This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000050 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2015 
TAGS: PREL PTER ASEC YM COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: ROYG FREES ITALIAN HOSTAGES: WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR 
FUTURE OF KIDNAPPING? 
 
REF: A. 2005 SANAA 3614 
     ¶B. SANAA 0002 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR THOMAS C. KRAJESKI, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) and ( 
D). 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  On January 6, tribesmen released unharmed 
five Italian tourists that had been held hostage since 
January 1 (ref A).  Breaking from a long-standing policy of 
granting concessions without legal consequences, the ROYG 
pursued a successful dual-track strategy of negotiating 
through tribal leaders while using counter-terrorism forces 
to pressure the kidnappers.  It is not clear what the ROYG 
had to concede during the negotiations (if anything) but 
security forces arrested several individuals involved with 
the kidnapping.  Although ROYG officials vowed to seek the 
death penalty for anyone convicted of kidnapping foreigners, 
it is not at all clear what punishment the ROYG will actually 
seek.  The fact is that to date, no Yemeni has ever been 
executed solely for kidnapping. 
 
¶2. (C) SUMMARY CONTINUED: Whatever the sentence handed down 
for these latest kidnappings, the ROYG has sent a strong 
message, albeit a belated one, to the tribes by demonstrating 
its ability to apply both political and military pressure to 
isolate kidnappers and bring them to justice.  The ROYG's 
success in implementing this new approach, without provoking 
a backlash from a powerful and dangerous tribe with past 
links to terrorists (ref B), is an important sign that when 
fundamentally challenged, the central government is still 
capable of responding and winning.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------ 
Safe Release of Hostages 
------------------------ 
 
¶3.  (S) Members of the Jahm tribe released five Italian 
tourists unharmed during the early morning of January 6.  The 
Ministry of Interior,s U.S.-trained Counter-Terrorism Unit 
(CTU), which had surrounded the kidnappers, compound, 
immediately arrested the kidnappers after the hostages' 
release.  According to security forces, one of the kidnappers 
arrested was an "Afghan Arab" who had fought against the 
Soviets in Afghanistan.  Others involved in the kidnapping 
are also suspected of being engaged in smuggling activity 
across the Yemeni-Saudi border. 
 
¶4.  (C)  The CTU originally deployed to the area on January 2 
as a show of force, while negotiations between government 
officials, tribal leaders, and the kidnappers continued. 
Initially, the exact location of the hostages was unknown. 
The CTU, using skills learned through USG-sponsored training, 
successfully tracked the kidnappers, cordoned off the area to 
prevent them from moving the hostages to a more remote and 
inaccessible location, and cut off water supplies.  The 
Italian Ambassador expressed concern that any rescue attempt 
would place the hostages in danger and requested that the 
ROYG first exhaust negotiations.  In the end, no force was 
necessary and the hostages were released without incident as 
helicopter-borne CTU forces closed in on the huts where the 
tourists were being held. 
 
¶5.  (C)  While the details of any settlement remain unknown, 
the ROYG had been negotiating with the kidnappers through a 
Member of Parliament from the opposition Islah party.  The 
kidnappers had demanded the release of other tribal members 
being held by the ROYG for unclear reasons.  As part of 
negotiations, the ROYG successfully managed to convince the 
tribal leaders to repudiate the members involved and condemn 
the kidnapping publicly. 
 
¶6. (U)  As negotiations and CTU pressure continued, the ROYG 
waged a media campaign to convince the tribes that the 
government would no longer deal lightly with the kidnapping 
of foreigners.  On January 4, the ROYG announced that anyone 
convicted of kidnapping a foreigner would receive the death 
penalty.  The ROYG also reportedly sped up the sentencing for 
several people previously convicted of kidnapping, in order 
to apply the death penalty.  (Note:  While a 1998 Yemeni law 
permits the death penalty for any kidnapping, no death 
sentence has ever been handed down for kidnapping alone.  On 
two previous occasions, convicted kidnappers were sentenced 
to death, but only because they were also convicted of murder 
as part of the same crime.  End Note) 
 
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Comment 
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¶7.  (C)  Comment:  The release of the hostages without the 
use of lethal force was the best possible outcome for the 
ROYG.  While the CTU is Yemen's most capable security force, 
its limited rescue skills would have likely put the hostages 
in great danger.  In the interest of maintaining peace with 
the tribes, the ROYG appears content with the isolation of 
the kidnappers by tribal leaders and has not sought 
retribution against the greater tribe.  Had security forces 
used overwhelming force against the kidnappers or attacked 
tribal members elsewhere, the security situation in the 
oil-rich region would have likely deteriorated even further. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Comment continued:  The ROYG clearly realized that 
its previous policy of appeasing kidnappers and not pursuing 
those involved only exacerbated the problem, resulting in 
four kidnapping incidents within the last six weeks.  By 
deploying the CTU, the ROYG demonstrated its ability and 
willingness to use force if necessary, especially on a tribe 
it already considers problematic.  Combined with the arrest 
of the kidnappers and a tough media campaign, the ROYG is now 
making a serious attempt to demonstrate that it can stop the 
tribes from using kidnapped foreigners as a tool to win 
concessions from the central government.  The true test for 
maintaining security in the area, however, will be if the 
ROYG focuses on the underlying causes of kidnapping, which is 
a lack of governmental control in many impoverished tribal 
areas and a weak legal system that lacks any effective 
conflict resolution mechanism. 
Krajeski