This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 RIYADH 000007 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/02/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER IZ SA
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD SEEKS POST-IRAQI ELECTIONS 
SUPPORT FROM SAUDI LEADERS 
 
REF: SECSTATE 23102 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JAMES C. OBERWETTER 
           FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1.  (S/NF) Summary: U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Khalilzad met 
with King Abdullah, Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal, and 
General Intelligence Presidency director Prince Muqrin bin 
Abd al-Aziz on December 27, to seek Saudi support in Iraq for 
building an Arab Sunni-Kurdish-Alawi coalition to engage the 
Shia-Kurdish alliance in forming a national unity government. 
 Ambassador Khalilzad stressed that the elections had gone 
well; turnout was very high and, while accusations of fraud 
and corruption had to be investigated thoroughly, experts who 
had significantly observed the elections did not believe that 
the level of fraud and corruption had affected the results. 
He acknowledged that the results were not what had been hoped 
for, and stressed the need to build a coalition and establish 
a national unity government, both to stabilize Iraq and to 
contain and turn back Iranian political successes in the 
country.  King Abdullah promised Saudi cooperation, but was 
deeply skeptical of the chances of success and even appeared 
to question the bonafides of U.S. policy in Iraq.  He 
commented that whereas in the past the U.S., Saudi Arabia, 
and Saddam Hussein had agreed on the need to contain Iran, 
U.S. policy had now given Iraq to Iran as a "gift on a golden 
platter."  In their meeting with Ambassador Khalilzad, 
Foreign Minister al-Faisal and Prince Muqrin listened 
carefully to the Ambassador's proposals and reviewed ongoing 
Saudi political efforts in Iraq.  They also asked whether the 
U.S. would approve SAG officials meeting with radical Iraqi 
dissident cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and his representatives in 
an effort to detach him from Iranian influence.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (S/NF) U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad met 
December 27 in Riyadh with King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz al 
Saud, Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal and General 
Intelligence Presidency director Prince Muqrin bin Abdel 
Aziz.  Ambassador Khalilzad met with the Foreign Minister and 
Prince Muqrin together and, later in the afternoon, with King 
Abdullah, with the Foreign Minister and Prince Muqrin sitting 
in.  Riyadh Charge d'Affairs, Baghdad PolCounselor and 
Ambassador's Special Assistant, and Riyadh PolMilChief 
(Notetaker) attended both meetings. 
 
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December 15 Election Went Smoothly 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (S/NF) Ambassador Khalilzad told the Saudi leaders that 
procedurally, the December 15 elections had gone well.  The 
70% turnout rate had eclipsed the voting levels of the 
January elections (58%) and the constitutional referendum 
(63%).  In parts of western Iraq, such as Anbar, there had 
been dramatic increases in voter participation.  Anbar 
Province had a turnout rate of over 50 percent,versus 2-3 
percent last January. 
 
¶4.  (S/NF) All three Saudi leaders expressed concern about 
reports of voter fraud, including allegations that not enough 
ballots or ballot boxes had been available in Sunni areas, 
and that stuffed ballot boxes had been brought into Iraq from 
Iran.  Ambassador Khalilzad acknowledged the reports and said 
that while experts who had observed the elections did not 
think that the level of fraud had significantly affected the 
overall results, the allegations of fraud had to be 
thoroughly investigated, to assure Iraqis that the elections 
were legitimate.  He said that while the Iraqi Election 
Commission would have to substantiate the allegations, 
ideally any investigation should have some international 
involvement.  The Ambassador said that, if the Iraqis agreed, 
the U.S. would support U.N.-sponsored international 
participation. 
 
