This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 DJIBOUTI 000043 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR DS/DSS/IP, DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA, DS/DSS/OSAC 
EMBASSY ADDIS ABABA FOR ESO AND RSO AND EMBASSY ASMARA FOR 
RSO 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC DJ KSEO
SUBJECT: DJIBOUTI: 4TH QUARTER STATUS REPORT - OCT, NOV, DEC 
 
REF: 05 STATE 228796 
 
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¶1. Summary of Significant Events 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶A. Narrative Overview of Significant Events 
 
¶1. (U) This is ARSO Fogarty,s first QSR as Acting RSO. RSO 
Gary Stoner is on leave until January 12, 2006. During this 
quarter the RSO continued to focus primarily on physical and 
procedural security. The reduction of residential security 
services began before RSO,s arrival and required a lot of 
attention and time-consuming adaptation. The elimination of 
residential guards significantly degraded security because 
the majority of the homes in the mission pool do not meet 
OSPB standards without guards. The RSO managed the 
installation of residential security alarms, the connection 
of a Central Alarm Monitoring System (CAMS) and the 
implementation of a 24-hour mobil patrol. 
 
¶2. (U) RSO supported the visit of a two-man Chem/Bio training 
team in September/ October. Training consisted of awareness 
presentations to the Mission community and response training 
for the Mission,s First Responders. Over 170 individuals 
were trained during the visit. The training team supervised a 
successful comprehensive Chem/Bio drill using the Mission,s 
First Responders. 
 
¶3. (U) RSO welcomed the visit of Addis SEO Eric Meinhardt and 
STS Thomas Migliore to Post in December. The team was 
successful in restoring camera control to Post 1 and repaired 
the main Chancery door magnetic lock system, which was broken 
for over a year. Post continues to suffer from equipment 
failure that is a result of power problems - both outages and 
surges - , extensive heat and salt-water corrosion. 
 
¶4. (U) ARSO Fogarty handled the various daily tasking of an 
RSO while still tackling several unforeseen incidents, e.g. 
Counter intelligence incidents, analysis and deconfliction of 
threat intelligence, coordinating TDY visits and assisted in 
the visit of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
General Peter Pace. 
 
¶5. (U) Although RSO has not received any reports of physical 
attacks on Americans during this quarter, there has been an 
increase in petty theft and violent crimes within the city. 
As reported before, RSO and embassy personnel continue to 
monitor crime trends and RSO continues to work closely with 
host nation police to ensure the safety of all personnel. 
Reports of petty theft, fraud, assault, battery, sexual 
deviation, and unlawful trade continue to be reported 
informally. Post has been fortunate so far in that the 
Embassy has experienced no serious incidents or assaults 
against its staff although violent crime is on the rise and 
post no longer has residential security guards. 
 
¶4. (U) RSO is working closely with DS/ATA in coordinating law 
enforcement training for local security personnel. One ATA 
course was successfully completed and one more course was 
offered during the 4th quarter. RSO is currently submitting 
cost estimates and submitting names for the 5412 - Major Case 
Management Course. 
 
¶5. (U) RSO supported the visit of the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs General Peter Pace and several other sub CINC visits 
of military personnel during this quarter. RSO continues to 
work closely with and support other agencies at post to 
coordinate visits and security briefings. 
 
¶B. Mission Wide Emergency Action Drills: 
 
Post continues to develop and carry out emergency response 
drills with U.S. Military elements assigned to assist the 
mission in case of a crisis. Two quick-response drills were 
coordinated between the RSO and U.S. Military personnel from 
Camp Lemonier. 
 
¶1. Chancery: 
 
(a) WMD Chem./Bio ) 29 September 2005 
(b) Fire Drill ) 18 December 2005 
(c) Emergency Destruction Drill ) 15 November 2005 
(d) Internal Defense ) 8 October 2005 
 
¶2.  Constituent posts: 
 
Not applicable. 
 
¶3.  MSG activities: 
 
Not applicable. 
 
