This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DOHA 000005 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR RIYADH: PLEASE PASS TO A/S WAYNE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2016 
TAGS: ECON EPET EFIN KTFN QA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER - VISIT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY ANTHONY 
WAYNE TO QATAR 
 
Classified By: Classified By: CDA Scott McGehee for reasons 1.4 (b) and 
 (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Embassy Doha is pleased to welcome you back to Doha. 
We expect that you will find the Qatari leadership open and 
responsive to the proposed Strategic Investment Initiative 
(SII) for several reasons. Our goals for regional democratic 
reform largely coincide with those of Qatar. Also, the Qatari 
leadership is drawn to roles that enhance its international 
prestige, and will likely view working with the U.S. on the 
SII with that optic and with its new seat on the UN Security 
Council in mind. Additionally, your visit comes at a time 
when Qatar and the U.S. appear to be seeking opportunities to 
get beyond the diplomatic estrangement over Al-Jazeera that 
has dogged our bilateral relations in recent years. Other 
important areas also stand to be bolstered by your visit: 
further cementing our energy relationship, helping support 
U.S. businesses, and advancing our cooperation on 
interdiction of terrorist financing. 
 
¶2. (C) We have requested meetings with Second Deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister of Energy and Industry Abdallah bin 
Hamad Al-Attiyah, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs 
Ahmed Abdallah Al-Mahmoud (the Foreign Minister will be out 
of the country), Minister of Finance Jousef Hussain Kamal, 
Minister of Economy and Commerce Sheikh Mohammed bin Ahmed 
Al-Thani, and Central Bank Governor Abdullah bin Khalid 
Al-Attiyah. 
 
¶3. (U) The paragraphs that follow provide background on key 
current economic issues in Qatar. 
 
4.(C) Qatar has begun to use its wealth more intensively for 
development and reconstruction purposes while seeking 
leadership roles for itself. One recent example is that 
establishment of the "Reach Out to Asia" foundation, headed 
by the Amir,s daughter, Sheikha Miyassa. The importance of 
the foundation is part of the leadership,s looking forward 
to the December 2006 Asian Games, which Qatar will host. 
 
5.(C) While the foundation's activities face east, Qatar has 
contributed as expected to reconstruction and development in 
Iraq and the Palestinian Territories. In Iraq, it sought a 
leadership position with the establishment of a $15 million 
higher education fund through UNESCO and has pledged $100 
million at Madrid.  Nevertheless, Qatari has not been 
proactive in pursuing reconstruction efforts. This may be due 
in part to U.S. pressure over Al Jazeera and to the 
perception that Qatar is already doing its share by hosting 
U.S. forces here. 
 
6.(C) In the Palestinian Territories, Qatar makes use of 
personal contacts when setting up bilateral programs. For 
example, Qatar built a soccer stadium for an Arab team in 
Israel and is donating 100 vehicles for the Palestinian 
police. The Amir has close relations with Mahmoud Abbas, who 
will visit Doha January 2 and 3. 
 
¶7. (C) Over the past year, Qatari officials have maintained a 
behind-the-scenes dialogue with their Syrian and Lebanese 
counterparts in an attempt to bring about stable 
disengagement and to defuse tensions with the United States. 
Qatari officials may have concerns about how their 
participation in the SII might play out in their relations 
with Syria. 
 
¶8. (C) In the Arab region Qatar has generally demonstrated a 
degree of independence and a desire to work quietly at the 
highest levels. The SII would institutionalize and make more 
transparent some aspects of regional policy. The GOQ will 
have to take this on board. Such an approach may complement 
their position on the UN Security Council. Qataris will also 
want to protect their role from being overshadowed by their 
large neighbors, the Saudis. 
 
----------------- 
Terrorism Finance 
----------------- 
 
¶9. (U) Qatari security services have an adequate legal 
structure in place to pursue terrorists. In March 2004, Qatar 
passed the Combating Terrorism Law. The law defines terrorism 
and terrorist acts, lists specific punishments for terrorist 
crimes to include the death penalty, provides measures 
against terrorist financing or fundraising activities, and 
gives the government authority to take action against 
terrorist crimes and activities. The law incorporates 
existing laws such as Qatar's penal code, criminal procedure 
code, judicial law, a law on weapons, ammunitions and 
explosives, and an anti-money laundering law. 
 
