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PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #0047/01 0171118
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171118Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5369
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 4087
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0137
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 0944
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0436

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NICOSIA 000047 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU CY
SUBJECT: WHO'S REALLY IN CHARGE HERE?  TURKEY AND THE 
TURKISH CYPRIOTS 
 
REF: A. 05 NICOSIA 2024 
     ¶B. 05 NICOSIA 291 
     ¶C. 05 NICOSIA 1766 
     ¶D. PALMER-INGMANSON EMAIL (11/28/05) 
     ¶E. 05 NICOSIA 1886 
     ¶F. LIBBY-INGMANSON EMAIL (12/07/05) 
     ¶G. LIBBY-PLOWDEN EMAIL (6/17/05) 
 
Classified By: Ambassador R. Schlicher, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. The relationship between Turkey and the 
"TRNC" is less of a clear-cut, master-servant arrangement 
than Greek Cypriot rhetoric about the "military occupation 
regime" would suggest.  The north's lack of outside political 
recognition, the large local Turkish garrison, and a heavy 
dependence on Turkish trade and financial largesse combine to 
render the Turkish Cypriots particularly susceptible to 
pressure from Ankara.  While the Lilliputian Turkish Cypriots 
harbor no illusions about ever being truly independent, their 
current leaders clearly resent the extent of Turkish 
influence.  As a result, Talat and his allies have tried with 
moderate success to carve out greater autonomy by pushing the 
envelope in areas of less importance to Ankara, operating "in 
the gaps" between various actors inside the GOT, and 
cultivating their democratic legitimacy and status as a 
"national cause" for Turkey.   The Turkish Cypriot leadership 
-- whose pro-settlement rhetoric distinguish them from "Mr. 
Deep State" Rauf Denktash -- view their ability to make 
trouble for Erdogan as a one-time trump card, providing a 
certain amount of influence (and perhaps even an "in 
extremis" veto) over Turkey's Cyprus policy.  As a result, 
relations between Lefkosa and Ankara are often more 
complicated and tense than they appear on the surface -- 
especially when it comes to issues such as property or 
deployment along the Green Line, which constitute sensitive 
"red lines" for the mainland's civilian and military 
leadership, respectively.  Without Turkish Cypriot buy-in, 
any Cyprus-related initiative from Turkey (including 
long-term settlement proposals but also intermediate steps 
like the opening of ports) could be difficult to pull off. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
NOT A REAL BOY... 
----------------- 
 
¶2. (C) In his introductory meeting with the Ambassador (ref 
a), Turkish Cypriot "President" Mehmet Ali Talat made the 
candid observation that his most difficult problem was the 
excessive influence Turkey had over the north.  While Talat 
quickly added that he enjoyed a good relationship with the 
GOT, his comment was nonetheless revealing.  And it is 
something we have heard before.  In previous off-the-record 
conversations with poloff, "Prime Minister" Ferdi Soyer has 
also made reference to the "limits" placed by Turkey in key 
policy areas -- something the current Turkish Cypriot 
leadership clearly resents. 
 
¶3. (C) From the Greek Cypriot perspective, the Turkish 
Cypriot administration is a "pseudo-state" entirely 
controlled by the occupying Turkish military.  Putting this 
spin on the facts is partly a tactical maneuver designed to 
reduce pressure on Nicosia to meet or negotiate with the 
Turkish Cypriots.  If Talat is a puppet of the Turks, the 
reasoning goes, the island's division can only be resolved 
through direct talks between Nicosia and Ankara -- preferably 
linking Turkey's EU accession to concessions on the Cyprus 
problem. 
 
¶4. (C) But dissing the Turkish Cypriots is also critical to 
the Greek Cypriot strategy of portraying themselves as 
righteous victims.  Casting the Cyprus problem solely as the 
result of Turkish aggression, successive Greek Cypriot 
leaders have dodged awkward questions about a decade of 
pre-invasion intercommunal violence, in which it was arguably 
the Greek Cypriots who threw the first punch.  UNSC 
resolutions condemning the secessionist entity in the north, 
as well as more recent ECHR rulings that classify the "TRNC" 
as an administration entirely "subordinate" to Turkey, add a 
legal sheen to Greek Cypriot claims that the Turkish Cypriot 
administration is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Ankara. 
 
¶5. (C) On the face of it, there is much evidence to support 
this interpretation of the "TRNC."  Denktash-era declarations 
of sovereignty notwithstanding, Turkey clearly holds enormous 
influence in the north.  The "TRNC" flag is never flown 
without the flag of Turkey, while Turkish Cypriots are 
emotionally attached to other symbols of their "Turkishness" 
and ties to the motherland.  Statues of Ataturk are 
 
NICOSIA 00000047  002 OF 004 
 
 
everywhere, and even the most European-oriented Turkish 
Cypriot bankers quietly reject as "impossible" economically 
sound arguments that the "TRNC" should ditch the Turkish lira 
in favor of the euro. 
 