¶5.  (S/NF) Responding to the concerns of the Foreign Minister 
and Prince Muqrin about the large number of candidates 
removed because of their Ba'thist affiliations, Ambassador 
Khalilzad said the De-Ba'thification Commission (DBC) had 
looked at 180 names, of which 90 were ultimately removed from 
candidate lists.  He acknowledged the Foreign Minister's 
argument that it was difficult to not be a Ba'thist under 
Saddam's regime and that the DBC had made some inappropriate 
decisions.  He agreed that there needed to be a change in DBC 
procedures, to bring to justice those who had committed 
crimes while also stressing reconciliation with former 
Ba'thists against whom there was no evidence of criminal 
wrongdoing. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
Post-Election: Build a Coalition, then build a Government 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶6.  (S/NF) Ambassador Khalilzad acknowledged that the 
election results were not what had been anticipated or hoped 
for.  The Shia list, he said, had done better than expected 
and would probably win 131 seats in the Assembly - down from 
a past high of 146, but still an excellent result.  The 
Ambassador estimated that other significant results would be 
57-58 Assembly seats for the Kurds, 54-55 seats for the two 
major Sunni factions together, and 25 seats for Alawi's 
party. 
 
¶7.  (S/NF) Ambassador Khalilzad told Saudi leaders that the 
Kingdom's support was needed for the vital next step of 
building a post-election coalition between the Kurds, Alawi, 
Tawafuq and Mutluq.  He said that such a coalition could 
amount to 130-136 Assembly seats, enabling the Kurds, Sunnis, 
and others to engage with the Shi'a list in forming a 
national unity government.  Ambassador Khalilzad stressed the 
importance of encouraging the various groups to think 
strategically, not tactically, and to dissuade them from 
striking a separate deal with the Shia.  He said in 
particular that Alawi must not leave Iraq, lest his group 
fall apart.  The Iranians, who he said would seek a 
Shia-Kurdish alliance, might then buy Alawi's electoral slate. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Foreign Minister - Now they must come together" 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶8.  (S/NF) The Foreign Minister, who indicated that Prince 
Muqrin was in charge of Saudi outreach to the Iraqi spectrum, 
commented that "An election is divisive, now they (the 
Iraqis) must come together."  Both leaders agreed with the 
need for a coalition to engage the Shi'a and were guardedly 
in agreement with the Ambassador's proposal for Saudi 
support.  They stressed that Saudi Arabia would remain 
equally distant from all groups and was neither representing 
nor exclusively supporting the Iraqi Sunnis.  They said that 
efforts to stabilize and unify Iraq must proceed without 
anyone except Iraqis taking the lead.  Saudi support for a 
stable, united Iraq would include targeted media campaigns 
and discrete humanitarian aid channeled through Iraqi 
political and other groups. 
 
¶9.  (S/NF) According to the Foreign Minister and Prince 
Muqrin, the Saudi government was already active in seeking 
Iraqi stability and unity.  The Foreign Minister said that 
Riyadh had formed a group of "like-minded" states to work 
toward these goals.  Prince Muqrin added that after initial 
meetings with other governments had been undertaken by 
Ministry of Interior and GIP representatives during the OIC 
summit in Mecca, Saudi officials had visited a number of 
countries, including Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Kuwait, and the 
UAE for further discussions. He said that in Iraq, the SAG 
had contacted Iraqis who supported a united Iraq, and 
encouraged them to pressure the insurgents to end their 
violence. 
 
¶10. (S/NF) Prince Muqrin offered to arrange for U.S. 
officials to meet with some of the disaffected Iraqi leaders. 
 The Foreign Minister added that such meetings would give 
those leaders great confidence.  Ambassador Khalilzad replied 
that such meetings might be possible, provided that the 
Iraqis involved were not affiliated with terrorists like 
Zarqawi or with Saddam.  The Saudi leaders laughed at the 
suggestion, noting that "Saddam's people are our enemies and 
we are looking for Zarqawi." 
 