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¶2.  Threats and incidents: 
-------------------------- 
 
¶A.  (SBU) Post has Convened the EAC 2 times during the 
quarter in response to threat information Post continues to 
be rated as critical for trans-national terrorism. RSO 
continues to work closely with 
host nation security to monitor activity and strengthen the 
physical security measures surrounding the embassy in 
response to that activity. (Djibouti 01046 and Djibouti 00996) 
 
 
 
¶B.  Constituent posts: Not applicable 
 
-------------------------------- 
¶3. DS initiated investigations: 
-------------------------------- 
 
Number of cases generated by headquarters offices: 
 
                    opened   closed   pending   overdue 
¶1. PSS                 (2)      (2)       (0)       (0) 
¶2. VF                  (0)      (0)       (1)       (0) 
¶3. PF                  (0)      (0)       (0)       (0) 
¶4. CIL                 (0)      (0)       (0)       (0) 
¶5. PR                  (0)      (0)       (0)       (0) 
¶6. CI                  (0)      (0)       (0)       (0) 
¶7. PII                 (0)      (0)       (0)       (0) 
 
Number of cases generated by post: 
 
¶1. Post FSN/PSC        (18)     (15)      (3)       (0) 
¶2. Other Agency RFAS   (0)      (0)       (0)       (0) 
¶3. Host Govt RFAS      (0)      (0)       (0)       (0) 
¶4. RSO Criminal        (0)      (0)       (0)       (0) 
 
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¶4. Action cables/e-mails not answered by DS: 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
NONE 
 
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¶5. Summary of separate reports: 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶A.   CIWG report: 12/21/2005 (Djibouti 01248) 
 
¶B.  Emergency action plans: completed and distributed by DS 
on 12/02/2004.  Next full revision of the EAP is due 12/07. 
An update of the EAP will be conducted in early 2006. 
 
¶C.  Security surveys: 
Chancery - 02 March 2003 
Warehouse ) 02 March 2003 
EMR ) 02 March 2003 
 
¶D.  Procedural security survey: 12/29/05 
 
¶E.  Comprehensive SPE inventory: 04/11/05 (Djibouti 344) 
 
¶F.  RSO quarterly travel report: 10/31/05-11/23/05 ARSO TDY 
coverage to Asmara, Eritrea. 
 
¶G.  Annual Crime Evaluation Questionnaire and OSAC 
Crime/Safety report:  There has been a significant rise in 
the crime posture of Djibouti since last years report. 
 
¶H. DSS overseas firearms qualification policy: RSO and ARSO 
conducted familiarization fire in October and November. 
 
¶I. ACEQ - 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Crime Mobility - response (c). 
 
Comments: Although criminals have easy access to embassy 
residential areas, there has been one report of attempted 
theft, burglary or other crimes against Americans in the past 
six months. The removal of Post,s residential guard coverage 
creates vulnerability for Embassy personnel arriving and 
departing from their residences leaving them unprotected as 
well as irresistible targets for crime. (Djibouti 00021) 
 
¶2. (SBU) Crime Ambience - response (b). 
 
Comments: Due to the proximity of the high crime port area, 
just 1 mile from the embassy residential area, the potential 
for criminal activity, especially at night, still exists. 
Physical security measures coupled with the mobile patrol has 
helped deter would-be burglars.  Post has acquired new 
housing within an area of the city that is farther away from 
the upper scale district of Heron.  The remote location of 
these residences makes them more susceptible to crimes of 
opportunity with the absence of residential guards acting as 
a deterrent.  Not enough time has passed to adequately survey 
the potential for criminal impact to these residences. 
Should criminal activity begin to surface in this area, RSO 
will report accordingly. 
 
¶3. (U) Aggressiveness of Criminals - response (b). 
 
Comments: Due to the habitual use of the legalized 
amphetamine, Khat, by the majority of the male populace, the 
potential for aggressive behavior on behalf of the criminal 
could be exhibited, but no reports have been submitted that 
document such behavior. 
 
¶4. (U) Arming of Criminals - response (b). 
 
Comments: Violent crimes involving firearms are rare, but the 
presence of firearms is becoming more prevalent due to the 
porous borders between Djibouti, Somalia, Ethiopia and 
Eritrea. Knives and sharp objects seem to be the weapon of 
choice for the would-be assailant. 
 
