VZCZCXRO7418
PP RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0241/01 0311241
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 311241Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1249
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0006
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0008
RUEHTRO/USLO TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0028

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000241 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA, AF/SPG, AF/E, EUR/RPM, EUR/NB, AND 
EAP/C 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2016 
TAGS: PREL KPKO ET ER SU AU
SUBJECT: A/S FRAZER AND NORWEGIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER 
JOHANSEN DISCUSS ETHIOPIA-ERITREA, SUDAN 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00000241  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Integrating Eritrea into the international 
community through promoting productive Eritrean engagement to 
resolve the crisis in Darfur could also produce forward 
movement on the Ethiopia-Eritrea border dispute, Norwegian 
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Raymond Johansen told A/S 
for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer on the margins of the AU 
Summit in Khartoum, January 23.  A/S Frazer and Johansen also 
discussed enhancing NATO engagement in support of the AU, and 
the need to bring the Chinese on board with assisting CPA 
implementation and AMIS transition to a UN mission.  End 
summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
ETHIOPIA-ERITREA EFFORTS TO EXPLOIT A SMALL OPENING 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶2. (C) Johansen commended A/S Frazer,s efforts to resolve 
the Ethiopia-Eritrea border dispute and said that Norway 
fully supports USG engagement on the issue.  A/S Frazer 
responded that past experience shows that making even a 
little progress on the border issue is very difficult, 
although both parties appear interested in finding a 
resolution. 
 
¶3. (C) A/S Frazer said that the USG is exploring how best to 
move forward given a small opening for progress.  It is in 
Eritrea,s benefit not to have that opening close, because 
the status quo favors Ethiopia, she noted.  Tension between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea is not limited to the border, A/S Frazer 
said, observing that Ethiopia and Eritrea were not seated 
next to each other at the AU Summit. 
 
¶4. (C) A/S Frazer told Johansen that her recent trip to the 
region was gauged to detect if there is a sense of will to 
resolve the conflict and also to inform a decision on the UN 
Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea,s (UNMEE) disposition.  A/S 
Frazer noted that she visited UNMEE soldiers and saw their 
determination to carry out their mission.  UNMEE,s mission, 
though, is hampered by Eritrean flight bans, which renders 
UNMEE vulnerable and limits its scope of activity. 
 
¶5. (C) The international community needs to put maximum 
pressure on Eritrea to allow UNMEE flights and on Ethiopia to 
allow demarcation to start, A/S Frazer said.  A/S Frazer 
noted that both countries are right - demarcation requires 
dialogue, but Ethiopia agreed to a final and binding decision 
regarding delimitation and demarcation.  Sustained pressure 
is needed to achieve a result. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
NEXT STEPS:  EEBC MEETING, BRING ERITREA INTO THE FOLD 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶6. (C) A/S Frazer told Johansen that the next step is to 
convene a meeting of the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission 
(EEBC) and persuade Ethiopia to attend.  The EEBC also must 
be flexible, A/S Frazer noted.  The EEBC,s stance that 
delimitation and demarcation are the same is unhelpful.  A/S 
Frazer said that the EEBC should make a statement to restore 
Ethiopia,s confidence.  The challenge is to get Ethiopia on 
board without scaring off Eritrea, she noted. 
 
¶7. (C) A/S Frazer said that Eritrea sees the EEBC as the only 
legally valid body.  She posited a subcommittee to engage in 
technical discussion, using the successful Military 
Coordination Committee (MCC) as a model. 
 
¶8. (C) While Ethiopia is clearly interested in resolving the 
dispute, Eritrea,s will to compromise is largely untested, 
A/S Frazer observed.  Johansen said that Eritrea is not at 
all flexible, but taking steps to bring Eritrea back into the 
fold of the international community could provide a key. 
Johansen noted that Eritrea is still largely isolated, and 
does not even take part in most African Union (AU) meetings. 
Eritrea needs acceptance and acknowledgement of the helpful 
role it could play to resolve the Darfur dispute, Johansen 
opined.  Creatively using common interest to engage Eritrea 
could also produce movement on the border issue, he said. 
 
¶9. (C) A/S Frazer took note of Johansen,s observations, but 
observed that while the international community is working 
 
KHARTOUM 00000241  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
for regime transformation in Sudan, Eritrea seems to advocate 
regime change.  Eritrea wants the U.S. to hammer Bashir, but 
the U.S. is working to address impunity by offering 
assistance to the International Criminal Court while still 
engaging the regime, she said. 
 
---------------------------------- 
AMIS REHATTING AND NATO ENGAGEMENT 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Turning to Darfur, A/S Frazer said that it was 
important that the AU step up to tackle Darfur, and that the 
USG wants to work to build AU capacity.  While African troops 
should form the core of a military mission in Darfur, force 
generation, logistics, financial, and other constraints make 
transition to the UN practical. 
 
¶11. (C) The international community needs to shore up AMIS in 
the transition period to prevent a further breakdown of 
security, A/S Frazer noted.  The parties in Darfur are 
testing AMIS and the situation will only get worse.  This 
means strategizing to get NATO more involved in Darfur by 
providing planning, operational, and logistics assistance. 
A/S Frazer said that the U.S. intends to work with the AU to 
determine the best formula for a value-added NATO role. 
Johansen commented that it is important that AU sensitivities 
are indeed taken into account. 
 
------------------ 
CPA Implementation 
------------------ 
 
¶12. (C) The Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC) work 
plan should be finished o/a January 29, AEC Chair Amb. 
Vraalsen said.  He thanked A/S Frazer for U.S. assistance to 
support and equip the AEC office as well as for close 
cooperation with USAID.  Vraalsen said that there are still a 
dozen issues slowing CPA implementation. 
 
¶13. (C) Vraalsen said that VPs Taha and Salva Kiir need to be 
encouraged to set up a civil administration in Abyei to 
defuse a ticking time bomb.  He observed that the U.S., 
Norway, and UN, plus the Dutch seem to be the only "genuinely 
concerned" parties. 
 
¶14. (C) A/S Frazer said that the Chinese also have a role. 
The Chinese say their interest is stability and want the 
National Congress Party (NCP) to stay.  The U.S. agrees on 
stability, but we need to convince the Chinese that some NCP 
policies lead to instability so pressure and assistance are 
needed.  Vraalsen concurred, noting that China recently 
donated five million dollars to the NCP and that Beijing has 
continued economic interest in Sudan.  He said that the 
Troika needs to build a bridge to the Chinese.  A/S Frazer 
added that blue-hatting the AMIS mission also requires 
China,s support in the UNSC. 
 
¶15. (U) A/S Frazer approved this message. 
 
¶16. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 
HUME