This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 003609 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/28/2015 
TAGS: ECON EFIN KMPI CASC YM ECON COM
SUBJECT: WATANI BANK FAILURE THREATENS BROADER FINANCIAL 
CRISIS 
 
REF: SANAA 3556 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d 
). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  In early December, the Central Bank of Yemen 
(CBY) declared Watani Bank insolvent, and initiated the first 
bank closure in Yemen's history.  General Manager Dr. 
Hamdani, and other bank officials, were arrested and face 
charges of financial crimes against the state.  Watani's 
future remains unclear, but it is likely that the CBY will be 
forced to liquidate its assets.  The bank suffered from poor 
management for several years, lending to its own board of 
directors and political insiders, and used political 
connections to prevent earlier disciplinary action by the 
CBY.  Such practices are prevalent at other banks in Yemen, 
and could point to a broader financial crisis in the coming 
year.  END SUMMMARY. 
 
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ROYG Closes First Bank in Yemeni History 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) On December 7, military police appeared at the main 
branch of Watani Bank in Sanaa, locked the doors and declared 
the bank insolvent.  The CBY immediately took control of the 
board of directors and froze all accounts.  CBY officials 
explained that the police arrived in response to rioting 
caused by a run on the bank totaling approximately USD five 
million, sparked by the CBY's inability to clear checks 
guaranteed by Watani. According to Abdullah al-Olafi, 
Sub-Governor for Supervision at the CBY, Watani had zero 
liquidity and held only its statutory reserves when it 
failed.  The closure is the first in Yemen's history, with 
the exception of a branch of BCCI.  The CBY is now faced with 
the choice of liquidation, new management, or returning the 
bank to its shareholders. 
 
¶3. (C) Shortly before the closure, police stopped the bank's 
General Manager, Dr. Ahmad al-Hamdani, from leaving the 
country.  The Attorney General's (AG) office issued a warrant 
for the arrest of Hamdani and eight other senior bank 
officials on December 18.  Dr. Hamdani and three others 
turned themselves in voluntarily and remain in prison, while 
others remain in hiding. (Reftel) Al-Hamdani, a dual 
Yemeni-American citizen, appeared in court for preliminary 
questioning on December 19, charged with "wasting bank funds" 
and of "causing economic damage to the country."  The ROYG 
froze the bank accounts and real estate holdings of Dr. 
Hamdani's relatives, including his children and aunts and 
uncles.  On December 28, Hamdani submitted an official 
request for help from post, asserting that he is being held 
without bail and falsely accused of embezzlement.  The AG 
also took the unusual step of trying Hamdani in the Special 
Penal Court, usually reserved for those who pose a "public 
danger" or are charged with capital crimes. (NOTE: Though an 
odd choice of venue for trying financial crimes, the Special 
Penal Court is one of the few well-functioning arms of the 
Yemeni judicial system.  END NOTE.) 
 
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Watani Survived on Political Connections 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) There is little question that Watani was experiencing 
severe liquidity problems before its closure.  Hamdani 
himself admitted that Watani suffered from a high volume of 
non-performing loans, but blamed his troubles on government 
contractors who were awaiting payment from the Ministry of 
Finance (MOF).  Approximately sixty major contracting 
companies, many belonging to well-connected politicians and 
tribal sheikhs, have failed to make loan payments.  Watani 
officials argue that despite direct orders from President 
Saleh and Prime Minister Bajammal, MOF refuses to issue 
payment for the contracts in question.  The CBY counters that 
these loans were made without sufficient guarantees and in 
violation of banking regulations.  Yemen's ineffective court 
system and pervasive corruption also make it difficult to 
settle such cases -- especially when borrowers have political 
connections.  (NOTE:  It is standard practice for MOF to 
delay payment as a means of bridging deficits and extending 
contracts into the following year's budget.  END NOTE.) 
 
¶5. (C) Watani began on poor financial footing in 1998, said 
Ahmed al-Absi, General Manager of the International Bank of 
Yemen, and was mismanaged until the day of its closure.  With 
only four branches and start-up capital of USD 3 million, 
Watani was small even by Yemeni standards.  Hamdani, a former 
minister of agriculture and economy, had strong connections 
with ROYG officials, said al-Absi, and made investments no 
other bank would consider.  Watani held the equivalent of USD 
88 million in deposits (USD 15 million in statutory reserves 
at the CBY) and issued loans totaling USD 70 million. 
According to al-Absi, Watani made USD 30 million in loans to 
the bank's own board of directors, a violation of Yemen's 
banking law.  Another USD 30 million were issued to 
government contractors, many of whom had no credit history. 
Some of the loans were made to single individuals in excess 
of 15 percent of the bank's total capital, also a violation 
of the law.  Watani Bank never made a profit in all its years 
of operation. 
 
¶6. (C) The bank conducted little in the way of core banking 
services, continued al-Absi, expanding into risky real estate 
and insurance ventures.  In a desperate attempt to solve its 
liquidity troubles, Watani began paying above market rate to 
depositors.  Three years ago, said Olafi, the CBY forbade 
Watani from making additional loans until it had settled 
accounts for non-performing loans.  Nevertheless, Watani 
continued to lend.  "Dr. Hamdani is the type of guy who likes 
to please his friends and associates," said Fathi Khairi, 
Watani's former auditor with Deloitte and Touche. 
 
