This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 000009 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/02/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR IR SA SY IZ
SUBJECT: SAUDI VIEWS ON IRANIAN AND SYRIAN ACTIVITIES IN 
IRAQ AND ELSEWHERE 
 
REF: RIYADH 00007 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JAMES C. OBERWETTER 
           FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1.  (S/NF) Summary: Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal and 
General Intelligence Presidency (GIP) director Prince Muqrin 
bin Abdul Aziz sought and shared views on Iran and Syria 
during a December 27 meeting with U.S. Ambassador to Iraq 
Khalilzad.  They told the Ambassador that while it was 
possible to understand Iranian concerns in Iraq, that did not 
justify Iranian interference.   The Foreign Minister and 
Prince Muqrin maintained that Iran in fact had much to lose 
by fomenting instability in Iraq, given the potential 
repercussions among Iran's own fragmented political and 
ethnic milieu.  They said that Saudi Arabia had begun 
discussions with Iran, including establishing a bilateral, 
Foreign Minister-level committee, to pressure Iran to end its 
interference in Iraq.  They also discussed Iran's nuclear 
program with Tehran, and were surprised by the Iranians' 
"surprising degree of innocence."  Despite the Kingdom's deep 
concern about Iranian activities, the Saudi leaders cautioned 
against threatening Iran to try to force a change in Iranian 
policies.   On Syria, the Saudi leaders questioned the level 
of Syrian involvement in Iraq, and cautioned against 
isolating Syria, lest that strengthen its ties to Tehran. 
End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (S/NF) U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad visited 
Riyadh December 27 to discuss the post-December 15 political 
situation in Iraq (Reftel).  He met first with Foreign 
Minister Saud al-Faisal and GIP Director Prince Muqrin bin 
Abdul Aziz together, and later with King Abdullah, with the 
Foreign Minister and Prince Muqrin sitting in.  Riyadh Charge 
d'Affaires, Baghdad Political Counselor and the Ambassador's 
Executive Assistant, and Riyadh PolMilChief (Notetaker) 
attended both meetings.  During their meeting with Ambassador 
Khalilzad, the Foreign Minister and Prince Muqrin also sought 
and shared views on Iran and Syria. 
 
---------------------------- 
Iranian Interference in Iraq 
---------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (S/NF) Foreign Minister al-Faisal told Ambassador 
Khalilzad that the SAG had spoken to Tehran about Iranian 
interference in Iraq.  He said the Iranians had sent former 
Iranian Foreign Minister Velayeti as Khameini's emissary to 
meet with King Abdullah, a senior level of representation 
that the Foreign Minister described as unheard of but that 
was intended to make a point.  According to the Foreign 
Minister, King Abdullah responded to Velayeti's claim of 
Iranian interest in good bilateral relations by insisting on 
an end to Iranian interference in Iraq.  The King reportedly 
told Velayeti that "we believe you are doing something very 
dangerous." 
 
¶4.  (S/NF) The Foreign Minister said that so far the Iranians 
have denied interfering in Iraq.  They have, however, agreed 
to form a committee, led by Foreign Minister al-Faisal and 
Khameini advisor Velayeti to allow the Saudis to present 
evidence of Iranian interference and for the Iranians "to 
prove they are not doing it."   Foreign Minister al-Faisal, 
who said the SAG would welcome any U.S. evidence to present 
to the Iranians, commented that this dialogue would be a test 
of Iran's future role in the region.  The SAG was uncertain 
whether there would be any positive results, but the SAG had 
to try.  It was one thing, he said, if a united Iraq was 
established and then developed close ties with Iran. 
However, Iranian attempts at interference and destabilization 
in Iraq were unacceptable and had to stop. 
 
¶5.  (S/NF) Although he stressed there was no justification 
for interference in Iraq, Foreign Minister al-Faisal 
commented that he could understand the Iranian imperative. 
Iran, he said, has faced war with Iraq for ten years.  He 
also noted that Iran's self-image, as well as its perception 
of its regional role, responsibility, and pre-eminence, 
likely drove Iranian activism in Iraq.  He told Ambassador 
Khalilzad that the way to deal with Iran was not with 
threats, but by convincing Iran of its role and national 
interest in working for a unified Iraq.  Efforts to fragment 
and destabilize Iraq could spill over into Iran, which has 
even more factions, sects, and ethnic groups than Iraq. 
 
