should be 
allowed to hold any positions in the new Palestinian 
government.  Both stressed that Israel will not accept former 
and current HAMAS members serving as civilian ministers, 
sub-ministers, or even clerks and secretaries, as, from a 
practical point of view, HAMAS' occupation of such positions 
would jeopardize Israeli-Palestinian coordination that has 
taken place to date.  They stressed that they do not wish to 
see cooperation with the PA discontinued. 
 
¶3. (C) Etzion pointed to the fact that the last Quartet 
statement said specifically that former HAMAS members could 
be cabinet ministers.  Etzion claimed that the wording 
suggested that HAMAS members beneath the ministerial level 
were acceptable.  He said this ambiguity needed to be closed. 
 "Otherwise," he said, "HAMAS will cross over from the 
legislative branch into the executive branch, and we will 
start down a slippery slope." 
 
¶4. (C) Eiland and Etzion said they are confused about the 
U.S. position regarding whether the USG will deal with a PA 
that has HAMAS members in it.  They referred to recent press 
statements by USG officials to the effect that the Lebanon 
model might be applicable, i.e., that the U.S. will deal with 
a government, but not with ministers that are members of 
Foreign Terrorist Organizations.  Eiland and Etzion stressed 
that the Palestinians are behaving as if they see no cost to 
having HAMAS members in a future Palestinian government. 
"The lack of clear USG and GOI messages may lead HAMAS to 
insist that it has people in the government," they said.  DAS 
Danin responded by pointing to the Secretary's statement of 
January 11 that armed groups have no place in the democratic 
process.  Eiland and Etzion replied that they are not sure 
that the Palestinians have accepted this position. 
 
¶5. (C) Eiland and Etzion said that the Palestinians must be 
told that if former and current HAMAS members take up 
positions in the executive branch, they will not enjoy the 
privileges accorded to their positions, and international 
financial support for the Palestinians will cease.  Eiland 
allowed that if HAMAS wins the elections, Israel might be 
forced to completely lock down the Gaza Strip and tell the 
Palestinians, "If you have problems, go to Egypt for help." 
Eiland clarified that this would be a worse situation than 
that which the Palestinians face today in which there are 
occasional crossing closures:  "We are talking about no 
cooperation whatsoever.  Even in the bad old days with 
Arafat, we had some cooperation.  The more HAMAS is part of 
any administration, the more measures Israel will have to 
take to show that it is unacceptable." 
 
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CLARITY ON TERRORISM, AND QUICK PERFORMANCE TO BENCHMARKS 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
¶6. (C) Etzion stressed that there are two main issues that 
need to be addressed in the immediate term as the Palestinian 
elections wrap up, and the government begins to form: 
 
A) Firewall:  The "firewall" between what is terrorist, and 
what is not, must be sound.  Israel is afraid that HAMAS and 
PA Chairman Abbas will try to find an accommodation by 
forming loose arrangements that blur this distinction. 
Etzion said that the EU would ultimately set the quality 
standard because it always sets the lowest standard.  In this 
case, the U.S. and Israel will need to get the EU to raise 
the bar.  The best way is to start by setting it high. 
Etzion stressed, "Israel will be opposed to anything that 
blurs the line between the good and the bad sides in the 
international community.  Hizballah does this very well.  We 
cannot accept game-playing, as this makes a mockery of 
anything that you want to implement." 
 
B) Time:  Israel needs to see the new Palestinian government 
perform to agreed-upon benchmarks that are pegged to a 
timetable of "no less than a few weeks, but no more than a 
few months."  Etzion said "The Israeli position will be that 
a clear timetable must be agreed upon.  This will put 
pressure on the new Palestinian government and HAMAS." 
Etzion suggested that if a political crisis ensued as a 
result, and Abbas were forced to step down, it would be 
unfortunate for Israel because of Abbas's departure, but 
would likely result in HAMAS being blamed for failure -- 
something Israel would welcome.  Etzion added, "I am sure the 
Europeans would not want a political crisis and Abbas' 
resignation, but it is an acceptable price for Israel to pay." 
 
