VZCZCXRO6156
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #0921/01 0301256
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301256Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0004
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000921 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL PINR RS
SUBJECT: CIVIL SOCIETY COUNCIL CHAIR PAMFILOVA:  "WE'LL 
TRACK IMPLEMENTATION OF NGO LEGISLATION" 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns.  Reasons: 1.4 (B/D). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  In a January 18 meeting with visiting DRL 
A/S Barry Lowenkron, the Ambassador and EUR DAS Kramer, Ella 
Pamfilova, head of the Presidential body that oversees civil 
society issues, said she had strongly opposed the 
controversial NGO legislation and had weighed in with 
President Putin.  She criticized public U.S. reaction, 
however as counterproductive in that it left President Putin 
no choice but to sign the bill in its current state.  She 
also argued more generally that the U.S. should be less 
critical of Russia in public.  Lowenkron countered that the 
USG had taken a discreet approach in dealing with the GOR on 
the legislation, avoiding public debate.  Public 
manifestations of U.S. concern were reflected in a 
Congressional resolution, yet even that was cast more in the 
spirit of registering concerns.  The NGO legislation will be 
harmful, Pamfilova said, but she will help lead a broad 
effort by a strong network of Russian NGOs to monitor its 
implementation.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) The meeting took place a day after the public notice 
that President Putin had signed the controversial NGO 
legislation.  Citing a dramatic worldwide increase in the 
number of NGOs over the past fifteen years, Lowenkron began 
by emphasizing that NGOs had become a reality and played a 
positive role throughout the world.  NGOs could be supportive 
or critical of governments, but they should not be viewed as 
enemies. 
. 
THE EFFORT TO DERAIL THE NGO BILL 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Pamfilova stressed that from the moment the first 
draft of the legislation had been offered for consideration 
by the State Duma, she had viewed it as "the most odious 
legislation I had ever seen."  She had immediately criticized 
the bill, and had voiced her criticism to Putin.  While some 
of the flaws in the first draft had subsequently been 
removed, many others remain in the text signed by Putin on 
January 10.  The legislation was in itself not terrible, she 
continued, but it raised fears about implementation.  While 
there was reason to hope that, like many other Russian laws, 
it would not be implemented at all, there was more reason to 
worry that it would be selectively implemented.  For that 
reason, Pamfilova continued, she would lead an effort to 
closely monitor the legislation once it formally goes into 
effect. 
 
¶4. (C) Saying that she wanted to speak frankly because "we 
share common interests," Pamfilova argued that U.S. public 
reaction had been harmful to the efforts she had helped lead 
to significantly change the bill.  Pamfilova characterized 
U.S. opposition as having come at a pivotal moment when there 
was a chance to further amend the bill in light of Western 
recommendations.  U.S. public criticism put Putin in a 
corner, and left him no choice but to approve it in its 
current form.  Much of the Russian public favored the thrust 
of the bill, Pamfilova said, noting that although she had 
received some five hundred letters opposing the draft 
legislation, she had received many more favoring it. 
 
¶5. (C) U.S. criticism reflected a broader flaw in the U.S. 
approach, Pamfilova argued.  The U.S. should not be so harsh 
publicly on the Russians, particularly in the current mood 
when the public rejects Western influences, associates 
democracy with poverty and corruption, still suffers from 
loss of its empire, and demonstrates significant 
anti-Americanism.  That mood, which prevails throughout the 
Russian population, places human rights and civil society 
activists in a difficult position; democrats are in a small 
minority in Russia, Pamfilova said.  Russia needs help from 
the U.S. to proceed along a democratic path, Pamfilova 
continued, but the U.S. should express itself more tactfully. 
 A measured approach, such as that taken by many Europeans, 
would be more effective.  According to Pamfilova, harsh 
criticism only reinforces a pervasive attitude among Russia's 
elite that because the West is being hyper-critical, 
listening to Western advice is fruitless. 
 