¶11. (S/NF) The Foreign Minister asked for Ambassador 
Khalilzad's view of Muqtada al-Sadr.  Prince Muqrin explained 
that al-Sadr had contacted the Saudis, and they believed they 
had "51-49" chance of bringing him on board, despite his 
Iranian support.  The Ambassador replied that al-Sadr had a 
large following and that the al-Sadr family members see 
themselves as righteous leaders, but that Muqtada himself is 
a little unbalanced.  He also noted that al-Sadr was facing 
murder charges and a warrant for his arrest for the slaying 
of Iraqi Shi'a leader Abd al-Majid al-Khoie; those would have 
to be resolved.  Ambassador Khalilzad said that the Saudis 
should talk with al-Sadr "with caution," and that it would be 
a positive step if the Saudis could ultimately pry al-Sadr 
away from Iran and Hizballah. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
King Abdullah - Giving Iraq to Iran on a Golden Platter 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶12.  (S/NF) In his meeting with Ambassador Khalilzad, King 
Abdullah promised Saudi cooperation with U.S. efforts in 
Iraq, but also pulled no punches about his skepticism of the 
chances of success and his anger at developments in Iraq. 
After thanking the Ambassador for his presentation, King 
Abdullah remarked that he agreed with everything the 
Ambassador had told him, though some of what he had said 
reflected "hopes" and "wishful thinking" rather than reality. 
 He said it was important to separate the two. 
 
¶13.  (S/NF) The King said he would speak bluntly.  In the 
past, he noted, the U.S., Saudi Arabia, and Saddam Hussein 
had agreed to fight Iran, to prevent Iranian intervention in 
Iraq and the region.  Now, he said, Iran has been presented 
with Iraq as a "gift on a golden platter."  He told the 
Ambassador that while it was possible to work the Iraqi Shia, 
most of whom are Arab, that reality is balanced by the 
influence, threats, and intimidation of Iran. 
 
¶14. (S/NF) King Abdullah said while the MFA and the GIP were 
working the Saudi policy of unifying Iraq, it was his 
personal assessment that it will be hard to stabilize Iraq in 
less than five years.  He commented that he believed it would 
be very difficult and perhaps even impossible to achieve a 
unified government in Iraq.   The balance of political forces 
is now uneven, with the Iraqi National Assembly dominated by 
one large bloc. King Abdullah said that Saudi Arabia would 
work with the U.S. in Iraq, and he prayed to God that the 
U.S. would succeed, but he had his doubts that there would be 
success.  He told the Ambassador that he would trust to God. 
In the end, he said, whether we succeed or not is up to God 
Almighty. 
 
¶15. (S/NF) Finally, the King appeared to caution the 
Ambassador about the motivations of some of those working the 
Iraq political process.  He said that one of the most 
important ingredients of success was to have noble, sincere 
intentions at all levels.  He said that "I trust in your 
sincerity, but what about those under you?"  He reminded his 
visitors again of the will of the one God, to whom everyone 
prays, regardless of whether they are Jewish or Christian, 
Sunni or Shia.  God, he said, always leads the faithful to 
success.  King Abdullah concluded the meeting by noting that 
it was near prayer time and that, if he was lucky, he might 
make it home in time to pray. 
 
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Comment 
------- 
 
¶16. (S/NF) General Intelligence Presidency stewardship of the 
Iraq portfolio reflects the degree of Saudi operational 
interest in trying to effect political success in Iraq. 
Ambassador Khalilzad,s meeting with the Foreign Minister and 
Prince Muqrin made clear that the Saudis are concerned and 
politically active over Iraq, which perhaps suggest that, 
while willing to cooperate with the U.S., such cooperation 
may be more clearly reflected in SAG parallel efforts to 
unify the disparate Iraqi political groups and encourage an 
end to the insurgency, as opposed to direct cooperation. 
King Abdullah was upset and somewhat emotional and, while not 
specific, even appeared to be questioning the bonafides of 
U.S. policy in Iraq.  He has on a number of occasions accused 
the U.S. of handing Iraq to Iran on a golden platter.  His 
disturbing invocation of Saddam Hussein,s name in reference 
to a consensus about Iran suggests that he believes that, 
post-12/15, Saudi Arabia's fears about Iraqi instability and 
an increased Iranian threat have been realized.  End Comment. 
 
¶17.  (U) Ambassador Khalilzad has cleared this cable. 
OBERWETTER