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PP RUEHRG
DE RUEHPE #0176/01 0171240
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8141
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 2845
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 2183
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6440
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 8918
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 2915
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 9919
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0073
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 1641
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 0025

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 12 LIMA 000176 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/ES-O/CMS, WHA, OES 
BRASILIA FOR ESTH HUB JSTORY 
 
E.O.  12958: N/A 
TAGS: AMGT ASEC CASC AMED KFLO AEMR TBIO PE
SUBJECT: EMBASSY LIMA AVIAN INFLUENZA TRIPWIRES 
 
REF: STATE 219189 
 
¶1. Summary:  (SBU) Embassy Lima's EAC approved tripwires and 
Embassy responses prepared by its Avian Influenza Working 
Group (AIWG).  Post has taken or has in process the 
Department's recommended immediate preparedness measures. 
The AIWG has agreed that efficient and sustained human-to- 
human transmission, anywhere in the world, and any cases of 
human AI in Peru, will be key tripwire events in an AI 
pandemic.  Adequate medical care would not be available in 
Lima in the event of a Pandemic.  Post recommends serious 
consideration of authorized departure after the earliest 
tripwires, but has kept its action plan flexible.  Despite 
limitations in GOP capability, the medical and avian 
expertise at post will enable it to make rapid and 
appropriate judgments.  End Summary. 
 
SITUATION IN PERU 
----------------- 
¶2. (SBU) Peru's hospitals will be completely overwhelmed in 
the event of Pandemic Influenza. Peru is a medically austere 
post, with no large sophisticated hospitals as are found in 
Colombia, Chile, Argentina or Brazil. The Regional Medical 
Officer (RMO) at post recommends hospitalization only at 
several small private hospitals in Lima. There are perhaps 
30 adequate intensive care beds in Lima, with around 20 
ventilators, all of which would be unavailable in a 
pandemic. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Post may be able to shelter in place for 3 to 4 
weeks, but two weeks is a more realistic maximum.  Civil 
disorder and food and other commodities disruption, as well 
as an inability to medically care for the sickest patients, 
would probably produce a calamity for post should we shelter 
in place.  RMO feels that the health and safety of our 
personnel would be best served by an authorized departure 
from Peru immediately after the WHO declares the start of a 
pandemic anywhere in the world. 
 
AVIAN INFLUENZA WORKING GROUP 
----------------------------- 
¶4. (U) The Embassy Lima Avian Influenza (AI) Working Group 
(AIWG) has met and discussed immediate actions, potential 
tripwires and possible Embassy activities in response to 
these tripwires. Participants on the AIWG include 
representatives from the Health Unit (HU)/Regional Medical 
Officer, the Naval Medical Research Center Detachment 
(NMRCD), USAID, Consular (CON), RSO, MAO, ECON, FAS and PAO. 
Many AIWG members are also on the Emergency Action 
Committee.  Other sections with assets that could be used to 
deal with an outbreak, such as Narcotics Affairs Section 
(NAS) and DEA were consulted. 
 
¶5. (U) Despite limitations in GOP and private medical 
capability, the medical/health and avian expertise at post 
represented by NMRCD, FAS, RMO and USAID will enable the 
AIWG to make rapid and appropriate judgments to confirm 
tripwires and responses.  For this reason tripwire responses 
contain maximum flexibility, with most situations calling 
for consideration of authorized or ordered departure 
requests. 
 
 
 
TRIPWIRES AND RESPONSES 
----------------------- 
¶6. (U) The AIWG agreed that the key tripwire event in a 
Pandemic Influenza outbreak among humans is the following: 
"Efficient and sustained human-to-human transmission." 
Once this tripwire is met, it will trigger a series of 
immediate Embassy activities (as listed under tripwires five 
and six below).  The medical experts on the AIWG advised 
that if an efficient and sustained human-to-human 
transmission should emerge, it will become fairly obvious 
within one or two weeks, with many people contracting 
influenza, including health care workers taking care of 
patients. 
 
¶7. (U) Other tripwires warrant attention, as they could 
indicate a change in the nature of the virus, but not to the 
 
LIMA 00000176  002 OF 012 
 
 
extent of an efficient and sustained human-to-human 
transmission. These tripwires are the following:  "A spike 
in the number and/or broadening geographic spread of animal 
to human cases" and "Sustained human-to-human transmission 
through close, prolonged contact." Specific scenarios also 
have been discussed and actions recommended below, but 
within the context of the broader tripwires. 
 
