This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 KABUL 000008 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SA/FO AMBASSADOR QUINN, S/CT, SA/A, EUR/RPM 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND 
DEPT PASS USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
REL NATO/ISAF 
REL AFGHANISTAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL AF PK
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN GOVERNORS' CONFERENCE FOCUSES ON SECURITY 
AND NEED TO EXTEND REACH OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
 
Classified By: A/POLITICAL COUNSELOR MARIE RICHARDS FOR REASONS 
1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary.  On 28 Dec, the Governors and Police 
Chiefs of Kandahar, Zabul and Helmand provinces met 
with key Regional Command (RC) South commanders and 
staff.  Security dominated the agenda.  Many Taliban 
are migrating to Pakistan for the winter but RC South 
and the governors all want to keep up operations 
during the winter against those remaining.  All 
realized the importance of reaching out to the 
population and trying to get them to support the 
government. 
 
Background 
---------- 
 
¶2.  (U) Afghan attendees included Kandahar Governor 
Assadullah Khalid, Zabul Governor Dilber Arman, and 
Engineer Daoud, who has been Helmand Governor for 
several weeks.  Also attending were the three 
provincial police chiefs and Gen Rauffy, the new ANA 
205th Corps commander.  Coalition members present 
included key RC South US commanders and staff, plus 
Romanian, Canadian, and British representatives. 
 
¶3.  (U) The four items on the agenda consisted of 
Security, the new Provincial Councils (PC), Cross- 
Provincial Coordination, and the Taliban 
reconciliation program known as Peace Through Strength 
(PTS).  While most of the entire conference focused on 
security, in his welcoming remarks the RC South 
commander stated that the PCs were bringing real 
democracy to Afghanistan, as these council members 
were the people who would actually deal with and 
answer to constituents.  He also said that many 
Taliban are tired, and would be willing to give up, if 
PTS enabled them to do so with dignity. 
 
Zabul Province 
-------------- 
 
¶4.   (S)  For each province, RC South S-2 
(Intelligence) officers briefed their assessment, 
followed by the governor and police chief.  For Zabul 
Province, S-2 expected the four northern districts to 
remain the most active during the winter, and that 
activity in the central and southern districts would 
slack off.  The winter this year will probably not be 
as severe as last year, which was unusually severe. 
The Afghan National Army (ANA) and Coalition Forces 
(CF) will work to keep the Ring Road open, as well as 
guarding key points on the road linking the Ring Road 
to the Pakistani border near Zanjshir.  Another 
objective is increased sustainment capability for the 
ANA.  In addition to military operations, the CF will 
maintain a presence all throughout the province over 
the winter, including such activities as Village 
Medical Outreaches (VMOs) and food and fuel 
distribution. 
 
¶5.  (S)  Chief Nabi (who is both the Zabul Police 
Chief and also the Afghan Highway Patrol (AHP) 
commander for the region from Kandahar to Ghazni) 
followed, saying that security is much better than 
last year, with the enemy divided into small groups. 
He noted that recently there had been attacks on 
checkpoints along the Ring Road in Sheri Safa, rather 
than Shajoy, where the Taliban normally traverse the 
Ring Road en route from Pakistan to northern Zabul. 
The Chief said he wantedo go on the offensive with 
small missions throughout the district this winter, if 
the CF could provide air support (both for firepower 
and rapid transport mobility).  While agreeing that 
about 50 percent of Taliban forces would leave Zabul 
for Pakistan over the winter, he believed those 
remaining were under pressure to conduct operations, 
not just rest and hide.  He concluded by noting the 
need for popular support out in the districts and also 
noting that 80 percent of Zabul,s population is poor, 
and the best solution is to give them a way to support 
their families. 
¶6.  (U) Zabul Governor Arman agreed with the last 
point, stating that the government was not effective 
in getting out the word and winning hearts and minds 
in the countryside.  He noted that when he briefed 
shuras at remote villages that the GoA was an Islamic 
government, and that President Karzai represented all 
the people of Afghanistan, the people had not realized 
that before.  He also lamented that the government 
could not provide security to each village to protect 
them from Taliban revenge or violence. 
 
Kandahar Province 
----------------- 
 
¶7.  (C)  Gov Asadullah Khalid warned that not all 
villagers were honest with the government and CF.  He 
favored ambushing the Taliban when they go to 
villages, and also supports more use of psychological 
operations and propaganda.  He had no answer as to how 
the government could guard each village, the key issue 
Governor Arman had raised. 
 
¶8.  (C)  For Kandahar, Chief Waheedi stressed the 
importance of hiring local ANP officers from their own 
villages.  Gov Khalid, like Gov Arman, stressed the 
importance of visiting the districts and having &meet 
and greets8 between the villagers and the Governor, 
Chief of Police, and ANA corps commander.  RC South 
commander noted that the winter would be a good time 
to try to win popular support, during a period of 
Taliban minimum manning.  He also noted a big Village 
Medical Outreach program in mid-January for the 
northern districts of Kandahar Province. 
 