¶6. (C) On a more practical level, the large garrison of 
Turkish troops stationed in the north (ref b) is an 800-pound 
gorilla on the northern political scene, with a long history 
of open meddling in Turkish Cypriot elections.  Although 
Turkish troops largely kept to themselves during the 2004 
Annan Referendum and subsequent elections, they still retain 
more subtle levers of influence over the Turkish Cypriot 
community.  The "TRNC's" police, small army, and even its 
fire brigade remain under the command of the ranking mainland 
general on the island -- while the army has reportedly used 
its financial clout to reward politically friendly 
businessmen with generous contracts.  According to Talat's 
private secretary, "the president" is constantly looking over 
his shoulder and calculating the military's possible reaction 
to practically every decision he makes. 
 
¶7. (C) Finally, the Turkish Cypriot economy remains 
overwhelmingly dependent on the mainland.  The vast majority 
of the north's trade, and a significant portion of its 
tourists, come from or travel through Anatolia.  At the same 
time, the "TRNC" relies on direct financial transfers from 
the GOT to pay for up to a third of its roughly $1 billion 
annual budget.  This aid pays for salaries and other 
day-to-day expenses, and is frequently topped off with grants 
for specific infrastructure projects.  The Turkish Embassy 
here is remarkably tight-lipped about the amount and shape of 
its assistance to the Turkish Cypriots, but advisors close to 
Talat have suggested the Turks attach certain conditions to 
their aid -- most recently demanding the reluctant 
center-left CTP take a more aggressive approach to 
privatization of "TRNC"-owned enterprises, to the chagrin of 
its traditional trade union allies. 
 
... BUT WHO PULLS THE STRINGS? 
------------------------------ 
 
¶8. (C) Talat's complaints of interference notwithstanding, 
the Turkish Cypriots enjoy a wider autonomy -- at least in 
certain policy areas -- than outside observers might think. 
Even under the dictatorial rule of Rauf Denktash, who 
reliably danced to the nationalist tune set by successive 
mainland governments and military leaders, the Turkish 
Cypriots (or at least Denktash) had a certain amount of 
influence both over their own affairs and in Turkey itself. 
As a living icon personifying one of the Motherland's 
do-or-die national causes, Denktash was given a wide berth by 
successive Turkish ambassadors and local force commanders. 
He accumulated significant personal wealth locally and 
developed a loyal fan base inside the "deep state" -- which 
he reportedly used over the years to influence military 
promotions, pressure civilian leaders, and tweak Turkish 
policy on the Cyprus question.  And because Denktash was 
trusted to be more nationalist than Ataturk, Ankara generally 
left him to run the "TRNC" as his own fiefdom. 
 
¶9. (C) The consolidation of Talat's pro-settlement leadership 
in 2003-2004 has changed this dynamic significantly.  Talat 
and his former-communist CTP party are said to be widely 
mistrusted by the Turkish military, and the cool reception 
Talat received when he called on President Sezer in 2005 
shows that the mainland's civilian nationalists are none too 
keen on him either.  Talat and his entourage lack the 
nationalist legitimacy to exercise the kind of quiet 
influence exerted by Denktash. 
 
¶10. (C) CTP heavyweight and Famagusta "mayor" Oktay Kayalp 
notes, however, a local perception that there is a "new 
balance of power" in Ankara, with the Turkish military 
sitting largely on the political sidelines (for the moment) 
and a wobbly-but-dominant AKP still officially committed to 
democratic reform and EU membership.  This he believes not 
only allowed the CTP to come to power in the first place, but 
now gives the Turkish Cypriots greater "autonomy."  Nicosia 
mayor and Talat confidante Kutlay Erk agrees, noting that 
Turkey cannot afford to be seen leaning too hard on a 
democratically-elected community leader. 
 
¶11. (C) As a result, the once hardline Turkish Ambassador 
"sings a more European song" than he did when he previously 
served in Cyprus in the early 90s.  According to Erk, the 
Turkish Embassy has sat largely silent as Talat pressed 
forward with "radical changes" such as the reform of the 
Education "Ministry's" previously ultra-nationalist history 
 
NICOSIA 00000047  003 OF 004 
 
 
curriculum, liberalization of trade across the Green Line, a 
crackdown on undocumented Turkish immigrants (ref c), or the 
opening of Orthodox churches in the north to Greek Cypriot 
worshippers.  As long as the army "stays in the barracks" on 
the mainland, Turkish Cypriots feel they have more breathing 
room to run their own affairs and take certain 
confidence-building steps. 
 
¶12. (C) At the same time, Erk and other insiders acknowledge 
that there are areas where Turkey perceives its vital 
interests to be at stake, and where Ankara sets much more 
narrow limits.  Turkey's sensitivities seem centered on a few 
key issues such as military control of the Green Line and 
core settlement-related questions like property.  The recent 
debacle over a Green Line crossing at Ledra Street (ref d) 
was a case in which Talat's desire to open the checkpoint 
foundered on the army's demand for continued access to its 
checkpoints in the area.  Meanwhile, the north's new property 
legislation was the result of considerable Turkish 
arm-twisting on a Turkish Cypriot public and parliament 
fearful of seeing their homes and businesses "restituted" out 
from underneath them (refs e and f). 
 