¶8. (U) The AIWG agreed that the location of a tripwire event 
- in a neighboring country, in a rural or isolated section 
of the home country, or near or within the city where the 
Embassy or other USG facility is located - is an important 
factor to consider.  Parts of Peru, including Iquitos, are 
accessible only by air or river boat.  Iquitos has a 
substantial USG presence (NMRCD staff and frequent visitors 
from other agencies); other towns east of the Andes such a 
Pucallpa have fairly constant USG official presence. 
Communications regarding AI would include the Consular Agent 
in Cuzco as appropriate.  Our Peace Corps volunteers (PCV) 
are grouped in certain areas, most of them isolated. 
 
¶9. (U) These tripwires are based on assumptions that should 
sustained human-to-human transmission become a reality: 
- The disease could spread rapidly, both within a particular 
country and internationally. 
- Once the World Health Organization has declared that a 
human pandemic has started, travel by commercial aviation 
will become limited as countries react to control the spread 
of the disease. 
- An effective human vaccine will still not be available. 
- Availability of effective therapy will be limited. 
- Public reaction to an outbreak, even solely among poultry, 
could be fueled by sensational media reporting and a 
proclivity for mass demonstrations, causing a public 
reaction out of proportion to the situation and making GOP 
and the Embassy's response more difficult. 
- Embassy personnel and dependants will want to return to 
the U.S. unless there is a significant PI outbreak there. 
- It may nevertheless be medically safer for personnel to 
remain in Peru. 
- Avoiding a double standard for non-official Americans, and 
to what extent to include LES in AI/PI preparations, will 
require careful navigation. 
- NMRCD-Iquitos, while primarily an entomology facility, 
will be the only laboratory in northern Peru capable of 
effecting testing for avian flu; it will probably remain 
operating where a peripheral USG facility might otherwise be 
closed so that employees could relocate to Lima. 
- Timely and appropriate communications with the Mission's 
FSN staff will be key for an organized response to a 
pandemic. 
 
¶10. (U) Any of the tripwires discussed below could occur 
independently of each other.  It is also possible that two 
or more tripwires could occur sequentially or 
simultaneously. In the course of discussions, it was 
apparent that certain actions need to take place now, before 
any tripwires are met, in order to be fully prepared in 
advance. 
 
¶11. (U) These tripwires are designed to stimulate maximum 
advance planning, to identify key events that will require 
rapid response to protect Post personnel and facilities, and 
to describe the (foreseeable) scope of issues that will need 
to be addressed under specific scenarios.  At the same time, 
Post recognizes that real-time judgments will need to be 
based on actual data and factors present in the situation -- 
which may not be anticipated in this document. 
 
¶12. (U) This report lists (A) actions that require immediate 
attention, (B) tripwires and responses, and (C) specific 
scenarios. 
 
¶13. (U) (A) Actions to be taken immediately in preparation 
for an Avian Influenza (AI) outbreak in humans (Pandemic 
Influenza - PI): 
 
- Provide Mission fact sheets for staff (American and FSN) 
and dependents in Lima and in Iquitos and other cities where 
Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) or other Mission employees 
 
LIMA 00000176  003 OF 012 
 
 
are located. (Already done as part of EAP.) 
 
- Mission prepares a drawdown list and a list of minimum 
emergency personnel. (Note: Emergency personnel in the 
context of an AI outbreak likely will be different from the 
usual list compiled by the EAC for other types of 
emergencies.  The Mission will plan to retain more NMRCD, 
FAS, and USAID staff than are on the basic EAC drawdown 
list, and some persons on the current basic EAC list may not 
be essential for an AI outbreak.) (In Progress) 
 
- Conduct inventory of supplies of Tamiflu and protective 
equipment, including gowns, gloves, protective eyewear, 
alcohol-based cleansers, and N95 respirators. (Done) 
 
- Determine what more is needed and procure the additional 
needed supplies.  Decide how to allocate Tamiflu, masks, and 
other equipment between Embassy Lima and NMRCD-Iquitos. (In 
progress) 
 
- Advise family members to keep at least a 2-week supply of 
food and water at this time, as they should in the event of 
any unforeseen emergency occurring overseas. (Already done 
as part of EAP and Embassy community outreach.) 
 