¶7. (C) Eiland stressed, however, that Israel wants to see 
Abbas succeed, "even though he has avoided commitments."  In 
order to make this more likely, Abbas should be presented 
with "realizable benchmarks" that require minimal performance 
of the new PA.  These benchmarks should include statements, 
laws and reforms, especially in the security area, and should 
be agreed upon by the USG and the GOI.  Eiland said that 
Israel would do nothing to undermine the PA's efforts in 
meeting the benchmarks.  At the end of a few months, Israel 
would then evaluate the performance.  If Abbas delivers, 
there should be some significant rewards, including progress 
on a Gaza seaport, and a meeting between the Israeli PM and 
Abbas.  Eiland admitted there is a low probability that this 
"best possible scenario" will materialize, but stressed that 
it is important that Israel "give a chance to even a 
partially reliable partner.  It is a genuine Israeli interest 
not to choose unilateralism before Abbas has one last 
chance." 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA COULD POSITIVELY INFLUENCE HAMAS 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶8. (C) Eiland and Etzion said that they believe the Egyptians 
and Saudis could influence HAMAS in a positive direction, if 
the U.S. were to approach them.  First, the U.S., Israel and 
Abbas need to agree upon benchmarks.  Then, the U.S. could 
encourage Egypt and Saudi Arabia to urge HAMAS to "do the 
right thing."  Eiland and Etzion stressed that now is the 
perfect time to talk to the Egyptians, Saudis, Jordanians and 
other Arabs. They recommended that the USG use the following 
approach:  "We are walking into a disaster.  The PA is about 
to collapse.  You need to play a more significant role than 
you have done to date.  To Egypt:  You should consider taking 
over Gaza when it plunges into a Somalia-like chaos.  You 
could do this with Saudi Arabia's political cover.  You could 
even have a role in the West Bank.  To Jordan:  Like, Egypt, 
you could help to facilitate transit between the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip." 
¶9. (C) Eiland and Etzion clarified that they were trying to 
be optimistic:  "With pressure, you could force HAMAS into a 
coalition under conditions that are acceptable to all of us. 
These conditions would include recognition of the state of 
Israel, renunciation of terrorism, and disarmament." 
 
¶10. (C) Etzion said he will look at the Letters of Mutual 
Acceptance that were signed by Rabin and Arafat to see if 
there is language that could be useful in working out "mutual 
recognition," or at least "unilateral recognition by HAMAS." 
He stressed that the U.S. and Israel need to avoid "mushy 
recognition of the PLO variety," and need to strike the right 
balance between concrete and symbolic steps that HAMAS would 
be required to make. 
 
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FURTHER ISRAELI UNILATERALISM IS NOT A REALISTIC OPTION 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
¶11. (C) Etzion said that when Israel's policy-making 
community initially looked at disengagement, it never thought 
of further steps, e.g., additional withdrawals from the West 
Bank.  Instead, the thinking was that disengagement would 
lead to a stable situation in the West Bank.  Etzion said 
that Israel is now somewhat disappointed with the results of 
disengagement due to the terrorist attacks that followed and 
the increase in Qassam rocket launches.  "Now, it seems, " 
Etzion said, "that a second unilateral move seems impossible, 
especially after the rise of HAMAS.  Pulling out of the Gaza 
Strip was an easy sell to the Israeli public.  Pulling out of 
the West Bank would be a much harder thing to sell." 
 
¶12. (C) Etzion said that the current situation pales in 
comparison, however, to what Israel would face in a PA run by 
HAMAS.  There is no way that Israel would be able to 
disengage from the West Bank without a very basic security 
regime in place.  If Israel were to withdraw now, Qassam 
rockets would find their way into the West Bank, and would be 
launched against strategic targets like Ben Gurion Airport. 
Etzion said that the GOI has not made up its mind on this 
issue right now, but would be reluctant to withdraw from the 
West Bank in the face of a "rogue Palestinian state and no 
reliable partner." 
 
¶13. (U) This cable has been cleared by NEA DAS Robert Danin. 
 
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