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Viewing cable 06MEXICO456, MADRAZO AIMS FOR THE SENSIBLE CENTER

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MEXICO456 2006-01-27 20:41 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Mexico
Appears in these articles:
http://wikileaks.jornada.com.mx/notas/eu-dudaba-de-la-viabilidad-del-pri/
VZCZCXRO4837
RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #0456/01 0272041
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 272041Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8549
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
50972
2006-01-27 20:41:00
06MEXICO456
Embassy Mexico
CONFIDENTIAL
05MEXICO7426|05MEXICO7612|06MEXICO251
VZCZCXRO4837
RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #0456/01 0272041
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 272041Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8549
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL MX
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 000456 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL MX
SUBJECT: MADRAZO AIMS FOR THE SENSIBLE CENTER 
 REF: A. A) 05 MEXICO 7612 
     B. B) MEXICO 251 
     C. C) 05 MEXICO 7426 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR LESLIE A. BASSETT, REASONS: 
 1.4(B/D). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  Roberto Madrazo, candidate of the PRI-led 
Alliance for Mexico, has kicked off his campaign by trying to 
position himself as the candidate of the political center. 
Madrazo used the month long holiday break to smooth over the 
divisions in his fractious party, restructuring his campaign 
so as to put the full weight of the party machinery behind 
it.  He has succeeded in integrating into his campaign 
structure -- at least for the moment -- key rivals from 
within the PRI's ranks.  He also released his long promised 
personal financial statements, eliciting little negative 
publicity for their delayed release, or for the remarkably 
high reported net worth of this lifelong public servant.  Yet 
despite his efforts, Madrazo remains third in all recent 
opinion polls, lagging by a considerable margin in at least 
one.  And his success in forging party unity will be sorely 
tested in the months ahead, when the PRI finalizes its 
legislative lists: in order to win the support of his critics 
within the party and maintain the loyalty of his allies, he 
has made far more promises of political rewards than he will 
be able to keep.  The publication of the PRI's legislative 
lists in March may end up disappointing some key supporters 
and fomenting party disunity just as the campaign enters its 
most intensive phase.    End summary. 
 
Staking Out the Middle Ground 
----------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) On January 15, Roberto Madrazo Pintado officially 
registered with the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) as the 
presidential candidate of the Alliance for Mexico, consisting 
of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and the Green 
Ecological Party of Mexico (PVEM).  Madrazo used the 
opportunity of his post-registration rally -- his first 
public appearance as the Alliance's candidate -- to stake out 
the center of the Mexican political spectrum.  Before a 
partisan crowd, he spoke about the importance of ending 
poverty and reducing inequality, while eschewing the cadences 
of class conflict preferred by his left-wing rival, Andres 
Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO).  He addressed the issue of 
migration in relatively moderate terms, noting that while the 
proposed border fence (ref A) offended Mexicans, the 
migration problem had to be resolved first and foremost in 
Mexico, through economic growth and job creation.  He said 
the next administration would need to devote its efforts to 
restoring Mexico's economic competitivity, strengthening the 
rule of law, and reducing poverty and inequality.  In 
subsequent campaign appearances, Madrazo has continued to 
tack to the center, dismissing Felippe Calderon as a 
"neoliberal," and AMLO as a "populist" and a "demagogue." 
 
Papering Over Differences in the PRI 
------------------------------------ 
 
3.  (C) During the campaign "cease fire" declared by the IFE, 
Madrazo worked intensively behind the scenes both to 
restructure his campaign and to achieve unity -- or at least 
the appearance of unity -- within the PRI.  Contacts in the 
party largely concur that he has been fairly successful in 
winning at least the token support of his erstwhile critics. 
Francisco Guerrero, Chief of Staff to Senate President 
Enrique Jackson, told poloff that several key leaders of the 
Everyone United Against Madrazo (TUCOM, for its Spanish 
acronym) faction have closed ranks with the candidate, an 
assertion supported by other contacts.  Many of the 
supporters of former rival Arturo Montiel have been 
integrated into the Madrazo team, most notably Montiel's 
former campaign manager and PRI heavyweight Manuel Cadena. 
Senate President Enrique Jackson, another leading member of 
TUCOM, has signed on to a senior advisory role in the 
campaign, and Nuevo Leon Governor Natavidad Gonzalez has 
publicly backed Madrazo as well. 
 
4.  (C) At this point, it appears the only two major PRI 
figures who remain fully outside the fold are Sonora Governor 
Eduardo Bours and teacher's union leader Elba Esther 
Gordillo.  Jose Alcalde, a political analyst with ties to the 
PRI, told poloff that Bours reportedly was contemplating a 
PRD offer to defect; whether or not true, the influential 
governor has not concealed his desire to undermine Madrazo's 
campaign.  As for Gordillo, she and Madrazo appear to have 
settled into a temporary stalemate in their long-simmering 
feud.  The PRI suspended its effort to formally evict her 
from the party, fearing that, according to PRI Deputy Jose 
Alberto Aguilar, doing so would cause it unnecessary 
political damage.  For her part, Gordillo appears content to 
 
MEXICO 00000456  002 OF 003 
 
 
remain a titular member of the PRI, while openly supporting 
the candidate of the New Alliance party, her protege and 
former PRI deputy Roberto Campa.  We suspect Gordillo is more 
likely to break this uneasy stalemate than is Madrazo, and if 
she does, Aguilar believes it would cost the PRI most, but 
not all, of the 16-20 deputies who are loyal to Gordillo. 
 
