VZCZCXRO8970
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHKU #0208/01 0231446
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 231446Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2615
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 000208 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ARPI, NSC FOR RAMCHAND, LONDON FOR TSOU, 
PARIS FOR ZEYA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KU SUCCESSION
SUBJECT: PROPOSED JANUARY 24 VOTE ON AMIR-DESIGNATE'S 
HEALTH; DISSOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT RUMORED POSSIBLE 
 
REF: A. KUWAIT 200 
 
     ¶B. KUWAIT 184 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: DCM Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: The leadership situation in Kuwait is in 
continual flux with one National Assembly session scheduled 
for January 24 at 10am to vote on declaring Amir-designate 
Shaykh Saad Al-Salem medically unfit for office, and another 
session scheduled for 6:30pm the same day to allow Shaykh 
Saad to take the constitutionally-mandated Amiri oath.  If 
the two-thirds of Parliament (44 votes) needed to declare the 
Amir medically unfit is obtained, as is rumored likely, the 
second session will automatically be negated.  Though 
unlikely, some suggest Shaykh Saad could dissolve Parliament 
prior to the morning session.  The ruling family rift is 
primarily between leading members of the Al-Jaber and 
Al-Salem branches (ref A).  The majority of Al-Sabah family 
members support Prime Minister Shaykh Sabah (Jaber) becoming 
Amir, but a vocal minority led by National Guard Chief Shaykh 
Salem Al-Ali (Salem), Shaykh Mohammed Al-Khaled (Hamad), and 
Shaykh Saud Al-Nasser (non-Mubarak descendant) are resisting 
Shaykh Saad's replacement.  Shaykh Salem Al-Ali, long an 
ardent critic of Jaber domination of political power, is 
likely holding out for key ministerial portfolios before 
agreeing to a compromise deal.  While Kuwaitis are 
disappointed (and embarrassed) by the current situation, no 
one expects the controversy to escalate beyond bitter 
Al-Sabah infighting.  The bright spot in the current 
controversy is the prevalence of open public debate about the 
country's leadership and the commitment to following 
constitutional procedures.  End summary. 
 
The Players 
----------- 
 
¶2. (C) The current leadership controversy is primarily 
between the Al-Sabah's leading Shaykhs, though some have 
suggested several younger Shaykhs are exacerbating the 
situation (ref A).  Prime Minister Shaykh Sabah, the de facto 
ruler of Kuwait for the past five years, is supported by the 
majority of the ruling family and is widely expected to 
prevail in the current dispute.  On January 20, 60 leading 
Al-Sabah family members attended a meeting at the Prime 
Minister's private residence to express their support for his 
leadership (ref B).  In addition to leading Al-Jabers like 
the Ministers of Interior, Defense, and Energy, a number of 
prominent Al-Salems were also present, including Foreign 
Minister Shaykh Dr. Mohammed and two of Shaykh Salem Al-Ali's 
sons.  Shaykh Sabah supports a close U.S.-Kuwait strategic 
relationship, and is generally considered as pro- economic 
and political reform, albeit at a relatively slow pace. 
 
¶3.  (C) Leading the opposition to Shaykh Sabah is National 
Guard Chief Shaykh Salem Al-Ali, who provoked a national 
controversy and indirectly criticized the Prime Minister in 
October 2005 when he called for the creation of a 
three-member committee to "assist the leadership" of the 
country.  The most senior member of the Al-Salem branch, 
Shaykh Salem Al-Ali has long agitated against Jaber 
domination of political power.  He is extremely rich, but is 
known to be somewhat of a miser.  Also opposing Shaykh Sabah 
are Shaykh Mohammed Al-Khaled from the Hamad branch, who was 
replaced as Interior Minister when Shaykh Sabah became Prime 
Minister in 2003, and Shaykh Saud Al-Nasser Al-Sabah (not a 
descendant of Mubarak Al-Kabir), formerly Minister of Oil, 
Minister of Information, and Kuwaiti Ambassador to the U.S. 
(Note: One of Shaykh Saud's sons is an Assistant 
Undersecretary in the Prime Minister's office.  End note.) 
 
