This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000023 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2016 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KPKO CG ELECTIONS
SUBJECT: UDPS, TSHISEKEDI ASSERT CHANGE IN DIRECTION 
 
REF: 05 KINSHASA 1855 
 
Classified By: PolOff CBrown, reasons 1.4 b/d. 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: In an ostensible reversal of its political 
strategy, the Union for Democratic and Social Progress (UDPS) 
announced it will participate in the DRC's 2006 elections, 
with UDPS leader Etienne Tshisekedi running as a candidate 
for president. As with previous messages from Tshisekedi and 
others in the UPDS, the devil is in the details.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (U) In a January 1 message to the Congolese people, Union 
for Democratic and Social Progress (UDPS) leader Etienne 
Tshisekedi wrote that his party would participate in the 
 
SIPDIS 
DRC's 2006 elections and intended to lead the Congolese 
people to victory over the forces of "chaos and humiliation." 
Tshisekedi also wrote that the UDPS would work to ensure the 
 
SIPDIS 
electoral process is "credible and equitable," unlike, 
according to Tshisekedi, the country's December 18-19 
constitutional referendum. 
 
¶3. (SBU) In his New Year's message, Tshisekedi thanked the 
international community for its support of the democratic 
process in the DRC and its efforts at establishing peace. 
This was a sentiment at odds with earlier attacks on the 
International Committee to Accompany the Transition (CIAT) as 
essentially colluding with the government.  He also applauded 
the UNSC resolution calling for the disarmament of armed 
groups in the DRC, and welcomed the International Court of 
Justice decision on December 19 against Uganda for plundering 
the DRC's resources during its wartime occupation in the 
eastern DRC beginning in 1998. 
 
¶4. (SBU) In January 3 letters to the President of the 
Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) and to SRSG Swing, 
UDPS Secretary General Remy Masamba affirmed the party's 
intention to take part in elections. The UDPS called upon the 
CEI, with the support of the international community, to 
re-open voter registration centers nationwide for the benefit 
of those Congolese who were "excluded" during the previous 
enrollment period. (Note: Voter registration officially ended 
nationwide December 15. Tshisekedi and his hard-line 
supporters boycotted the registration process and are 
therefore currently ineligible to run for office and to vote 
in the elections. End note.) 
 
¶5. (SBU) Since the establishment of the DRC's transitional 
government in 2003, the UDPS has refused to participate in 
the country's political process, calling for a boycott of the 
voter registration drive and the referendum. Despite the 
UDPS's decision to boycott, 25 million Congolese (of an 
estimated maximum 28 million eligible) registered to vote. 
While voter turnout in the UDPS strongholds of Kasai 
Orientale and Kinshasa was low (36 and 46 percent, 
respectively), nearly two-thirds of all registered voters 
nationwide participated in the December 18-19 referendum with 
over 80 percent voting in favor of the new constitution. 
 
¶6. (SBU) In subsequent conversations with post, UDPS 
officials said the party will demand to be represented on 
both the CEI and the High Media Authority, as are the major 
factions of the transitional government. UDPS political 
adviser Joseph Mukendi said the party is urging its members 
to run in elections at all levels of government: provincial, 
legislative and presidential. Mukendi also said Tshisekedi 
himself plans to run for president. 
 
¶7. (C) Comment: Tshisekedi's apparent decision to enter the 
political process at the last moment may be a realization 
that the party's strategy of boycotting has been a failure. 
Tshisekedi had hoped that by boycotting the electoral 
 
SIPDIS 
process, the entire system would collapse, be declared 
"illegitimate," and Congolese voters would turn to him as a 
political savior. His latest announcement is a last attempt 
to become the DRC's "rightful" leader, which he considers 
himself to be. The UDPS position needs to be further 
verified, however, as Tshisekedi is prone to making grand 
political statements which often contain hidden conditions. 
For example, Tshisekedi refers to measures which must be 
taken to "correct" the electoral process. He also indirectly 
referenced steps needed that would re-open the entire 
transition process -- which were presented during the UN 
Security Council visit in November and subsequently rejected 
as unreasonable (reftel).  The CIAT plans to discuss the 
Tshisekedi statement and its implications at its regular 
 
SIPDIS 
meeting this week.  Informal discussion among several 
members, however, suggest a shared sense of caution about 
what Tshisekedi's new public stance really represents. 
Rather than restart immediately CIAT "facilitation" talks 
that were killed by Tshisekedi's pre-referendum hard-line 
statement condemning the whole Transition process, for 
example, the CIAT may wish to ask UN Deputy SRSG Menkerios to 
undertake direct but informal discussions with Tshisekedi 
himself -- and not with his representatives -- to get a clear 
and explicit read of his conditions to engaging in the 
electoral process. 
 
¶8. (C) Comment continued: The UDPS declaration puts 
tremendous pressure on the CEI and carries with it some 
risks. On the one hand, if the CEI decides to re-open 
registration centers to accommodate Tshisekedi and the UDPS, 
the already tight electoral calendar may be delayed further. 
On the other hand, if the CEI does not re-open registration, 
Tshisekedi will no doubt claim he is being unfairly excluded 
 
SIPDIS 
from the elections and will work to undermine their 
legitimacy. Either scenario places Tshisekedi in the role of 
"spoiler," giving him undue power and influence over a 
process which he has chosen not to participate in thus far. 
End comment. 
MEECE