VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDM #0141/01 0091342
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 091342Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6542
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0572
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000141 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: KHADDAM, UNIIIC, AND A POSSIBLE CABINET RESHUFFLE 
 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d. 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Polchief met January 8 with XXXXXXXXXXXX, a long-standing Embassy contact, who described 
possible motives for the interviews being given by former 
Syrian VP Khaddam, as well as increased Alawite 
dissatisfaction with President Asad.  XXXXXXXXXXXX also described 
a threatening outburst by Syria's former Military 
Intelligence Chief in Lebanon, Rustom Ghazaleh, possibly 
under stress from being informed that UNIIIC wants to 
re-interview him in Vienna in the coming days.  XXXXXXXXXXXX 
suggested that Syrian President Bashar al-Asad will agree to 
be interviewed in some form by UNIIIC, noting that Syria has 
no choice but to cooperate.  Despite the crisis related to 
Khaddam and UNIIIC developments, or partially even in 
reaction to them, the regime is still considering a Cabinet 
reshuffle in the month after the impending Eid holidays, said 
XXXXXXXXXXXX.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) KHADDAM STRATEGY:  XXXXXXXXXXXX described the Khaddam 
interviews as "a card being played now" largely because of 
developments in Lebanon.  In his view, Sa'ad Hariri and the 
Saudis calculated that "the March 14 forces" in Lebanon were 
demoralized after the second Mehlis report.  At the same 
time, Hizballah looked to be headed into a dangerous alliance 
with the Aoun camp.  The Khaddam card was played to 
strengthen the March 14 forces.  XXXXXXXXXXXX also noted that the 
SARG is convinced that the Saudis, or some group of the royal 
family, are definitely involved with Khaddam and have been 
plotting secretly for months to oust the Asad regime. (For 
XXXXXXXXXXXX remarks on the Saudis and Asad's January 8 visit to 
Jeddah, see septel). 
 
¶3.  (C) While playing the Khaddam card now made sense from 
the Lebanese angle, it did not mean that Khaddam had 
calculated his own interests accurately, assessed XXXXXXXXXXXX. 
In his view, Khaddam may have moved prematurely and escalated 
things too quickly.  "What can he possibly say now" to keep 
his attacks going, asked XXXXXXXXXXXX.  It is understandable, 
nonetheless, that Khaddam is moving quickly, XXXXXXXXXXXX said, noting 
that for Khaddam to have any influence, he needs things to 
develop in Syria while his reputation as a key former regime 
(and Sunni) figure is still imposing. 
 
¶4.  (C) IS IT WORKING?  XXXXXXXXXXXX also questioned whether 
Khaddam "is betting on real horses."  The Syrian street is 
not ready to move at all, and certainly not behind any 
Khaddam-led movement.  He cannot lead any "Orange Revolution" 
here, added XXXXXXXXXXXX.  There is "significant flux" in the 
Syrian military, however, something that has become tangible 
to close observers in the past few weeks, insisted XXXXXXXXXXXX. 
XXXXXXXXXXXX quoted one well-placed, very senior observer (but did not 
name him), who said that the situation in the Syrian military 
"is not good at all, not like it was, even a month ago" a 
statement XXXXXXXXXXXX took to mean that things are not stable and 
that there is widespread dissatisfaction with the regime and 
its leadership. 
 
¶5.  (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX also pointed to significant recent signs of 
growing dissatisfaction and unease in the Alawite community 
with Bashar al-Asad and the regime.  XXXXXXXXXXXX recounted a recent 
cultural event at which some of the most distinguished 
Alawites in Damascus were gathered.  A prominent XXXXXXXXXXXX 
actor, XXXXXXXXXXXX, a close relative to former senior 
officials in the regime, "trashed" Asad in front of a group 
of forty people, calling him indecisive and guilty of 
catastrophically bad decision-making.  XXXXXXXXXXXX said that such 
an outburst in public against the president in such a crowd 
would have been unheard of, even a few weeks ago. 
 
¶6.  (C) UNIIIC INVESTIGATION:  According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, two of 
the five suspects previously interviewed in Vienna, Rustom 
Ghazaleh and Colonel Samih Qashami, were scheduled to return 
presently to Austria for further questioning.  XXXXXXXXXXXX
expected that the two would be arrested there or immediately 
upon their return to Damascus.  Perhaps sensing that the end 
was near, an armed Ghazaleh and several similarly armed 
bodyguards charged into a meeting at the MFA in early 
January, attended by XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX. 
The purpose of the meeting had been for the five suspects to 
sign some routine retainer papers for lawyers arranged for 
them by the MFA.  While Ghazaleh did not pull his weapon, he 
shouted in an insulting, threatening manner, calling XXXXXXXXXXXX 
and XXXXXXXXXXXX "agents for the Americans" and insisting that only 
he was standing up for Syria's interests.  XXXXXXXXXXXX said the 
tense confrontation lasted for much of an hour, with MFA 
guards coming to ask Ghazaleh to remove his weapon.  (He 
refused.)  There was a real sense that Ghazaleh was capable 
of shooting himself or others, said XXXXXXXXXXXX, still unnerved 
by the incident several days later.  Ghazaleh seemed severely 
depressed and unbalanced, said XXXXXXXXXXXX.  Eventually the 
President's office was called and informed of the incident. 
XXXXXXXXXXXX quoted Asad as saying that Ghazaleh should be 
compelled to apologize.  So far no apology has been 
forthcoming. 
 