As Family Negotiations Fail... 
------------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (C) Negotiations between senior family members on 
succession appear to have stalled.  Last minute mediation 
efforts on January 22 by a delegation of Al-Sabah family 
members, which included family heavyweights such as Interior 
Minister Shaykh Nawaf Al-Ahmed (Jaber), Foreign Minister 
Shaykh Dr. Mohammed (Salem), Shaykh Mubarak Al-Abdullah 
(Jaber), and Chairman of the National Committee on Missing 
and POW Affairs Shaykh Salem Al-Sabah (Salem), to reach an 
agreement with Shaykh Salem Al-Ali - believed to be the power 
behind Shaykh Saad - failed when Shaykh Salem Al-Ali left in 
the middle of the meeting.  Some sources say Shaykh Salem 
Al-Ali is demanding any resolution include agreement on 
ministerial portfolios, as well as the positions of Amir, 
Crown Prince, and Prime Minister. 
 
¶5.  (C) Sources report that senior Jaber members Prime 
 
KUWAIT 00000208  002 OF 002 
 
 
Minister Shaykh Sabah and Shaykh Mubarak Al-Ahmed met with 
Shaykh Salem Al-Ali the evening of January 22 to negotiate a 
compromise.  Shaykh Salem Al-Ali proposed two deals.  In one, 
Shaykh Saad would be allowed to take the Amiri oath, then 
depart the country for medical treatment, appointing Shaykh 
Sabah Crown Prince and deputizing him as Amir before he left; 
Shaykh Sabah would also be allowed to retain the Prime 
Minister position.  In exchange, Shaykh Salem Al-Ali demanded 
the Ministries of Defense, Interior, and Energy for his 
picks.  In the alternative deal, Shaykh Saad would step down, 
allowing Shaykh Sabah to become Amir in return for Foreign 
Minister Shaykh Dr. Mohammed becoming both Crown Prince and 
Prime Minister.  Shaykh Sabah reportedly rejected both of 
these proposals.  (Note: During the January 20 meeting at 
Shaykh Sabah's residence, family members reportedly agreed on 
an arrangement whereby Shaykh Sabah would become Amir, Shaykh 
Dr. Mohammed would become Crown Prince, and Interior Minister 
Shaykh Nawaf would become Prime Minister.  End note.) 
 
...Kuwait Turns to Parliament 
----------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) In a meeting with Shaykh Saad on January 22, National 
Assembly Speaker Jassem Al-Khorafi agreed to hold a special 
parliamentary session allowing Shaykh Saad to take the 
constitutionally mandated Amiri oath at 6:30pm on Tuesday, 
January 24.  The Cabinet, proceeding on a separate track, has 
scheduled (with parliamentary support) a National Assembly 
session at 10am the same day to vote on activating Article 3 
of the Succession Law to declare Shaykh Saad medically unfit 
to be Amir.  If two-thirds of Parliament (44 votes) vote for 
the activation, as is rumored likely, the Amiri oath-taking 
session would automatically be canceled.  Some contacts 
speculate, however, that as a last resort Shaykh Saad (or 
those acting on his behalf) could move to dissolve Parliament 
before the 10am session.  (Comment: Such a move is highly 
unlikely.  The image-conscious Kuwaitis do not want to be 
viewed in the region or globally as not being able to resolve 
the succession issue when other countries in the region have 
successfully managed the transition of power following the 
death of their leaders.  End comment.) 
 
¶7.  (C) Given the breakdown in negotiations, sources say the 
Cabinet has no choice but to proceed with activation of 
Article 3.  If Shaykh Saad is removed, the Cabinet can 
nominate a new Amir, who must be approved by a majority vote 
(33 votes) in Parliament.  It is unclear, however, what would 
happen if the two-thirds majority (44 votes) needed to remove 
Shaykh Saad was not obtained.  Local media reported that 
National Assembly Speaker Jassem Al-Khorafi met 33 MPs on 
January 22 to discuss the parliamentary reaction to the 
contradictory requests it has received.  Sources report 
Al-Khorafi and a majority of MPs prefer voting to activate 
Article 3 prior to the special oath-taking session. 
 
Political Precedence 
-------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) While Kuwaitis are nervous (and embarrassed) by the 
leadership crisis, no one expects the situation to escalate 
beyond the bitter infighting within the ruling family. 
Regardless of the outcome, U.S. interests and the 
U.S.-Kuwaiti bilateral relationship are unlikely to be 
significantly affected.  Ironically, the leadership crisis 
may inadvertently set a precedence for parliamentary 
involvement in choosing the Amir, which could have a 
long-term impact on political reform in Kuwait. 
 
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LeBaron