- Offices should evaluate mechanisms for conducting work 
from home or other locations under conditions of a pandemic 
requiring limiting access to Mission offices. (In progress.) 
 
- Develop a contingency plan of action for directly 
supporting potential embassy evacuees from neighboring posts 
with limited medical resources. (Already done as part of EAP 
for dealing with political unrest causing evacuation from 
neighboring posts.  Note: this is a low priority as Lima 
would not be an advisable evacuation point for neighboring 
country U.S. Missions.) 
 
- Prepare pre-planned packets - including travel orders to 
the extent possible - for potential Mission evacuees under 
an authorized departure, to avoid a last minute backlog. 
(Travel order requests are already on file for mission 
members per EAC SOP; Mission is working on preparation of 
draft travel orders.) 
 
- Continue to monitor GOP ability to detect, contain and 
treat AI cases in birds and humans. (ECON, AID, NMRCD and 
FAS are doing this.) 
 
- Meet with Roche Peru medical director to assess 
availability of Tamiflu in Lima. (ECON - in Progress) 
 
- Involve Commissary Board in developing plan to stock 
appropriate items and how to transfer to members (and non- 
members, in emergency) without compromising financial 
integrity. (In progress) 
 
- GSO to develop authorization for Embassy community to have 
increased number of filled water containers on hand. (In 
progress) 
 
- Confirm secure location of Tamiflu and other essential 
materials. (Done) 
 
- Hold Town Hall meeting, simultaneously using warden system 
to inform AmCit community. (Scheduled) 
 
¶14. (U) (B) TRIPWIRES AND RESPONSES: 
 
TRIPWIRE ZERO 
 
Any human case of H5N1 influenza appearing in Peru, or human 
case of H7N7 (or other avian, or pandemic flu), presumably 
transmitted from birds or other animals, appears in Peru, 
without evidence of sustained human-to-human transmission. 
(Note: despite lack of clear danger of PI, Embassy and 
Peruvian public concern will be high.) 
 
- AIWG meets to confirm tripwire.  NMRCD-Iquitos 
participates by telephone. 
 
 
LIMA 00000176  004 OF 012 
 
 
- Restrict official and unofficial travel to affected areas, 
bird markets and similar facilities. (exception below) 
 
-  Release a warning announcement to Mission personnel and 
warden message to private American citizens, and post the 
warning announcement on the Embassy website. Prepare talking 
points for domestic and international press. 
 
- Provide detailed briefing to Embassy staff.  Communicate 
pertinent information to the Embassy community by way of 
venues such as town hall meetings, the embassy web site and 
newsletter articles.  AIWG meets with FSN committee 
representatives. 
 
- Consider sending NMRCD or USAID expert to area to verify 
situation. 
 
- ECON, FAS, NMRCD contact key GOP agency contacts to assess 
situation.  These agencies include: 
 
- SENASA (Min. of Ag. Animal Inspection Service) (FAS, ECON) 
 
- Min. of Health (NMRCD, USAID, ECON) 
 
- INDECI (Disaster/Civil Defense Agency)(MAAG, USAID, ECON) 
 
- Defense Ministry (MAAG, DAO)- Police (Ministry of 
Interior) (RSO) 
 
¶15. (U) TRIPWIRE ONE 
 
A spike in the number and/or broadening geographic spread of 
animal to human cases or sustained human-to-human 
transmission through close, prolonged contact in a 
neighboring country in South America (Colombia, Ecuador, 
Bolivia, Chile, Brazil), but not in Peru. Consider this 
tripwire if situation occurs in an Asian country with which 
Peru has extensive trade, such as China. This is 
particularly significant if there are multiple, 
geographically diverse clusters, or if a cluster occurs in a 
major transit hub. (No efficient and sustained human-to- 
human cases.) 
 
- AIWG meets to confirm tripwire.  NMRCD-Iquitos 
participates by telephone. 
 
- Restrict travel to the affected country or affected areas 
within the country, except for NMRCD, FAS, or other 
personnel involved in possible investigation/containment 
efforts.  (No restrictions on these personnel returning to 
Lima.) 
 
- Coordinate with U.S. Mission in the affected country 
regarding that Mission's plans for possible public 
announcements, warden messages, or plans for evacuating 
personnel. 
 
- Provide Mission fact sheet or briefings for staff 
(American and FSN) and dependents in Lima and in other USG 
facilities as appropriate. 
 
- AIWG meets with FSN committee representatives. 
 
