Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06RIYADH9, SAUDI VIEWS ON IRANIAN AND SYRIAN ACTIVITIES IN

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06RIYADH9.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06RIYADH9 2006-01-02 14:10 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Riyadh
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 000009 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/02/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR IR SA SY IZ
SUBJECT: SAUDI VIEWS ON IRANIAN AND SYRIAN ACTIVITIES IN 
IRAQ AND ELSEWHERE 
 
REF: RIYADH 00007 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JAMES C. OBERWETTER 
           FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
1.  (S/NF) Summary: Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal and 
General Intelligence Presidency (GIP) director Prince Muqrin 
bin Abdul Aziz sought and shared views on Iran and Syria 
during a December 27 meeting with U.S. Ambassador to Iraq 
Khalilzad.  They told the Ambassador that while it was 
possible to understand Iranian concerns in Iraq, that did not 
justify Iranian interference.   The Foreign Minister and 
Prince Muqrin maintained that Iran in fact had much to lose 
by fomenting instability in Iraq, given the potential 
repercussions among Iran's own fragmented political and 
ethnic milieu.  They said that Saudi Arabia had begun 
discussions with Iran, including establishing a bilateral, 
Foreign Minister-level committee, to pressure Iran to end its 
interference in Iraq.  They also discussed Iran's nuclear 
program with Tehran, and were surprised by the Iranians' 
"surprising degree of innocence."  Despite the Kingdom's deep 
concern about Iranian activities, the Saudi leaders cautioned 
against threatening Iran to try to force a change in Iranian 
policies.   On Syria, the Saudi leaders questioned the level 
of Syrian involvement in Iraq, and cautioned against 
isolating Syria, lest that strengthen its ties to Tehran. 
End Summary. 
 
2.  (S/NF) U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad visited 
Riyadh December 27 to discuss the post-December 15 political 
situation in Iraq (Reftel).  He met first with Foreign 
Minister Saud al-Faisal and GIP Director Prince Muqrin bin 
Abdul Aziz together, and later with King Abdullah, with the 
Foreign Minister and Prince Muqrin sitting in.  Riyadh Charge 
d'Affaires, Baghdad Political Counselor and the Ambassador's 
Executive Assistant, and Riyadh PolMilChief (Notetaker) 
attended both meetings.  During their meeting with Ambassador 
Khalilzad, the Foreign Minister and Prince Muqrin also sought 
and shared views on Iran and Syria. 
 
---------------------------- 
Iranian Interference in Iraq 
---------------------------- 
 
3.  (S/NF) Foreign Minister al-Faisal told Ambassador 
Khalilzad that the SAG had spoken to Tehran about Iranian 
interference in Iraq.  He said the Iranians had sent former 
Iranian Foreign Minister Velayeti as Khameini's emissary to 
meet with King Abdullah, a senior level of representation 
that the Foreign Minister described as unheard of but that 
was intended to make a point.  According to the Foreign 
Minister, King Abdullah responded to Velayeti's claim of 
Iranian interest in good bilateral relations by insisting on 
an end to Iranian interference in Iraq.  The King reportedly 
told Velayeti that "we believe you are doing something very 
dangerous." 
 
4.  (S/NF) The Foreign Minister said that so far the Iranians 
have denied interfering in Iraq.  They have, however, agreed 
to form a committee, led by Foreign Minister al-Faisal and 
Khameini advisor Velayeti to allow the Saudis to present 
evidence of Iranian interference and for the Iranians "to 
prove they are not doing it."   Foreign Minister al-Faisal, 
who said the SAG would welcome any U.S. evidence to present 
to the Iranians, commented that this dialogue would be a test 
of Iran's future role in the region.  The SAG was uncertain 
whether there would be any positive results, but the SAG had 
to try.  It was one thing, he said, if a united Iraq was 
established and then developed close ties with Iran. 
However, Iranian attempts at interference and destabilization 
in Iraq were unacceptable and had to stop. 
 
5.  (S/NF) Although he stressed there was no justification 
for interference in Iraq, Foreign Minister al-Faisal 
commented that he could understand the Iranian imperative. 
Iran, he said, has faced war with Iraq for ten years.  He 
also noted that Iran's self-image, as well as its perception 
of its regional role, responsibility, and pre-eminence, 
likely drove Iranian activism in Iraq.  He told Ambassador 
Khalilzad that the way to deal with Iran was not with 
threats, but by convincing Iran of its role and national 
interest in working for a unified Iraq.  Efforts to fragment 
and destabilize Iraq could spill over into Iran, which has 
even more factions, sects, and ethnic groups than Iraq. 
 
