VZCZCXRO5105
OO RUEHKUK
DE RUEHKUK #0012 0282003
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O R 282003Z JAN 06
FM REO KIRKUK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0486
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 0450
INFO RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0001
RUEHKUK/REO KIRKUK 0512

S E C R E T KIRKUK 000012 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  1/28/2016 
TAGS: PGOV EAID PINR PINS KDEM IZ IS BAGHDAD FOR POL
POL-MIL, NCT 
SUBJECT: (C) KRG UNIFICATION: TWO YEARS TO FORM NEW SECURITY SERVICE 
 
REF: (A) KIRKUK 8, (B) 05 KIRKUK 301 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: RBELL, PRC, PRC, DOS. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1.  (S) SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION.  Kurdistan Regional 
Government-Sulaymaniyah (KRG-S) PM Omar Fattah told RC and DRC 
January 26 he expected the two main Kurdish parties to name a PM 
and a Deputy PM for a unified KRG in the next few days so the 
Kurds could present a unified face in Baghdad.  PUK Deputy 
GenSec Noshirwan Mustafa suggested privately that the Kurds 
should get Israeli advice about merging party militias into a 
state army.  The parties plan to create a new KRG security 
service over the next two years (now, the PUK and KDP each have 
their own intelligence services).  The PM stood by his earlier 
view that the U.S. should not cover Sulaymaniyah through a 
future Regional Reconstruction Team in Erbil.  END SUMMARY AND 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
¶2.  (C)  KRG-S Prime Minister Omar Fattah told RC and DRC 
January 26 he expected the two Kurdish parties to name a PM and 
a Deputy PM for a unified KRG in the next few days.  He thought 
it important to name the unified KRG leadership soon, so the 
Kurds would present a unified face in the negotiations to form a 
national government.  (NOTE:  A PUK source told our LES that 
Arslan Baiz, head of the PUK office in Erbil, had been chosen to 
fill the DPM slot; Fattah had been the obvious first choice, but 
it would be a demotion for him.  END NOTE.) 
 
¶3.  (S) Fattah pointed both to technical problems and a lack of 
trust in explaining why the Peshmerga, interior, justice and 
finance ministries are not to be unified for a year (ref A). 
The Erbil and Sulaymaniyah ministries of justice had issued 
conflicting regulations; the Kurdistan National Assembly needed 
to resolve this.  Similarly, the finance ministries had issued 
two different budgets for the year.  The two Peshmerga still 
distrusted each other.  PUK Deputy GenSec Noshirwan Mustafa 
later told us the Kurds should get Israeli advice on how to 
merge hostile militias, since they had to deal with Haganah, 
Irgun and Stern. 
 
¶4.  (C)  The PM explained that the two main parties planned to 
create a new KRG security service.  This process is expected to 
take two years.  KRG-S Interior Minister Othman Haji Mahmud 
(whom PUK expects to stay on as interior minister for the 
unified KRG) told us the two parties had agreed the KRG 
President would create a committee to form the new security 
service and vet personnel for it.  Othman envisaged recruiting 
college graduates, and asked for U.S. assistance in creating 
such a neutral, professional security service.  It was not clear 
whether the new service would replace or augment the current 
separate PUK and KDP Asayish (intelligence/security) services. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  As he had in December (ref B), the PM continued to 
insist that the U.S. should not cover Sulaymaniyah through a 
future Regional Reconstruction Team in Erbil, but should deal 
separately with Sulaymaniyah. 
 
¶6.  (S)  COMMENT:  The two Kurdish parties want KRG unification 
to be seen to take effect quickly, so as to help them in Baghdad 
negotiations.  Nevertheless, the devil remains in the details. 
Uniting the rival Peshmerga and Asayish will be particularly 
problematic.  Both parties recruit their own loyalists.  The 
Kurdistan Democratic Party measures loyalty on a clan basis, 
while the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan takes a more political 
approach. 
 
BELL