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C O N F I D E N T I A L BUENOS AIRES 000128 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL AR
SUBJECT: A/S SHANNON'S MEETING WITH ARGENTINE FOREIGN 
MINISTER 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Lino Gutierrez for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Assistant Secretary Tom Shannon, 
accompanied by the Ambassador, met with Argentine Foreign 
Minister Jorge Taiana on January 12.  During the 
conversation, which focused on Bolivia, A/S Shannon defined 
key U.S. concerns about the incoming Evo Morales 
administration and underscored the importance of active 
Argentine involvement in promoting democratic governance and 
institutions in Bolivia.  FM Taiana acknowleged the margin of 
Morales's victory had surprised the GOA and said it was still 
not clear what direction the new Bolivian government would 
eventually take.  Prior to the Taiana meeting, A/S Shannon 
also met separately with Deputy Foreign Minister Roberto 
Garcia Moritan.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C) A/S Shannon, accompanied by Ambassador, PolCouns, and 
PolOff, met with Foreign Minister Jorge Taiana on January 12. 
 Taiana was accompanied by Deputy Foreign Minister Roberto 
Garcia Moritan, Under Secretary for Latin American Policy 
Leonardo Franco, Director of North American Affairs Vicente 
Espeche Gil, and Argentine Ambassador to the U.S. Jose 
Octavio Bordon. 
 
¶3.  (C) A/S Shannon told Taiana that the U.S. had "no 
illusions" about future relations with the Morales 
administration but would approach the new government "in good 
faith."  A/S Shannon noted that Morales's rhetoric had 
softened somewhat recently but was still very personal and, 
at times, aggressive, complicating our efforts to begin a 
dialogue.  A second key area to our future relations would be 
the Morales response to our counternarcotics programs.  A/S 
Shannon asked how we approach the new government on this 
issue without provoking immediate problems and confrontation. 
 He noted that while he understood that cocoa growers were 
the original base of support for Morales, eradication 
remained a key part of U.S. anti-drug strategy in Bolivia 
along with interdiction and development programs.  The 
Assistant Secretary said Argentine and Brazilian involvement 
would be key in maintaining democratic institutions in 
Bolivia. 
 
¶4.  (C) FM Taiana acknowledged the difficulties that lay 
ahead for Bolivia.  He said the margin of victory Morales 
obtained in the December elections had come as a surprise to 
the GOA.  However, despite Morales's majority, there was 
still no answer as to "what is Bolivia" and that the Bolivian 
social compact was essentially "broken."  Taiana said the 
indigenous angle to the elections was "unprecedented" not 
only for Bolivia but for South America.  He opined that 
Morales viewed himself as "the Nelson Mandela" of indigenous 
Bolivians but that it was still not clear how much influence 
the indigenous movement would have in the new government. 
 
¶5.  (C) In an earlier meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister 
Roberto Garcia Moritan, A/S Shannon said that Argentina and 
Brazil have important interests in Bolivia.  He said the U.S. 
faced a diplomatic challenge with the Morales government, but 
that the first step would be to start a dialogue and see what 
is possible.  He said that we faced two obstacles to that 
dialogue.  The first was Morales's rhetoric, which was 
personal and reflected the confrontational tactics of Chavez. 
 The second barrier was Morales's position on our 
counternarcotics program.  Since so much bilateral assistance 
is tied to the GOB,s counter-drug performance, our overall 
relationship will suffer across the board if the 
counternarcotics program falls apart.  Shannon said we want 
to coordinate our actions with the GOA, and also use 
multilateral instruments like the Inter-American Commission 
on Drug Control (CICAD). 
 
¶6.  (C) Garcia Moritan said the success of Bolivian democracy 
was very important and the GOA intended to help the Bolivians 
achieve success.  He said if Morales asks the GOA for help 
"we will see what we can offer."  Under Secretary for Latin 
 
American Policy Leonardo Franco said the GOA was working on a 
variety of bilateral projects in the areas of trade, 
education, and technical assistance for a possible 
constitutional reform.  The GOA was also looking at Bolivia's 
entry into MERCOSUR as a full member.  Franco praised the 
United States for its "mature reaction" to Morales's 
electoral victory. 
 
¶7.  (C) On the question of drugs, Garcia Moritan said the GOA 
would work closely with Bolivia and liked the idea of using 
regional mechanisms like CICAD.  He said it was important to 
watch Morales,s actions rather than his words and cautioned 
against painting Morales as a narcotrafficker. 
GUTIERREZ