VZCZCXRO1198
PP RUEHCN
DE RUEHIN #0253/01 0250727
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 250727Z JAN 06
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8194
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH PRIORITY 1107
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4584
RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 8926
RUESLE/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 8327
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 4933
RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 1012
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 5784
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 3112
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 6337
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 7377
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 7571
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 3765
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA 9624

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 TAIPEI 000253 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR CA/FPP AND EAP/TC 
DEPARTMENT ALSO PASS TO KCC 
POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS 
HONG KONG PLEASE PASS TO DHS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC TW
SUBJECT:  FRAUD SUMMARY - AIT TAIPEI, JANUARY 2006 
 
REFS: (A) 05 AIT TAIPEI 2416 (B) 05 AIT TAIPEI 3816 
(C) 05 AIT TAIPEI 4631    (D) 05 AIT TAIPEI 4888 
 
SUMMARY:  While AIT Taipei experiences low rates of 
documentary fraud in immigrant and nonimmigrant visas, and 
American Citizen Services operations, the use of Taiwan 
passports containing valid U.S. NIVs to smuggle nationals of 
the People's Republic of China (PRC) into the United States 
continues to be a major concern and the primary focus of 
AIT's Fraud Prevention Unit.  Post has excellent 
relationships with Taiwan government authorities, 
representative offices of other countries, and DHS/CBP and 
DHS/ICE officers in the U.S. and abroad.  This, plus 
intensive investigation into individual alien smuggling 
cases, as well as continual discussion of fraud trends among 
adjudicating officers, has raised the bar for alien 
smugglers, but a solution to this ever-evolving problem 
remains elusive.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶A. COUNTRY CONDITIONS:  Taiwan is a fully developed and 
industrialized society. Long a powerhouse of manufacturing 
in everything from light industry to high technology, Taiwan 
has one of the highest standards of living in East Asia. 
Politically, Taiwan has continually made steps towards more 
transparency, rule of law, and democratic processes in a 
peaceful fashion.  While tensions exist between Taiwan and 
the People's Republic of China (PRC), these tensions have 
not had a major impact on migration patterns of Taiwan 
passport holders. 
 
The United States has long been a popular destination for 
Taiwan travelers for tourism, education, business, and 
family visits. Despite the high volume of Taiwan travelers 
to the U.S. (in FY 2005, AIT adjudicated 200,000 non- 
immigrant visa applications), the overstay rate among Taiwan 
passport holders is low. AIT's nonimmigrant visa refusal 
rate is commensurately low, thus minimizing the number of 
applicants who might otherwise use false documents, fake 
marriages, and other forms of fraud to overcome the 
presumption of immigrant intent. Fraud prevention efforts in 
Taiwan are targeted primarily at the sale and use of valid 
Taiwan travel documents containing U.S. visas to illegal 
aliens and their escorts  which are used to smuggle 
nationals of the People's Republic of China to the U.S. 
illegally. 
 
For both economic and cultural reasons, Taiwan is also a 
magnet for ethnic Chinese from other areas in Asia, 
particularly Burma and Vietnam, as well as PRC nationals who 
migrate to Taiwan primarily from coastal Fujian Province. 
After meeting certain conditions, these migrants can receive 
a Taiwan national ID card and Taiwan passport. 
 
¶B. NIV FRAUD: AIT has seen negligible amounts of fraud in 
applications for all classes of non-immigrant visa, 
including the L, E, and H1B categories. The majority of 
Taiwan passport holders have strong ties to Taiwan that are 
easily demonstrated. Obtaining genuine job certificates, 
household records, police certificates, bank statements, 
school registration certificates and other documents that 
demonstrate an individual's bona fides is generally easy, 
and the information contained in the documents is generally 
reliable and accurate. Thus, there is little need and little 
market for forged documentation. 
 
Although a relatively small percentage of our total NIV 
workload, AIT does receive a substantial number of 
applications from citizens of Philippines, Burma, Vietnam, 
Thailand, and Indonesia.  Most of these applicants are visa 
shoppers with few ties to their home countries and no ties 
to Taiwan.  Additionally, overseas Chinese temporarily 
resident in Taiwan and PRC immigrants to Taiwan also 
frequently apply for visas at AIT.  AIT's 2005 validation 
study (see Ref A) showed that all of these applicants had 
low rates of return to Taiwan and they are adjudicated 
 
TAIPEI 00000253  002 OF 005 
 
 
accordingly. 
 