- Ensure that any public announcements or travel warnings 
issued by neighboring posts are transmitted to American 
citizens (AmCits) in Peru; publish the updates on the 
Consular Section's web site. Consider a public announcement 
to private American citizens. 
 
- Consider requesting authorized departure of U.S. family 
members and non-emergency personnel. Have evacuation plans 
for both the well and ill. 
 
- Institute screening practices for all visitors to U.S. 
Government facilities and consider limiting visitor numbers. 
 
- Consider mandatory sick leave for any employee who shows 
any influenza (flu)-like symptoms or has a family member 
with flu-like symptoms. Information will be disseminated 
regarding the details of flu symptoms. Monitoring by the 
 
LIMA 00000176  005 OF 012 
 
 
Health Unit. 
 
- Consider use of prophylactic oseltamivir (Tamiflu) by U.S. 
and LES staff in positions that require frequent contact 
with the public. 
 
¶16. (U) TRIPWIRE TWO 
 
A spike in the number and/or broadening geographic spread of 
animal to human cases or sustained human-to-human 
transmission through close, prolonged contact in rural Peru 
or in an isolated section of Peru, but not in Lima. (No 
efficient human-to-human cases.) 
 
- AIWG meets to confirm that tripwire has been met. NMRCD- 
Iquitos participates. 
 
- Restrict travel to the affected region(s) of the country 
except for NMRCD, FAS, or other personnel involved in 
possible investigation/containment efforts.  (No 
restrictions on these personnel returning to Lima.) 
 
- In coordination with the Dept, issue public announcement, 
warden message, or travel warning and update website 
cautioning American citizens against nonessential travel to 
the affected region(s).  Provide press guidance for the 
potential use of the Mission, neighboring posts, the 
Department and concerned government agencies. 
 
- Provide Mission fact sheet and schedule briefings for 
staff (American and FSN) and dependents in Lima and other 
USG facilities as appropriate.  Fact sheet would detail the 
episode(s) and suggest means of disease prevention. The 
notice will also be posted on the Embassy website.   AIWG 
meets with FSN committee representatives. 
 
- Consider reduction to emergency consular services only. 
 
- Consider requesting authorized departure. Consider 
requesting ordered departure.  Consider implementing 
selective administrative leave for those Americans who 
remain at post, and LES employees. Consider other options 
for minimizing workplace exposure, like telecommuting. 
 
- Order mandatory sick leave for any employee who shows any 
flu-like symptoms or has a family member with flu-like 
symptoms. 
 
- Consider home quarantine and limiting venues of human-to- 
human contact, such as commnity gatherings. 
 
- Consider screening of all visitors to the chancery and 
other USG facilities, and recommend use of protective gear, 
especially surgical masks, to those with frequent contact 
with visitors. (Note: Due to limited supply of N95 masks and 
lack of necessity for their use at this time, the N95 would 
not be required.) 
 
- Health Unit to initiate appropriate use of prophylactic 
oseltamivir (Tamiflu) by minimal U.S. and LES staff 
remaining on the job. 
 
¶17. (U) TRIPWIRE THREE 
 
A spike in the number and/or broadening geographic spread of 
animal to human cases or sustained human-to-human 
transmission through close, prolonged contact near or within 
Iquitos, Pucallpa, or other NAS facilities. 
 
- AIWG meets to confirm that tripwire has been met.  NMRCD- 
Iquitos participates. 
 
- Town meetings are held and fact sheets distributed.  AIWG 
meets with FSN committee representatives. 
 
- Restrict travel to affected areas except for NMRCD, FAS, 
or other personnel involved in possible 
investigation/containment efforts. (No restrictions on these 
personnel returning to Lima.) 
 
 
LIMA 00000176  006 OF 012 
 
 
- In coordination with the State Department, issue public 
announcement, warden message, or travel warning and update 
website advising American citizens to defer all non- 
emergency travel to affected areas.  Prepare press guidance 
and issue press release outlining the new guidance. 
Coordinate public affairs and media activities with NMRCD- 
Iquitos. 
 
- Implement home quarantine of any staff or dependents that 
have been in contact with a person confirmed to have an AI 
infection. 
 
- Embassy Lima maintains operations, but maintains close 
monitoring. 
 
