This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000107 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SA/FO AMBASSADOR QUINN, S/CT, SA/A, EUR/RPM, 
EUR/UBI 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2015 
TAGS: PTER ASEC PGOV AF
SUBJECT: PRT/TARIN KOWT: SUICIDE BOMB TARGET UNCLEAR; PRT 
EVALUATES COURSE OF ACTION 
 
Classified By: ACTING POLITICAL COUNSELOR MARY TOWNSWICK FOR REASONS 
1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary.  Contrary to media reports, the 
January 5 suicide bombing in Tarin Kowt, Uruzgan, did 
not take place in proximity to Ambassador Neumann and 
was probably intended as an attack on senior police 
officials ) although the actual motive is not yet 
known.  A final casualty count of approximately 15 
dead and 50 wounded, all Afghans, make this one of the 
bloodiest attacks of this kind in Afghanistan.  PRT 
medical staff acted quickly and efficiently in 
treating the victims.  ANA and PRT personnel, 
including poloff, later visited the hospital to assist 
the families of the wounded and talk with them about 
the attack.  The PRT will also convene a provincial 
security meeting on Monday, January 9, to discuss 
future actions.  End summary. 
 
Suicide Attack at Local Dog Fight 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) On January 5, Tarin Kowt suffered its 
first suicide attack of the war.  A suicide bomber 
attacked a crowd of spectators gathered to watch a 
traditional Thursday dog fight behind the local 
headquarters of the Afghan Highway Police.  The bomber 
evidently mingled amongst the crowd before approaching 
the rear of the AHP HQ building where a number of 
senior AHP Officers (including the AHP Commander 
Matullah and the Tarin Kowt Municipal ANP Commander 
Haji Ali Ahmad) were seated on the roof to observe the 
dog fight.  The bomber became entangled in the 
concertina wire surrounding the building and detonated 
himself at that time.  It is not clear what or who was 
the intended target: the crowd, the AHP HQ. the AHP 
Commander, or even the visiting U.S. Ambassador -- the 
road in front of the AHP building had been used by the 
Ambassador,s motorcade to move to Tarin Kowt proper 
about a half-hour earlier.  The Ambassador, who at the 
time was on the other side of Tarin Kowt visiting with 
local officials, was never in danger.  After an 
initial assessment, he continued with his program by 
traveling to a meeting at the Governor,s Compound (an 
identified in-town safe area for the PRT). 
 
Mass Casualty Response 
---------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Back at the PRT, a Mass Casualty (MASCAL) 
event was initiated as wounded from the attack were 
brought to the installation by local Afghans. 
Following a pre-arranged SOP, PRT medical personnel 
supported a U.S. Forward Surgical Team (FST) in 
triaging and caring for the wounded. The FST treated a 
total of 24 patients, of whom three died, nine were 
evacuated by air to Kandahar Air Field, eight were 
evacuated to Tarin Kowt Hospital, and two were treated 
and released.  Total number of casualties and 
fatalities at the site of the attack and at Tarin Kowt 
Hospital are unclear.  However, discussions with TK 
Hospital personnel and AHP officers indicate that 15 
dead and 50 wounded are probably fair estimates. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Poloff, Civil Affairs, and ANA visited the 
Tarin Kowt hospital with humanitarian assistance for 
the victims and their families.  PRT personnel 
discussed medical events with hospital officials while 
the ANA distributed food, cooking oil, blankets, 
radios, and government material as well as candy and 
toys for the children.  The ANA commander spoke with 
families and hospital employees imploring them to 
reach out within their communities to current or 
potential Anti-Coalition Militia (ACM) members, asking 
them to come and talk with the government to reconcile 
because such attacks served no one.  Failing that, the 
ANA officer requested that citizens give information 
to the GOA that could lead to the capture and arrest 
of ACM members. 
 
Provincial Security Meeting to be Convened 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶5. (SBU) On Monday, January 9, following the 
traditional three days of mourning, the PRT will 
convene a provincial security meeting to discuss the 
attack and the near- and long-term response to the 
attack.  The PRT hopes that progress will be made in 
determining the origin of the attacker, his method of 
travel to Tarin Kowt, his contacts, and how the 
province will adapt to this new tactic. 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶6. (C) The use of a suicide attack is a disturbing 
escalation for the ACM in Uruzgan province.  Critical 
to understanding the full import of this event will be 
determining: (1) the reaction of the local populace; 
and (2) whether the attacker was a local or an 
outsider.  Thus far in Uruzgan, as well as in much of 
the country, the ACM have been reluctant to resort to 
suicide attacks. Hopefully, as the full story of this 
attack becomes clear - that it was not/not an attack on 
the U.S. but rather an assassination attempt on a 
local commander that killed and wounded dozens of 
Afghans * there will be a local backlash.  Key to 
harnessing this potential reaction will be challenging 
the egregiously incorrect media reporting on this 
event. 
NEUMANN