The most significant NIV fraud trend in Taiwan is the 
improper use of Taiwan passports with valid U.S. NIVs by 
organizations smuggling PRC nationals into the U.S.  Because 
Taiwan passport holders are considered low risk travelers, 
Taiwan passports containing valid U.S. visas are valuable 
items in this lucrative trade. Criminal syndicates involved 
in PRC alien smuggling are highly sophisticated and 
organized, and their methods leave FPU limited options for 
combating them. 
 
A common fraud pattern involves Taiwan passport holders 
applying for NIVs with genuine Taiwan passports, then 
immediately selling the passports with valid U.S. visas 
(normally B1/B2) to brokers or alien smuggling syndicates. 
Generally, the passports are not altered, but rather the 
passport is used by an imposter, usually a PRC citizen (see 
Ref B).  Additionally, valid Taiwan passports are often used 
in boarding pass swaps, in which the passport and U.S. visa 
are used to obtain boarding passes that are then given to 
PRC nationals in airport transit lounges.  These PRC 
nationals use the boarding passes to board non-stop flights 
to the United States, where they arrive as no-doc passengers 
requesting asylum (see Ref C). Taiwan passport holders 
frequently serve as escorts for groups of malafide PRC 
travelers. 
 
FPU has conducted detailed investigations into, and 
maintains complete files on, cases of alien smuggling 
reported to AIT by local authorities, FPUs at other U.S. 
posts in the region, and DHS/CBP officers at U.S. ports of 
entry.  Airport liaison has proved a particularly valuable 
tool in combating identity fraud and has thwarted many 
smuggling attempts at Taipei's Chiang Kai-shek International 
Airport.  In addition, FPU has worked closely with the NIV 
unit in heightening awareness of potentially fraudulent 
applicants, and enhanced training for line officers and 
local staff. 
 
¶C. IV FRAUD:  AIT experiences very little IV fraud. 
Occasionally there is a need to verify family relationships, 
or there is some doubt about an applicant's qualifications 
for an employment based visa, but few of these cases involve 
outright fraud.  Recently, we have seen a few employment 
based applications with petition approval based on the 
applicants' entrepreneurial experience gained while 
operating corporations in Taiwan or elsewhere in the region. 
However, the current condition of these corporations as 
presented during the interviews does not seem to be the same 
as presented to DHS when the petition is filed. Through 
investigating the local companies we attempt to determine if 
there has been a change in circumstances since the petition 
was filed, or if there was fraud or exaggeration in the 
petition application. 
 
¶D. DV FRAUD:  There is very little fraud in the Diversity 
Visa program at AIT.  Taiwanese registration in the DV 
program has decreased over the last two years and interest 
in the program is limited.  The few fraudulent cases 
encountered have involved overseas Chinese from Burma 
(carrying either Taiwan or Burmese passports) submitting 
fake school diplomas and transcripts. 
 
Potential Taiwan DV applicants are frequently targeted by 
non-U.S. government organizations offering to register 
applicants in the DV program for a fee.  Although these 
services are not fraudulent per se, they imply that 
registration is not possible without their services, or that 
their services can increase the chances of "winning." 
Often, their Web sites look deceptively similar to the 
Department of State's web site. Another trend we have seen 
are  organizations, posing as USG entities, who send emails 
"congratulating" Taiwan passport holders on having "won" the 
Diversity Lottery, and asking for payment in order to 
 
TAIPEI 00000253  003 OF 005 
 
 
"accept and process" a U.S. green card.  In response, in 
November 2005 AIT's Consular Section issued a press release 
through the Public Affairs Section warning the public 
against these DV scams. 
 