- Emergency Action Committee meets regularly and coordinates 
closely with NMRCD-Iquitos and other USG facilities to 
determine next steps as tripwire circumstances develop. 
Next steps could include the following: 
 
- Close NAS or other USG facilities outside of Lima, reduce 
NMRCD-Iquitos to minimal staff, and reduce services and 
operations to emergency Consular services and other 
designated services and operations. 
 
- Consider authorized departure of dependents.  Authorized 
departure of non-emergency staff. (Note: In deciding whether 
to authorize departure, the EAC should take into account not 
only the medical risk, which may be minimal, but also the 
perceived risk by employees and family members.) 
 
- Ensure that staff purchase additional supplies of food and 
water. 
 
- Depending on level of public inquiries, embassy Lima 
establishes a call center for inquiries from American public 
and the press. 
 
¶18. (U) TRIPWIRE FOUR 
 
A spike in the number and/or broadening geographic spread of 
animal to human cases or sustained human-to-human 
transmission through close, prolonged contact near or within 
Lima. (still no efficient human-to-human transmission.) 
 
- AIWG meets to confirm that tripwire has been met.  NMRCD- 
Iquitos participates. 
 
- Town meetings held and fact sheets distributed.  AIWG 
meets with FSN committee representatives. 
 
- Cancel (deny Country Clearance for)  incoming official 
travel to Peru, except for personnel involved in 
investigative/containment efforts, or as otherwise deemed 
necessary by COM. 
 
- In coordination with the State Department, issue or revise 
warden message, and travel warning and update website urging 
all American citizens to defer all non-emergency travel to 
Peru.  (Prepare press guidance and issue press release 
outlining the new guidance.)  Coordinate public affairs and 
media activities with NMRCD-Iquitos. 
 
- Implement home quarantine of any staff or dependents that 
have been in contact with a person confirmed to have an AI 
infection. 
 
- Embassy Lima maintains full service operations, but 
maintains close monitoring. 
 
- Consular Section reduces visa appointments to a minimum to 
reduce risk of spreading disease within the Embassy and to 
make more staff available to provide emergency assistance to 
American citizens. 
 
- Emergency Action Committee meets regularly and coordinates 
closely with NMRCD-Iquitos and other USG facilities to 
determine next steps as tripwire circumstances develop. 
Next steps could include the following: 
 
 
LIMA 00000176  007 OF 012 
 
 
- Close USG facilities outside of Lima, reduce NMRCD-Iquitos 
to appropriate staffing level, and/or Embassy to minimal 
staff, reduce services and operations to emergency Consular 
services and other designated services and operations. 
 
- Consider requesting authorized departure of dependents and 
non-emergency staff. (Note: In deciding whether to request 
authorized departure, the EAC should take into account not 
only the medical risk, which may be minimal, but also the 
perceived risk by employees and family members.) 
 
- Except for designated emergency American and FSN staff, 
all others remain home (administrative leave) or on 
authorized departure. 
 
- HU and designated EAC members meet with school 
administrators to review advisability of closing the 
schools. 
 
- Ensure that staff purchase additional supplies of food and 
water. 
 
- Social restrictions (restrict movements of all personnel 
in the city, restrict social events/gatherings, restrict 
participating in sporting events, etc.). 
 
- Depending on level of public inquiries, embassy Lima 
establishes a call center for inquiries from American public 
and the press. 
 
¶19. (U) TRIPWIRE FIVE 
 
Efficient and sustained human-to-human transmission in a 
neighboring country in South America, or a country with 
which Peru has substantial trade in avian products, such as 
China. 
 
- AIWG meets to confirm that tripwire has been met.  NMRCD- 
Iquitos participates. 
 
- Restrict travel to the affected country, except for NMRCD, 
FAS, or other personnel involved in possible 
investigation/containment efforts.  (Note: Need to determine 
what type of quarantine/restrictions by GOP authorities may 
be placed on these personnel returning to Peru.) 
 
- Coordinate with U.S. Mission in the affected country 
regarding that Mission's plans for possible evacuation of 
personnel to Lima.  (Note: See Scenario One below.) 
 
- Provide Mission briefings for staff (American and FSN) and 
dependents in Lima and in USG facilities outside of Lima. 
AIWG meets with FSN committee representatives. 
 
- MED and designated EAC members meet with school 
administrators to review advisability of closing the 
schools. 
 
- Embassy staffs and equips a situation room.  Uses cleared 
press guidance. 
 
- Maintain normal Consulate and Embassy operations, but 
maintain close monitoring. 
 
