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FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3154
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 5301
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 5069
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 5266
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 4891
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0063
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCNFB/FBI WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0611
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0129

UNCLAS BUENOS AIRES 000146 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA PDAS CHARLES SHAPIRO AND S/CT DEBORAH MCCARTHY 
NSC FOR DAN FISK AND JUAN ZARATE 
FBI FOR CTD/IRAN-HIZBOLLAH UNIT FOR SSA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREF PREL PTER KJUS AR
SUBJECT: STAFFDEL MACKEY PUSHES AMIA BOMBING CASE 
 
REF: BUENOS AIRES 2844 AND PREVIOUS 
 
¶1. (U) This cable is sensitive but unclassified, and not for 
Internet distribution. 
 
¶2. (U) This is an action cable.  Please see paragraph 14. 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶3. (SBU)  House Committee on International Relations (HIRC) 
Senior Counsel John Mackey and HIRC Democratic Deputy Chief 
Counsel Paul Oostburg Sanz traveled to Argentina January 
10-13 to review the status of the current investigation into 
the 1994 Jewish Community Center (AMIA) terrorist bombing. 
Prosecutors are making progress and expect to issue new 
indictments against a number of Iranian nationals within 
months.  Upon issuance of those indictments, Argentina will 
need U.S. help at Interpol to counter an expected Iranian 
campaign against the issuance of international capture 
notices.  The Staffdel's visit was very helpful in 
reinforcing to relevant officials and bombing victims the 
longstanding U.S. commitment to seeing justice done in this 
case.  End Summary. 
 
-------- 
The Trip 
-------- 
 
¶4. (U) House Committee on International Relations (HIRC) 
Senior Counsel John Mackey and HIRC Democratic Deputy Chief 
Counsel Paul Oostburg Sanz traveled to Argentina January 
10-13 to review the status of the current investigation into 
the 1994 Jewish Community Center (AMIA) terrorist bombing. 
(Note: The Staffdel also worked on regional narcotics issues, 
and those discussions are summarized in septel.  End Note.) 
The Ambassador and Country Team members briefed the Staffdel 
before its meetings with the prosecutors in charge of the 
current investigation, high-ranking MFA officials, and 
numerous groups representing the Jewish community in 
Argentina. 
 
-------------------------- 
Prosecutors Moving Forward 
-------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) The Staffdel met January 11 with Special AMIA 
Prosecutor Marcelo Martinez Burgos, one of two prosecutors 
heading the AMIA Special Investigative Unit (the other, 
Alberto Nisman, was traveling and unavailable).  Mackey began 
by stressing that the U.S. Congress was disappointed to see 
that the previous investigation had gotten off track 
(reftels), but views the current investigation with U.S. 
government support as a serious inquiry.  He explained that 
the Staffdel was not visiting Burgos to talk about any of the 
Investigative Unit's possible conclusions, but rather to get 
a sense of when the Unit would reach those conclusions. 
Oostburg Sanz added that while Congress understands the 
difficult circumstances facing investigators, there is 
frustration among members regarding the long time this case 
has taken to come to conclusion.  Argentina and the world 
have a responsibility to bring the perpetrators to justice. 
Mackey opined that the current investigation was likely the 
last chance to see justice done in the AMIA case. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Both staffers said Congress backed the ongoing U.S. 
Embassy support for the Special Investigative Unit's 
investigation and preparations for new and additional 
indictments in the case.  Our common goal is to avoid a 
repeat of the debacle at Interpol in September 2005, when 
Interpol's Executive Committee voted unanimously to cancel 
the "red notices," or international capture orders, for the 
12 Iranian nationals indicted by Argentina for their roles in 
the AMIA attack.  The Staffdel assured Burgos that the U.S. 
Congress backs the Administration's full diplomatic support 
to help Argentina make its case to reinstate the red notices 
based upon any new indictments.  With that in mind, the 
Staffdel emphasized the importance of close coordination 
between the Special Investigative Unit and the USG.  Such 
coordination will allow for timely diplomatic intervention to 
counter a certain Iranian campaign against reinstatement of 
the notices. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Burgos told the Staffdel that he was unable to 
predict exactly when his office would be issuing new 
indictments, but that "developments" were likely during the 
period between May and July 2006.  He added that he would 
like to issue indictments before July 18, the anniversary of 
the bombing.  (Note:  Burgos said that any new indictments 
would involve only AMIA's "international connection" (i.e. 
Iranian nationals).  His office does not have any immediate 
plans to re-open cases against those Argentines alleged to 
have comprised the "local connection," who were all acquitted 
in 2004 (reftels).  The GOA is currently appealing those 
acquittals.  End Note.)  Burgos admitted that Argentina faces 
an uphill battle in Interpol, but pointed out that his is a 
new case that Interpol will have to judge on its own merits. 
The organization will not be able to use the same arguments 
it used to cancel the red notices.  Still, the case is not as 
strong as it could be due to an absolute lack of cooperation 
from Iran, and incomplete cooperation from Lebanon, according 
to Burgos.  The U.S.'s support at Interpol is therefore 
crucial. 
 
