VZCZCXYZ0008
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNC #0087/01 0241534
ZNY CCCCC ZZH (CCY ADX849E25 MSI0281-623)
P 241534Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5433
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 4518
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 3473
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1116
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 0401
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0447
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000087 
 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D COPY (ADDING INFO ADDRESSEES) 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2020 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM CY
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S INTRODUCTORY CALL ON INTERIOR 
MINISTER ANDREAS CHRISTOU 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher; Reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  On January 23, Ambassador Schlicher and 
Interior Minister Andreas Christou discussed the GOC's slow 
pace in implementing the National Action Plan on Trafficking 
in Persons, as well as the latest developments on property 
issues, the prospects for a reinvigorated Cyprus process and 
the outlook for parliamentary elections in May.  Christou 
expressed hope that the resolution of the Cyprus Airways 
dispute would enable his Ministry to re-energize its efforts 
on TIP, and he committed to opening the promised victims 
shelter in Nicosia by the end of February.  Christou 
complained to the Ambassador about Cyprus' designation as 
both a destination and a transit country.  For the "vast 
majority" of foreign women employed in nightclubs and 
cabarets, Cyprus was their final destination.  On property, 
Christou maintained that the Ministry did everything it could 
be help Turkish Cypriots living in the south gain access to 
their property or property of similar value.  It was unfair 
and unreasonable, however, for Turkish Cypriots occupying 
Greek Cypriot homes in the north to also seek control over 
their abandoned properties in the south.  Christou and the 
Ambassador agreed that the growing complexity of property 
issues underscored the urgent need for a Cyprus solution. 
Christou did not expect anything to happen before the 
Parliamentary elections.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) Ambassador Schlicher underscored U.S. interest in 
Trafficking in Persons as a high-priority issue and asked the 
Interior Minister for an update on efforts to implement the 
GOC National Action Plan on Trafficking.  Christou maintained 
that implementation of the Action Plan was "not so bad," but 
neither, he added, was it as advanced as he personally would 
like it to be.  The Permanent Secretary at the Interior 
Ministry, Lazaros Savvides, had been charged with 
coordinating the various ministries with responsibility for 
different aspects of implementation, but he had also been in 
charge of the Cyprus Airways negotiations.  Now that the 
talks with Cyprus Airways were essentially concluded, 
Christou hoped Savvides would be able to devote more time to 
trafficking.  In particular, Christou wanted the government 
to take action to limit the overall number of establishments 
-- cabarets, nightclubs, and bars -- employing foreign women 
under conditions that left them open to exploitation. 
Christou also promised the Ambassador that the planned 
victims shelter in Nicosia would be open by the end of 
February. 
 
¶3.  (C) Christou further acknowledged the need for new 
legislation in tackling the problem of trafficking.  This was 
a complex issue, but the Parliament was committed to taking 
up new draft laws regarding the obligations of cabarets and 
nightclubs towards their female employees.  Because of the 
upcoming elections, however, it was unlikely action on the 
new legislation could be completed before October.  The 
Ambassador asked about the status of the promised public 
awareness campaign.  Christou noted that there were at least 
three ministries involved in this, but stressed that his own 
ministry had the lead and undertook to ensure that the GOC 
met its commitments with respect to raising awareness. 
¶4.  (C) Christou complained to the Ambassador that Cyprus had 
been identified in the U.S. TIP report as both a destination 
and a transit country.  He did not believe that this was 
accurate.  Cyprus was, he maintained, the final destination 
for the "vast majority" of women employed in nightclubs and 
cabarets.   There were only a few isolated instances of women 
transiting Cyprus for employment elsewhere.  Cyprus did not 
have "camps" such as those in Eastern Europe serving as 
way-stations to more lucrative employment in the West. 
 
¶5. (C) The Ambassador asked Christou for an update on 
property issues, particularly with respect to his role as the 
"Guardian" of Turkish Cypriot properties in the south. 
Christou noted that the GOC had introduced a number of policy 
changes intended to improve the overall climate on property. 
First, the government had changed its prior policy of 
allowing refugees to construct new housing on un-used Turkish 
Cypriot land.  This land could now only be used for 
agricultural purposes.  Moreover, the GOC had computerized 
the land registry.  Cyprus now had one of the most 
sophisticated registries and title search systems in Europe. 
The Interior Ministry provided considerable assistance, 
including financial assistance, to Turkish Cypriots looking 
to reclaim unoccupied properties.  If a refugee family was 
living in the house, however, it was a more complicated 
situation. Where possible, the GOC tried to find compromise 
solutions to these conflicts by offering the use of a 
superior property to either the original owner or the 
occupant.  The Ministry had, according to Christou, resolved 
at least sixty cases in this manner. 
 
¶6.  (C) Christou acknowledged the particular difficulties of 
the Arif Mustafa case in which a Turkish Cypriot resident in 
the south requested the return of his property and the 
refugee family currently inhabiting the house refused to 
move.  Christou hoped a compromise could be found, but he 
stressed that the Mustafa case was quite different from one 
in which a Turkish Cypriot living in a Greek Cypriot property 
in the north sought access to his property in the south as 
well.  This was simply unfair.  Christou seemed sanguine 
about the recent ECHR suit challenging the ROC's Caretaker 
Law governing the disposition of Turkish Cypriot property. 
This was the Attorney General's problem, he noted, not the 
Interior Ministry's.  Christou agreed with the Ambassador 
that the growing complexity of property issues only 
highlighted the need for a comprehensive solution to the 
Cyprus problem. 
 
¶7.  (C) The Ambassador noted our continued interest in 
reinvigorating negotiations on a Cyprus settlement.  We were 
looking to the parties for ideas on the way forward.  The 
United States recognized that AKEL had an important role to 
play in this process and we hoped the party was prepared to 
exercise constructive leadership.  Christou suggested that 
the pre-electoral period on the Greek Cypriot side was likely 
to be marked by nationalist rhetoric.  He cautioned us not to 
judge the parties' positions on the Cyprus issue until after 
the elections.  Since the referenda in April 2004, relations 
between the two communities have been characterized by 
profound mistrust.  Christou lamented the "false picture" the 
Greek Cypriot public had of Turkish Cypriots as almost 
completely under the control of Ankara.  Even on the vital 
level of personal contact between the two communities, 
momentum was flagging.  Previously, entire villages would 
organize trips back and forth.  This practice had all but 
ceased. 
 
¶8.  (C) The Ambassador asked for Christou's take on the May 
Parliamentary elections.  Would the Cyprus issue figure 
prominently in the campaigns, or would domestic issues 
dominate?  Christou did not see a unifying theme emerging in 
the upcoming campaigns.  In the end, he expected that both 
AKEL and DISY would lose a seat; DIKO would probably pick up 
one; EDEK would hold its position; the European Party would 
win two seats; the Greens would hold onto one; and both the 
United Democrats and Dinos Michalides' ADIK had a reasonable 
chance of crossing the threshold. 
SCHLICHER