¶E. ACS AND PASSPORT FRAUD:  AIT has had no cases of 
citizenship or passport fraud in recent years.  There is no 
significant local market for stolen or fraudulent foreign 
passports and Taiwan citizens are not seeking to 
fraudulently obtain foreign citizenship.  Taiwan 
documentation used to support U.S. citizenship claims for 
Consular Report of Birth Abroad (CRBA) cases, such as 
hospital records, birth certificates, family registries, and 
entry-exit histories, are reliable and verifiable.  In the 
few CRBA cases where there was not sufficient documentation 
to confirm a claim of paternity by an American citizen, DNA 
testing was done and in every case paternity was confirmed. 
 
¶F. ADOPTION FRAUD: There have been no confirmed cases of 
adoption fraud in Taiwan for immigration to the United 
States.  In the few instances where cases raised suspicions, 
additional questioning of the adopting parents and, in one 
instance, by an FPU field investigation and cooperation with 
DHS resolved the case. 
 
Most adoptions by American citizens of Taiwanese orphans are 
conducted through orphanages/adoption agencies in Taiwan 
with whom AIT has excellent working relationships.  The IV 
Unit also has regular communication with the adoption 
agencies in the U.S. who refer their clients to Taiwan 
orphanages and agencies.  The majority of adoption cases are 
prescreened by the Immigrant Visa unit for compatibility 
with U.S. immigration law prior to a child being identified 
to the prospective American parents and the initiation of 
local adoption proceedings.  Local documentation is reliable 
and decisions by Taiwan courts are open and generally based 
on rule of law. 
 
Private adoptions of Taiwan orphans by American citizens, 
who are often ethnic Chinese or dual US-Taiwan nationals, 
are somewhat more problematic than those conducted through 
the agencies and orphanages, although no fraudulent cases 
have been identified.  The origin of the children in these 
cases is often more difficult to trace and there are 
frequently family connections between the adopting parents 
and the children.  There have been a few cases of family- 
based "targeted" adoptions where AIT has refused to process 
the cases as IR-3's or IR-4's because they have not met the 
standard for adoption of an orphan and the adopting parents 
have been advised they must instead maintain legal and 
physical custody of the child(ren) for two years for them to 
qualify as IR-2's. 
 
¶G. ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFIT FRAUD: AIT has had no fraud 
in this area.  Reports of lost/stolen I-551 are frequent, 
but checks through DHS have confirmed the status of all the 
applicants.  We issued 107 travel letters in FY 2005 to 
replace lost I-551s, one Visas 91, and no Visas 92 and Visas 
93 in FY 2005, with no cases in process. 
 
¶H. COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES:   Local law 
enforcement takes seriously the abuse of Taiwan government- 
issued documents, but rarely prosecutes cases involving 
smuggling attempts to other countries, including the U.S. 
Local authorities actively investigate and prosecute, where 
possible, violation of laws concerning the issuance and use 
of Taiwan passports and national ID cards, and they have 
uncovered several alien smuggling rings in recent years. 
Local authorities have a number of laws on their books to 
use in bringing about arrests and prosecutions.  The Taiwan 
Passport Law imposes a maximum 5 year prison sentence and/or 
NTD 500,000 (USD 15,000) fine for forging a passport or 
national ID card that is used to apply for a passport.  The 
penalty is the same for "handing over" (e.g., selling) a 
passport or national ID card, except that the fine is 
 
TAIPEI 00000253  004 OF 005 
 
 
NT$100,000 (USD 3,000).  Taiwan's immigration law also 
imposes a maximum 3 year sentence and/or NT$1 million (USD 
30,000) fine on boarding pass swappers, although this crime 
is rarely prosecuted.  This punishment is heavier when 
illegal PRC nationals are involved.  Article 80 of the 
"Statute Governing Relations Between People's of the Taiwan 
Area and the Mainland Area" stipulate a maximum prison 
sentence of 3 years and/or a fine of NT$1 million to NT$15 
million (USD 30,000 to USD 455,000) for anyone who illegally 
transports PRC nationals into Taiwan or countries other than 
the PRC. 
 
