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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MANAGUA 000127 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/OAS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2016 
TAGS: KDEM NU PGOV PINR
SUBJECT: ELECTION 2006: POSSIBLE SCENARIOS, RISKS, AND 
POTENTIAL OUTCOMES 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D). 
 
 - - - - - - - - - - 
Summary/Introduction 
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¶1.  (C) Our election priorities in Nicaragua are twofold: 
ensure Nicaragua holds clean, fair, credible, and inclusive 
national elections and encourage Nicaraguans to vote for 
presidential and legislative candidates who uphold democratic 
principles.  We will encourage an electoral process that will 
help Nicaragua strengthen its democracy and democratic 
institutions, create a truly representative balance among 
Nicaragua's political powers, and reinforce a bialteral 
productive working relationship to further economic and 
security cooperation.  Currently, a four-way presidential 
race is the most likely scenario.  However, there still is a 
possibility this could be reduced to a three-way race by 
summer and possibly even a two-way race thereafter.  End 
Summary/Introduction. 
 
 - - - - - - - 
Basic Premises 
 - - - - - - - 
 
¶2.  (C) The following are some basic premises concerning 
Nicaragua's current political landscape: 
 
--Most Nicaraguans seek a change in their political 
leadership and reject the current leadership of Nicaragua's 
two dominant political parties, the Liberal Constitutional 
Party (PLC) and the Sandinista Party (FSLN).  Early polls peg 
dissident PLC candidate Eduardo Montealegre (ALN-PC) and 
dissident GSLN member Herty Lewites as the clear 
front-runners. 
 
--Anti-Sandinista does not necessarily mean democratic; 
Aleman's caudillismo is not democratic.  Further, a dissident 
Sandinista, such as Lewites, could conceptually support 
democratic governance. 
 
--The PLC is unlikely to reform and move squarely into the 
democratic, anti-caudillisto column in large part because 
Aleman will not loosen his hold on the party apparatus and 
the PLC leaders are too compromised to break away from him. 
 
--To encourage Lewites to maintain his independence from 
Ortega, Lewites needs to believe we will work with him/his 
government if he wins in November. 
 
--An Ortega victory in a clean election is possible, but not 
probable.  His negatives are very high and he has lost three 
presidential bids in the past 15 years. 
 
--Montealegre cannot affiliate with the PLC as long as the 
PLC remains under Aleman's control.  He would lose all of his 
credibility and much of his support if he were to do so. 
 
--A four-way presidential race offers Nicaraguans real 
choices and the opportunity to strengthen their democracy - 
but such a race is unpredictable as four roughly equal 
political forces would vie for the prize. 
 
-- Voter turnout and the votes of independents and the 
undecided are pivotal.  Low voter turnout is likely to favor 
Ortega; high turnout is more likely to favor the 
anti-Sandinista vote, and the anti-caudillo vote more 
generally. 
 
--Vigorous international monitoring starting NOW, combined 
with robust Nicaraguan observation can minimize pact-driven 
fraud.  Without it, fraud at levels that will affect the 
electoral outcome is likely. 
 
--Voter education is key.  Many Nicaraguans are illiterate 
and recognize only party symbols; voters must be informed of 
which candidates and parties correspond to the different 
symbols and "casillas" (party registry numbers) on the 
ballot. 
 
- - - - - - - 
Four-Way Race 
- - - - - - - 
 
¶3.  (C) As it stands, a four-way presidential race is the 
most likely scenario.  If this holds, it would represent a 
 
MANAGUA 00000127  002 OF 004 
 
 
new political phenomenon for Nicaragua, one that could offer 
Nicaraguans a broader choice of candidates and platforms and 
an opportunity to choose a leader who will focus on 
strengthening Nicaragua's fragile democracy rather than 
consolidating personal power or the party's control over 
Nicaragua and its resources.  Likely candidates in a four-way 
race are the following: 
 
   -Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) candidate (TBD - 
probably not until May).  The party has two basic options: an 
Alvarado/Rizo combination in a quest for a "respectable" 
ticket, or the election of a more malleable Alemanista 
candidate. 
 
   -Sandinista (FSLN) candidate Daniel Ortega 
 
   -FSLN dissident Herty Lewites 
 
   -PLC dissident Eduardo Montealegre (now ALN-PC) 
 
¶4.  (SBU) To win on the first round, a candidate must have at 
least 35 percent of the votes and lead the closest competitor 
by at least five points.  Thus, in a four-way race, a run-off 
may well be required.  Lewites and Montealegre lead the 
polls.  If the elections are clean and inclusive, and if 
Lewites and Montealegre are able to develop strong enough 
organizations to transform their popular support into votes, 
the duo could face each other in a runoff. 
 
¶5.  (C) A four-way race presents risks and it could suffer 
setbacks, among them: 
 
     -Voter fraud could be easier to commit and more 
prevalent due to non-traditional circumstances (the Supreme 
Electoral Council (CSE) remains in the hands of the "pacted" 
FSLN and PLC, while other parties currently have no 
representation). 
 