SELECTIVELY PUSHING THE ENVELOPE 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (C) According to his private secretary, Talat feels that 
the best strategy to strengthen the Turkish Cypriot position 
on issues like this is to bolster his own image both here and 
on the mainland -- nibbling away at the constraints and 
pressures placed on him by Ankara.  By traveling to Turkey at 
least once a month, granting frequent interviews to the 
Denktash-smitten media there, and grabbing every opportunity 
to stride on his own across the world stage (such as his 
recent visit to Washington or an upcoming trip to London), 
Talat seeks to reinforce the perception that he is the 
legitimate leader of his community. 
 
¶14. (C) In some cases Talat pushes the envelope, risking the 
ire of the local brass, to show (in the words of one 
U.S.-trained Turkish Cypriot academic) "that he, and nobody 
else, is the Mayor of the Munchkin City."  His recent 
decision to host Bayram holiday receptions without the 
participation of the Turkish Ambassador or force commander, 
who traditionally co-hosted the event in the Denktash years, 
caused quite a stir.  The military and Ambassador are 
reportedly still sulking over the perceived slight, but have 
publicly held their tongues. 
 
ERDOGAN "NEEDS" TALAT 
--------------------- 
 
¶15. (C) Talat's ultimate trump card in Ankara, according to 
his private secretary, is that "Erdogan needs him."  For 
example, Turkish Cypriot cooperation in drafting (and 
implementing) a new property scheme is an indispensable part 
of the GOT's strategy of countering the increasingly costly 
and embarrassing raft of ECHR law suits against it.  The 
Turkish Cypriot leadership feels that this gives it a certain 
amount of influence in Ankara -- despite Talat's lack of 
deep-state "street cred."  By cooperating to a greater or 
lesser degree with the AKP on matters such as property, the 
Turkish Cypriots can bargain for a greater or lesser degree 
of freedom on issues like settler immigration. 
 
TURKISH CYPRIOTS TAKE A HARD LINE ON PORTS 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶16. (C) The big kahuna on the Turkish Cypriot agenda today, 
however, is the question of whether Turkey will open its 
ports to ROC-flagged planes and ships -- a question Talat has 
characterized as a do-or-die issue for his community.  If 
Ankara accepts EU demands to open its ports without a 
reciprocal "lifting of isolation," the theory goes, the 
north's economy would be slowly choked to death by trade 
diversion.  And the door would be open to Turkey abandoning 
the "TRNC" in favor of recognizing the ROC. 
 
¶17. (C) Mayor Erk, Talat's private secretary, and other 
insiders have all told us that this was an issue over which 
Talat would willingly risk an open falling-out with Erodogan 
if necessary.  They insist Talat could seriously damage the 
AKP's domestic political fortunes by using his bully pulpit 
to condemn Erdogan loudly and publicly for any "selling out" 
of Cyprus.  Talat advisors are quick to point out that the 
AKP has given them every assurance that no unilateral 
sell-out deal is in the works, and they acknowledge that such 
an open break with the AKP would probably be disastrous for 
 
NICOSIA 00000047  004 OF 004 
 
 
their own tenure in office.  But they quietly hope that the 
implicit threat of "mutually assured destruction" (and the 
possibility that the army would come to Talat's rescue if he 
took up Denktash's nationalist mantle) will keep the GOT from 
bargaining away vital Turkish Cypriot interests. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶18. (C) It is an open question whether Talat would pick such 
a fight, and whether he could win.  Even without a 
knock-down-drag-out over ports, however, the tension between 
Turkish Cypriot autonomy and Ankara's equities and influence 
is dynamic, making it hard to predict with certainty how the 
north's decision-making process works at any given time.  On 
one hand, for example, if another way can be found to 
resupply Turkish troops in the area, the army would probably 
allow Talat to tear down the bridge at Ledra Street -- 
although whether he could swallow his own pride and back down 
in front of Papadopoulos is another issue.  On the other 
hand, it is far from certain the Turkish Cypriots could have 
persuaded Ankara to deliver on Talat's offer to return 
Varosha in exchange for the "lifting of isolation," had the 
Greek Cypriots accepted the deal during last year's 
Luxembourg-sponsored talks in Brussels (ref g). 
 
¶19. (C) As we engage the Turks and Turkish Cypriots on issues 
related to EU accession, settlement talks, and confidence 
building measures, it will be important to work both ends of 
the Ankara-Lefkosa axis.  The interests and goals of the two 
sides do not always overlap -- and one party may be unable to 
deliver without buy-in from the other.  END COMMENT. 
SCHLICHER