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INFO RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0065
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA PRIORITY 0036
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0062
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0033
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0028
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0402
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0025
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY 0032
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY 0022
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 0148
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0010
RUEHTRO/USLO TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0024
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0021

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 000239 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/FA, AF/SPG, AND AF/RSA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR US AU
SUBJECT: A/S FRAZER MEETING WITH GOS NISS D/G GHOSH ON 25 
JANUARY 2006 
 
REF: 05 KHARTOUM 01941 
 
Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (S) SUMMARY:  A/S Frazer met with NISS D/G Saleh Ghosh on 
January 25 following the AU Summit in Khartoum.  This was A/S 
Frazer,s second meeting with Ghosh, the first was in late 
November 2005.  Ghosh emphasized his and his government,s 
desire to make the Darfur issue go away, noting that active 
U.S. engagement was essential to achieving peace in the 
region.  Ghosh offered material on the situation in Eritrea 
and Chad; Libya,s role in Darfur; and his assessment of how 
to neutralize the LRA threat.  A/S Frazer outlined U.S. 
expectations for Sudan and offered comment on how Sudan 
needed to improve its security situation and how it could 
improve its standing with the world community.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C) On January 25, 2006, Assistant Secretary for African 
Affairs Jendayi Frazer, Charge d,Affaires Cameron Hume, and 
Regional Affairs Counselor met with Government of Sudan (GOS) 
National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) Director 
General Dr. Saleh Ghosh at NISS Headquarters for a one-hour 
meeting.  The meeting was a follow-up to A/S Frazer,s 
initial meeting with Ghosh in late November 2005 (see 
reftel). 
 
Ghosh:  Darfur on My Mind 
------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Ghosh opened by emphasizing that the GOS had the most 
to lose from continuing problems in Darfur.  Ghosh believed a 
solution for Western Sudan was needed sooner rather than 
later.  He said President Umar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir made 
these same points in his speech during the Africa Union 
Summit in Khartoum.  Ghosh said the role of the USG was 
imperative for solving the crisis and he appealed for 
continued U.S. engagement in the peace talks and added that 
the U.S. should apply pressure to Sudan,s neighbors (read 
Chad, Eritrea, and Libya) that have been attempting to 
perpetuate the problems in Darfur. 
 
¶4.  (C) Ghosh offered his understanding that the State 
Department and the Administration faced pressure from the 
Congress and the American public to do something about Sudan, 
and, as a result, that Sudan received a number of signals 
from the U.S., all of them negative.  He said he understood 
why the State Department had to take the positions it did. 
Ghosh, who said he had been briefed on A/S Frazer,s other 
meetings with Sudanese Officials, expressed a need for 
continued dialogue on the array of issues facing Sudan and 
stated again that the GOS &wanted the (Darfur) issue off the 
table.8 
 
Keys to Change:  Engagement and Trust 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (U) A/S Frazer, commenting on the dynamics of the talks 
in Abuja, said the GOS sat back and then allowed the rebels 
to demonstrate their clear inability for neither organizing 
nor putting forth any meaningful proposals for progress.  A/S 
Frazer appealed to the GOS to initiate active engagement on 
the peace process and to make efforts to try to generate a 
solution that all parties would find reasonable, workable, 
and attractive.  She explained how her team likewise would do 
all it could to advance the effort; adding that CDA Hume 
would take the lead in Khartoum, Special Representative for 
Sudan Roger Winter in Abuja, and she in Washington.  A/S 
Frazer commented that the key was to work quickly on the 
matter. 
 
¶6.  (C) A/S Secretary again emphasized that efforts by 
President Bashir both to reach out and attempt to build trust 
with President Bush would be important, if not imperative, 
for creating a new way forward.  President would have 
confidence in Bashir if Bashir first sent a letter outlining 
his intentions AND if he actually followed through on what he 
said he would do.  A/S Frazer emphasized that the U.S. had 
 
KHARTOUM 00000239  002 OF 004 
 
 
both strategic interests in Sudan and a need to ensure that 
Sudan was a stable nation in which all citizens could live 
together in peace.  The key for gaining momentum with U.S. 
Policy and with President Bush was to build trust. 
 
Two Suggestions for any GOS Proposal on Darfur 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶7.  (C) A/S Frazer stressed that there were two points that 
should be included in any GOS proposal for peace in Darfur. 
First, that the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) not be 
required to disarm prior to the full implementation of the 
agreement because the SLM would not agree to such an idea. 
A/S Frazer explained that SLM Leaders believed they would 
have to preserve the ability to defend themselves during the 
period of negotiations, which could last up to two years. 
 
¶8.  (C) Second, A/S Frazer said she hoped the GOS would 
respond positively to the transition of the African Union 
(AU) Mission in Sudan,s (AMIS) security program in Darfur to 
the United Nations.  A/S Frazer said AMIS was operating at, 
or possibly beyond, its maximum capacity and that the 
deteriorating security situation in Darfur was a result of 
this.  Most believed, she said, the GOS would react 
negatively to a proposed UN deployment even though such a 
transition would be a natural progression for achieving 
lasting peace in the region.  She added that the GOS would 
succeed if it could, for once, get ahead of the likely 
international political backlash that will come if the GOS 
did not support the deployment.  The GOS could show true 
leadership and demonstrate to the world community that it 
wanted, and was ready for, peace in Darfur by supporting the 
UN deployment plan.  A/S Frazer suggested that if President 
Bashir were to write a letter to President Bush as she 
suggested, Bashir should consider stating his full support 
for the UN deployment. 
 
