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Viewing cable 06MANAGUA221, NICARAGUAN ELECTIONS REGIONAL REPORTING: CARAZO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MANAGUA221 2006-01-30 22:28 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Managua
Appears in these articles:
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758456.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758467.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758468.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758464.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4103/la-embusa-y-el-gabinete-de-ortega
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4104/d-rsquo-escoto-en-onu-ldquo-un-desafio-de-ortega-a-ee-uu-rdquo
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4102/estrada-y-la-ldquo-doble-cara-rdquo-ante-ee-uu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3966/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-ee-uu-en-el-2006
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2758764.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2758753.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4041/millones-de-dolares-sin-control-y-a-discrecion
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4040/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-venezuela-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4047/rodrigo-barreto-enviado-de-ldquo-vacaciones-rdquo
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2757239.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2746658.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2757244.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2746673.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3991/dra-yadira-centeno-desmiente-cable-diplomatico-eeuu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3968/pellas-pronostico-a-eeuu-victoria-de-ortega-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3967/barreto-era-ldquo-fuente-confiable-rdquo-para-eeuu
VZCZCXYZ0013
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #0221/01 0302228
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 302228Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5067
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0532
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000221 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2016 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM SOCI NU
SUBJECT: NICARAGUAN ELECTIONS REGIONAL REPORTING: CARAZO 
 
REF: MANAGUA 124 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR PAUL TRIVELLI. REASONS 1.4 (B,D). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  Meetings with political, economic and 
religious leaders in the Department of Carazo suggest that by 
far the two most popular presidential candidates there are 
Eduardo Montealegre and Herty Lewites.  Montealegre has 
successfully siphoned off elements of the PLC departmental 
organization and enjoys significant urban and rural support, 
while the candidacy of native-son Lewites has sharply divided 
the FSLN, particularly in urban areas.  The FSLN retains a 
hard core of supporters and the PLC departmental organization 
remains dogmatically loyal to Arnoldo Aleman, but none of the 
would-be presidential candidates of either of the two 
traditional parties have campaigned seriously in Carazo. 
Most observers remain deeply concerned that a combination of 
CSE incompetence and malfeasance could prevent free and fair 
elections in November, citing local examples of CSE officials 
facilitating issuance of voter identification cards for FSLN 
supporters, while obstructing the efforts of others to obtain 
the documents.  The loyalty of rural voters who have 
historically voted for the PLC remains a wild card in what 
most observers describe as a "naturally" anti-Sandinista 
department.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) On January 26, poloff and political FSN traveled to 
the Department of Carazo, just south and east of Managua, and 
met local leaders of "Vamos con Eduardo", the Alliance for 
the Republic (APRE), the Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC), 
and the one non-Sandinista mayor in the Department, the PLC 
mayor of the tiny municipality of La Conquista.  Embassy 
officials also discussed politics, economics, and social 
issues with leaders of the Carazo Chamber of Commerce and the 
head of the Catholic Church's hierarchy in the department. 
The departmental representative of the Supreme Electoral 
Council, a Sandinista, refused a meeting, and referred 
emboffs to the CSE magistrates in Managua.  It was clear that 
the real electoral campaign has yet to begin in Carazo, as 
its cities, towns, and highways were largely empty of 
electoral propaganda.  The only visible posters, painted 
signs, and billboards dated from the 2004 municipal electoral 
campaign or earlier; most were for either the PLC or APRE. 
This cable focuses on the political elements of the Carazo 
trip.  Post will report on social and economic issues septel. 
 
MONTEALEGRE POPULAR AND CAMPAIGNING ACTIVELY, BUT STRENGTH OF 
ORGANIZATION AND DEPTH OF RURAL SUPPORT STILL UNCLEAR 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
3. (C) Except for the local PLC leaders, everyone emboffs met 
reported that Eduardo Montealegre is taking large numbers of 
party activists and supporters away from the PLC in both 
urban and rural areas.  Along with Lewites, Montealegre is 
one of only two presidential candidates to have campaigned 
seriously in Carazo, with regular visits that have included 
even the smallest municipality.  Most interlocutors believed 
that the national opinion polls portraying Montealegre and 
Lewites as the two most popular politicians in the country 
are reflective of popular sentiment in Carazo. 
 