- Embassy Emergency Action Committee meets regularly and 
coordinates closely with NMRCD-Iquitos and other USG 
facilities to determine next steps as tripwire circumstances 
develop.  Next steps could include: 
 
- Reduction to emergency CON services; suspension of some 
services. 
 
- Close USG facilities outside of Lima, reduce NMRCD-Iquitos 
and/or Embassy to appropriate staffing, and reduce services 
and operations to emergency Consular services and other 
designated services and operations. 
 
- Consider requesting authorized departure for dependents 
and non- emergency personnel.  (Note: Authorized departure 
will be dependent on possible Government of Peru 
 
LIMA 00000176  008 OF 012 
 
 
restrictions on outgoing travel and on possible U.S. 
restrictions on incoming travel.) 
 
- Except for designated emergency American and FSN staff, 
all others remain home (administrative leave) or on 
authorized departure; children remain home from school or 
on authorized departure. 
 
- Ensure that staff purchases additional supplies of food 
and water. 
 
- Social restrictions (restrict movements of all personnel 
in the city, restrict social events/gatherings, restrict 
participating in sporting events, etc.). 
 
¶20. (U) TRIPWIRE SIX 
 
Efficient and sustained human-to-human transmission in an 
isolated section of Peru. 
 
- AIWG meets to confirm that tripwire has been met.  NMRCD- 
Iquitos participates in person or by telephone. 
 
- Issue revised travel warning and update website advising 
American citizens to defer all non-emergency travel to Peru. 
 
- Consider requesting authorized or ordered departure of 
dependents and non- emergency personnel.  (Note: Authorized 
departure will be dependent on possible Government of Peru 
restrictions on outgoing travel and on possible U.S. 
restrictions on incoming travel.) 
 
- Cancel all incoming official travel, except for personnel 
involved in investigative/containment efforts, or as 
otherwise deemed necessary by COM. 
 
- Provide Mission briefings for staff (American and FSN) and 
dependents and to school administrators at schools used by 
American staff in Lima; recommend 
schools close.  AIWG meets with FSN committee 
representatives. 
 
- Embassy and NMRCD-Iquitos at minimal staff, reduction to 
emergency Consular services, suspension of designated 
services and operations. Closure of other USG facilities 
such as NAS-supported bases.  PCV are pulled back to Lima 
and stay with volunteer host families from Embassy 
Community. 
 
- Except for designated emergency American and FSN staff, 
all others remain home (administrative leave) or on 
authorized departure; children remain home from school or on 
authorized departure. 
 
- Ensure that staff purchase additional supplies of food and 
water. 
 
- Social restrictions (restrict movements of all personnel 
in the city, restrict social events/gatherings, restrict 
participating in sporting events, etc.). 
 
- Split the Marine Security Guard detachment into two 
separate and independent units.  (In the event individuals 
in one unit acquire the disease, the other unit can still 
ensure proper coverage of classified materials.) 
 
- Restrict visitor access to Mission buildings.  If entry 
into Mission buildings is necessary to conduct business, 
visitors must go through screening procedures to include 
temperature monitoring and/or questionnaire related to 
symptoms/exposure.  (Note: There are no studies that provide 
verification regarding effectiveness of these procedures. 
They also will not identify people who are contagious but 
asymptomatic or have minimal symptoms.  The level of 
restrictions on access to Mission facilities should depend 
on the particular circumstances at that moment.) 
 
- Embassy staffs and equips a situation room and a call 
center for inquiries from American public and the press. 
 
 
LIMA 00000176  009 OF 012 
 
 
- Establish a database listing details of any American 
citizen, hospitalized, quarantined, or ill at home. 
 
- HU closely monitors availability of medical/hospital 
facilities in Lima. 
 
- MAO closely monitors availability of outgoing commercial 
flights. 
 
- Embassy EAC meets regularly and coordinates closely with 
NMRCD-Iquitos to determine next steps as tripwire 
circumstances develop.  Next steps could include: 
 
- Restrict/prohibit visitor access to internal Mission 
facility offices. 
 
- Reduction of staff at NMRCD-Iquitos to those performing AI- 
related duties. 
 
- Consider ordered departure of non-emergency personnel and 
dependents with authorized departure of designated emergency 
personnel on a case-by-case basis. (Note: Ordered or 
authorized departure will be dependent on possible 
Government of Peru restrictions on outgoing travel and on 
possible U.S. restrictions on incoming travel.) 
 