¶5. (U) Aggregation of Criminals - response (b). 
 
Comments: Criminals generally aggregate by ethnic 
affiliation, clanship or tribalism. Incidents in the past 
indicate that victims are spared gratuitous violence if they 
comply with the perpetrators. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Deterrence/Response of Police - response (c). 
 
Comments: The national police force is under-trained, 
under-resourced and under-paid. They lack sufficient and 
adequate equipment and do not have the budget, experience or 
knowledge to effectively combat crime. The local criminal 
sees this and is not deterred by the presence or actions of 
the police. Embassy officers rely on the RSO and LGF to 
respond to any incident that may occur at their residences. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Training/Professionalism of Police ) response (d). 
 
Comments: It has been three years since the attempted, but 
failed, coup was carried out against the current president. 
The police forces have appeared to bounce back and are in the 
daily process of carrying out their duties. RSO works closely 
with senior level police and believes that a concerted effort 
to change the past is being made. The lower levels of police 
officers still suffer from low salaries, virtually no 
benefits, poor equipment and inadequate training. In FY-05, 
DS/ATA provided the government of Djibouti with a series of 
courses that are designed to enhance the law enforcement 
capabilities of their security services.  The ATA program 
continues to evolve for Djibouti in FY-06. 
 
¶J. OSAC/CSR - 
 
¶1. (U) Overall crime and safety situation:  The State 
Department,s Bureau of Diplomatic Security rates Djibouti as 
a high crime threat post.  Endemic poverty, widespread 
unemployment and a growing refugee population have led to an 
increase in criminal activity over the past several years. 
Most reported incidents are crimes of opportunity for 
immediate gain such as pick-pocketing and petty theft. 
Violent crimes committed at knifepoint are also reported but 
not common.  There have been burglary attempts against 
expatriate residences, but perpetrators generally lack the 
sophistication required to overcome home alarm systems and 
security guards.  The large number of unemployed males 
loitering downtown and in other areas frequented by 
expatriates allows criminals to roam undetected.  The port, 
bus terminal and downtown areas of Djibouti are considered at 
greatest risk for street crime.  Criminal activity is 
exacerbated by the widespread abuse of Khat, an amphetamine 
that tends to increase aggressiveness among users. 
 
¶2. (U) Political violence:  The government and community 
leaders have stated publicly their strong support for the 
U.S. and coalition efforts in the Global War on Terrorism and 
although anti U.S. demonstrations broke out at the beginning 
of the Iraqi conflict, the focus of the demonstrations was 
aimed at the war and not Americans overall.  The 
demonstrations lasted approximately 5 days, but there have 
been no signs since of anti-American sentiment.  65 percent 
of Djiboutians are ethnic 
Somalis, and the rest are Afar or foreigners. 
 
Domestic political violence is a less significant threat than 
during the civil war (1990-1996), but rivalry persists 
between Djibouti,s Somali and Afar ethnic groups.  Since the 
May 2001 signing of a peace accord, many former rebels have 
been integrated into the National Police and Defense Forces. 
 
Demonstrations, often protesting against the Government,s 
nonpayment of salaries, sometimes take place and police 
occasionally use non-lethal force to disperse unauthorized 
demonstrators.  Civil unrest could also result if the daily 
air delivery of Khat from neighboring countries were 
disrupted or delayed for any reason.  Visitors are advised to 
avoid political gatherings and large crowds. 
 
Djibouti lies at the crossroads between the Middle East and 
the Horn of Africa and hosts a substantial population of 
refugees from throughout the region.  The governments of 
Libya, Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Russia, 
China, France, The United States and other nations maintain 
diplomatic or honorary representation in Djibouti. 
Djibouti,s proximity to a number of conflict-torn states and 
the governments limited capacity to monitor border controls 
has raised concerns over the possibility of cross-border 
terrorist acts. 
 
¶3. (U) Post-specific safety concerns: 
 
Road travel to the north of the country is considered unsafe 
due to poorly constructed roads and the lack of service or 
emergency stations. 
 