4. (C)  Chamber of Commerce leaders stated that most of the 
current FSLN mayors in the department are performing poorly, 
and that both the PLC and the FSLN were largely discredited 
with all but their most die-hard supporters.  They added that 
Herty Lewites had drawn away a significant number of FSLN 
supporters, especially in urban areas.  Virtually all 
business people, they claimed, support either Montealegre or 
Lewites (primarily the former), hoping that one or both of 
the two outsiders could bring the stability that Carazo and 
Nicaragua need in order to develop.  The business sector 
opposed the disqualification, or "inhibition" of any 
candidate, but feared that the FSLN and PLC would use their 
control of the CSE and the judiciary in efforts to manipulate 
the outcome of the elections. 
 
5. (C) Wilber Lopez, the Carazo coordinator of "Vamos con 
Eduardo", met emboffs along with representatives from 
individual municipalities.  Almost all were relatively young 
(in their 30s), but with long local experience in Nicaragua's 
turbulent politics, dating back to 1990 in most cases.  Many 
were former PLC youth leaders.  All described themselves as 
"100 percent Liberal" and stated that they still considered 
themselves to be PLC members even though most have been 
thrown out of the party for supporting Montealegre.  Lopez 
and his subordinates asserted that they are building a strong 
departmental organization, going house to house to rally 
support, and have garnered over 10,000 supporters in seven 
months of work thus far.  They claimed that even many of 
those who remain in local PLC structures privately support 
Montealegre as the most viable liberal candidate. 
 
6. (C) In addition to training party activists to defend the 
vote as "fiscales" on election day, the "Eduardo" movement is 
also preparing a campaign to assist voters in obtaining the 
required identity documents ("cedulas").  Although they 
welcomed the idea of a broad center-right alliance free of 
Aleman, they doubted whether such an alliance is possible, 
asserting that if voter turnout is sufficiently high, they 
could win in Carazo without such an alliance.  While most 
outside observers acknowledged Montealegre's popularity and 
his regular campaigning in Carazo, many questioned the 
movement's claims regarding the strength of its organization 
and its ability to change the allegiance of die-hard rural 
PLC voters. 
 
NATIVE-SON LEWITES POPULAR IN CARAZO TOWNS, BUT NOT MUCH 
IMPACT IN COUNTRYSIDE 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
7. (C) Although he was most recently mayor of Managua, Herty 
Lewites is originally from Jinotepe, the departmental capital 
of Carazo.  His "Hertylandia" theme/waterpark is located in 
 
the department, and when he was Minister of Tourism in the 
1980s, he helped bring a variety of tourism-related 
investments to Carazo.  Lewites thus enjoys a reputation for 
pragmatism and promotion of jobs and development in Carazo, 
and has a natural base of support there.  The mayor of 
Jinotepe, who was elected on the FSLN ticket in 2004, is 
actually from the Sandinista Renewal Movement (MRS), one of 
the members of Lewites' electoral coalition, and is actively 
supporting his campaign. 
 
8. (C) Except for one FSLN town counselor from La Conquista 
who "crashed" emboffs meeting with the PLC mayor there, 
everyone else agreed that Lewites enjoys widespread support 
in urban areas of Carazo, particularly with many small 
business owners and educated public sector workers (teachers, 
doctors, etc.).  Some officials of other parties feared that 
Lewites might draw as many urban votes from the center-right 
parties as he would from the FSLN, and many questioned 
whether the Herty/Daniel split is anything more than a 
Sandinista tactic to divide the "democratic" vote.  Most 
interlocutors questioned the strength of Lewites' local 
organization and doubted that his support extended into rural 
areas.  However, everyone acknowledged that Lewites is 
campaigning actively and visibly throughout the department. 
 
ALVARADO SUPPORTERS LEANING TOWARDS PLC, BUT CANDIDATE 
INVISIBLE IN CARAZO 
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9. (C) Although his local supporters claim otherwise, emboffs 
saw and heard little to suggest that APRE pre-candidate Jose 
Antonio Alvarado has much of a campaign organization in 
Carazo, has campaigned in the department at all, or enjoys 
any real degree of popular support there.  Other than APRE 
officials, no one even mentioned Alvarado in any context 
until emboffs asked about him.  When asked, virtually 
everyone reported that, as far as they know, Alvarado is not 
active in Carazo. 
 