The High Price of Unity 
----------------------- 
 
5.  (C) While Madrazo has managed to paper over differences 
with most of his critics in the PRI, this semblance of unity 
came at a high price, a price that will come due in March, 
when the party finalizes its national lists for the 
legislative elections.  Francisco Guerrero told poloff that 
in order to secure the support of those senior PRI leaders 
who initially opposed his candidacy, Madrazo presumably 
promised many of them high-ranking spots on the party's 
electoral lists.  He undoubtedly has made similar promises 
not only to his numerous long-term supporters, but also to 
other assorted party luminaries. 
 
6.  (C) Moreover, according to the terms of the PRI's 
alliance with the Green Ecological Party of Mexico (PVEM), 
four of the Senate list's top eight spots have been set aside 
for PVEM candidates.  In fact, the Senate list affords 
relatively few opportunities to reward political allies. 
While the party can list 32 candidates, only the most 
optimistic of Madrazo supporters would be satisfied with a 
position outside of the top 12; in the last legislative 
elections, the PRI succeeded in electing only 12 senatorial 
candidates from its national list, and this year's race 
promises to be more competitive.  Guerrero suspects -- and 
other contacts tend to agree -- that the electoral lists will 
leave some Madrazo supporters very dissatisfied, creating the 
possibility of major dissension in the party just as the 
campaign enters its most intensive phase. 
 
Counting on the Machine 
----------------------- 
 
7.  (SBU) Unlike the campaigns of his two principal rivals, 
which are managed separately from their party apparatus, in 
December, the Madrazo campaign integrated its operation with 
that of the PRI party apparatus, even physically moving the 
campaign's offices to the PRI headquarters.  PRI president 
Mariano Palacio Alcocer has agreed to serve concurrently as 
Madrazo's campaign manager, to ensure that the full weight of 
the PRI political machine is employed on behalf of his 
campaign.  According to campaign media advisor Ady Garcia, 
the campaign has set up a number of regional and thematic 
directorates, to ensure that the regional PRI operations are 
well-coordinated. 
 
8.  (C) The party appears to be counting on its 
well-organized nationwide political machine to give it the 
margin of victory in this election.  The PRI boasts of having 
between 9 and 10 million hard core loyalists, of whose 
unconditional support the party is confident.  Assuming this 
large base holds, our contacts observe that Madrazo would 
need to win over far fewer uncommitted voters than his rivals 
in order to win the election.  They believe that their 
party's superior political machine will pick off enough 
uncommitted voters to swing the election to Madrazo. 
 
Transparency Starts at Home 
--------------------------- 
 
9.  (SBU) To the surprise of many, on January 18, Madrazo 
actually complied with a longstanding promise to release 
information concerning his personal finances.  His financial 
statement revealed that this lifelong public servant has a 
net worth of approximately USD 3 million, including four 
luxury condominiums in Mexico City, all purchased in 2004, 
other properties in the capital and in his home state of 
Tabasco, and a Porsche automobile (among others) worth 
approximately $100,000.  He further revealed that his wife -- 
the widow of the scion of one of Mexico's wealthiest families 
-- owns a luxury condominium in Williams Island, Florida. 
One issue that remains murky, at least in press accounts 
surrounding the release of Madrazo's financial statement, is 
his ownership of a second Williams Island luxury condo.  This 
property sparked controversy last fall (ref A), when Reforma 
reported that Madrazo had purchased the property through a 
British Virgin Islands company.  Recent press reporting has 
stated that Madrazo rents this condominium and has an option 
to purchase it; the reporting does not confirm whether 
Madrazo controls the offshore company that owns the condo, as 
earlier reporting strongly suggested. 
 
Comment: Where are the Loyal PRI Voters? 
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MEXICO 00000456  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
10.  (C) A consummate political operator, Madrazo appears to 
have been fairly successful in uniting his party -- at least 
to the public eye -- and surviving to wage the general 
election campaign.  However, by making profligate promises of 
political rewards, he has set himself up for a possible 
crisis in March, when the party's electoral lists will be 
published, and he will have to make good on those promises. 
Indeed, many in the party are questioning the wisdom of 
promising four of the party's top eight Senate spots to the 
PVEM, a party that historically has drawn only approximately 
5 percent of the national vote.  Madrazo may need to draw on 
all of his formidable political skills to navigate the 
intra-party crisis that the publication of the legislative 
lists could provoke.  On the other hand, the candidate  has 
built a long political career on the practice of making 
promises he knows he may be unable to keep, and he may be 
counting on his ability to pull this off one more time. 
 
11.  (C) With nearly six months to go until Election Day, 
this is very much a three-way race and it is entirely 
possible that it will remain that way until the finish line. 
Although Madrazo is lagging for the moment, the PRI's 
organizational advantages are considerable and many in the 
party are so hungry to return to power, they will use every 
tactic at their disposal -- no matter how ignoble -- to win. 
In a closely fought, three-way race, the final advantage 
might go to the candidate who makes the fewest mistakes, a 
dynamic that could tend to favor the highly experienced 
Madrazo. Nevertheless, we have trouble reconciling PRI claims 
of a 10 million vote rock solid base with Madrazo's polling 
in the low to mid 20 percent range.  We cannot help but 
wonder whether even for many formerly loyal PRIistas, a vote 
for Madrazo is a bridge too far, or if the candidate simply 
has no traction whatsoever beyond his base.  End comment. 
 
 
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity 
 
GARZA