VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #0272/01 0230828
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 230828Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5580
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 9955
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7058
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0037
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 1028
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000272 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR CHA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION 
TAGS: PREL ETRD ECON MNUC CH KN KS
SUBJECT: MOFAT OFFICIALS UPBEAT ON CURRENT ROK-PRC RELATIONS 
 
REF: A. 05 SEOUL 5054 
     ¶B. 04 SEOUL 748 
     ¶C. 05 SEOUL 5347 
 
Classified By: ACTING POL CHIEF SUNG Y. KIM.  REASONS 1.4 (B, D). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C) Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) 
officials told poloffs January 20 that the generally positive 
state of ROK-PRC bilateral relations was attributable mainly 
to the expanding volume of bilateral trade and growing 
educational exchanges, but also partially to the recent 
deterioration in Korea's relationship with Japan.  Beijing 
and Seoul enjoyed an unusually high number of high-level 
visits in 2005, culminating in the November summit between 
Presidents Roh Moo-hyun and Hu Jintao in Busan.  The South 
Korean officials hinted at a possible visit to China by Roh 
in 2006, as well as a defense ministerial.  They also 
reported that while the number of North Korean refugees 
seeking protection at ROK diplomatic facilities in China 
dropped in 2005, the number of South Korean POWs from the 
Korean War seeking to return to the ROK rose in the same 
timeframe.  They speculated that Kim Jong Il's visit to the 
cities of Shanghai and Shenzhen might signal more openness to 
inter-Korean economic projects, such as the Kaesong 
Industrial Complex.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (U) In a January 20 meeting with poloffs, MOFAT Northeast 
Asia Division II (China) Director Chung Kwang-kyun and Deputy 
Director Choi Young-sam provided a tour d'horizon of current 
ROK-PRC bilateral relations and discussed briefly the recent 
visit to China by North Korean leader Kim Jong Il. 
. 
BILATERAL RELATIONS GOOD, THANKS IN PART TO JAPAN 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶3.  (C) Chung assessed the overall bilateral relationship in 
the past year as "sound and generally well-managed," 
especially in light of the unexpected chill in Seoul-Beijing 
relations after a Chinese state-run history institute made 
controversial claims over the ethnic origin of the ancient 
kingdom of Goguryeo in early 2004 (ref B).  The ROK public's 
outcry over Goguryeo had calmed over the intervening two 
years, while both the volume of trade and the number of 
high-level contacts between the two nations grew.  The two 
governments also worked together closely on sensitive issues, 
including keeping the DPRK engaged in the Six Party process 
and moving North Korean refugees safely to South Korea. 
 