10. (C) Emboffs heard a very different story from APRE 
Departmental President Erick Mendieta, who is also the 
departmental president of the "Amigos de Alvarado." 
Mendieta and a small group of APRE departmental officials met 
emboffs in the town of Diriamba, in a building with a large 
sign proclaiming it to be the local office of APRE National 
Assembly deputy Miguel Lopez Baldizon.  Mendieta proclaimed 
APRE the "Third Force" in Carazo (after the PLC and FSLN), a 
reference to its performance in the 2004 municipal elections 
that does not take into account the subsequent fracturing and 
desertions the party has suffered.  In keeping with the 
recent tentative rapprochement of APRE leaders Lopez and 
Alvarado with Aleman's PLC, Mendieta asserted that APRE 
maintains good relations with the PLC and Camino Cristiano in 
Carazo and that a grand center-right alliance of all these 
parties will be required to defeat the FSLN. 
 
11. (C) In a refrain often used by Alvarado and his 
supporters (as well as by the PLC), Mendieta dismissed as 
inaccurate and flawed polls showing Montealegre and Lewites 
to be the country's two most popular politicians.  Mendieta 
insisted that the polls do not represent sentiments in 
Carazo, neglecting both Alvarado's support and the rural 
strength of the PLC.  Early in the meeting, Mendieta 
dismissed Eduardo Montealegre's chances in Carazo, claiming 
that while he might enjoy a certain popularity, h?Q8]practical people, the party's departmental 
leaders were among the most unpleasant, intransigent PLC 
officials emboffs have ever met.  Such differences are not 
uncommon (see reftel), as local PLC elected officials are 
often more open and flexible than their counterparts in the 
party structures.  While Chavez and his councilors agreed 
that the PLC needs to become more democratic and stated that 
theQQBH3I]0g and that of the "Vamos con Eduardo" group were 
striking.  While Wilber Lopez of "Vamos con Eduardo" acted as 
though he was leading a meeting of equals, and the other 
"Vamos con Eduardo" officials present all spoke their minds 
when they wished, it was obvious that Tapia was the local PLC 
caudillo, and that no one could speak without his approval. 
The PLC representatives, as a group, were also significantly 
older than their "Vamos con Eduardo" counterparts, and did 
not give the impression of being the sort of people who had 
ever been out defending the vote on election day. 
 
14. (C) In a wide-ranging, reality-defying diatribe, Tapia 
insisted that in Carazo, the PLC organization and support are 
as strong as ever, that Montealegre has no organization and 
has met with "total rejection" in the department, that every 
PLC member in Carazo agreed one hundred percent with every 
decision ever taken by Aleman and his inner circle in 
Managua, that Aleman was a "political prisoner" who had never 
stolen a cent, and that no Aleman-Ortega "pact" had ever 
existed.  Tapia and his cohorts insisted that Aleman is the 
"indispensable leader" of the PLC and that the party could 
not change leadership in a time of "crisis."  Tapia claimed 
that the local PLC enjoys good relations with all of the 
other local political forces on the right of the 
spectrum--except for "Vamos con Eduardo", with which they 
have no relations whatsoever.  Tapia and company were 
unwilling or unable to offer any commentary on the various 
PLC presidential "pre-candidates", save to proclaim that 
whichever one is ultimately selected will win the general 
election.  While some kind of rapprochement with Jose Antonio 
Alvarado might be possible in Tapia's view, no accommodation 
could possibly be reached with Montealegre, whom he derided 
as rejecting primary elections now that the PLC had accepted 
them. 
 
15. (C) While the PLC organization in Carazo is a shadow of 
its former self and while no PLC presidential pre-candidate 
enjoys any significant support there, Tapia and his followers 
were not the only ones to claim that uneducated rural voters 
accustomed to voting for the PLC slot on the ballot 
("casilla") would unthinkingly punch the same ticket as 
usual, effectively making the PLC an indispensable part of 
any strategy to win the rural areas.  Such claims are 
difficult to evaluate, but anti-Sandinista rural voters in 
Nicaragua have a history of voting for whichever force they 
believe is most likely to prevent an Ortega victory. 
 