     -Either or both of the dissident candidates are 
disqualified on trumped-up legal charges; 
 
     -Lewites rejoins the Ortega FSLN fold and drops out of 
the election; 
 
      -One or both of the dissident candidates fail to 
develop an organization capable of transforming popular 
support into sufficient votes and defending the vote against 
fraud perpetrated by the majority parties; or, 
 
      -Lewites takes more votes from Montealegre than from 
Ortega, and Lewites and Ortega end up being the top two 
vote-getters in the first round.  (Note: this scenario is 
highly unlikely because of the sizeable anti-Sandinista bloc 
(over 50 %) and Herty Lewite's weakness in the countryside.) 
 
¶6.  (C) If PLC Liberals, including rural voters who tend to 
vote Liberal, rally around Montealegre in a second round, he 
would be the favorite. 
 
- - - - - - - - 
Three-Way Races 
- - - - - - - - 
 
¶7.  (C) The three-way race scenario presents two 
possibilities: 
 
     -Ortega, Lewites, and a Liberal Alliance candidate 
(likely Montealegre), or 
 
     -Ortega, a PLC candidate (likely selected by Arnoldo 
Aleman), and Montealegre. 
 
Although these scenarios appear unlikely at this time, they 
could arise later in the year (as the election date nears and 
campaign time diminishes).  Lewites could eventually decide 
to run as Ortega's VP, or be "disqualified," or a 
PLC-Montealegre alliance could conceivably materialize. 
 
¶8.  (C) Risks of a three-way scenario: 
 
     -If Montealegre were to form an alliance with a PLC 
still under Aleman's control, this could subtract, not add, 
votes for Montealegre and the Liberal, anti-FSLN cause. 
Montealegre could be perceived to have sacrificed his 
democratic principles to win Aleman's benediction, and more 
of the undecided and independent voters could gravitate to 
 
MANAGUA 00000127  003 OF 004 
 
 
Lewites rather than Montealegre. 
 
     -An Ortega-Lewites alliance would increase the 
likelihood of a Sandinista win, especially if the Liberals 
remain divided.  However, Lewites would also lose a large 
number of interdependent voters if he associated with Ortega. 
 
- - - - - - - 
Two-Way Race 
- - - - - - - 
 
¶9.  (C) A two-way race, pitting an Ortega-Lewites Sandinista 
alliance against a PLC-Montealegre Liberal alliance, is 
unlikely but could emerge in reaction to an Ortega-Lewites or 
a PLC-Montealegre alliance. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Polls - What We Need to Know 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶10. (SBU) Although the polls tell us much, gaps remain in the 
information available, specifically in the following areas: 
 
      -More details on the breakdown of Nicaraguans according 
to party affiliation and strength/depth of that party 
affiliation (PLC, FLSN, Conservatives, minor parties, none, 
independent, undecided, refuse to reveal). 
 
      -Breakdown of Nicaraguan voters according to 
ideological rather than political affiliations (Liberal, 
Sandinista, Conservative, independent, none, other, refuse to 
reveal) --and what these ideological/philosophical difference 
represent and/or are perceived to be. 
 
     -Intention to vote (yes/no, candidate preference VS 
party VS ideological preference  VS platform/program 
offerings (which preference will carry more weight on 
Election Day); preference or not for political change. 
 
     -Information on regional preferences to improve message 
targeting. 
 
¶11. (SBU) In addition to traditional polling, focus groups 
would provide a more complete picture of voter interests 
(e.g., top three concerns), and preferences.  We will draw on 
this information to hone and better target our messages to 
different audiences. 
 
- - - - - - 
Our Message 
- - - - - - 
 
¶12. (U) Clear, concise, and consistent messages conveying our 
policy will minimize distortion: 
 
     -The Nicaraguan people have shown they want fresh, truly 
representative leadership that cares about their needs, not 
personal or partisan interests.  We too care about these 
needs - this is what true democracy is about. 
 
     -We and other donors hold a stake in seeing that the 
democratic wishes of the Nicaraguan people are fulfilled. 
 
     -We have contributed hundreds of millions of dollars 
over the past decade to help give Nicaraguans a fair shake - 
to hold well paying jobs, put food on the table, and educate 
their children.  We cannot allow these efforts to go to waste 
or to permit Aleman or Ortega to steal the hopes of the 
Nicaraguan people to better their lives. 
 
     -We make no apologies for defending the rights of the 
Nicaraguan people to live in dignity and prosperity. 
 
     -It is up to the Nicaraguan people to determine the 
direction their country will take and to choose their new 
leaders. 
 
     -Every vote counts and every voter should have a chance 
to vote. 
 
     -We encourage Nicaraguans to select leadership that best 
represents their aspirations. 
 
     -Our interest is helping to ensure the elections are 
free fair, credible, and inclusive. 
 
 
MANAGUA 00000127  004 OF 004 
 
 
     -We endorse principles and ideas, not candidates, and 
representative leadership, separation of powers, honest, 
public service, and selection by merit. 
 
     -We can work with a candidate who is elected in a fair 
and transparent process and who will strengthen Nicaragua's 
democracy, govern under the rule of law, and partner with us 
on economic and security matters. 
 
      -The CSE is responsible for ensuring that all eligible 
Nicaraguan voters obtain their cedulas, cast their ballots 
unencumbered, and have their votes counted. 
 
     -We will work with the CSE, domestic observers and 
Nicaragua's donor partners to make that possible. 
TRIVELLI