¶10. (U) The Qatar Authority for Charitable Works, which 
monitors all domestic and international charitable 
activities, increased its resources and capabilities during 
¶2005. The Secretary General of the Authority approves 
international fund transfers by the charities. The Authority 
has primary responsibility for monitoring overseas 
charitable, developmental, and humanitarian projects, and 
reports annually to Government ministries on the status of 
all projects. The Authority is developing measures to exert 
further control over domestic charity collection. 
 
¶11. (U) Qatar continues to develop its financial intelligence 
unit (FIU). The FIU is responsible for reviewing all 
financial transaction reports, identifying suspicious 
transactions and financial activities of concern, and for 
ensuring that all Government ministries and agencies have 
procedures and standards to ensure proper oversight of 
financial transactions. 
 
------------- 
Energy Sector 
------------- 
 
¶12. (U) Qatar's economy is one of the fastest-growing in the 
world, achieving a 20.5% increase in GDP in 2004 and is 
expected to record equal or better growth for 2005. Per 
capita income is nearing $38,000, exceeding that of the U.S. 
and soon to be the highest in the world. Qatar's vast wealth 
has resulted from the successful development of its natural 
gas resources over the past 10 years with plans for even 
greater expansion over the next decade. Under the leadership 
of the Minister of Energy and Industry, Qatar Petroleum is 
maximizing use of Qatar's natural resources to diversify the 
economy and provide business and employment opportunities to 
Qataris. Since 1999, there has been $60 billion in foreign 
investment in Qatar's energy sector, about $40 billion of it 
coming from U.S. companies. Qatar plans to invest $70 billion 
in the natural gas sector over the next seven years. 
 
¶13. (U) The GOQ estimates Qatar's oil reserves are at 27 
billion barrels. Qatar's daily average production is 
currently estimated to be 806,000 barrels per day; at current 
production rates, oil reserves are expected to last 20 to 40 
years. Qatar's goal is to increase overall production 
capacity to over one million bpd by 2006. Occidental and 
Anadarko are the two U.S. companies operating in this sector. 
 
-------------- 
Oil Production 
-------------- 
 
¶14. (U) Foreign oil operators in Qatar include Maersk Oil 
(Norway) in Al-Shaheen at 300,000 bpd; Occidental Petroleum 
in Idd Al-Shargui North and South Domes with a combined 
100,000 bpd (90,000 in the North Dome and 10,000 in the South 
Dome); TotalFinaElf (France) in Al-Kahleej with 30,000 bpd; 
and, Anadarko (USA) Al-Rayyan with 15,000 bpd. Qatar's oil 
exports target primarily the Asian market: Japan 71.5%, 
Thailand 8%, South Korea 8%, Singapore 5.5%, China 3.5% and 
other countries 3.5%. 
 
---------------------- 
Natural Gas Production 
---------------------- 
 
¶15. (U) The majority of Qatar's current development in the 
energy sector is focused on its natural gas reserves. 
Discovered in 1971, Qatar's North Field contains 15.3% of 
world natural gas reserves, third behind Russia and Iran. 
Estimated at 900 trillion cubic feet (tcf), the North Field 
is the largest non-associated gas field in the world. The 
North Field extends over an area of approximately 6,000 
square kilometers is expected to support planned production 
for over 200 years. 
 
¶16. (U) QP manages the natural gas sector through its two 
major joint ventures, Qatargas and RasGas. The GOQ's primary 
goal is to supply 78 million tons of LNG annually to the 
international market by 2012 in order to meet about 30% of 
the global energy needs for LNG. GOQ officials have said that 
QP would increase its LNG output from 15.1 million tons per 
annum (mtpa) in 2003 to 20.2 mtpa by the end of 2004. In 
October 2004, Minister al-Attiyah said that Qatar plans to 
invest $70 billion in the natural gas sector over the next 
seven years. The production facilities for Qatargas, Rasgas 
and other natural gas related projects are located at Ras 
Laffan Industrial City. 
 