- Suspension of additional Embassy services and operations. 
 
- In coordination with the State Department, revise Travel 
Warning to add message advising Americans to leave Peru. 
 
- Update website and issue public announcements as 
necessary. 
 
- Per State 183776 (10/05/2005), prophylactic treatment with 
Tamiflu will be considered only for staff that are required 
to be in direct contact with potentially infected persons. 
 
- Assist in evacuation of private American nationals. (Note: 
Significant evacuation from Lima may not be 
feasible/advisable for a variety of reasons including the 
size of the post, limited availability of air transport, the 
potential and added risk of acquiring influenza at crowded 
airports or on long international flights during a true 
pandemic, travel restrictions and possible quarantine 
measures.  Therefore, a complete evacuation of all Mission 
personnel and closure of Embassy Lima is not/not 
anticipated.) 
 
¶21. (U) TRIPWIRE SEVEN 
 
Efficient and Sustained human-to-human transmission, as 
evidenced by clusters of cases in Lima. This is particularly 
significant if there are multiple diverse clusters, or a 
cluster is not safely isolated. 
 
- AIWG meets to confirm that tripwire has been met.  NMRCD- 
Iquitos participates in person or by telephone. 
 
- AIWG meets with FSN committee representatives. 
 
- Order mandatory reduction to emergency consular services. 
Consider closing consular section. 
 
- Implement ordered departure, if airlines are still 
servicing Lima. 
 
- Implement administrative leave for non-emergency LES 
(FSNs). Consider other options for minimizing workplace 
exposure, like telecommuting. 
 
- Order mandatory sick leave for any employee who shows any 
flu-like symptoms or has a family member with flu-like 
symptoms. 
 
- Screen all visitors to chancery and USG facilities, and 
use of protective gear, including N95 masks by those 
employees with significant contact with the public. 
 
- Initiate appropriate prophylactic use of oseltamivir 
 
LIMA 00000176  010 OF 012 
 
 
(Tamiflu) by LES staff remaining on the job and by American 
employees and family members remaining at post. 
 
- Issue public announcement to private American community. 
 
- Consider shelter in place order by COM.  Use Embassy 
warden system to maintain contact with employees. 
 
- Implement drawdown of Embassy staff to AI/PI drawdown 
list; rest of Amcit staff are on administrative leave. 
 
¶22. (U) TRIPWIRE EIGHT 
 
Efficient and sustained human-to-human transmission anywhere 
in the world.  (Note: due to frequency of air travel between 
Lima and North America, Asia and Europe, Embassy would 
consider spread to Lima as probable.) 
 
- AIWG meets to confirm that tripwire has been met.  NMRCD- 
Iquitos participates. 
 
- AIWG meets with FSN committee representatives. 
 
- Restrict travel to the affected country. 
 
- Provide Mission fact sheet and town meeting for staff 
(American and FSN) and dependents in Lima and in USG 
facilities outside of Lima. 
 
- Maintain normal Consulate and Embassy operations, but 
maintain close monitoring. 
 
- Embassy Emergency Action Committee meets regularly and 
coordinates closely with NMRCD-Iquitos and other USG 
facilities to determine next steps as tripwires develop. 
 
- Request authorized departure for dependents and non- 
emergency personnel.  (Note: Authorized departure will be 
dependent on possible Government of Peru restrictions on 
outgoing travel and on possible U.S. restrictions on 
incoming travel.) Prioritize departure for persons at high 
risk for medical complications of influenza. 
 
- Ensure that staff purchases additional supplies of food 
and water. 
 
¶23. (U) C. SPECIFIC SCENARIOS: 
 
SCENARIO ONE 
 
A neighboring post evacuates personnel to Lima. (Note: this 
scenario is unlikely as Lima is not an appropriate recipient 
of evacuees in the event of a PI.) 
 
- If scenario occurs outside of the context of Tripwire Six 
(above), the Embassy MAO in coordination with its sub- 
sections will implement the following procedures: 
 
- Identify suitable temporary lodging arrangements for the 
evacuees. 
 
- Establish procedures for the evacuees to receive 
administrative services such as cashing checks, use of 
commissary, access to the Medical Unit, filing travel 
vouchers, etc. 
 
- Designate sponsors for the evacuees. 
 
- Assist school age children to enroll into temporary 
classes in appropriate school if the evacuation period is 
extended beyond two weeks. 
 