--------------------------- 
Central Bank Acted Too Late 
--------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) George Mullinax, a banking expert with the MEPI-funded 
regional office of the Treasury Department in Abu Dhabi, is 
providing technical assistance to the CBY in administering 
the Watani closure.  The real problem, said Mullinax, is that 
the CBY did not act sooner.  According to al-Absi, the CBY 
gave Watani its lowest ranking for the past three years, and 
allowed them to submit a qualified statement allowing for a 
deficit of USD 2.7 million.  (NOTE: In a qualified statement, 
the bank is allowed to make adjustments to its balance sheets 
pending future transactions, and is generally prohibited by 
central banks.  END NOTE.)  This should have set off alarm 
bells, said Mullinax, and prompted immediate action such as 
the replacement of the board of directors.  Olafi attempted 
to take action earlier, said al-Absi, but was prevented from 
doing so because of Hamdani's connections to the President 
and other high officials. 
 
¶8. (C) In general, the CBY followed standard procedure in 
closing Watani, said Mullinax, but details are cause for 
concern.  Military police were left alone with the bank's 
cash for an extended period of time, and no CBY officials 
were present at the closure.  According to bank managers, the 
CBY warned government-owned companies and state employees 
months ahead of time that Watani was in danger of collapse. 
Yemenia and the Yemen Tobacco Company both ceased depositing 
funds in their accounts at Watani one month before the 
closure.  Watani managers accused CBY officials in the 
clearing room of warning borrowers that the bank faced 
collapse, and urging them to withhold payment.  CBY officials 
themselves held over USD 100,000 in loans from Watani, said 
the accounts manager, which they ceased payments on two years 
ago. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
OITC:  Mystery Company Interested in Watani Shares? 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶9. (C) Hamdani believes he was the target of political 
vendettas, accusing the MOF of withholding payment to harm 
his business and to prevent him from selling shares to an 
international company.  According to Hamdani, the Office of 
International Treasury Control (OITC), a New York-based 
company currently involved in a buyout of Land Rover in the 
United Kingdom, expressed interest in purchasing 53 percent 
of Watani's shares.  According to Yemeni law, foreign 
interests may not own more that 49 percent of a local 
company.  In this case, however, the Central Bank expressed 
genuine concern over the legitimacy of OITC.  The company has 
provided no contact information or business address.  OITC 
does not have a web site and, according to some investment 
experts, may be a hoax.  Olafi was perplexed as to why any 
reputable international company would buy a small, insolvent 
Yemeni bank.  If OITC is still interested in purchasing the 
bank, said Olafi, they are still welcome to submit a bid. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Growing Concern for Yemen's Financial Health 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) There is deep concern within the Yemeni financial 
sector about the repercussions of liquidating Watani.  A 
number of other private commercial banks, including Yemen 
Gulf, Yemen Islamic Bank, and Yemen Commercial Bank, face 
similar difficulties and could face closure within the next 
year.  The bulk of Yemen Gulf Bank's loans, said al-Absi, are 
to only five or six people, and insider loans are common 
practice in most Yemeni banks.  Even banks that face no 
liquidity problems could be adversely affected by Watani's 
troubles.  The public's confidence is already low, said 
Mullinax, with just over two percent holding accounts.  Yemen 
has no deposit insurance, and additional bank failures will 
frighten away any potential depositors.  Yemen's credit 
rating could also be harmed with international banks, which 
provide essential guarantees for letters of credit to Yemeni 
traders.  According to the CBY, however, 80 percent of 
Watani's loans are non-performing.  If this is only partially 
accurate, said Mullinax, then liquidation is the only 
realistic option without a huge influx of capital from the 
ROYG. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
Comment: ROYG Looks to Avert Financial Train Wreck 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶11. (C) Yemen's financial system is in serious trouble.  With 
a large number of family-owned banks and little enforcement 
from the CBY, poor management practices abound, including 
insider loans, fraudulent accounting, and speculative 
investing.  There is little question that Hamdani and other 
Watani managers engaged in all of these practices.  The CBY's 
lack of independence exacerbates the problem, by preventing 
CBY officials from taking action against well-connected 
banking families.  In the case of Watani Bank, Dr. Hamdani's 
connections managed to keep him afloat for several years, and 
widened the impact of Watani's eventual collapse.  The long 
delay allowed a series of leaks to the public, worsening 
Watani's liquidity problems and perhaps contributing to a run 
on the bank. 
 
¶12. (C) Dr. Hamdani is desperate and many of his statements 
appear unfounded.  It is highly unlikely that OITC (if it 
exists), or any other international company, would be willing 
to bail out a failed Yemeni company.  Hamdani has only 
himself to blame for making non-performing loans, but he is 
likely correct in accusing the ROYG of non-payment.  The AG's 
decision to try Hamdani for crimes against the state appears 
to be a case of scapegoating, and belies a growing panic 
about a broader collapse of the financial sector.  The ROYG 
is seeking to recoup whatever assets it can, whether from the 
bank, Hamdani, or anyone in his family, to restore confidence 
in the banking system.  Even if Hamdani is proven guilty, he 
cannot be blamed for all the ailments plaguing Yemeni banks. 
Without swift and decisive action by the CBY to enforce 
banking regulations, Watani's collapse could mark the 
beginning of a broader crisis. 
Krajeski