VZCZCXYZ0004
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDM #0207/01 0191411
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 191411Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6622
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0581
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000207 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU; STATE FOR NEA/P, NEA/PPD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPAO
SUBJECT: IMPACT OF KHADDAM:  A SYRIAN OPPOSITION FIGURE 
SPEAKS OUT 
 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d. 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  In a conversation held before the release 
of political prisoner Riyad Seif and others, prominent Syrian 
 XXXXXXXXXXXX opposition figure XXXXXXXXXXXX told Polchief 
January 16 that former VP Abdul Halim Khaddam's press 
campaign had thrown the Syrian regime into crisis but would 
not by itself threaten its survival.  Khaddam's sharpest 
criticism had been aimed directly at President Bashar 
al-Asad, as a way to encourage regime pillars to calculate 
that it was in their interest to distance themselves from or 
possibly move against Asad, XXXXXXXXXXXX said.  Khaddam's attacks had 
strengthened the opposition in Syria and given it more 
prominence, but we assess that the release of five of the six 
Damascus spring detainees effectively short-circuits 
Khaddam's plans for encouraging the Syrian opposition to 
rally around him.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) KHADDAM INFLICTED DAMAGE, BUT ...:Syrian opposition 
figure XXXXXXXXXXXX told Polchief January 16 
-- before the release of former MP Riyad Seif and other 
detainees -- that former VP Abdul Halim Khaddam was in a 
position to deepen severely the long-term crisis in which the 
regime finds itself but not, by himself, to bring the regime 
down.  His primary limitation is that he has never had strong 
support in the Syrian military and security services, which 
are dominated by the Alawites, noted XXXXXXXXXXXX. 
 
¶3.  (C) ENCOURAGING REGIME FIGURES TO ABANDON ASAD?  XXXXXXXXXXXX 
said that Khaddam's criticism of Asad as a weak, indecisive, 
dangerously inexperienced and impulsive leader highlighted a 
problem that regime power brokers like SMI head Asif Shawkat 
and brother Maher al-Asad were already aware of:  How does an 
essentially totalitarian regime function with such a vacuum 
at the center?  The issue is more stark now:  Do regime 
pillars (mostly Alawite) stand with Asad and risk possibly 
losing power completely, or move against him?   XXXXXXXXXXXX also 
noted that Asad now found himself ensnared in a dangerous, 
intractable crisis with UNIIIC over the assassination of 
Hariri, with the finger of suspicion directed by Khaddam 
pointing squarely at him. 
 
¶4.  (C) OPENING DOORS FOR THE OPPOSITION:  With regard to the 
opposition in Syria, Khaddam's attacks had strengthened it 
significantly.  Khaddam had spoken about it in a very 
positive manner and adopted the opposition's program, 
primarily embodied in the Damascus Declaration.  This had 
enhanced the opposition's standing in Syria, making it likely 
that the regime would try to reach out to it in the coming 
weeks.  (Comment:  The release of Seif and the fresh rumors 
about a new political parties law indicate this effort may 
already be underway.) 
 
¶5.  (C) In addition, Khaddam had opened a door for the 
opposition to the U.S., insisted XXXXXXXXXXXX.  His criticism 
provided some cover for opposition figures who wanted to 
criticize the regime but feared being branded as an agent of 
the U.S. or as anti-Syrian.  "We must take advantage of the 
opening Khaddam has provided," maintained XXXXXXXXXXXX.   On a 
separate note, XXXXXXXXXXXX, took note of Khaddam's 
opening to the Syrian Muslim Brothers (MB) and urged the U.S. 
to engage with the MB leadership, dismissing the notion that 
they posed a threat to future secular democratic development 
in Syria.  (Comment: Our contacts are divided on whether the 
MB poses a potential threat.  Post will provide a fuller 
assessment septel.) 
 
¶6.  (C) Comment:  Post shares XXXXXXXXXXXX assessment that 
Khaddam's press interviews have created some space for the 
opposition, although how much its position has been 
strengthened remains to be seen.  The January 18 release of 
Riyad Seif and four other Damascus Spring detainees seems to 
represent a regime attempt to respond to Khaddam and close 
off his effort to rally the oppositon to his side.  Seif is 
now likely to attract all that opposition support (and to 
draw much broader support in Syrian society).  The SARG 
release of Seif is likely to render Khaddam a less imposing 
figure, with less potential for being viewed as an 
alternative to the regime.  Seif's prison term would have 
ended in September of this year in any case, forcing the SARG 
to deal with his case soon enough.  The fact that it moved 
now, however, as it navigates through a crisis Khaddam helped 
to precipitate, gives some indication of how much Khaddam 
rattled the regime's leadership.  Seif, previously viewed by 
the regime as a potential Mandela-type figure on the Syrian 
political scene, appeared post-Khaddam as a useful 
distraction and perhaps for the regime as less threatening 
 
than Khaddam.  In the long run, as he moves out of the shadow 
momentarily cast by Khaddam, Seif will probably prove to be 
the far more imposing opposition figure (but without access 
to the weapon of "regime secrets" wielded by the former VP). 
The SARG for its part will work strenuously in the coming 
months to split the opposition, manipulate any political 
opening resulting from a new parties law, and in short, 
circumscribe to the maximum Seif's political potential. 
SECHE