- If scenario occurs within the context of Tripwire Six 
(above), incoming personnel should be diverted to other 
points.  Incoming personnel who have already arrived in 
Peru will be placed on ordered departure. 
 
¶24. (U) SCENARIO TWO 
 
Reported saturation of available medical facilities in 
 
LIMA 00000176  011 OF 012 
 
 
Lima/Peru. 
 
- Response assumes Scenario Two takes place within the 
context of PI outbreak in Lima or outside Lima with cases 
transported to Lima.  Many dependents and staff likely will 
have already been evacuated.  Emergency Action Committee 
meets to discuss next steps, which could include: 
 
- Staff reduction at NMRCD-Iquitos and NMRCD-Callao.  Recall 
to Lima of PCV and NAS employees. 
 
- Request ordered departure of non-emergency personnel and 
dependents with authorized departure of designated emergency 
staff on a case-by-case basis.  (Note: Ordered or authorized 
departure will be dependent on possible Government of Peru 
restrictions on outgoing travel and on possible U.S. 
restrictions on incoming travel.) 
 
¶25. (U) SCENARIO THREE 
 
International commercial flights departing Peru are severely 
curtailed or halted or are fully booked. 
 
- Emergency Action Committee meets to discuss next steps, 
which could include: 
 
- Except for designated emergency American and FSN staff, 
all others remain home (administrative leave). 
 
- HU and designated EAC members meet with school 
administrators to review advisability of closing the 
schools. 
 
- Ensure that staff purchase additional supplies of food and 
water. 
 
- Consider social restrictions (restricting social 
events/gatherings, sporting events, etc.) 
 
- Evacuation of non-emergency personnel and dependents out 
of Peru via commercial airlift, via U.S. military flights 
out through Lima, or by sea.  (Note: Both Air and Sea are 
viable methods for conducting an evacuation of non- 
combatants.  Military assets, however, are not pre- 
positioned or "waiting" to execute; they would have to be 
diverted from support of combat operations in Iraq.  Once 
the COM or SECSTATE requests assistance from the SECDEF or 
CDR USSOUTHCOM, the method of conducting the 
evacuation will be decided by military mission planners once 
the requirements are actually known - response time, number 
of personnel to be evacuated, destination, 
availability of resources, location, etc.  Based on an air 
evacuation, negotiations by State for the destination would 
have to be conducted.  The most likely choice would be 
the Southern United States, or if travel to the U.S. is 
restricted, Santiago or Bogot.  Evacuation of non-emergency 
personnel and dependents by sea is outlined in the Emergency 
Action Plan.  Any evacuation related to avian influenza, 
however, must take into account possible Government of Peru 
restrictions on outgoing travel and on possible Chilean 
and/or U.S. restrictions on incoming travel. 
 
¶26. (U) SCENARIO FOUR 
 
A Mission staff member, a student, teacher, or other staff 
at a school used by Mission families is suspected of having 
contracted avian influenza. 
 
 
- At the request of the HU, can offer limited testing of 
Mission personnel and family members.  All samples would be 
sent to the U.S. for confirmation, but NMRCD can provide a 
reliable although non-FDA approved result within a few hours 
of receiving the sample. 
 
- If patient is a Mission staff member or dependent, HU 
begins therapeutic treatment of the patient with Tamiflu. 
 
- Home quarantine of patient and anyone who has had direct 
contact with patient. 
 
LIMA 00000176  012 OF 012 
 
 
 
- Per State 183776 (10/05/2005) The HU will consider 
prophylactic Tamiflu treatment only for persons required to 
be in direct contact with potentially infected persons.  In 
general, treatment with Tamiflu will be restricted to those 
who become ill rather than for prevention in persons without 
symptoms.  "This strategy includes withholding medication 
from asymptomatic close contacts of those with known 
illness, such as family members, until clinical symptoms 
appear."  In addition, American citizens not eligible for 
DOS medical program benefits, non-ICASS contributors, and 
those outside the official community will not have access to 
these Tamiflu stockpiles. 
 
POC AND DOD PERSONNEL 
--------------------- 
¶27. (U) All DOD personnel are under COM authority. The 
individuals with Top Secret clearances who will update the 
Tripwire Reporting and Integrated Planning System (TRIPS) 
are ARSO Kory Hammond and ECONoff Howell Howard. 
 
STRUBLE