VZCZCXYZ0015
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #0124/01 0232056
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 232056Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4951
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000124 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2016 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM SOCI NU
SUBJECT: NICARAGUAN ELECTIONS REGIONAL REPORTING: JINOTEGA 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli for reasons 1.4 (b and d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Conversations with political, religious, and 
economic leaders in Jinotega department reveal an affinity 
across the Liberal spectrum for dissident presidential 
candidate Eduardo Montealegre, although Liberal leaders 
acknowledged that local campesinos -- the majority of the 
population -- are largely Arnoldista.  On the other hand, PLC 
pre-candidate and native son Jose Rizo appears to have 
completely alienated the vast majority of Jinotegan Liberals, 
even friends and family, by failing to "bring home the bacon" 
while vice president.  Other dissident candidates Jose 
Antonio Alvarado (Liberal) and Herty Lewites (Sandinista) do 
not appear to have much support in Jinotega.  Virtually 
everyone accuses the local and national Electoral Councils of 
Sandinista partisanship, specifically claiming that the 
electoral authorities are denying national ID/voting cards to 
Liberals.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) On January 11 and 12, Poloff and Political Assistant 
traveled to the northern Nicaraguan department of Jinotega to 
meet with the local leaders of the Liberal Constitutional 
Party (PLC), Alliance for the Republic (APRE), "Vamos con 
Eduardo," "Herty 2006" and the six PLC mayors.  We also 
discussed politics and other issues with the Jinotega Chamber 
of Commerce, the Coffee Growers Association, and other 
businessmen and religious leaders.  The following is a 
compilation of the information gathered on specific 
candidates and organizations involved in the 2006 elections. 
 
Friends and Family Reject Jose Rizo 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶3. (C) The leading PLC pre-candidate and ex-vice president 
under Bolanos is a coffee farmer and native of Jinotega.  One 
might therefore assume that Jinotegans would support Rizo, 
but virtually everyone expressed anger and resentment towards 
the candidate.  The consensus, even among Rizo,s close 
friends and relatives, is that Rizo "abandoned" the 
department and failed to use his influence in Managua to 
improve conditions in Jinotega, e.g. by repairing the 
tortuous roads that connect the city of Jinotega to Matagalpa 
and the Pan-American Highway, the lifelines of the coffee 
producers.  Eduardo Rizo Lopez, president of the coffee 
growers association and a cousin of Jose Rizo, declared him 
"persona no grata" in Jinotega and predicted that Rizo would 
attract "less than two percent of the vote" in the department. 
 
¶4. (C) Even the PLC departmental leadership and PLC mayors 
reject Rizo's candidacy.  Youth leader Roberto Herrera 
claimed that Rizo had informed them privately that he is 
Arnoldo Aleman's choice as the candidate, and PLC 
departmental president Alcala Blandon said they had rejected 
the "dedazo" (personal choice of Aleman) as a legitimate 
means to select a candidate.  The six PLC mayors were open to 
Liberal dissidents Eduardo Montealegre and Jose Antonio 
Alvarado, but snickered when Jose Rizo's name was mentioned. 
 
If Not Rizo, Then Who? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶5. (C) The Jinotegan PLC members repeatedly emphasized that 
their party enjoys the best organization in the department, 
but were largely at a loss to name a viable alternative 
candidate to Jose Rizo.  The departmental officers mentioned 
Francisco Aguirre Sacasa and Ramiro Sacasa as having 
potential as PLC candidates, but the PLC mayors said that, 
other than the infamous Rizo, none of the other 
pre-candidates is known or has any influence in Jinotega ) 
they instead seemed to favor Montealegre.  Coffee grower and 
PLC convention delegate Mario Lopez Rizo claimed that the 
other pre-candidates have no support.  "Vamos con Eduardo" 
director and former PLC candidate for mayor of Jinotega Ruby 
Zeledon disputed the PLC's claims to having an indispensable 
party organization, asserting that during her run for mayor 
she witnessed considerable disorganization within the party 
and was forced to raise funds from friends and family. 
 
¶6. (C) All local PLC leaders lamented the lack of support 
from their national representatives, naming Jinotega the 
"orphan department."  They claimed that, along with Jose 
Rizo, Liberal departmental deputies Fremio Altamirano and 
Carlos Noguera had also abandoned the department.  Members of 
all organizations interviewed emphatically agreed that the 
departmental deputies should be directly elected, not placed 
on a party list created by the national leadership. 
 
