This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 000617 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2016 
TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL IR EU AORC ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA SOFT ON REPORTING IRAN TO THE UNSC 
 
REF: STATE 6236 
 
Classified By: Ambassador B. Lynn Pascoe, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  Summary:  On January 16, the Ambassador followed up the 
Secretary's telephone call to Foreign Minister Wirajuda 
 
SIPDIS 
seeking Indonesian support for referral of Iran to the UN 
Security Council by the IAEA Board of Governors.  The 
Ambassador called for Indonesia to serve as a strong voice in 
support in keeping with its own policies on 
non-proliferation.  Wirajuda affirmed that Indonesia has told 
Iran that it should follow IAEA rules but suggested that a 
mechanism be found for continued negotiations, not unlike the 
Six Party Talks in response to DPRK actions.  The Ambassador 
rejoined that the talks with the EU-3 had been such a 
mechanism, but now had been discarded by Tehran.  The 
Minister questioned whether the right time has arrived for a 
referral, saying it might increase Iranian militancy.  The 
Ambassador rejoined that Iran's statements were already 
militant, and that it should not be allowed to act without 
consequence.  If steps were not taken, Iran would hide its 
actions behind countries such as Indonesia.  While Wirajuda 
said he promised the Secretary that he would look at the 
issue closely, and would discuss it with President Yudhoyono, 
he provided the usual list of reasons to justify Indonesian 
inaction.  The Ambassador will follow-up with the 
Presidential Palace in order to try to stiffen Indonesian 
resolve.  End Summary 
 
¶2.  (C) In a late January 16 meeting before Minister Wirajuda 
departed on a trip to Europe, the Ambassador followed up 
Secretary Rice's telephone call and sought Indonesian support 
 
SIPDIS 
to refer Iran to the UN Security Council due to its breach of 
commitments to the EU-3 and to its IAEA safeguard 
obligations.  The Ambassador argued that given consistent 
Jakarta's support for non-proliferation goals, and 
Indonesia's importance as the fourth largest country in the 
world, it could be a powerful voice on this issue.  Given our 
agreement on non-proliferation goals, we would like to see 
Indonesia help push for their implementation. 
 
¶3.  (C) Wirajuda replied that they follow the issue closely 
and have consulted with the EU-3.  Iran had sent a special 
envoy on the topic a few months ago, and had planned another 
visit, but recently canceled the trip.  Indonesia has 
emphasized to Iran that they should meet all their 
obligations including transparency and safeguards.  The 
Minister said he promised the Secretary that he would look at 
the issue, and would discuss it with President Yudhoyono.  He 
said there was a hopeful sign that Iran had shown a 
willingness to follow all the rules since it had acceded to 
the Second Additional Protocol. 
 
¶4.  (C) Wirajuda questioned whether this is in fact the time 
whether Iran should be brought before the UNSC.  He argued 
that Iran had not yet stopped fully cooperating and that the 
Indonesian view is that Iran and the EU-3 should maximize 
their talks.  Comparing the situation to the DPRK, which 
abrogated its treaty commitments and declared it had nuclear 
weapons, Wirajuda said a mechanism had been found, the Six 
Party Talks, to deal with the situation.  Should there not be 
a mechanism for Iran as well? 
 
¶5.  (C) The Ambassador responded that there already had been 
a mechanism for several years, the talks with the EU-3, which 
Iran has now pushed aside.  The U.S. had supported that 
mechanism, to the point that there is domestic criticism 
within the United States about it.  The Iranians had thrown 
the mechanism away, and it is now time to take action on the 
issue.  The Minister would surely not want Iran to hide 
behind countries such as Indonesia as Tehran intentionally 
destroyed the mechanism available to it.  If this is not the 
time, then when would it be? 
 
¶6.  (C) The Minister asked rhetorically what the consequences 
might be of isolating Iran.  It might become even more 
militant, and successfully uses the nuclear issue as a 
rallying point.  Wirajuda added that he has more questions 
than answers on this issue.  The Ambassador replied that Iran 
should not be allowed to acquire the sense that there would 
be no consequences for its actions, and should not be allowed 
to ignore its agreements.  Threatening the world with higher 
oil prices is rhetoric not heard anywhere else.  We hope that 
Indonesia would stand up to such tactics, and doing so would 
be an important step. 
 
¶7.  (C) Comment:  Foreign Minister Wirajuda provided all the 
usual reasons for Indonesia to avoid action.  The Ambassador 
will follow up with the Presidential Palace in order to try 
to stiffen his backbone on this issue. 
PASCOE