This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 000018 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FROM THE U.S. MISSION TO THE UN AGENCIES IN ROME 
 
FOR S/ES-O/CMS, CA/OCS/ACS/EUR, OES/IHA AND IO/EX 
 
E.0. 12598:  N/A 
TAGS: AMGT ASEC CASC AMED KFLO AEMR IO UN AVIAN INFLUENZA
SUBJECT: AVIAN INFLUENZA: POST CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND 
TRIPWIRES  US Mission UN ROME 
 
REF: A) 05 ROME 4188  B) 05 STATE 219189 
 
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SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION 
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¶1. Embassy Rome's response (Ref A) to the Department's 
ref B action request regarding Avian Influenza (AI) 
contingency planning and tripwires includes logistical 
and other related plans for the entire Rome tri-mission 
community.  This message provides US Mission UN Rome- 
specific considerations and planning. 
 
¶2.  In formulating operational requirements in such a 
contingency, we note that the Rome-based UN Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) is the lead UN agency 
responsible for working the animal-related aspects of 
Avian Influenza.  We anticipate that this Mission would 
continue to be the primary USG liaison with FAO in the 
event of an epidemic.  We would also expect to both 
participate in any FAO working group efforts to deal with 
a local or global outbreak as well as to bring FAO 
expertise to the tri-mission planning process.  This will 
affect our tripwire responses differently than at the 
Embassy, particularly in how we structure the Mission in 
the event of reduced staffing. 
 
¶3.  In addition, the World Food Program (the UN's 
emergency feeding organization, heavily supported by U.S. 
tax dollars) is also concerned that an AI outbreak could 
lead to severe food pipeline disruptions, endangering the 
lives of millions of people dependent on WFP food 
assistance.  WFP is also the lead UN Agency for 
logistics, and could be called upon to organize and 
support a broader UN response to an AI crisis.  We assume 
that should such an event occur, this Mission might also 
continue to have critical liaison requirements with WFP. 
 
¶4.  Our plans for drawdown of staff, who would remain on 
a "skeleton crew," and how we would function in the event 
of a drawdown are based on these assumptions. 
 
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TRIPWIRES 
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¶5.  For local logistical and planning purposes, including 
the provision of medical and emergency supplies as well 
as liaison with the GOI, we will rely heavily on the 
Embassy's management section, RSO, and Health Unit, as 
outlined in Ref A. 
 
¶6. Tripwire 1: a spike in the number and/or broadening 
geographic spread of animal to human cases or sustained 
human-to-human transmission in a neighboring country 
 
US Mission UN Rome Responses to Tripwire 1: 
 
¶A. Keep Mission community including families and 
dependents informed; disseminate any travel warnings 
issued by the Department or those posts affected. 
 
¶B. No travel to affected areas; recall any employees 
traveling in areas in or near the region of outbreak. 
 
¶C. Consider drawdown to skeleton-staff, with the 
realization that this may not be desirable nor possible. 
At a minimum keep on duty those officers with liaison 
duties with FAO and WFP. 
 
¶D. Encourage staff to stockpile water, food, blankets, 
and medicines to be used under quarantine status of in 
case of a run on local markets. 
 
¶E. Ensure mechanisms (such as the FOB) are in place to 
allow work from offsite locations. 
 
¶F. Make a determination on evacuation of dependents and 
any employees with relevant health problems. 
 
¶7. Tripwire 2: a spike in the number and/or broadening 
geographic spread of animal to human cases or sustained 
human-to-human transmission in any area of Italy 
 
US Mission UN Rome Responses to Tripwire 2: 
 
¶A. Once EAC confirms that tripwire has been crossed, 
inform and provide latest information to all employees 
and dependents.  Coordinate briefings with Embassy. 
 
¶B. Make determination on whether to move to skeleton 
staffing.  At a minimum keep on duty those officers with 
principal liaison responsibilities for FAO and WFP. 
 
¶C. Maintain close collaboration with FAO and WFP 
expertise in any response strategy or emergency response 
capability.  Participate in any FAO and WFP AI Working 
Group meetings. 
 
¶D. No unofficial travel to affected areas. Recall or re- 
direct to the U.S. any staff traveling worldwide. 
 
¶E. Consider an ordered departure of non-essential staff 
and family members, again with the realization that this 
may not be either desirable or possible. (Coordinated 
with Tri-Mission team) 
 
¶F. Contribute to coordinated tri-mission issuance of 
public announcement and travel warning to include expert 
advise from FAO. 
 
¶G. Contribute to coordinated tri-mission press guidance. 
 
¶H. Require any employee with flu-like symptoms to take 
mandatory sick leave and assure that Health Unit is 
alerted. 
 
¶I. Ensure staff is stockpiling water, food, blankets, and 
medicines to be used under quarantine status of in case 
of a run on local markets. 
 
¶J. Issue protective equipment (gloves, masks), following 
MED guidance. 
 
¶8. Tripwire 3: a sharp further spike in the number and/or 
broadening geographic spread of animal to human cases or 
sustained human-to-human transmission near or within Rome 
 
US Mission UN Rome Responses to Tripwire 3: 
 
¶A. Once EAC confirms that tripwire has been crossed, 
inform and provide latest information to all employees 
and dependents.  Coordinate briefings with Embassy.  This 
may have to be done by phone or e-mail, in coordination 
with Embassy. 
 
¶B. Reduce to skeleton staffing to include only Executive 
Office and FAO/WFP liaison officers.  Instruct all non- 
essential staff to remain home on administrative leave, 
and for children to remain home from school.  Limit 
movement of all personnel and dependents in the city. 
 
¶C. Maintain close collaboration with FAO and WFP 
expertise in any response strategy or emergency response 
capability.  Participate in any FAO and WFP AI Working 
Group meetings (again, possibly by phone or e-mail). 
 
¶D. Cancel any incoming official travel not related to 
investigation or containment. 
 
¶E. Coordinate with Embassy and FAO on travel warning and 
press guidance to ask that any non-essential travel be 
deferred. 
 
¶F. "Home quarantine" any individuals or individuals with 
cold or flu symptoms. 
 
¶G. Coordinate with Embassy on home visits to sick 
individuals from health unit for monitoring and 
medication.  Consider delivery system for any essential 
supplies (groceries, water, etc.). 
 
¶H. Coordinating with Health Unit and MED, consider 
prophylactic Tamiflu treatment. 
 
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TRIPS INPUT 
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¶7. DCM J. Michael Cleverley, Management/Political Officer 
Bruce Berton and/or OMS Alison Lewis will be responsible 
for TRIPS input. 
 
CLEVERLEY