Eduardo Montealegre Draws the Most Support 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶7. (C) Jinotega, the front line during the 1980,s civil war, 
is a heavily Liberal department.  Most of the Liberals we met 
with, including PLC mayors and the local APRE directorship, 
favored Montealegre as the consensus candidate of the 
&democratic forces.8  Isidro Leon York, departmental 
coordinator of the Liberal "Vamos con Eduardo" movement, 
claimed that volunteers from all backgrounds, not just 
disenchanted PLC members, have joined the movement, but he 
also admitted that they must do "a lot of work" to sell 
Montealegre in the countryside.  Chamber of Commerce 
president Teresa Altamirano stated that Montealegre enjoys 
support in both urban and rural areas, claiming his rallies 
"filled the streets" in every location.  Local APRE 
coordinator Jairo Fajardo, nominally allied with Montealegre 
rival Jose Antonio Alvarado, said that either Montealegre or 
Alvarado would be a good candidate for the Liberals. 
 
¶8. (C) "Vamos con Eduardo" director and deputy alternate Ruby 
Zeledon shared that Montealegre's supporters have accepted 
the probability of entering the elections in competition with 
the PLC.  She reported that the group's political allies, the 
Conservative and Resistance parties, had a wide presence 
throughout the department, but with relatively few activists 
in any given location.  Eduardo Rizo Lopez alleged that the 
Resistance Party was previously strong in Jinotega given the 
high presence of ex-Contras, but claimed that the FSLN had 
eliminated the Resistance's "true leaders," costing the party 
strength and credibility. 
 
¶9. (C) Although many PLC members agree that Montealegre is 
the strongest candidate, they insist that the campesinos in 
Jinotega (the majority of the population) are strictly 
pro-PLC Arnoldistas and that Eduardo will not possibly win if 
he does not run under the PLC banner.  Departmental PLC 
president Alcala Blandon claimed that Montealegre's 
organization is weak and accused him of recruiting 
Sandinistas into his ranks.  They admitted, however, that the 
eventual PLC candidate will not win either if Eduardo divides 
the Liberal votes.  The PLC militants offered no suggestions 
on how to unite the Liberals, simply clamoring that &unity 
must be achieved8 and begging the Embassy so somehow make 
this happen. 
 
¶10. (C) The six PLC mayors in Jinotega department are more 
openly pro-Montealegre than the local party leadership.  Eric 
Castillo, the PLC mayor of El Cua, stated that Montealegre 
and Alvarado are both "excellent people" but should be united 
with the PLC.  When Poloff pointed out that both candidates 
were prohibited from running within the party by the Central 
Committee (CEN), Castillo fumbled for words and finally 
admitted, "we know we have some bad leaders on the CEN." 
Lujerio Carazco, mayor of San Jose de Bocay, went further, 
admitting that the CEN should have let Montealegre run within 
the PLC, but acknowledged that the mayors are afraid to speak 
out against the CEN for fear that they will be "cut off." 
(Comment: We were surprised that all six PLC mayors traveled 
to Jinotega city, some for as long as six hours, to attend 
the meeting with Emboffs.  End Comment.) 
 
Jose Antonio Alvarado - Splashy Billboards, but Little 
Support 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- 
 
¶11. (C) Of all the candidates, Alvarado has the only visible 
propaganda on the streets of Jinotega, with several large 
billboards in strategic locations.  Actual support for his 
candidacy, however, was lukewarm even among his supposed 
allies.  Local APRE leaders said that the "Amigos de 
Alvarado" had mounted the billboards and done all of the 
logistical work related to Alvarado,s earlier visit to the 
department, though APRE secretary Baltazar Jarquin accused 
the &Amigos8 of raiding APRE offices to obtain lists of 
party affiliates.  They said they would support Alvarado when 
and if he is declared APRE,s official candidate, but were 
more enthusiastic about Montealegre.  APRE coordinator Jairo 
Fajardo reported that they had organized a well-received 
meeting with their PLC counterparts last December to discuss 
Liberal unity in Jinotega, but apparently there has not been 
any substantive follow-up since then.  Chamber of Commerce 
president Teresa Altamirano told us that Jinotegans 
appreciate what Alvarado accomplished while in government, 
but said that he lacks "traction" in the department and 
should join with Montealegre. 
 
¶12. (C) When asked about the competing candidate for the APRE 
presidential nomination, Francisco Fiallos, Fajardo readily 
admitted that Fiallos has no support inside or outside of the 
party and does not even bother to attend APRE's conferences. 
Fajardo predicted that Fiallos is waiting to be promised a 
National Assembly deputy position before renouncing his 
candidacy. 
 
