VZCZCXRO5103
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHMOS
DE RUEHKUK #0011 0281958
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 281958Z JAN 06
FM REO KIRKUK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0485
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 0449
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHKUK/REO KIRKUK 0511

C O N F I D E N T I A L KIRKUK 000011 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
POL, ECON, NCT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  1/28/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PNAT EFIN PREL IZ
SUBJECT: (SBU) KURDS EXPECT SHIITES WILL AGREE KIRKUK CAN JOIN KRG 
 
REF: 05 KIRKUK 285 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: RBELL, PRC, PRC, DOS. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION.  Kurdistan Regional 
Government-Sulaymaniyah (KRG-S) leaders complained to RC and DRC 
January 26 that the December elections had cheated the Kurds out 
of seats, though this would not prevent the Kurdish alliance 
from participating in the government.  PUK Dep GenSec Noshirwan 
Mustafa seemed to think the U.S. had created the compensatory 
seat mechanism to move seats from, e.g., the Kurds to smaller 
parties.  KRG-S PM Omar Fattah reported that the Kurdistan 
Islamic Union would vote with the Kurdish Alliance on major 
votes, but not join the alliance itself.  Mustafa predicted the 
Kurds would avoid an Iraqi civil war over Kirkuk by guaranteeing 
minorities rights in the KRG constitution.  The Arab district of 
Hawijah could split off to remain in Arab hands as part of the 
deal to join Kirkuk to the KRG.  He predicted the status of 
Kirkuk would not be a controversial point in government 
formation negotiations: both Kurds and Shiites wanted to go back 
to 1968 provincial boundaries.  END SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION. 
 
(C) DECEMBER ELECTIONS CHEAT KURDS? 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  Both Fattah and Mustafa complained to RC and DRC 
January 26 that the December elections had cheated the Kurds out 
of seats.  The PM charged that the Kurds lost six seats (from 59 
to 53) because the IECI had changed voting districts and thrown 
out returns.  He said this would not prevent the Kurdish 
Alliance from participating in the government.  Mustafa charged 
the compensatory seat mechanism had moved four seats from the 
Kurds to smaller parties; he clearly thought the U.S. had 
created this mechanism at Kurdish expense to manipulate the 
outcome of the election, but seemed willing to accept this 
grudgingly.  When RC explained the electoral commission (IECI)'s 
formula for allocating compensatory seats, it was plain that 
this was news to Mustafa. 
 
¶3.  (C)  PM Fattah reported that the Kurdistan Islamic Union 
would vote with the Kurdish Alliance on major votes, but not 
join the alliance itself. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Mustafa argued the new national government should 
divide cabinet seats both according to a party's number of votes 
and an ethnicity's percentage of the population.  He thought a 
national unity government could move forward on agreed elements 
such as economic development, but not on disputed points such as 
ownership of natural resources and federalism. 
 
(U) PRIORITIES FOR A NEW NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C)  Mustafa said the Kurds would avoid an Iraqi civil war 
over Kirkuk: the Kurds were the strongest party in Kirkuk and 
they wanted a peaceful transition (to KRG rule).  The Kurds 
could avoid problems by guaranteeing minority rights in the KRG 
constitution, e.g., through autonomy along the lines of the 
Ottoman millet system with limited self-rule, right to use of 
language, and by promising certain political jobs to 
ethnicities, as in Lebanon.  The Kurds were not hard over on 
Kirkuk province's borders: Hawijah could split off to remain in 
Arab hands as part of the deal to join Kirkuk to the KRG. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Mustafa predicted the status of Kirkuk would not be a 
controversial point in negotiations to form a new national 
government.  Both the Kurds and the Shiites wanted to go back to 
1968 provincial boundaries, so both would turn a blind eye to 
this in government formation negotiations. 
 
¶7.  (C)  When asked, Mustafa said that the new government should 
spur the Iraqi Property Claims Commission (IPCC) in 2006 and 
¶2007.  He was unconcerned that the national government had not 
budgeted enough to compensate claimants: the KRG had a $5 
billion annual budget from monthly revenues and could contribute 
funds; KRG revenues would increase if oil production rose. 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  When asked why the KRG had opened an education office 
in Qarah Hanjir (inside Kirkuk province), PM Fattah said it was 
to pay and otherwise deal with (Kurdish) teachers that the KRG 
had sent to Kirkuk province to fill the void left by the local 
authorities' failure to hire enough teachers. 
 
BELL