¶6. (C) Expressing appreciation for her candor, Lowenkron 
emphasized that President Bush, in his conversations with 
President Putin, and Secretary Rice in her discussions with 
FM Lavrov, had raised the issue quietly.  In response to 
Russian arguments that its NGO bill was similar to American 
procedures, the Secretary had instructed State to provide the 
GOR with an analysis of U.S. laws and to offer a comparison 
with the Russian draft legislation.  Throughout the entire 
period of Duma consideration of the NGO bill, the USG had 
handled the issue discreetly, Lowenkron underscored.  We 
pursued quiet discussion rather than public debate.  The 
 
MOSCOW 00000921  002 OF 002 
 
 
Secretary had also consistently made clear that democracy by 
 
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its very nature cannot be imposed on a country, while at the 
same time stressing that creation of democracy cannot be a 
top-down process in any country.  The U.S. Congress passed a 
resolution expressing its concerns, Lowenkron noted, but this 
did not "threaten" Russia.  Pamfilova replied that the 
Russian public does not differentiate between the 
Administration and the Congress.  Moreover, Russians 
interpreted the resolution as a threat. 
. 
LOOKING AHEAD 
------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Now that Putin had signed the legislation, Lowenkron 
asked, what will be its consequences and how will Pamfilova 
help monitor its implementation?  Pamfilova replied that 
Putin had not fostered the legislation to counter a potential 
orange revolution in Russia.  According to Putin, what 
happened in Ukraine could not happen in Russia.  Such a 
revolution could occur only where the population did not 
respect its leadership, as was the case in Ukraine.  While 
Putin understood this, Pamfilova said, others in the elite 
did remain fearful of an "orange revolution."  From Putin's 
viewpoint, the legislation had been created to fight both 
foreign influences on Russian domestic politics and radical 
Islamic influences from abroad.  The legislation will not 
succeed in either goal, Pamfilova continued, adding that she 
had made that point to Putin.  Its biggest flaws were that it 
failed to define "political activity," thus leaving room for 
its arbitrary use by bureaucrats against organizations they 
disliked, and that it opened the door to massive corruption. 
Indeed, bureaucrats and Duma deputies had lobbied heavily for 
the bill because, having lost opportunities to receive bribes 
as businesses found their registration process more 
transparent, they now saw NGO registration as a new 
opportunity to collect bribes. 
 
¶8. (C) The legislation was a step backward, but Putin had 
nonetheless helped strengthen civil society in other ways, 
Pamfilova argued, adding that foreign critics did not seem to 
notice that.  Changes to tax laws had created more 
possibilities for foundations to support NGOs, for example, 
and Putin was meeting regularly with civil society 
organizations.  He met once a year with Pamfilova's Council, 
she reported.  In the most recent such meeting, in July 2005, 
Putin had asked the Council to prepare a plan to encourage 
funding to NGOs, studying Western models as a basis for its 
suggestions.  Pamfilova added that her Council did not 
reflect a top-down approach; while some Russian "political 
technologists" took such an approach, it had been 
discredited.  In addition to the steps she had listed, 
Pamfilova said that Putin had also taken other positive steps 
on civil society, although the new NGO legislation might 
threaten some of those. 
 
¶9. (C) With respect to monitoring of the new legislation, 
Pamfilova said that Russia's vast civil society community -- 
containing some 120,000 NGOs -- had a strong network of 
experts.  Her own NGO (which works on child welfare issues) 
includes over 750 groups throughout the country, and many 
other Council members had similar networks.  This would allow 
for effective monitoring implementation of the legislation, 
which would also include issuing reports on the Internet and 
elsewhere about how things were proceeding, Pamfilova 
continued.  She planned to report to the State Duma and to 
Putin.  Although civil society may be in the minority in 
Russia, Pamfilova said, it is well organized, thanks partly 
to Western help, and was well prepared to monitor the 
legislation's implementation.  Pamfilova added that Putin had 
asked her to work with international NGOs in the run-up to 
the G-8 summit. 
 
¶10. (C) Lowenkron welcomed the fact that Pamfilova would 
report to Putin and that she was helping address 
misconceptions about the orange revolution.  He echoed her 
concern that the legislation could be used against any NGO. 
Adding that he also welcomed the Council's role in using 
Western models to generate ideas on funding sources for NGOs, 
Lowenkron stressed that in the U.S., organizations need 
register only if they are to represent a foreign government 
or if they seek tax free status; otherwise, they are free to 
function as long as they are not terrorist or extremist. 
Acknowledging Lowenkron's point, Pamfilova reiterated that 
Putin had told her that he wanted Russian law to be based on 
Western experience.  She said that Russian legislation would 
get to that point eventually, and expressed appreciation to 
the Ambassador for having provided her with information about 
U.S. laws on NGOs. 
 
¶11. (SBU) A/S Lowenkron cleared this cable. 
BURNS