------------------------------- 
Al-Khaleej Gas Pipeline Project 
------------------------------- 
 
¶17. (C) A Memorandum of Understanding was signed between QP, 
ExxonMobil and Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC) in July 
2000 to develop a project to transport natural gas from Qatar 
to Kuwait. The execution of this project awaits the approval 
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to allow part of the pipeline 
to go through Saudi territorial waters. The GOQ wants the 
U.S. to convince the Saudis to agree to an easement for the 
pipeline. The Saudis do not appear willing to budge, leaving 
Kuwait in a position to look to Iran to provide additional 
gas supplies. 
 
------------ 
Trade Issues 
------------ 
 
¶18. (U) Qatar signed a Trade and Investment Framework 
agreement with the U.S. in March 2004 but progress toward a 
Free Trade Agreement is moving slowly at best. The Minister 
of Economy and Commerce has expressed his commitment to 
achieving a FTA, but doing so will require Qatar to remove 
such trade obstacles as mandatory majority Qatari ownership 
of most businesses, the government telecom monopoly, 
restrictions to foreign investment in the financial services 
sector, labor issues, and transparency in government 
procurement. 
 
---------------- 
Political Reform 
---------------- 
 
¶19. (U) Qatar's own program of reform, launched by the Amir 
after he assumed power in 1995, took a significant step 
forward last June when its first constitution came into 
force. The constitution calls for a two-thirds elected 
national legislature. These elections have not been scheduled 
but are expected to take place sometime in early 2007. Qatari 
women will have the right to vote and will be encouraged by 
the government to run for office. In municipal elections in 
1999 and 2003, women here were the first in the Gulf region 
to cast votes, and one woman was elected to the council. 
 
----------------------------- 
Dramatic Changes in Education 
----------------------------- 
 
¶20. (U) Education reform, headed by the Amir's wife, Sheikha 
Mozah, is a becoming a showcase. This reform includes a 
sweeping revamp of Qatar's pre-university and higher 
education system based on Rand Corporation recommendations. 
Also as part of this effort, Qatar has brought to its 
"Education City" the branch campuses of Texas A&M University, 
Virginia Commonwealth University, Carnegie-Mellon, and the 
Weill-Cornell Medical College. In May, Georgetown University 
signed an agreement with Sheikha Mozah's Qatar Foundation to 
open a branch campus here in September. These have been 
ground-breaking efforts that have been hailed by many as 
models for other states in the region. 
 
---------- 
Al-Jazeera 
---------- 
 
¶21. (C) Al-Jazeera remains a blight on our robust 
cooperation.  In response to our repeated protests and 
appeals, Al-Jazeera's management claims to have reduced the 
air time given to Al-Qaida and kidnappers' videos, and have 
made efforts to address the inflammatory nature of its 
reporting from Iraq. The channel has highlighted to us its 
coverage of pro-democracy movements in Lebanon and Egypt as 
well as broader coverage of Middle Eastern politics. Al 
Jazeera Managing Director told the Ambassador, "If the 
Americans want to find a proper partner in its effort to get 
democracy and reform, they won't find a better one than Al 
Jazeera." 
 
¶22. (C) During the Ambassador's May 2005 visit to Washington, 
the consensus of opinion among USG agencies monitoring 
Al-Jazeera is that the station has shown some signs of 
improved broadcasting but still remains unacceptably sloppy 
in its journalist practices and in its anti-American 
editorial bent. The Al-Jazeera issue has cast a long shadow, 
affecting cooperation on a variety of bilateral initiatives 
floated by the U.S. The GOQ wants to find ways to put 
U.S.-Qatar relations on a stronger, more positive foundation. 
We anticipate that your Qatari interlocutors will welcome 
your visit and the SII as a chance to move toward that 
objective. 
MCGEHEE