¶4.  (C) Chung attributed the improved state of ROK-China 
relations in part to Seoul's deteriorating relationship with 
Japan, since the latter's continued inability to address 
history issues with its neighbors pushed the ROK and the PRC 
farther away from it and closer to each other.  China's 
increasingly prominent role in the Six Party Talks as host 
and the most effective interlocutor with North Korea also 
contributed to Seoul's increasing desire to improve relations 
with China, Chung said. 
. 
POSSIBLE SECOND ROH VISIT TO BEIJING, DEFENSE MINISTERIAL 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶5.  (C) Per Chung, an unusually high number of high-level 
visits between Seoul and Beijing marked 2005, most notably 
the November 16 bilateral summit between Presidents Roh 
Moo-hyun and Hu Jintao on the sidelines of APEC.  During Hu's 
visit -- the first to South Korea in ten years by a Chinese 
leader since Jiang Zemin's visit in 1995 -- the two 
governments agreed to expand the level of bilateral trade and 
initiate regular meetings between their vice foreign 
ministers (ref A).  ROK Prime Minister Lee Hae-chan visited 
Beijing in 2005, as did the South Korean Foreign, Defense, 
and Education Ministers.  Seoul and Beijing also expected to 
resume the bilateral security dialogue between their foreign 
and defense ministries.  Chung, without elaborating on the 
timeframe, hinted that there could be another Roh-Hu summit 
in 2006 given that Hu invited Roh during their November 
summit to visit China for a second time.  (NOTE: Roh's first 
visit to Beijing was mid-2003 -- shortly after his 
inauguration -- during which he and Hu signed a joint 
statement on expanding trade and security ties. END NOTE.) 
Chung added there could be a defense ministerial as well. 
. 
HIGH TRADE VOLUME, STUDENT NUMBERS 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) According to Chung, both governments were satisfied 
that the volume of bilateral trade surpassed USD 100 billion 
in 2005.  China had been Korea's number one trading partner 
since 2004, and the ROK's trade surplus with China was USD 25 
billion.  South Korea committed approximately USD 3-4 billion 
for investment in China.  Chung did not believe the level of 
the ROK's trade surplus with China would result in trade 
friction between the two nations, especially given Beijing's 
immense surplus in its global trade and its huge foreign 
currency reserves.  In addition to growth in trade, the two 
nations continued to maintain high numbers of educational and 
cultural exchanges, Chung said.  There were currently 35,000 
Korean students enrolled in degree programs in China, making 
up the largest group of foreign students in the PRC.  The 
actual number of Korean students could, however, exceed 
100,000 counting students enrolled in short-term 
Chinese-language programs. 
. 
FEWER NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES, MORE ESCAPED KOREAN WAR POWS 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶7.  (C) On refugees, Chung reported there were currently 
fewer than 100 North Koreans awaiting processing for 
relocation to South Korea at the ROK embassy in Beijing.  The 
number of refugees being sheltered at the ROK's mission and 
related facilities in China had declined somewhat recently 
due to heightened security by the Chinese government both in 
urban centers and at the DPRK-PRC border.  Chung noted, 
however, that a growing number of ROK POWs from the Korean 
War who escaped North Korea had sought refuge at ROK 
diplomatic facilities.  In 2005, 59 POWs entered the ROK 
embassy in Beijing.  The ROKG had a different system for 
processing and evaluating POWs than that for North Korean 
refugees since "brokers" who shuttled North Korean refugees 
to ROKG facilities in China realized that the monetary reward 
from the families of returned POWs was potentially greater 
than the fees paid by refugees.  As such, South Korea 
scrutinized the POW cases more thoroughly to ensure that the 
POWs were not victims of human trafficking. 
 
¶8.  (C) Chung pointed out that the issue did not get much 
press coverage -- unlike the case of American or Korean POWs 
returned from the Vietnam War -- because the ROKG handled the 
cases with utmost secrecy for fear of negative reaction from 
China and the DPRK that could disrupt existing operations. 
There was also general understanding among the public and the 
journalists that wide publicity could affect the chances of 
the remaining 500-plus South Korean POWs to be reunited with 
families in the ROK.  Chung added, however, that the ROK 
continually stressed to the Chinese government that the POWs 
were ROK citizens and must be allowed to return to their 
homeland. 
. 
NOTHING ON KJI TRIP, SHANGHAI/SHENZHEN PARALLEL TO KAESONG? 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Turning to Kim Jong Il's recent visit to China, Chung 
complained that the Chinese Foreign Ministry had not yet 
provided a substantive read-out of Kim's meeting with Chinese 
President Hu Jintao.  Information was slow since Foreign 
Ministry personnel did not participate in the meeting, Chung 
said.  Deputy Director Choi opined that Kim's travel 
destinations in China offered some hints on what the North 
Korean leader was looking for and their relevance to North 
Korean economic development.  Shanghai was an example of 
economic development resulting from serious economic reform 
and easing of regulations on market activity, while Shenzhen 
demonstrated economic development through outside assistance 
-- capital and product inflow from neighboring Hong Kong -- 
somewhat similar to the Kaesong Industrial Complex. 
VERSHBOW