Herty Lewites ) a Long Way to Go 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶13. (C) Lewites, local campaign manager, Ali Zeas, is a 
Sandinista coffee grower who does not even have his own phone 
number (we had to call a relative to meet him).  Zeas 
admitted that Herty has &a lot of work to do8 in a 
traditionally Liberal department, and said that Lewites is 
planning a campaign tour in Jinotega following the Atlantic 
Coast elections in March.  Many Sandinistas will not publicly 
support Lewites for fear of losing their job with the 
municipality or some other form of reprisal, but have 
privately confided that Lewites has their vote, he claimed. 
Zeas reported that he had received some financing from coffee 
growers supportive of Lewites, but nothing from the national 
campaign -- he also said that many independent voters 
sympathetic to Lewites were reluctant to donate funds because 
they are still suspicious that Lewites may return to the FSLN 
fold.  He testily remarked that he had to pay off journalists 
to report on Lewites' campaign activities. 
 
¶14. (C) The Liberals seemed to approve of Herty,s campaign 
in so much as he is causing problems for Ortega, but most did 
not think he would have a major impact in Jinotega or 
nationally.  "Vamos con Eduardo" director Noel Blandon 
commented that Lewites is taking votes from Ortega, but 
wondered "how much of it is real?"  Coffee association 
president Eduardo Rizo Lopez predicted that "at the end of 
the day" the Sandinistas will not abandon Ortega for Lewites. 
 On a less cynical note, small business owner Lidia Fonseca 
said that Lewites enjoys an "image of transparency" and the 
perception that he can work with private industry, unlike 
Ortega. 
 
Everyone Suspicious of Electoral Council 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶15. (C) All of the Liberals (Montealegre's group, the PLC, 
APRE, etc.) claimed that the local and national electoral 
councils are in thrall of the FSLN.  They are worried that 
the Departmental Electoral Council (CED) will perpetrate 
another "raton loco" (random switching of voting stations to 
discourage citizens, presumably Liberals, from voting) and 
complained that the CED is not issuing national ID/voting 
cards (cedulas) to Liberals, only Sandinistas.  Ali Zeas also 
complained that many of Lewites' known supporters are unable 
to obtain cedulas.  Lidia Fonseca stated that the business 
community has no confidence in the electoral authority 
because "the magistrates manipulate everything."  Even Bishop 
Herrera acknowledged that "there have been irregularities 
with the issuance of cedulas." 
 
¶16. (C) Aside from the issue of electoral council fraud, PLC 
mayor of Yali, Noel Moreno, noted that a large number of 
campesinos lack their cedula simply because they cannot 
afford to take all of the bureaucratic steps necessary to 
obtain one.  He explained that many do not even possess a 
birth certificate, a prerequisite, because their parents did 
not/could not travel to the departmental capital to register 
the birth.  Of the campesinos who managed to obtain a birth 
certificate, many are illiterate and become frustrated with 
all of the bureaucratic steps necessary to apply for the 
cedula.  (Comment: Post is investigating the possibility of 
supporting a FIBRAS project that proposes to set up 
cedulation booths in poor areas to help people complete all 
of the documentation, take photos, etc.  End Comment.) 
 
Jinotega: Demographics and Voting Profile 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶17. (U)     Total Population (2005 est.): 297,270 
            Total Urban Population:        81,887 
            Total Rural Population:        215,383 
 
            Votes Received by Party, 2004 Municipal Elections 
            PLC:        38,792 
            FSLN:       33,626 
            PRN:        9,434 
            APRE: 5,786 
            Others:     2,834 
COMMENT: Divided We Fall 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶18. (C) Jinotega is one of the most heavily Liberal 
departments in Nicaragua.  Nevertheless, the FSLN won two of 
the eight municipalities in the department in 2004, including 
Jinotega city, because of Liberal division.  Liberal leaders 
from the PLC, APRE, and "Vamos con Eduardo" all expressed 
concern that the same fate would befall them in the 
presidential elections, but none seem ready to make 
substantive concessions to their rivals; rather, they want 
the USG to impose a solution so they cannot be blamed for 
failure.  On a more positive note, the local PLC leaders were 
not as dogmatic as the national directorship regarding 
"dissidents" such as Montealegre and were even cautiously 
critical of the PLC CEN, sentiments Montealegre may be able 
to exploit if he continues to gain strength. 
TRIVELLI