Helmand Province 
---------------- 
 
¶9.  (C)  The objective in Helmand is to try to disrupt 
movement of the Taliban as they transit to their 
sanctuaries in Oruzgan and northern Kandahar 
Provinces.  The Taliban use smuggling and narcotics 
routes from Pakistan and exploit Baluch tribal issues. 
Governor Daoud noted that Helmand has problems similar 
to the other two provinces.  It has a 100-mile long 
border with Pakistan, where the Taliban is strong, and 
one district has 19 cross-border routes in it. 
 
¶10. (S)   Governor Daoud estimated that there are 
about 450 Taliban in Helmand, distributed among 53 
groups or cells, and that they are better equipped and 
funded than government forces in the province, where 
the ANA and ANP are almost non-existent.  He believes 
the population is neither pro-government nor pro- 
Taliban.  He further claimed that the Taliban promise 
protection against government poppy eradication 
efforts, and that the Taliban in Helmand are well- 
funded with money from narco-traffickers and 
smugglers. 
 
¶11.  (C)  He claimed that when he assumed office 
several weeks ago, the Taliban had managed to close 50 
percent of the schools in the province. One of his 
goals is to keep the education system open, he said, 
as it would be much harder to re-open it if the 
Taliban manage to close down all schools in the 
province. 
 
¶12.  (C)  Governor Daoud said he has talked to many 
people in Helmand since taking office, and he feels 
most are optimistic, but that they have no power to 
support the government.  He proposed moving forward by 
cutting the number of ANP in the province to the 
number who are loyal to the government and willing to 
oppose the Taliban and the more numerous smugglers, 
both of whom are the enemy.  He estimated the number 
of reliable policemen to be about 1,200 - claiming 
that 50 percent of the ANP now are escorting drug 
traffickers.  He also said that while some ANP 
officers are completely bad, but some just need 
training.  In some villages with ineffective ANP 
units, he has helped them develop unofficial village 
protection forces. 
 
¶13.  (C)  He continued by saying that Helmand has lots 
of tribal issues, that some tribes feel neglected by 
the government, and that some districts are virtually 
run by the Taliban.  He would like to have the forces 
to attack Taliban cells and close up or tighten the 
currently open border with Pakistan.  For that, he 
would like air support (firepower and transport) from 
the CF.  He opined that if it were a cold winter, many 
Taliban may migrate from Helmand to Kandahar and 
Zabul. 
 
ANA Perspective 
--------------- 
 
¶14.  (U)  The new ANA 205th Corps commander agreed with 
the governors that there is a huge gap between the 
government and the population. 
 
¶15. (S)  From a military perspective, he also wanted 
to press the enemy during the winter, so that they 
would be weaker when they regrouped in the spring.  He 
was in favor of Chief Nabi,s recommendation of 
patrolling and setting up ambushes, and taking 
advantage of air transport and firepower.  He noted 
his forces were spread out and not very mobile.  He 
needs a third brigade but thinks that will take about 
three more months (the RC South commander recommended 
he push the government to staff it up sooner). 
 
Reconciliation Program 
---------------------- 
 
¶16.  (C)  Gov Daoud was more enthusiastic about PTS 
than the other governors.  He felt it could be 
effective if the enemy was weakened first, and the 
program were publicized in all of the districts.  He 
claimed that PTS was forcing Pakistan to recruit and 
train foreigners for the Taliban, and that only 10 
percent of the Taliban members today were former 
Taliban members.  He cited additional statistics that 
out of 400 prisoners released under PTS, only about 2 
percent had gone back to the enemy.  He also stressed 
the importance of family and village vetting in the 
screening process.  He urged the CF to work more with 
the governors and local officials, when arresting 
people and in trying to determine where CF prisoners 
really are from. 
 
Kandahar Governor,s Initiatives 
------------------------------- 
 
¶17.  (C)  The agenda item of cross-province 
coordination was not formally discussed, but some 
coordination did take place.  Governor Khalid 
discussed some issues with the other governors on the 
margins, then raised them formally at the conference. 
He said they all agreed they were facing a guerrilla 
war and needed air support.  He proposed a tri- 
province Quick Reaction Force (QRF) in addition to the 
provincial ones already in existence.  He envisioned 
them traveling out somewhere for a week or so and 
setting up ambushes.  The ambushes would weaken the 
enemy, and rumors of ambushes would hopefully be a 
deterrent, he said.  Governor Daoud added that it 
would be better to use helicopters than trucks for 
operations, as there would be better operational 
security and the troops would be less open to attack 
when returning to base after their ambush operations. 
RC South commander noted that such a force already 
existed and was trained, but he and his staff noted 
some technical problems that would have to be worked 
out.  Governor Khalid said if the CF would agree to 
provide the helicopter support, the governors would do 
the rest of the planning.  There were several lively, 
side-bar discussions among the Afghan participants. 
 