----------------------------- 
MFA Takes Hard Line With Iran 
----------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) The Staffdel also focused on the AMIA case during a 
January 10 meeting with MFA Undersecretary for Foreign Policy 
Ambassador Luis Cappagli and members of his staff.  Mackey 
and Oostburg Sanz stressed the importance of the case to the 
U.S. Congress, and encouraged Argentina to take all steps 
possible toward justice for the victims.  Cappagli complained 
about Iran's unwillingness to cooperate, but said that 
Argentina does not have a lot of cards to play because of the 
low level of the bilateral relationship.  MFA Middle East 
Director Ambassador Ramon Villagra Delgado told the Staffdel 
that Argentina is "disappointed and angry" at the lack of 
results from the AMIA investigation, and said that the 
frustration expressed by the Staffdel regarding the length of 
time the case has dragged on "is the frustration felt by 
every decent Argentine."  Villagra explained that Iran used 
to be Argentina's largest trading partner in the Middle East, 
but after AMIA Argentina shut down the trade relationship 
completely.  Villagra also said that "there is no possibility 
that Argentina will ever get to any agreement with Iran short 
of Iran honoring its word to provide full cooperation to the 
investigation.  We don't trade the blood of our people for 
anyone's money." 
 
¶9. (SBU) Tracking Embassy efforts, Mackey encouraged the MFA 
to begin work with friendly nations toward a better Interpol 
result the next time.  Cappagli agreed, but said that 
Argentina has to be realistic and cannot ignore the fact that 
very few nations at Interpol thought Argentina's groundwork 
was solid enough to maintain the red notices.  Cappagli also 
noted that taking action before new indictments are issued 
could be construed as GOA interference with the domestic 
justice system, which would give Iran the ability to argue 
that the new indictments were politically motivated.  The DCM 
said the red notices incident at Interpol was a sad example 
of governments not fully understanding the case and confusing 
its international aspects with the internal.  He stressed the 
Embassy's long-term commitment to assist in the case, and 
told Cappagli that the U.S. would use its diplomatic and 
political muscle in another push to support Argentina if/when 
new indictments are issued. 
¶10. (SBU) The Staffdel questioned why Argentina has failed to 
take a harder public line against Hizbollah, such as by 
arguing for its inclusion on the UNSCR 1373 terrorist list. 
Villagra answered that "Argentina knows all about Hizbollah," 
but cannot make any changes to its policy until an Argentine 
judge rules that Hizbollah was involved in AMIA.  Argentina 
has not acted against Hizbollah to date because of concerns 
about the stability of Lebanon, where Hizbollah has a strong 
parliamentary representation, according to Villagra. 
 
¶11. (SBU) The Staffdel also asked Cappagli about Venezuela 
and Bolivia, with Oostburg Sanz noting Congress' particular 
concern about the deterioration of democracy in Venezuela, 
especially as it relates to the rule of law and the 
concentration of power in the executive branch.  Cappagli 
said that presidents Chavez and Morales are best dealt with 
through constructive engagement and not by "isolating these 
countries."  Oostburg Sanz emphasized that Congressional 
leaders do not seek to isolate Chavez, but that he makes 
alternative courses of action almost inevitable, as evidenced 
by the rebuke of Codel Hyde in November 2005.  Oostburg Sanz 
also said that it is a pity that Argentina, a leader for so 
many decades in the region, is beginning to be seen by 
Members of Congress as a follower of Venezuela and Chavez 
because of its failure to pressure Venezuela on key democracy 
and rule of law issues. 
 
-------------------- 
The Jewish Community 
-------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Much of the Staffdel's time in Argentina was 
dedicated to meetings with Jewish community organizations. 
Those meetings allowed the Staffdel to hear a range of views 
about the progress of the investigation and the role and 
comfort level of the Jewish community in Argentina.  The 
Staffdel's schedule included meetings with the AMIA 
leadership; the directors of AMIA sister organization DAIA; 
Argentina's branch of the Simon Weisenthal center, local 
religious leaders; and victims' associations and their legal 
representation.  There is overwhelming consensus in the 
Jewish community on the importance of pressing forward 
vigorously with the investigation and seeking new 
indictments.  Jewish leaders of AMIA and DAIA vowed to 
continue to lobby the GOA to make the AMIA case a top foreign 
policy priority. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) Staffdel Mackey's visit was a real boost to the 
Embassy's longstanding commitment to see justice done in this 
case.  It was important for the relevant Argentine officials 
and organizations to see that the U.S. Congress and Executive 
continue to speak with one voice on this issue, that both 
branches are still watching developments closely, and that 
the U.S. remains fully involved and willing to assist in any 
way possible. 
 
-------------- 
Action Request 
-------------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) The Staffdel recommended that the USG be fully 
coordinated and ready to act when new indictments are issued 
and international arrest warrants are forwarded to Interpol. 
Specifically, the staffers suggested that State (S/CT, L, 
WHA) should coordinate a USG position with DOJ, with one 
office from State or DOJ assuming responsibility (and 
accountability) for overall management of the USG effort in 
support of Argentina's position at Interpol.  The staff of 
the HIRC plans to follow up with State and DOJ to ensure USG 
preparedness. 
GUTIERREZ