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PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #0018/01 0091256
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 091256Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8635
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000018 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV RS
SUBJECT: NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR GRAHAM'S MEETING WITH 
KREMLIN'S MODEST KOLEROV 
 
REF: A. 05 MOSCOW 5588 
     ¶B. 05 MOSCOW 3317 
 
Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs Kirk Augustine. 
  Reasons: 1.4 (b/d). 
 
¶1. (C)  Summary.  NSC Senior Director Thomas Graham met 
December 21 with Modest Kolerov, who was named several months 
ago to run a new Kremlin directorate dealing with Russia's 
ties to its neighbors.  Kolerov rejected the notion that the 
U.S. and Russia should engage in a dialogue on Russia's 
neighborhood.  He saw the U.S. role in the region in largely 
negative terms, noting that the practical results of U.S. 
diplomacy potentially included greater extremism in Central 
Asia, tacit support for Georgian efforts to ethnically 
cleanse South Ossetia, and a ruined Ukrainian economy.  He 
said the USG uses the region as a laboratory to promote our 
global agenda, but missteps could have tragic results for 
Russia while they little affect the U.S.  Kolerov, a 
self-described "isolationist," saw only negative effects of 
globalization for Russia and thought the consequences of 
instability in the post-Soviet space were largely Russia's 
business.  He rebuffed Graham's arguments that the lessons of 
9/11 were clear, that terrorism and extremism anywhere in the 
world were a problem for all nations, including the U.S. 
Kolerov described Russia's global interests, beyond its own 
region, as largely commercial.  Kolerov, who comes from an 
academic and journalistic background, clearly represents 
those in the GOR who believe Russia should solve Russia's 
problems -- including with her neighbors -- without outside 
"interference."  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C)  Modest Kolerov, Head of the Presidential 
Administration's Directorate for Interregional and Cultural 
Ties with Foreign Countries -- a unit created in March 2005, 
and widely viewed as an attempt to reverse the Kremlin's 
missteps in Ukraine and elsewhere in the CIS -- met December 
21 with NSC Senior Director Thomas Graham in Moscow.  Kolerov 
told Graham he thought Russia and the U.S. have the same main 
goal in the former Soviet space, namely to combat the spread 
of extremism and terrorism.  But ever since the U.S. decided 
to widen the list to include our "global priorities," he 
personally believed, we began to run into conflict with 
Russia.  While Graham encouraged Kolerov to recognize the 
importance of the U.S. and Russia understanding each others' 
interests in the region, Kolerov asked Graham to imagine how 
the U.S. would react if Moscow demanded the U.S. and Russia 
come to a common understanding of our respective interests in 
Mexico. 
 
¶3. (C)  Kolerov accused the U.S. of involvement in the region 
to use it as a laboratory for U.S. "experiments."  The 
consequences of mistakes the U.S. may make in performing 
those experiments were only theoretical to us, he said, while 
to Russia they could be tragic.  Russia suffers -- either 
immediately or down the road -- by the imposition of Western 
modes and solutions, be they imposed in Afghanistan or in the 
Baltics.  Graham disputed the notion that Russia's 
neighborhood is its own business or that its ills have no 
consequences for the rest of the world.  September 11 proved 
that the U.S. had to follow and react to events worldwide. 
While Graham argued for the value of a U.S.-Russia dialogue 
on the region, Kolerov insisted the only thing to discuss was 
the "limits on your activities." 
 
¶4. (C)  Kolerov firmly rejected any consideration of global 
interests in the CIS and called himself an "isolationist." 
He said the region was still encumbered by a Soviet mentality 
and constituted a burden for Russia, but it was Russia that 
had to solve the problems.  Graham said globalization was a 
fact that would continue to impact on Russia,s neighborhood. 
 Kolerov, saying he was "not a diplomat," called 
globalization a "huge burden" for Russia because it had 
brought with it uncontrollable illegal migration.  He said 
Russia needed to find a legal basis for dealing with the 
inflow of people from other former Soviet republics, and 
insisted it was not a political issue.  Regarding how Russia 
should interact in the world, Kolerov said "we were weak, we 
took a day off; now in the twenty-first century we must 
protect our own house." 
 
¶5. (C)  Kolerov called potential Ukrainian entry into NATO 
"death for Ukrainian industry," which Russia did not want. 
European integration offered no great benefits for Ukraine, 
only negative consequences.  He said only the western oblasts 
of Ukraine were ready for European integration, and only 
because they have no industry.  Graham argued that Russia 
itself bore some responsibility for the fate of Ukrainian 
industry, by using the leverage of gas deliveries.  Kolerov, 
who pointedly noted that he had played no role at all in the 
events of fall 2004 in Ukraine, said that the psychology of 
 
MOSCOW 00000018  002 OF 003 
 
 
the authorities there had not changed at all.  On Belarus, 
Kolerov insisted Russia does not consider its neighbor 
through an imperial lens, but rather exactly as the U.S. 
views Mexico and Canada. 
 
