VZCZCXRO3796
PP RUEHLMC
DE RUEHMU #0023/01 0052319
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 052319Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4834
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAGUA 000023 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2016 
TAGS: PGOV ECON KDEM SOCI OAS NU
SUBJECT: BOLANOS CONFIDENT HE CAN DEMAND KEY LEGISLATION 
FOR ASSEMBLY LEADERSHIP DEAL 
 
REF: MANAGUA 3246 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli for reasons 1.4 (b and d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: In a recent breakfast meeting on January 4, 
Nicaraguan President Enrique Bolanos told the Ambassador that 
he could obtain agreement on key legislation during 
negotiations for the upcoming elections for the National 
Assembly's Executive Board ("Junta Directiva").  Such 
legislation would include implementing measures for the CAFTA 
and IMF agreements, approval of the MANPADS destruction, a 
new Penal Code, and the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) 
compact.   Bolanos also discussed his options to replace 
recently deceased Secretary of the Presidency Ernesto Leal, 
the need to encourage an OAS observer mission for the 
impending regional and national elections, and the positions 
of the presidential candidates and the likely outcome of the 
regional elections in March on the Atlantic Coast.  End 
Summary. 
 
PRESIDENT CLAIMS TO CONTROL SWING VOTE IN ASSEMBLY 
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¶2. (C) During a January 4 breakfast with the Ambassador, 
President Bolanos reported he would meet on Friday, Saturday 
and Sunday with representatives of each of the caucuses in 
the National Assembly to broker the January 9 elections for 
the new Junta Directiva.  Bolanos said he would insist on an 
inclusive Junta with representation from each caucus and the 
election of a president from one of the minority caucuses 
(i.e., not the PLC or FSLN candidate).  The President stated 
that he would accept a PLC deputy for the First Secretary 
position as long as the candidate would agree not to promote 
an amnesty bill for convicted ex-President and PLC leader 
Arnoldo Aleman. 
 
¶3. (C) Bolanos declared that he would simultaneously 
negotiate an agreement to pass key legislation of interest to 
the executive, including implementing laws for the CAFTA and 
IMF agreements, approval of the new Penal Code, approval for 
the government to destroy Nicaragua's remaining official 
stock of MANPADS, and MCA-related legislation.  Bolanos told 
the Ambassador that he could kill an FSLN-sponsored law 
regarding appointments for National Police commissioners that 
would force the President to select a strongly FSLN 
affiliated subcommissioner to head the Police instead of a 
candidate more favorable to his administration.  He reported 
that the current head of the Police, Commissioner Edwin 
Cordero, will be offered the position of mayoral candidate 
for Leon for the FSLN following the expiration of his term. 
 
¶4. (C) Comment: Bolanos seemed quite confident that he could 
demand such concessions in exchange for the votes of the 
twelve National Assembly deputies that he "controls."  While 
it is true that twelve deputies do not belong to the PLC or 
FSLN caucuses, and neither the PLC nor the FSLN can win the 
elections without support from these deputies or each other, 
the President does not "control" all of them.  Some deputies 
from the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN-PC), Azul y Blanco 
and Camino Cristiano caucuses have told Emboffs that they are 
willing to work with Bolanos on the Junta elections, but 
others, such as Orlando Tardencilla and Jaime Morales Carazo 
(Azul y Blanco), are openly critical of Bolanos and unlikely 
to follow his lead.  The six deputies in the ALN-PC are loyal 
to Liberal presidential candidate Eduardo Montealegre and 
will not obey Bolanos without Montealegre's approval.  As has 
happened during other (rare) periods of relative political 
calm in Nicaragua, President Bolanos may be tempted to 
overplay his hand and demand too much from politicians who 
regard him as a lame duck.  End Comment. 
 
LEAL'S DEATH CREATES VOID AT PRESIDENCY 
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¶5. (C) The sudden death of Secretary of the Presidency 
Ernesto Leal on December 26 created a vacuum at the 
Presidency that has temporarily been filled by the 
President's private secretary, Ariel Montoya.  Bolanos told 
the Ambassador that he was considering replacing Leal with 
Finance Minister Mario Arana or Vice Minister of Environment 
Leonardo "Nayo" Somarriba.  The President favored Somarriba, 
however, saying he needed Arana to stay in his current 
position and maintain continuity in the government's economic 
program.  Bolanos claimed he would make his decision that day 
and announce the new Secretary on Friday.  (Comment: Bolanos, 
in fact, announced Somarriba's appointment later the same 
day, saying Somarriba enjoys the President's "full 
confidence."  Somarriba is a quiet, somewhat squeamish 
functionary in a low-profile position who will now be forced 
to do some heavy political lifting.  End Comment.) 
 
BOLANOS WILL CONTINUE TO PUSH FOR OAS OBSERVATION TEAM 
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¶6. (C) President Bolanos and the Ambassador agreed that the 
OAS should send a technical level electoral observation 
mission "at once" to oversee preparations for the Atlantic 
Coast regional elections in March and national elections in 
November.  The President stated he would contact OAS 
Secretary General Insulza again to urge him to send a team. 
Bolanos also presented the idea of the OAS sponsoring a "team 
of notables" from Latin America and Europe to monitor the 
election periodically during the year. 
 
BOLANOS MOVING CLOSER TO MONTEALEGRE 
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¶7. (C) In contrast to past impressions that Bolanos favored 
presidential candidate Jose Antonio Alvarado, Bolanos seemed 
to agree in this encounter that Eduardo Montealegre is the 
most promising candidate.  Bolanos stated that pressure from 
three sources -- himself, the Embassy, and the political 
financiers -- could force the Liberals to forge an alliance 
beyond the influence of corrupt PLC leader Arnoldo Aleman. 
The President claimed he planned to call other Central 
American presidents to pass the message to financiers in 
their countries not to give money to the PLC.  Bolanos and 
legal advisor Frank Arana, who also attended the meeting, 
believe that a "residual PLC" will nevertheless survive, 
winning perhaps 7 to 15 deputies.  The President predicted 
that Sandinista dissident candidate Herty Lewites will drop 
his presidential bid due to lack of party organization and 
make a deal with FSLN leader Daniel Ortega for that party's 
vice presidential slot. 
 
¶8. (C) Regarding the Atlantic Coast elections, Bolanos stated 
that the local indigenous party Yatama is very strong in the 
Northern Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAN) and would likely 
win there, while the PLC controls the most votes in the 
Southern Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAS), where that party 
will come out ahead.  The President acknowledged that 
Montealegre has managed to gain a following on the Coast and 
will win some votes, but Alvarado and Lewites are very weak. 
TRIVELLI