VZCZCXRO2869
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSM #0060/01 0170825
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 170825Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9629
INFO RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA IMMEDIATE 0027
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 0064
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 0987
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 0088
RUEHSL/AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA IMMEDIATE 0092
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 4504
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES IMMEDIATE 0035
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0030
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 0657
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO IMMEDIATE 0064
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE 0115
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 0152
RUEHLJ/AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA IMMEDIATE 0173
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1164
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 0097
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 2223
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 2123
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 0130
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO IMMEDIATE 0062
RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE 0015
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 0718
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE IMMEDIATE 0383
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0696
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0051
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO BRUSSELS BE IMMEDIATE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0129
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STOCKHOLM 000060 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2016 
TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL IR EU AORC
SUBJECT: SWEDEN:  MFA POLDIR ON REPORTING IRAN TO THE 
UNITED NATIONS 
 
REF: A. STATE 5477 
     ¶B. STATE 6236 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Stephen V. Noble, reason 1.4 (b) 
and (d). 
 
¶1.  (c)  Charge d'Affaires a.i. Noble delivered ref A 
demarche January 13 to MFA Political Director Olof Skoog, 
seeking Sweden's support as an IAEA Board member for a 
proposed emergency meeting of the Board, with the purpose of 
reporting Iran to the UNSC.  Charge underscored that Iran had 
been found in contravention of it nuclear safeguards 
obligations in September 2005, and since then had repeatedly 
ignored international efforts to find an acceptable solution 
and had made numerous belligerent statements leading up to 
its recent action of removing the seals at the Natanz 
enrichment facility. 
 
¶2.  (c) Poldir Skoog said Sweden had focused its attention on 
Iran and shared our concerns.  Sweden took a very firm 
approach to Iran.  The next natural step was to react to what 
Iran was doing; Sweden supported convening an extraordinary 
meeting of the IAEA Board.  Sweden also favored a gradual 
approach, and believed it was important, as much as possible, 
to build an alliance for actions concerning Iran.  The P-5 
countries were of course essential.  In addition, India, 
Brazil, and South Africa needed to be included.  Sweden 
believed it was in the interest of those countries, as well 
in our own interests to ensure that Iran did not go down the 
road of developing nuclear weapons.  The potential nuclear 
power states may see this as a double standard, and there is 
some wariness, but Sweden strongly supports bringing them 
into them on board in regard to containing Iran's ambitions. 
Skoog said a strong international response, and not only from 
the P-5 and nuclear powers, is the only thing that will deter 
Iran. 
 
¶3.  (c) In regard to the role of the UNSC, Skoog urged 
gradual steps.  The UNSC should endorse the efforts of the 
IAEA to press Iran to comply with previous IAEA Board of 
Governors' resolutions.  Skoog thought this would be a good 
first step in pressing Iran.  The Charge said he understood 
the question of how the IAEA might report Iranian compliance 
with a UNSC mandate was still at play. 
 
¶4.  (c) Skoog asked Charge if the U.S. was considering 
proposing "sharper measures."  The Charge referred to the 
description of the gradual approach the U.S. had in mind in 
the non-paper.  Charge noted that Iran has applied pressure 
to some of the key countries in response to their joining 
IAEA consensus resolutions in the past.  We should be aware 
of this practice by Iran and would welcome information from 
the GoS if they learn of similar tactics being applied now. 
The U.S. shared the views of Sweden on the importance of 
working with India, South Africa, and Brazil.  Skoog noted 
the success of our efforts to press Iran will depend on our 
success in mobilizing the P-5, key non-aligned and others to 
act in concert.  The Charge said we agree and look forward to 
GoS support to this end.  Skoog agreed that each time we 
apply pressure on Iran to comply with its outstanding 
obligations, we should leave open a clearly understood path 
on how it should comply. 
 
 
STOCKHOLM 00000060  002 OF 002 
 
 
Comment 
------- 
¶5.  (c) Sweden shares our underlying concerns and endorses an 
extraordinary session of the IAEA Board.  The Swedish 
approach is very much oriented toward consensus-building in 
recognition of the fact that we need the P-5 and key 
influential non-aligned states to prevail in the IAEA Board 
of Governors and the UNSC.  As a nuclear-capable country that 
made the decision prior to 1960 not to pursue nuclear arms, 
Sweden is committed to preventing the proliferation of 
nuclear arms, and sees Iran as a test case.  On prior 
occasions, they have told us they will follow the lead of the 
EU-3 on Iran. 
NOBLE