¶6. (C)  Continuing his discussion of Russia's neighbors, 
Kolerov decried "Georgian radicals" who could in the future 
advocate ethnic cleansing of South Ossetians.  Asking 
rhetorically where South Ossetians would flee, he noted that 
Russia would end up with a more complicated situation in 
North Ossetia.  He accused the U.S. of exacerbating the 
situation through its close ties to Georgia.  Kolerov raised 
the issue of U.S. bases in Georgia and said U.S. bases in 
Georgia did not constitute "cooperation."  When Graham firmly 
denied that the U.S. had plans to base troops in Georgia, 
Kolerov pointed to the planned presence of U.S. troops in 
Romania and called it "a matter of definition." 
 
¶7. (C)  Graham raised Central Asia, asking how Russia would 
react to an explosion in the Ferghana Valley, and arguing 
that the U.S. and Russia have much to contribute to stability 
through cooperation.  In response, Kolerov blamed the U.S. 
and the West for tensions in the region and suggested that 
Western grants helped fund extremism.  He called "external 
influences" in Central Asia destructive and said the 
"so-called" democratic movements in Central Asia are only 
fronts for narco-trafficking.  Kolerov again accused the U.S. 
of having no basis for being involved in the region; in 
contrast, he said, Russia views Central Asian nations like 
family.  There were, for instance, 500,000 Kyrgyz living in 
Russia.  Graham noted the large number of Russians living in 
the U.S.  Kolerov complained that emigres from the CIS to the 
U.S. were talented and smart; they left behind the less 
educated and poor. 
 
¶8. (C)  On Chechnya, Kolerov accused the U.S. of a double 
standard in demanding that Russia solve an internal problem 
in the way we preferred, and asked whether we demanded the 
same of Spain in its conflict with the Basques and of France 
as it dealt with the Corsicans.  Graham said that we of 
course encourage others to solve their problems, but said the 
international community could help with the conflict in 
Chechnya.  He offered that the U.S. might even have useful 
suggestions, based on our experience in Iraq. 
 
¶9. (C)  Kolerov narrowly defined Russia's global interests. 
He saw Russian interests in Africa, and Latin and South 
America, for example, as largely commercial.  He did allow, 
however, that, in Russia, politics and business are more 
closely connected than in the U.S.  Kolerov decried the 
"Anglo-Saxon tradition" of seeking to legitimize political 
positions through whatever means available.  He said most 
Russians do not understand that that is the way the U.S. 
tries to seek political advantage, but he understands.  He 
said he had been invited many times to speak at seminars or 
attend other events in the U.S., and he always refuses. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶10. (C)  Since Kolerov's directorate was created, it has been 
unclear to us exactly what he does.  References to him in the 
Russian press this fall -- his trip to Latvia to articulate 
Russian impatience with the term "occupation" and to keep up 
the drumbeat about violations of ethnic Russians' rights, and 
his keynoting November's "Parallel CIS" (South Ossetia, 
Abkhazia, Transniestria, Nagorno-Karabakh) conference in 
Moscow -- reinforce the notion that the Kremlin sees him as 
an advocate for Russia and Russians in the CIS region -- and 
not as a negotiator, problem-solver, or a key decision-maker. 
 
 
¶11. (C)  Besides his disdain for participating in discussions 
in the U.S., Kolerov apparently has no use for Russian 
critics either.  When asked if he had found a quotation 
(which he cited at the beginning of the meeting) from one of 
Graham's speeches in a recent article by Moscow Carnegie 
Center scholar Liliya Shevtsova, he said dismissively that he 
did not read anything she wrote.  Kolerov embodies the view, 
not uncommon in today's Russia, that Russia can solve its own 
problems and that U.S. and Western "interference" in Russia 
or the broader region on its borders works against Russian 
interests, creating instability, drug trafficking, and 
extremism that threaten the Russian body politic. 
 
¶12. (C)  In parting, Kolerov gave Graham a selection of 
literature, which he said he helped publish.  The books 
included: "Georgia: Ethnic Cleansing in Relation to Ossetia," 
"Non-citizens in Estonia," "The Setu People: Between Russia 
and Estonia," "Around Chechnya: Is Russia's Rear Secure in 
the North Caucasus?" "The Lusatian Question and 
 
MOSCOW 00000018  003 OF 003 
 
 
Czechoslovakia, 1945-48," and "The Russian Guide to 
Historical Research on Russia in the 19th and 20th 
Centuries."  The titles reflect the thrust of the outreach 
effort that Kolerov and his office are trying to intensify. 
 
¶13. (U)  Senior Director Graham has cleared this cable. 
BURNS