VZCZCXRO6890
PP RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHCHI #0020/01 0201021
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 201021Z JAN 06
FM AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0136
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0017
RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU PRIORITY 0021
RUCPDOC/US DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE HQ WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI PRIORITY 0161

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 CHIANG MAI 000020 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS USTR 
TREASURY FOR OASIA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETRD ECIN WTRO EAGR PGOV CH TH
SUBJECT: ANGER OVER THAILAND'S EARLY HARVEST AGREEMENT FUELS FTA 
PROTESTS 
 
REF: 04 CHIANG MAI 00218 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000020  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Summary:  The controversial 2003 Thai-Chinese "Early Harvest" 
agreement on fruits and vegetables became a whipping boy during 
anti-Free-Trade Agreement (FTA) demonstrations in Chiang Mai 
January 9-11, as protestors pointed to the Early Harvest 
agreement of the China-ASEAN FTA for proof of the negative 
effects of FTAs.  In fact, although the country as a whole shows 
a growing overall trade surplus with China in agricultural 
products, northern Thai fruit and vegetable farmers have 
suffered huge losses in the wake of the agreement.  End Summary. 
 
The Thai-China Early Harvest agreement was an effort by the two 
governments to fast-track tariff reductions included in the 
China-ASEAN FTA negotiations.  The six original countries of 
ASEAN began trade negotiations with China in November 2001, 
agreeing in November 2004 to reduce the tariffs for goods on the 
"Normal List" to zero in 2006. 
Impatient with the pace of these talks, Thailand jumpstarted 
free trade with China by signing an "Early Harvest" agreement 
that reduced tariffs on Chapter 7 (Vegetables) and Chapter 8 
(Fruits) to zero starting October 2003.  (Reftel) 
 
Since the new terms of trade went into effect, Thailand's trade 
surplus with China has grown, up more than 50% from 2003 to 2004 
according to statistics from Thailand's Customs Department. 
"It's been a loss for the Chinese," Chinese Consul General Peng 
Rendong told the U.S. ConGen, waving aside northern Thai 
perceptions to the contrary. 
A breakdown of the trade statistics for Chapters 7 and 8 reveals 
that Thai farmers have indeed suffered tremendous losses since 
the reduction in tariffs.  The trade balance is strongly in 
China's favor in 20 out of 28 product categories.  Excluding the 
eight categories in which Thailand has seen more growth in 
exports than in imports leaves the country running a trade 
deficit with China that grew by 845% between 2003 and 2004 and 
supports northern Thai concern over the economic damage caused 
by cheaper produce flowing in from China. 
 
The balance only swings in Thailand's favor when the eight 
remaining categories are taken into account, particularly 
tapioca, which accounts for more than 50% of total agricultural 
trade between the two countries.  In 2004, Thailand exported 8.6 
billion baht ($215 million U.S.) of tapioca to China, up 59.1% 
from the previous year.  Thai exports in the other 13 categories 
of vegetables barely reached 19 million baht ($475,000 U.S.). 
Take tapioca out of the equation and Thailand had a 2004 trade 
deficit with China in Chapter 7 of 1.4 billion baht ($35 million 
U.S.), 72% larger than the previous year. 
 
Thanks to Thailand's exotic fruits, the scales in fruit trade 
are more balanced.  Since the Early Harvest agreement was 
signed, Chinese fruits have flooded into Thailand via the Mekong 
River port at Chiang Saen (the value of Chinese fruits imported 
to Thailand grew 142% 2003-2004 while Thai fruit exports to 
China grew only 78%).  Chinese orange, grape, and apple growers 
are enjoying broader access to the Thai market; Thailand's trade 
deficit in these three categories was 2.3 billion baht ($58 
million U.S.) in 2004.  But growers of Thai fruits such longan, 
durian, mangosteen, and bananas have fought back with a 408% 
growth in exports of these fruits to China, bringing Thailand's 
trade surplus in these categories up to 1.5 billion baht ($38 
million U.S.).  Thailand continues to run a slim trade surplus 
with China in fruits overall (230 million baht or $5.8 million 
U.S. in 2004).  Although end-of-year statistics for 2004 
indicate that this surplus might be shrinking (down 33%), 
numbers for January-July 2005 show a 44% increase compared to 
the same period from 2004. 
 
Without tapioca and exotic fruits, the Early Harvest agreement 
has been a disaster for Thai farmers, especially in the north. 
Removing those two categories to show how limited gains are, 
ThailanQs 2004 Chapters 7 and 8 combined trade deficit was 2.6 
billion baht ($65 million U.S.), a gap 319% wider than the 
previous year.  The depressing effect of cheap Chinese imports 
has been especially sharp in the cool-climate north.  Data from 
the Office of Agricultural Economics show that in the pre- Early 
Harvest period the average price of dried garlic was 25.6 Baht 
per kilogram.  After this agreement, the price fell to only 18.4 
Baht per kilogram.  The pre-agreement price for white onions was 
8.2 Baht per kilogram, plummeting to 1.59 Baht per kilogram. 
The price of dried red onions dropped from 18.3 Baht per 
kilogram to only 9.0 Baht per kilogram. 
 
The Ministry of Agriculture is struggling with limited success 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000020  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
to get Thai vegetable farmers to move into production of more 
competitive fruits.  According to Kasetsart University Economist 
Vinit Atisook, Thai farmers are skeptical of the government's 
ability to assist and are resistant to cultivating new plants. 
The Ministry of Agriculture has made subsidy loans to Thai 
agriculturists in failing sectors contingent on crop 
substitution.  But so far participation in these programs has 
not enabled northern Thai farmers to compete successfully with 
China, with farmers insisting that the compensation is far too 
small to justify switching crops. 
 
Comment:  Northern Thai farmers look at the depressed prices for 
garlic and onions as a result of the Early Harvest agreement and 
conclude that they have nothing to gain from free trade 
agreements.  This distrust in their own government was a major 
factor in swelling the protests during the sixth round of 
U.S.-Thai trade negotiations earlier this month. 
CAMP