This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T  JAKARTA 000252 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2016 
TAGS: EFIN ETTC KTFN PREL AS ID
SUBJECT: TERRORIST FINANCE: ENGAGING TEH GOI FURTHER ON TF 
IN ADVANCE OF PLANNED BA'ASYIR DESIGNATION 
 
REF: SECSTATE 315 
 
Classified By: Economic Officer Tobias Glucksman.  Reason: 1.4 (b) and 
(d). 
 
¶1.  (S) As requested reftel, Embassy Jakarta proposes the 
following talking points for an initial approach to the 
Government of Indonesia (GOI) on securing better 
implementation of Indonesia's exiting UNSCR 1267 obligations. 
 We recommend the same approach this time as in the past, 
i.e., a separate but coordinate demarche with Australia.  We 
also recommend that at an appropriate time soon we inform the 
GOI of our intentions to proceed with designating all JI-4 
instead of temporarily holding back Abu Bakar Ba'ashir's 
(ABB) name.  A more candid approach will help us convince the 
GOI that we serve as a constructive partner on 1267 
designations and actions to curb terrorist financing.  This 
will provide the GOI more time to consider ABB's designation 
and whether the GOI should take the lead or co-sponsor the 
designations.  In the past, the GOI has respected the need to 
protect information related to possible future designations. 
That said, a leak about a possible ABB designation could turn 
into a political football.  We will need to use care when 
providing GOI interlocutors pre-notification of a possible 
ABB designation and stress the importance of guarding this 
information closely. 
 
¶2.  (S) Although we have seen a growing public acceptance 
Indonesia of the existence of terror links to radical Islam, 
ABB retains a small but vocal following; some Muslim and 
political leaders also question his role in JI and in the 
terrorist attacks that have rocked Indonesia.  Effectively 
managing the public affairs aspects of this designation would 
limit the potential negative spillovers that could impact 
other key U.S. -- and GOI -- counterterrorism objectives.  We 
will draft contingency press points (septel) should a leak 
occur. 
 
¶3.  (S) We support a UN lead and a low-key U.S. role in the 
proposed workshop.  While we see as important to remind the 
GOI of its UN commitments, we do not recommend this as a key 
focus of the workshop.  The GOI knows its obligations, but 
fails on implementation.  We recommend, instead that regional 
partners, such as Malaysia and Australia, provide briefs 
early in the workshop on how they implement their UN 
commitments.  The Indonesians could follow with a similar 
brief, which could lead to a constructive dialogue on how to 
improve GOI processing of UN 1267 designations. We should 
consult the GOI on the level of regional participation they 
would find comfortable. 
 
¶4.  (S) We support providing GOI specific leads on 1267 
violating accounts from prior designations, and encourage 
sharing as much information as possible re such accounts. 
 
¶5.  (S) Begin Talking Points: 
 
-- In the past, your government has expressed doubts about 
the effectiveness of UNSCR 1267 designations of Indonesian 
citizens.  These doubts have drawn on two broad concerns: 
 
(1) fear that certain domestic groups would portray the 
designations as Western attempts to discredit Islam in 
Indonesia and undermine your broader CT efforts; 
 
(2) low technical capacity and the nature of terrorist 
finance in Indonesia mean such designations seem unlikely to 
produce the discovery and freezing of terror assets. 
 
-- Over the past few years, your government has made 
significant progress in its CT efforts.  Investigations of 
attacks in Bali, Jakarta and elsewhere have led to over 200 
arrests and over 100 convictions. 
 
-- National Police success in killing master bomb-maker 
Azahari and the discovery of evidence linking his group's 
activities to radical Islam have prompted prominent Islamic 
leaders actively and publicly to denounce terrorism. 
 
-- These impressive accomplishments, along with President 
SBY's strong support for Indonesia's CT efforts, have 
terrorists on the defensive. They have led to public 
understanding of the nature of terrorism and encouraged 
viewing terrorists as criminals.  Robberies by terror groups, 
such as the December 2005 jewelry store heist in Yogyakarta 
that resulted in the shooting death of the owner and 
employees, support depicting terrorists as criminals. 
 
-- Given these positive developments, we remain interested in 
working quietly to help you make the UN1267 designations 
process more effective in Indonesia with the goal of curbing 
the flow of financial resources to terror networks. 
 
 
-- For now, terrorists in Indonesia use mostly cash and 
couriers to fund activities and move assets within Indonesia 
and across its borders, but that will not likely remain so in 
the future. UN 1267 designations, therefore, have an 
important role to play in broader CT efforts. 
 
-- Wide publicity of UN designations could deter terrorists 
from moving assets through your formal financial system. 
 
-- An effective system for processing and implementing UN 
1267 designations in the GOI and the financial system would 
complicate and increase the costs of terrorists' activities 
and help identify and freeze assets when terrorists do work 
through Indonesia's financial institutions. 
 
-- With the recent favorable shift in public perception of 
terrorism and your CT efforts, we see an opportunity for the 
GOI, by sponsoring or co-sponsoring names to the 1267 
Committee, to take ownership of UN designations of those 
responsible for terror in Indonesia. 
 
-- Developing an effective system in Indonesia to process UN 
1267 designations remains a challenge. Administrative 
procedures and technical capacity shortfalls can produce long 
delays in notifying some banks of new UN 1267 designations. 
Many banks have limited capacity to search accounts and 
report suspicious findings.  We know that some UN 1267 
designations contain insufficient or inaccurate information 
that could result in the failure to identify assets or lead 
to accusations against innocent Indonesians. 
 
-- We would like to work with you and other CT partners to 
understand better these challenges, help you overcome them 
and build an improved system for implementing UN1267 
designations and asset freezes. 
 
-- We propose to work with you and other CT partners (e.g., 
the UN, Australia, and other regional partners) and hold a 
workshop to discuss these issues with representatives from 
key Indonesian institutions such as the Foreign Ministry, 
Central Bank, the PPATK, banks and others. 
 
-- We note that Indonesia's Financial Intelligence Unit 
(PPATK) has made progress in this area.  The PPATK has 
underway a secure website that banks and other financial 
institutions could check for updates to the UN 1267 list. 
These institutions would then report suspicious findings. 
 
-- The PPATK and other agencies seek to strengthen 
Indonesia's anti-money laundering law. One proposed amendment 
to the law would provide PPATK authority temporarily to 
freeze assets. Such authority and the development of the 
website could prove an important start towards improving GOI 
processing of designations. 
 
-- We want to explore what UN 1267 information seems most 
useful and ways to improve your financial institutions' 
capacity to search accounts and report suspicious findings. 
Australia has technical expertise in this area. 
 
-- We can work together so that Indonesia better meets its 
commitments and makes effective use of the UN 1267 process. 
AMSELEM