¶18.  (C)  Governor Khalid also proposed that the three 
regional governors and their police chiefs meet in 
Kabul with President Karzai, the Minister of the 
Interior, the Minister of Defense, Ambassador Neumann 
and LTG Eikenberry to push for a third ANA brigade to 
be deployed here as soon as possible, due to the 
Taliban threat.  The governor claimed the central 
government would forget about them unless they 
constantly reminded it about the needs of the 
southeast provinces.  He also lamented that the 
ministers in Kabul do not visit the provinces, even 
large ones like Kandahar.  The governors felt the best 
timeframe for such a meeting would be after the London 
Conference next month, which the government is 
currently focused on. 
 
¶19.  (C)  The governor also raised narcotics.  He 
claimed the earlier eradication had been too early in 
the season.  He said believed growers in Helmand and 
Uruzgan were waiting to see what would happen in 
Kandahar, and that he proposed a serious eradication 
effort this year.  He proposed mainly using ANA and 
ANP but asked what indirect support the US could 
provide.  The ANA commander replied the MoD had 
directed him not to participate in poppy eradication, 
although the Helmand governor responded that the 
Taliban and drugs are tied together. 
 
Bring Provincial Council Members to Shuras 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶20.  (U)  Due to the length of time spent on security, 
there was no time to discuss the Provincial Councils. 
However, in his closing remarks, the RC South 
commander stressed their importance to the new Afghan 
democracy, as they are the people who connect the 
government to the local citizens.  He strongly urged 
the governors to have the local PC member present when 
they conduct shuras out in their districts. 
 
Conference Atmospherics And Dynamics 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶21.   (C)  These regional conferences have been held 
roughly once a quarter, at different venues.  The 
advantages of having them at the Governor,s Compound 
are having the Afghans in front and the CF more in the 
background, and demonstrating the Afghans, ability to 
host a secure conference at a civilian compound.  The 
disadvantage is that there are too many attendees, and 
too much time is usually spent making speeches for the 
benefit of the press and the other attendees.  In 
contrast, this conference was very business-like and 
the discussions remained focused.  While each governor 
had some points he wanted to make about his province, 
there was no posturing or long-winded  speeches. 
Also, without the press and other attendees, they were 
able to be more candid and open in discussing just how 
little reach the government has out into the 
districts. 
 
¶22.  (U)  One positive development is that the 
governors are showing more initiative and taking 
ownership of these conferences.  In August, the S-2 
followed the same format of briefing their assessment 
by province, then asking for input and feedback from 
the governors.  There was very little feedback.  The 
RC South staff set the agenda and pretty much ran the 
conference while the governors were mostly passive 
(except for making speeches).  By contrast, the 
governors and CoPs at this conference actively 
participated and initiated discussions on a number of 
points (to the extent that the agenda could not be 
finished). 
 
¶23.  (U)  One constant is that Kandahar (and therefore 
its governor), remains preeminent in this  region. 
Using a state analogy in terms of population and 
economic development and importance, Kandahar would be 
like New York or California, Zabul like West Virginia 
or Mississippi, and Helmand perhaps like Montana (or 
the old &wild west.8). 
 
Assessments of the Governors 
---------------------------- 
 
¶24.  (C)  Gov Arman:  The Qalat PRT and TR Rock think 
very highly of the governor, both for his honesty and 
strong leadership abilities. 
 
¶25.  (C)  Gov Khalid:  He is young (about 35) and very 
dynamic.  However, he lacks on follow-through of his 
ideas.  He hosted a major anti-narcotics shura, with 
much publicity, in late September, but then did 
nothing to follow through on it.  Thus, RC South is 
skeptical of him following through on the initiatives 
he proposed during this conference. 
 
¶26.  (C)  Gov Daoud:  The PRT,s first impressions are 
very positive, and they are glad he has replaced the 
former governor.  The PRT commander noted that Gov 
Daoud spent quite a bit of time preparing for this 
conference, and seems willing to seriously attack the 
drug problem in Helmand. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶27.  (S)  This was a successful conference.  The 
governors and the CoPs all recognize and agree on the 
seriousness of the threat posed by the Taliban (and 
narco-traffickers), and the need to keep up operations 
against them over the winter. 
 
¶28. (U)  The governors also all realize that the 
government has not been successful so far in extending 
its influence out into the districts, which it needs 
to do in order to win the loyalty of its citizens. 
NEUMANN