A significant percentage of Djiboutian males are under the 
influence of Khat on a daily basis.  The drug's affects may 
escalate what would otherwise be a casual interaction (such 
as a bumped elbow) into a confrontation. 
 
Djibouti is an Islamic country; visitors should dress 
conservatively and observe local customs. 
 
¶4. (U) Police response:  The Djiboutian National Police Force 
is severely under-resourced.  The police lack transportation, 
fuel, and communications equipment, which severely affects 
Police responsiveness.  The government is generally 3-6 
months in arrears for payment of police salaries. 
 
Visitors requiring police assistance are advised to appear in 
person at the commissariat of police, located across from the 
general post office on the Boulevard de la Republique.  The 
central police telephone number is 352-343.  Private security 
guards for residences and facilities are generally hired on 
an ad-hoc basis.  There are few security guard companies, 
none that are capable of providing patrol response services. 
 
¶5. (U) Medical emergencies:  Local medical facilities do not 
generally offer standards of care available in western 
countries, although there are a few French-trained doctors 
who cater to the expatriate community.  Depending on the 
medical care required and on the availability of space 
visitors with medical problems are advised to contact the 
hospital Bouffard (French Military hospital) at 351-351 
ext.53015. 
 
Falciparum-type malaria (chloroquine-resistant) is widespread 
in Djibouti; prophylaxis is advised. 
 
HIV/AIDS is also a serious concern, especially among the 
urban population; approximately 3 percent of all Djiboutians 
are infected. 
 
¶6. (U) Tips to avoid being a victim: 
 
a) Street Safety:  Visitors to Djibouti should remain 
vigilant at all times and maintain a high security awareness 
while on the streets.  Additional caution should be exercised 
around the port, bus terminal, central market (Quartiers 2 
and 3) and downtown, especially after dark.  Panhandlers and 
street children target foreigners for petty theft by creating 
distractions.  Visitors should avoid isolated areas, 
particularly along the urban coastline. 
 
b) Traffic Safety:  Road conditions are poor throughout 
Djibouti.  Drivers should beware of potholes, unskilled 
drivers, and the presence of non-roadworthy vehicles on urban 
and rural roads.  Pedestrians and livestock often appear on 
roadways without warning.  Reports indicate that nomads in 
rural areas place rocks on the roads to stop vehicles and 
demand water and/or transportation.  The theft of high-value 
items from stopped vehicles has been reported.  Drivers 
should keep their windows up and doors locked and be 
especially vigilant at intersections. Unattended vehicles 
should always be locked, with valuables secured in an 
inconspicuous location. 
 
Visitors who are involved in traffic accidents should attempt 
to exchange insurance information with the other party and 
summon a traffic policeman if one is nearby.  It is 
inadvisable to make restitution at the scene, especially if 
livestock or pedestrians are involved.  Drivers should be 
wary of crowds gathering at the scene of an accident and 
should depart immediately if they perceive a threat to their 
safety. 
 
c) Hotel Safety:  US Government personnel on temporary 
assignment to Djibouti are advised to stay in one of four 
hotels:  The Sheraton, The Plen Cielle, The Bellevue and The 
Europa.  Other hotels are considered inadequate.  Visitors 
have reported incidents of robbery and aggressive 
solicitation by prostitutes.  Visitors are advised to lock 
their doors and admit only expected visitors into hotel rooms. 
 
¶7. (U) Further information:  There is no OSAC country council 
in Djibouti.  American citizens are encouraged to register 
with the embassy by appearing in person at the Consular 
section. The embassy is located on Avenue Marechal Joffre at 
the Plateau du Serpent (near the Sheraton hotel). Business 
hours are 08:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., Sunday through Thursday. 
Telephone numbers are (253) 353-995.  Americans are welcome 
to visit the Consular section any time during business hours 
or to telephone the embassy 24 hours a day in case of an 
emergency. 
 
 
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¶6. POC is Acting RSO Michael Fogarty at 253-35-39-95 ext 2307. 
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RAGSDALE