¶6.  (S/NF) Ambassador Khalilzad said that Iran was 
overreaching in Iraq, and that there seemed to be an Iranian 
sense of entitlement to influence because of the Shia 
population and eight years of war.  He commented that Tehran 
is very influential in Iraq right now, that Iranian leaders 
appeared to believe events were heading in a favorable 
direction and that time was on their side.  He related to the 
Saudi leaders a report that Iranian officials had visited 
Kurdish leaders in Iraq, told them that Iran and not the U.S. 
would be a permanent presence in the region, and suggested 
that the Kurds needed to think about that.  Ambassador 
Khalilzad told the Foreign Minister and Prince Muqrin that 
the U.S. had indicated a willingness to talk with Tehran 
about Iraq, but that there also had to be a plan to contain 
the Iranians and reverse their gains.  He also stressed that 
the U.S. had specific military concerns vis-a-vis Iranian 
interference in Iraq, noting in particular the increased use 
by insurgents of shaped-charge IEDs, of a kind developed and 
used by Lebanese Hizballah in Lebanon. 
 
---------------------- 
Iran's Nuclear Program 
---------------------- 
 
¶7.  (S/NF)  Finally, Foreign Minister al-Faisal told 
Ambassador Khalilzad that Saudi Arabia had also pressed Iran 
about its nuclear program, both because of the dangers of 
regional proliferation and the danger posed to the entire 
region by an accident at Iran's nuclear facilities.  He said 
the Iranians had responded to Saudi safety concerns with 
assurances that the facilities were very safe because "we are 
using Russian technology."  Still clearly amazed by that 
statement, the Foreign Minister commented that there was a 
"surprising degree of innocence" about the Iranians.  He 
remarked that the current Iranian President's only 
qualification for office is that he is a "Khomeiniite." 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
Syria - Level of Activity in Iraq, Coordination with Iran 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶8.  (S/NF)  Both the Foreign Minister and Prince Muqrin 
sought Ambassador Khalilzad's views on the both the level of 
Syrian involvement in Iraq and the extent to which any such 
involvement was coordinated with Iran.  They noted Syrian 
denials of involvement in Iraq, and pointed out that Damascus 
had been complimented by the Iraqi government and even 
General Casey for the SARG's efforts against foreign 
fighters.  They said that the SARG seems to feel that it has 
done what is necessary. 
 
¶9.  (S/NF) Ambassador Khalilzad acknowledged that Damascus 
had taken some positive steps, such as tightening visa 
requirements and closing parts of the Syrian-Iraqi border. 
He agreed that General Casey had made some statements about 
Syria that could be taken as positive, but cautioned that the 
remarks were not as positive as some wanted to believe. 
Ambassador Khalilzad said that despite some positive 
measures, Syria had not made a strategic decision to break 
with the foreign fighters and continued pressure was required. 
 
¶10.  (S/NF) Ambassador Khalilzad said that the Coalition did 
not have a clear view of the degree of Iranian-Syrian 
coordination in Iraq.  Foreign Minister al-Faisal noted 
ongoing Syrian-Iranian cooperation in support of Lebanese 
Hizballah in Lebanon, but suggested that the SAG did not 
perceive a similar level of cooperation in Iraq.  He noted 
that Syria is a Ba'thist state and that there was not much 
love for Ba'thists in Tehran.  He said he doubted that Iran 
would want Syria much involved in Iraq because of the 
potential Ba'thist influence.  Likewise, he commented that it 
would be too sensitive for Syrian President al-Asad to 
cooperate with Iran in Iraq because the potential for 
alienating Ba'thists in both Iraq and Syria. 
 
¶11.  (S/NF) Foreign Minister al-Faisal cautioned that the 
more Syria feels isolated, the more it will strengthen its 
ties with Iran.  He maintained that the SARG was open to 
listening if talked to seriously.  At the same time, the 
Foreign Minister appeared to acknowledge the difficulty of 
dealing with Damascus.  He said the SARG missed an 
opportunity to leave Lebanon as "heroes."  The Foreign 
Minister said the SAG had urged Damascus to call for a 
Lebanese government of national reconciliation and sign 
proposed border agreements.  Instead, the Syrian leadership 
obfuscated.  Now, he said, there has been too much bloodshed 
and irresponsibility. 
 
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Comment 
------- 
 
¶12.  (S/NF) The Foreign Minister's comments on Syria mirror 
past statements by him and other Saudi leaders.  They reflect 
the conflicting Saudi views of Damascus; frustration and 
anger with the Bashar regime, but also a deep concern that 
pressure and isolation could cause it to collapse, leading to 
a greater instability and Islamist threat in the region. 
Concerning Iran, the Saudi-Iranian dialogue, coupled with 
measures being taken to encourage unity (Reftel), suggest a 
SAG decision that the Kingdom must now play a role in 
stabilizing Iraq. End Comment. 
 
¶13.  (U)  Ambassador Khalilzad has cleared this cable. 
OBERWETTER