P 091115Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1403
INFO ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L  BEIRUT 000059 
 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2016 
TAGS: IS KDEM LE PGOV PHUM SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01:  SALLOUKH STONEWALLS, GIVES APOLOGIST 
DEFENSE OF SHIA DEMANDS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman.  Reason:  Sections 1.4 (b 
) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  On January 7, the Ambassador and emboff met 
with Foreign Minister Fawzi Salloukh to express the USG's 
mounting concern over the reported contents of a draft 
agreement between the Siniora government and the 
Hizballah-Amal bloc that would bring the Shi'a parties back 
into the cabinet.  Initial drafts of the agreement indicate 
the GOL would give a priori approval to Hizballah actions 
across the Blue Line, making the GOL complicit in any 
Hizballah activity.  If this were the case, the Ambassador 
counseled, it would provoke a strong reaction from the United 
States and the international community of a kind that the GOL 
would find unhelpful.  Salloukh stonewalled in response, 
claiming he did not know the contents of the draft agreement 
and that we should wait until we see the final agreement 
before passing judgment on it.  He reaffirmed Hizballah's 
status as a legitimate "resistance," rather than a militia, 
and came dangerously close to advocating a GOL policy of 
kidnapping Israeli citizens to extort desired foreign policy 
goals.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) The Ambassador and emboff met with Lebanese Foreign 
Minister Fawzi Salloukh at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 
January 7 in order to assure the minister of the USG's 
continuing support for Lebanon's reform agenda, and to 
express concern over the reported contents of a draft 
agreement between the Siniora government and the 
Hizballah-Amal bloc to bring the Shi'a parties back into the 
Cabinet.  The Ambassador also expressed his alarm that while 
the initial pretext for the walkout was PM Siniora's supposed 
disregard for consulting his ministers on an international 
tribunal for the Hariri assassination suspects, the 
negotiations for bringing the Shia parties back into 
government now seemed to focus on 1559 and legitimizing 
Hizballah's status as a "resistance organization."  The 
Ambassador cautioned that any written agreement that 
legitimized Hizballah as a "resistance organization," exempt 
from 1559 and the Ta'if Accords, and gave a priori approval 
to Hizballah transgressions against Israel across the Blue 
Line, risked provoking strong condemnation from the United 
States and the international community, not to mention Israel 
itself. 
 
¶3.  (C) Salloukh, rather disingenuously, responded that he 
had not even seen the draft agreement and was unaware of its 
contents.  He added that any concerns over the agreement's 
contents should be delayed until we actually see the draft 
agreement itself.  As for the point, quite publicly known, 
that the focus of negotiations had now shifted from the 
cabinet's consultative process with the prime minister to 
Hizballah's status and compliance with UNSCR 1559, Salloukh 
claimed that this was a natural extension of the 
negotiations.  He also claimed that the "most important part" 
of 1559 had been implemented, and that any outstanding issues 
(i.e., Hizballah's arms), were for internal dialogue.  In 
what was to become his primary tactic for the rest of the 
meeting, Salloukh then shifted blame to Israel, blaming 
Israeli airspace violations for the status of the 
government's dialogue with Hizballah. 
 
¶4.  (C) The Ambassador countered that declaring compliance 
with 1559 an "internal issue" only set the stage for future 
cabinet crises.  If Siniora ever discussed 1559 with the UN 
or international community again, the Shi'a bloc could walk 
out again, claiming that the prime minister had violated 
their agreement that 1559 be solved by internal discussion 
only.  As for the recent increase of Israeli overflights, the 
Ambassador reminded the Foreign Minister that these were 
undoubtedly in response to unilateral attacks on Israeli 
positions from Hizballah-controlled territory in the south 
during November and December of last year.  The Ambassador 
again stressed the seriousness of the USG's concern over any 
language making the GOL complicit in Hizballah military 
actions, and suggested that Siniora could sidestep the issue 
of validating the "resistance" in writing, simply by 
referring back to the Ministerial Statement released last 
summer when the present cabinet was formed. 
 
¶5.  (C) Salloukh's only response was to ask the Ambassador 
not to worry about an "imaginary" document that hadn't even 
been released yet, and to suggest that any resolution on 
these issues would have to be part of a regional agreement 
because they were the result of regional problems.  Turning 
again to Israel, Salloukh suggested that the USG focus its 
efforts on the Palestinian issue, "the mother of all 
problems."  The Ambassador counseled Salloukh to be realistic 
in this time of Israeli transition, and he noted that, with 
the recent Hizballah attacks and the parachutist incident, 
Lebanon had narrowly avoided violent Israeli reprisals. 
 
¶6.  (C) Salloukh then lamented that Hizballah had not been 
able to capture the Israeli parachutist who landed in 
southern Lebanon, because it would have "solved the prisoner 
issue."  Salloukh went on to explain, rather smugly, that if 
Hizballah were to be able to get its hands on another Israeli 
instead, it would certainly be able to arrange a prisoner 
swap with Israeli, thus achieving one of Hizballah's 
longstanding goals of freeing the two remaining Hizballah 
fighters in Israeli custody.  Outraged, the Ambassador 
cautioned Sallaoukh that, as a Lebanese government official, 
he should not advocate kidnapping people for ransom.  The GOL 
should be playing by international rules.  He warned that 
certain politicians in Lebanon would want to use this period 
to show that they are tough on defense.  He reminded Salloukh 
that Shimon Peres, a moderate Israeli politician, was 
responsible for the blistering assault on Qana, and that the 
Lebanese should be very careful to avoid giving the Israelis 
any pretext for an attack. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Comment:  Salloukh has, prior to this meeting, been 
a more constructive interlocutor than we imagined when the 
cabinet was formed.  It was Salloukh, for example, who took 
the initiative to put to rest the press stories that Siniora 
had succumbed to "international dictats" in September, when 
Siniora headed a delegation to New York and Washington.  But 
our earlier positive experiences aside, it is hard to imagine 
how the content of this discussion could have been any worse. 
 Salloukh, like the other four Shia ministers who walked out 
of the cabinet on 12/12, is clearly following Syrian and 
Iranian messages to be intransigent.  Were the GOL to adopt 
as policies what Salloukh suggested in this meeting, the GOL 
would easily be branded a state sponsor of terrorism.  We 
cannot believe that Salloukh actually believed his own 
arguments, but, whatever he thinks privately, it is 
outrageous that he made them.  End comment. 
 
 
FELTMAN