However, enforcement of these penalties does not seem to be 
entirely consistent, often because local law enforcement 
struggles with the question of jurisdiction.  For example, 
most boarding pass swaps occur in the transit lounge at CKS 
Airport, and there seems to be a constantly shifting 
consensus on whether or not transit lounges are considered 
to be within law enforcement's legal jurisdiction. For the 
most part, however, the Aviation Police Bureau has 
cooperated closely with both AIT and DHS/CBP officers at the 
ports of entry in intercepting swappers and their PRC 
national clients at CKS International Airport, although 
arrests are rarely made. 
 
Overall, FPU's relations with host government authorities 
have been positive and constructive.  FPU enjoys excellent 
relations with the Ministry of Justice's Investigation 
Bureau, and the National Police Administration's Criminal 
Investigation Bureau and Aviation Police Bureau, 
particularly in the sharing of information regarding known 
alien smugglers and their Taiwan recruits. 
 
FPU has also enjoyed good relations with the Ministry of 
Interior's Immigration Bureau, particularly in tracking the 
movements of Taiwan passport holders in and out of Taiwan. 
However, in 2004, the Taiwan government prohibited all 
government agencies from releasing information on Taiwan 
passport holders to foreign government entities, and written 
requests for such information have gone unanswered.  In 
addition, the Immigration Bureau and the Aviation Police 
have been reluctant to assist FPU in flagging and detaining 
alien smugglers moving in and out of Taiwan unless they are 
caught in an actual act of smuggling. 
 
FPU's cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has 
been excellent, particularly with the passport division, who 
routinely provide information regarding reports of lost and 
stolen passports, as well as information regarding specific 
passport applications. 
 
AIT's Consular Section continues to promote training of 
local airline and immigration personnel and urge greater 
local prosecution of immigration fraud, and more secure 
methods of obtaining local identity documents. 
 
¶I. AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN: Interdiction of alien 
smugglers is a difficult task for FPU because a significant 
amount of this fraud occurs beyond our control.  For 
example, CKS International Airport, which has a relatively 
high number of non-stop flights to the United States, is 
often used for boarding pass swaps between non-Taiwan third- 
country nationals and illegal PRC nationals transiting the 
airport to the U.S. These swaps may or may not involve 
Taiwan travel documents (see Ref D).  In addition, Taiwan 
documents are often used to smuggle illegal PRC nationals 
into the U.S. through Central and South America, often 
following circuitous routes from Asia through Africa and/or 
Europe.  Finally, data on Taiwan citizens found to have 
misused or sold their U.S. NIV's shows that a broad range of 
applicants is involved in this activity, making detection at 
time of visa interview extremely difficult. 
 
Since FPU often does not learn about smuggling activity 
until after flights carrying smuggled individuals are en 
 
TAIPEI 00000253  005 OF 005 
 
 
route to the U.S., close cooperation with DHS/CBP officers 
at U.S. ports of entry is essential. FPU has worked with 
DHS/CBP line officers at Agana (Guam), Los Angeles, and 
Honolulu airports, which have resulted in numerous 
interdictions of alien escorts and illegal PRC nationals, 
and even some arrests and prosecutions.  However, FPU could 
benefit from closer, more formalized cooperation with 
DHS/CBP.  For example, TECS/IBIS and CLASS should expand 
information-sharing, and a list of key contacts in various 
DHS/CBP offices and ports of entry could facilitate more and 
faster communication. 
 
FPU has cooperated closely with the Canadian, Australian, 
British, New Zealand, German, and Dutch representative 
offices in Taipei.  In May 2005, AIT hosted a Pan-American 
fraud prevention meeting that brought together 
representatives from the embassies of Costa Rica, Nicaragua, 
El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala, as well as the 
Brazilian, Canadian, and Mexican trade offices in Taipei, to 
discuss the problem of alien smuggling through Central and 
South America. 
 
¶J. STAFFING AND TRAINING: Post's Fraud Prevention Manager is 
a part-time position, generally a second-tour Entry Level 
Officer with collateral duties that rotate through the IV, 
NIV, and ACS units.  FPU also has three full-time Foreign 
National (FN) fraud investigators.  The incumbent FPM has 
had no fraud prevention training other than the fraud 
prevention unit of FSI's Basic consular training course. 
One FN investigator received fraud prevention training in 
Washington in 2002.  The other two FN investigators have had 
no formal fraud prevention training. 
 
KEEGAN