State Sponsors of Terrorism List 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (S) While nothing was certain, A/S Frazer said, there 
were feelings/intimations in Washington that the U.S. may 
fully normalize relations with Libya.  She then commented 
that if Libya could do what was needed to normalize its 
relations with the U.S., then by all means, Sudan should 
desire and be able to do the same.  This was particularly 
true since the U.S. and Sudan had a more substantive 
relationship with more interests than the U.S. and Libya. 
The onus for change, however, was with President Bashir, not 
the U.S., just in the same way that the onus for changing 
course was with Libyan President Khadafi.  Khadafi, unlike 
Bashir to date, however made the conscious decision and took 
action to change the dynamic between the two countries. 
 
¶10.  (S) While discussing Khadafi, Ghosh added that Libya 
also played an active role in Darfur, but that he did not 
believe that Libya provided weapons to the Darfurian rebel 
groups, only logistical support.  Khadafi wanted to build and 
maintain an image of peacemaker/statesman by keeping an 
influential hand on the rebel groups, thereby appearing to be 
guiding the rebels toward a peaceful solution.  While Khadafi 
has not provided weapons to the rebels, the GOS was aware 
that Libya provided automobiles/SUVs, food, petroleum, and 
other logistical support to them.  Ghosh believed that 
supporting the rebel movements in any capacity was 
detrimental to lasting security in the region. 
 
Ghosh:  Changing Goal Posts?  Frazer:  Different Arenas 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶11.  (C) Ghosh commented that the U.S. appeared to change the 
goal posts each time the GOS reached an objective set by the 
U.S./Int,l Community.  This was the case when the GOS 
believed it was on course for normalized relations with U.S. 
upon the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 
and the appointment of John Garang as First Vice President. 
Neither action improved relations as much as GOS was led to 
 
KHARTOUM 00000239  003 OF 004 
 
 
believe they would.  A/S Frazer acknowledged that the GOS had 
made advances on issues concerning Southern Sudan, but at the 
time these negotiated efforts were underway, no one expected, 
or could have expected, that the flashpoint problems in 
Darfur would complicate further Sudan,s progress.  It was 
for this reason, A/S Frazer added, that the GOS should not 
allow an escalation of Beja problems to set back progress if 
we ever reached a peace agreement on Darfur. 
 
No Desire to Follow Somalia Model for Progress 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶12.  (C) Ghosh said the U.S. and the Int,l Community 
continued to apply pressures on Sudan and that internal 
stability continued to suffer, in large part, due to these 
external pressures.  The security failings continued even 
though the interested parties were attempting to develop 
lasting solutions for the problems.  He acknowledged that 
much was being lost by the GOS by the failure to achieve a 
lasting solution.  He said that Sudan faced the risk of 
becoming fractionalized and factionalized much like Somalia. 
That is, he added, that Sudan could face an eventual collapse 
like Somalia if too much pressure were applied with no means 
for Sudan to address the internal security issues that it 
faced )- he pointed to Darfur as an example.  Ghosh said the 
U.S. could soon find itself in the position of losing both 
the CPA and the whole of Sudan if internal security continued 
to degrade.  A/S Frazer agreed that many issues appeared to 
be getting worse not better, and then used the issue to 
re-emphasize that Sudan needed to find a solution sooner 
rather than later. 
 
Eritrea, Chad, and the LRA 
-------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (C) Ghosh said Sudan was trying to normalize relations 
with Eritrea and added that he accompanied Second Vice 
President Taha for a meeting with Eritrean President Isaias 
Afwerki to discuss the problems that existed between the two 
neiehbors.  Ghosh sa)d er)trei was0an astivgpmAs%r r"$iFqrQQi.t pa4.bwrh0EewZo@QiQ^zw2s$`zd!ikQxnmroxJecjQ`u2 Qthm%1AafB1Q2Q.  (C) Ghosh said Chadian President Deby was under intense 
internal pressure as the population was not happy with him or 
his stewardship of the country.  Deby had lost support of his 
own tribe, the Zaghawa, and of most Chadian citizens, and, as 
such, Deby had all but lost his country.  Ghosh denied 
Deby,s allegations that Sudan played an active role in the 
recent rebel attacks/attempted coup d,etat in Eastern Chad. 
He noted that the GOS attempted several times to advance 
reconciliation efforts by arranging meetings in Chad between 
Deby and disaffected Chadians, only to find out that Deby 
would soon have the opposition figures killed. 
 
¶15.  (S) Following-up on a topic discussed at their first 
meeting, Ghosh said LRA leader Joseph Kony needed to be 
removed from the region and that it would be impossible to 
capture him.  Ghosh believed that the only way to neutralize 
the LRA threat was for the SPLA, Ugandan, and GOS forces to 
unite and to take the fight to the LRA.  A negotiated and 
individualized approach would yield nothing.  To this end, 
the GOS had been cooperating with the GOU, but noted that 
their efforts, to date, had not yet advanced significantly. 
A/S Frazer reiterated the U.S., interest in neutralizing 
Kony and the LRA, and asked what support Ghosh/GOS needed 
from the U.S. to achieve success.  Ghosh did not state a 
specific need, but instead added that the LRA required 
logistical support in Sudan (i.e., to transnavigate the 
river) and that the LRA continued to exploit the local 
population in northern Uganda to survive.  RAO will raise the 
needs question separately. 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00000239  004 OF 004 
 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶16.  (C) With his second meeting with A/S Frazer, Ghosh has 
demonstrated his willingness to be, at least, a cordial 
interlocutor.  Although Ghosh does not hold a ministerial 
position, he maintains a close relationship with most senior 
government officials, President Bashir in particular.  It 
remains to be seen how much movement Ghosh can generate on 
the political issues the Assistant Secretary outlined during 
the meetings, but Embassy will continue to meet with him 
periodically to reiterate the points. 
 
¶17. (U) A/S Frazer has cleared this message 
HUME