¶7.  (C) The other suspects told XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX afterwards 
that Ghazalah had been encouraged to act in such a manner by 
SMI head Asif Shawkat.  XXXXXXXXXXXX surmised that Ghazaleh was 
attempting to obtain some assurances from the regime in 
advance of any return trip to Vienna.  XXXXXXXXXXXX predicted that 
after any arrest of Ghazaleh, the role of Shawkat is likely 
to become much more prominent and problematic, with a 
possible regime crisis, as Shawkat would sense the noose 
tightening.  An arrest of Ghazaleh also might spark unrest in 
Dara'a, the Sunni population center closest to Ghazaleh's 
hometown, thought XXXXXXXXXXXX.  There is a persistent feeling in 
such Sunni areas "that the Alawites are robbing the country 
and the Sunnis are paying for it." 
 
¶8.  (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX insisted that the SARG has no choice but to 
continue cooperating with UNIIIC.  This included allowing 
UNIIIC to interview Asad, although the SARG would not admit 
it at first.  Some type of "face-saving formula" would be 
developed, thought XXXXXXXXXXXX.  (Comment:  Other contacts are 
divided about whether Asad would be cooperative on this 
point.  An Egyptian diplomat repeatedly pointed out to 
Polchief that it would be unprecedented for a sitting head of 
state to sit down to such an interrogation and expressed 
incredulity that the UNSC would insist on this. 
XXXXXXXXXXXX, on the other hand, 
insisted to Emboffs January 8, based on his conversations 
with Asad uncle and advisor Mohammed Makhlouf, that Asad 
would agree eventually to an interview with UNIIIC.) 
 
¶9.  (C) KHADDAM CRISIS AND CABINET RESHUFFLE RUMORS:  Despite 
the crisis related to Khaddam and UNIIIC developments, or 
partially even in reaction to them, the regime is still 
considering a Cabinet reshuffle in the month after the 
January 10-13 Eid holidays, said XXXXXXXXXXXX.  He recounted an 
extended discussion he had at the MFA, also in early January, 
with Ba'ath Party Regional Command National Security Office 
 
head Hisham Ikhtiyar and Party Regional Secretary Mohammed 
Said Bukhaytan (on the margins of another meeting) about such 
a reshuffle and other actions the SARG would take on the 
domestic front to confront the current crisis.  XXXXXXXXXXXX said 
they described the current government as non-functioning, 
frozen to a significant degree over the deadlock between 
Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs Abdullah Dardari 
and the Ba'ath Party Regional Command, led by Finance 
Minister (and Dardari rival) Mohammed al-Hussein.  Despite 
Hussein's significant support, Dardari would not be pushed 
out of a new government.  According to XXXXXXXXXXXX summary of 
the conversation, reform issues aside, Dardari is now viewed 
as "representing the Sunnis," and hence had become 
indispensable for the regime in the current crisis.  Hussein 
(also a Sunni) was viewed as more dispensable.  (Note:  Other 
contacts are divided about the prospects for such a reshuffle 
in the coming weeks.  XXXXXXXXXXXX, 
a confident of Asad uncle and advisor Mohammed Makhlouf, told 
Emboffs he too believed it was imminent, even post-Khaddam 
interview, while XXXXXXXXXXXX said 
Khaddam had frozen any movement towards the reshuffle.) 
 
¶10.  (C) In addition to a possible reshuffle, the two 
Regional Command officials indicated that the government was 
discussing (again) granting nationality to stateless Kurds, a 
new political parties law, a freer media policy, and 
concessions on reform (and appointments) that would please 
the Damascene business class, and greater participation by 
Sunnis in a new government.  While XXXXXXXXXXXX thought a cabinet 
reshuffle likely, he discounted much action on these other 
issues. 
 
¶11.  (C) COMMENT:  The Khaddam media campaign in Paris 
continues to provoke tremendous interest and speculation 
here.  With every new theory emerging about his motives, 
sense of timing, plans and partners, it becomes more clear 
that observers do not have a very clear sense about what 
Khaddam is up to.  The impact he seems to be having on the 
UNIIIC investigation is probably the pressure point that most 
concerns the regime right now.  Already Khaddam seems to have 
put a smug, confident Bashar al-Asad on the defensive, as he 
faces an unexpected summons to be questioned by UNIIIC 
investigators.  Even if the more grandiose ambitions that 
seem to be lurking behind Khaddam's action prove to be 
unrealistic, given the weak opposition here and Khaddam's 
lack of political support, the UNIIIC angle he is relying on 
seems to be an effective instrument for getting back at Asad 
and his regime. 
 
 
 
SECHE