FSLN DIVIDED BY LEWITES, BUT RETAINS ITS HARD CORE 
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16. (C) Carazo has been strongly anti-Sandinista since the 
inception of democracy in Nicaragua in 1990, and the current 
predominance of FSLN mayors in the department is largely a 
result of high voter abstention in 2004 and the sharp 
divisions amongst the "democratic" parties that year (see 
paragraph 18).  Virtually all of emboffs' interlocutors 
agreed that the Sandinista vote in Carazo tops out at 30 
percent of the electorate.  Only disillusionment with 
politics and corresponding high abstention, shenanigans by 
the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE), and divisions among the 
"democratic forces" allowed the FSLN to make significant 
inroads in Carazo in the 2004 municipal elections.  With 
Lewites apparently drawing off a significant portion of these 
voters, at least in urban areas, numerous observers 
characterized the FSLN as "badly divided" in Carazo.  Given 
these circumstances, only a Lewites return to the FSLN fold, 
high voter abstention (which is not common in Nicaraguan 
presidential/legislative elections), or new CSE machinations 
could enable an FSLN breakthrough in Carazo.  Perhaps in part 
as a result of these realities, Daniel Ortega has yet to 
campaign in any serious way in the department. 
 
EVERYONE WORRIED ABOUT CSE INCOMPETENCE AND PRO-FSLN BIAS 
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17. Everyone emboffs met expressed concern on the ability and 
the desire of the CSE to carry out free and fair elections in 
November.  All of the representatives of the center-right 
parties stated that they are planning and implementing 
projects to obtain cedulas for their voters, as the local CSE 
official actively obstructed the efforts of their voters 
while facilitating the applications of FSLN militants and the 
delivery of their cedulas.  This was particularly a problem 
for non-FSLN rural voters, who must travel to Jinotepe to 
apply for and obtain cedulas.  Sandinista voters do not 
suffer such difficulties, as their cedulas are delivered to 
them by CSE officials.  Emboffs also heard regular complaints 
that the CSE is issuing cedulas to underage FSLN 
sympathizers.  Aside from such biases, numerous party 
officials also complained that the CSE has never made any 
kind of effort to update the electoral register or issue 
cedulas until a few months before each election. 
 
CARAZO: DEMOGRAPHICS AND VOTING PROFILE 
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18. (U)   Total Population (2003 est.): 178,818 
          Total Urban Population:         109,614 
          Total Rural Population:         69,204 
 
          Votes Received by Party, 2004 Municipal Elections 
 
          PLC:   17,080 
          FSLN:  25,167 
          APRE:  8,459 
          CCN:   1,014 
          PLI:   600 
          AC:    488 
          PLN:   390 
          PRN:   307 
          MSL:   120 
 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
19. (C) Since 1990, Carazo has been a strongly 
anti-Sandinista department.  When the non-Sandinista parties 
were more united, they won six out of eight municipalities in 
the 2000 municipal elections.  But when they were sharply 
divided in the 2004 municipal elections, and their voters 
disillusioned with the direction of national politics, 
abstention was over 50 percent and the FSLN took seven out of 
eight municipalities.  However, even with historically high 
abstention in 2004, the combined votes of anti-FSLN parties 
were larger than the Sandinista tally in all but two of the 
eight municipalities.  Particularly if Herty Lewites remains 
in the race and divides the FSLN vote, Carazo is a department 
that the center-right forces should win--if they can overcome 
their differences.  Herty Lewites and Eduardo Montealegre 
have started their campaigns with the advantage of widespread 
popularity, but the depth of their organizational strength 
remains in doubt, as well as their ability to change 
ingrained rural voting preferences.  However, despite PLC and 
APRE claims that poor campesinos are blindly loyal to Aleman 
and the PLC, they and other anti-FSLN voters have 
demonstrated considerable electoral savvy in the past, 
casting their ballots for whatever force seemed most capable 
of defeating Daniel Ortega.  If Montealegre can build a solid 
organization and convince people that his movement has 
eclipsed the PLC, he stands a good chance of persuading rural 
voters in Carazo and elsewhere not to "waste" their ballots 
by casting them for the PLC. 
TRIVELLI