This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 000576 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT PLA PASS USTR EEISSENSTAT AND BHARMON; WHA FOR A/AS 
SHANNON; EB FOR A/S WAYNE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2015 
TAGS: ETRD ECIN EAGR CO FTA
SUBJECT: COLOMBIANS HOPE TO CLOSE USATPA NEGOTIATIONS ASAP 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C)  Summary:  The Ambassador met with Trade Minister 
Botero and Chief Trade negotiator Gomez on January 20 to urge 
rapid Colombian movement toward agreement of a final text. 
Botero and Gomez indicated a clear determination to reach 
agreement, but more than any other time, indicated concern 
over the reaction of key sectors supporting Uribe in this 
election year.  Botero laid out Colombia,s red lines (used 
clothing, liquor tax harmonization, sugar and rice TRQ,s and 
SPS) and explained their impact on key political 
constituencies, such as rice and sugar growers, coffee 
growers and cattle farmers. The Ambassador pressed the GOC to 
be more realistic in their expectations and not risk 
practical and workable solutions by pursuing unrealistic 
expectations.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) The key non-agricultural issues raised were used 
clothing and liquor tax harmonization.  Botero reiterated 
that while the GOC had flexibility on other non-agricultural 
issues, the GOC could not sign an agreement prior to the 
upcoming elections that included either item. 
 
¶3.  (C) Used clothing: if they agree to its import while Peru 
maintained a prohibition, it would be impossible to obtain 
congressional approval for the agreement.  The GOC also 
cannot accept using WTO legal means to regulate the trade - 
it,s a prohibition or nothing. 
 
¶4.  (C) Liquor tax:  Although the said they were prepared to 
advance on more equitable distribution, they could not 
harmonize the taxes, as they would face a rebellion among 
local governors.  A previous reform took three years and 
despite an Andean ruling to change the tax, the Congress had 
refused to do so.  Botero suggested challenging the tax at 
the WTO, not attacking directly through the agreement. 
 
¶5.  (C) On agriculture, the GOC accepted that nothing could 
be excluded, but would prefer a sugar for rice technical 
exclusion.  The underscored a clear link between rice and 
sugar: they could trade off one group against the other 
domestically, but could not face the opposition of both. 
Their preference would be to seek more flexibility on rice 
(basically trading off the sugar sector for more protection 
of rice) because of its greater electoral impact.  A 
Peru-size rice TRQ with little increase in sugar would doom 
the agreement in Congress. 
 
¶6.  (C) Rice:  It was clear this was the GOC,s most 
sensitive issue.   The GOC could accept a rice TRQ in the 
40-45,000 MT range, but not one as large as Peru,s as 
Colombia has traditionally been more closed to rice than 
Peru.   Moreover, rice is grown throughout the country and 
this has considerable Congressional importance.  The GOC 
believes its rice would be competitive against US rice, save 
for US domestic supports.   The Ambassador and Agatt 
countered strongly that if rice was so sensitive, there were 
WTO-consistent mechanisms that the GOC could use. 
 
¶7.  (C) Sugar: The GOC could contain the damage if they 
received a relatively small increase in the sugar quota, so 
long as they were able to export ethanol.  Another option 
would be to broaden the country-specific quotas offered into 
an Andean quota that any of the three countries could fill, 
since Peru and Ecuador are not significant sugar exporters 
and regularly have their quotas re-allocated to others. 
Also, the quota the GOC provided for high fructose corn syrup 
would need to be proportionate to the access given by the US 
for sugar.  The GOC is also concerned about the mechanism to 
administer the sugar quota; they prefer to maintain the 
current system using eligibility certificates rather than a 
first come, first serve methodology. 
 
¶8.  (C) Corn:  The GOC needs some type of mechanism to assure 
that domestic production was purchased.  The GOC was willing 
to explore WTO legal alternative mechanisms such as an 
auction system, but the GOC could not open the market and not 
have some way of ensuring a domestic market for the 
400-500,000 MT produced locally. 
 
¶9.  (C) Coffee:  Colombia can accept the CAFTA rules, but 
does not want to open the door to non-U.S. origin coffee from 
Asia.  They have also offered a quota to take care of U.S. 
roasters and distributors, including Starbucks.  500,000 
families depend on coffee production in Colombia making the 
coffee federation a major electoral player.  The GOC also 
wants some type of side agreement to strengthen trademark 
protection for Colombian coffee. 
 
¶10.  (C) SPS:  Colombia persists on demanding a level of 
consultation that they don,t need.  Embassy noted that 
Colombia has the best phyto-sanitary relationship with us in 
the hemisphere, thanks to the APHIS,  Center of Excellence 
here.  Embassy also recalled that they had rejected 
assistance - training and consultations - offered outside the 
treaty that could have already resolved a number of practical 
problems.  We urged them to trim back their proposal for 
consultations to what they needed, and what we were likely to 
be able to give. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Botero and Gomez said that Ecuador may fear an 
agreement, but fears being out of it even more.  President 
Palacio is unpredictable on intellectual property, and seems 
unwilling to listen to practical arguments regarding data 
protection.  The Colombians got the Ecuadorians to agree to a 
joint IP meeting to try to control them, but if Ecuador 
refuses to move forward, Colombia will do so without them. 
¶12. (C) Comment.  This was the first meeting with Botero and 
Gomez in almost two years of negotiations where they focused 
on the political element.  The Colombians want to close, and 
this is the closest they have ever come to spelling out their 
bottom line.  The political calculus presented by Botero is 
on the mark.  The GOC needs key sectors -- cattlemen, rice 
and sugar growers, textile manufacturers -- to pass this 
agreement and to advance in an electoral year.  They want the 
deal and have crafted a path they believe gives the US 
improved access to important sectors while also providing 
them political cover and support.  They are willing to offer 
the U.S. agricultural access equal to the Peru agreement, as 
long as some fine tuning is possible to reflect the different 
reality in Colombia.  If we push beyond the red lines listed, 
we risk harming our strongest ally in a region in turmoil. 
We also risk losing a USD 5 billion export market that is 
growing by 20 percent a year to Mercosur, who has a limited 
FTA with Colombia that affects our key export products.  End 
Comment. 
WOOD