6.  (S/NF) Ambassador Khalilzad said that Iran was 
overreaching in Iraq, and that there seemed to be an Iranian 
sense of entitlement to influence because of the Shia 
population and eight years of war.  He commented that Tehran 
is very influential in Iraq right now, that Iranian leaders 
appeared to believe events were heading in a favorable 
direction and that time was on their side.  He related to the 
Saudi leaders a report that Iranian officials had visited 
Kurdish leaders in Iraq, told them that Iran and not the U.S. 
would be a permanent presence in the region, and suggested 
that the Kurds needed to think about that.  Ambassador 
Khalilzad told the Foreign Minister and Prince Muqrin that 
the U.S. had indicated a willingness to talk with Tehran 
about Iraq, but that there also had to be a plan to contain 
the Iranians and reverse their gains.  He also stressed that 
the U.S. had specific military concerns vis-a-vis Iranian 
interference in Iraq, noting in particular the increased use 
by insurgents of shaped-charge IEDs, of a kind developed and 
used by Lebanese Hizballah in Lebanon. 
 
---------------------- 
Iran's Nuclear Program 
---------------------- 
 
7.  (S/NF)  Finally, Foreign Minister al-Faisal told 
Ambassador Khalilzad that Saudi Arabia had also pressed Iran 
about its nuclear program, both because of the dangers of 
regional proliferation and the danger posed to the entire 
region by an accident at Iran's nuclear facilities.  He said 
the Iranians had responded to Saudi safety concerns with 
assurances that the facilities were very safe because "we are 
using Russian technology."  Still clearly amazed by that 
statement, the Foreign Minister commented that there was a 
"surprising degree of innocence" about the Iranians.  He 
remarked that the current Iranian President's only 
qualification for office is that he is a "Khomeiniite." 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
Syria - Level of Activity in Iraq, Coordination with Iran 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
8.  (S/NF)  Both the Foreign Minister and Prince Muqrin 
sought Ambassador Khalilzad's views on the both the level of 
Syrian involvement in Iraq and the extent to which any such 
involvement was coordinated with Iran.  They noted Syrian 
denials of involvement in Iraq, and pointed out that Damascus 
had been complimented by the Iraqi government and even 
General Casey for the SARG's efforts against foreign 
fighters.  They said that the SARG seems to feel that it has 
done what is necessary. 
 
9.  (S/NF) Ambassador Khalilzad acknowledged that Damascus 
had taken some positive steps, such as tightening visa 
requirements and closing parts of the Syrian-Iraqi border. 
He agreed that General Casey had made some statements about 
Syria that could be taken as positive, but cautioned that the 
remarks were not as positive as some wanted to believe. 
Ambassador Khalilzad said that despite some positive 
measures, Syria had not made a strategic decision to break 
with the foreign fighters and continued pressure was required. 
 
10.  (S/NF) Ambassador Khalilzad said that the Coalition did 
not have a clear view of the degree of Iranian-Syrian 
coordination in Iraq.  Foreign Minister al-Faisal noted 
ongoing Syrian-Iranian cooperation in support of Lebanese 
Hizballah in Lebanon, but suggested that the SAG did not 
perceive a similar level of cooperation in Iraq.  He noted 
that Syria is a Ba'thist state and that there was not much 
love for Ba'thists in Tehran.  He said he doubted that Iran 
would want Syria much involved in Iraq because of the 
potential Ba'thist influence.  Likewise, he commented that it 
would be too sensitive for Syrian President al-Asad to 
cooperate with Iran in Iraq because the potential for 
alienating Ba'thists in both Iraq and Syria. 
 
11.  (S/NF) Foreign Minister al-Faisal cautioned that the 
more Syria feels isolated, the more it will strengthen its 
ties with Iran.  He maintained that the SARG was open to 
listening if talked to seriously.  At the same time, the 
Foreign Minister appeared to acknowledge the difficulty of 
dealing with Damascus.  He said the SARG missed an 
opportunity to leave Lebanon as "heroes."  The Foreign 
Minister said the SAG had urged Damascus to call for a 
Lebanese government of national reconciliation and sign 
proposed border agreements.  Instead, the Syrian leadership 
obfuscated.  Now, he said, there has been too much bloodshed 
and irresponsibility. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
12.  (S/NF) The Foreign Minister's comments on Syria mirror 
past statements by him and other Saudi leaders.  They reflect 
the conflicting Saudi views of Damascus; frustration and 
anger with the Bashar regime, but also a deep concern that 
pressure and isolation could cause it to collapse, leading to 
a greater instability and Islamist threat in the region. 
Concerning Iran, the Saudi-Iranian dialogue, coupled with 
measures being taken to encourage unity (Reftel), suggest a 
SAG decision that the Kingdom must now play a role in 
stabilizing Iraq. End Comment. 
 
13.  (U)  Ambassador Khalilzad has cleared this cable. 
OBERWETTER