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INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIRUT 000268 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/WERNER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2026 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KCRM LE SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01: UN LEGAL AFFAIRS CHIEF BRIEFS P-3 ON UNSCR 
1644 FOLLOW-UP 
 
 
Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (S)  In a 1/28 meeting, UN Under Secretary General for 
Legal Affairs Nicolas Michel briefed P-3 ambassadors on his 
consultations with GOL authorities on follow-up to UNSCR 
¶1644.  Michel said that he was pleasantly surprised and 
relieved by the broad base of support he found for an 
international tribunal.  The details of where such a tribunal 
would sit, who would preside, what legal jurisdiction would 
be followed, etc. all need to be pursued, but the Lebanese 
were generally well prepared and "asked the right questions." 
 Next, Michel said, he hoped the Lebanese would send a small 
team to New York for consultations, after which a UN team 
would return to Beirut.  His goal was for UNSYG Annan to 
report initially to the UNSC by March 15.  UK Ambassador 
James Watt revealed that the British have offered the 
Lebanese use of a Cyprus airbase for Hariri-related trials. 
Watt cautioned that this offer has not yet been shared with 
the Cypriots and thus should be carefully protected. 
Disagreeing on one point with Michel, P-3 ambassadors 
questioned Michel's preference for GOL action to set up an 
international tribunal rather than reliance on a UNSC 
decision.  UNIIIC Commissioner Brammertz, who attended the 
P-3 briefing and talked with Ambassador Feltman on the 
margins, said that he hoped international tribunal questions 
could be answered quickly, as the UNIIIC should prepare its 
own work according to the anticipated trials.  Brammertz, 
expressing concern that the UNIIIC must prepare a case that 
would meet international standards, suggested that he will 
work on establishing legal and analytical systems to replace 
a rather ad hoc nature of the UNIIIC operation thus far. 
Brammertz also noted that he has already establishd a liaison 
unit within the UNIIIC to fulfill another part of UNSCR 1644 
regarding assistance to the Lebanese in investigating the 
other terrorist attacks.  End summary. 
 
IN WIDE-RANGING CONSULTATIONS, MICHEL 
IMPRESSED BY SENSE OF URGENCY, APPRECIATION 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  In the evening of 1/28, Michel, joined by his team 
from the UN's Office of Legal Affairs (UN/OLA) and Geir 
Pedersen, briefed the P-3 Ambassadors and UNIIIC Commissioner 
Brammertz on his just-concluded 1/27-1/28 consultations with 
the Lebanese authorities on UNSCR 1644 follow-up.  Michel 
noted that he had met with President Emile Lahoud, Parliament 
Speaker Berri, Prime Minister Siniora, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Salloukh, Hariri bloc legal advisor (and "shadow" 
Justice Minister) Bahej Tabarah, and UN staff.  Minister of 
Justice Charles Rizk hosted a long working lunch for the 
UN/OLA team that included Prosecutor-General Said Mirza, 
Higher Judicial Council chief Antoine Kheir, Presiding Judge 
for the Hariri assassination Elias Eid, and judicial liaison 
to the UNIIIC Judge Ralf Riachi.  Everyone he met, Michel 
reported, emphasized how much the Lebanese appreciate the 
UN's help.  All his Lebanese interlocutors stressed the need 
to move quickly, to get the Hariri assassination behind them 
as fast as possible.  Both the appreciation and the sense of 
urgency impressed Michel, he said. 
 
"RELIEVED" TO DISCOVER BROADER 
THAN EXPECTED LEVELS OF SUPPORT 
------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  Starting out with general impressions, Michel said 
that he was also pleasantly surprised, "even relieved," at 
the broad base of support for an international tribunal to 
try any suspects in the Hariri assassination.  He was aware 
of sharp political divisions within Lebanon on many issues, 
but, on this question, even Shia representatives Berri and 
Salloukh expressed their strong support or an international 
tribunal.  People may differ on the details, but Michel was 
pleased to discover more common ground than he had expected, 
even in the current difficult political circumstances in 
Lebanon.  He reported that the Lebanese had done their 
homework before he arrived and thus were prepared with good 
questions and comments.  In general, he said, the 
consultative process between the UN and the GOL must be seen 
as an educational process, but the Lebanese were ready to 
learn.  Asked what he meant by this educational process, 
Michel explained that Bahaj Tabbarah had spent much time 
questioning Michel about what elements make a tribunal 
considered to be "international."  Michel said that he 
explained to Tabbarah that the Lebanese need to think of what 
 
BEIRUT 00000268  002 OF 005 
 
 
they need for fair, independent, and transparent judicial 
procedures.  There is no single model of when a tribunal 
becomes international, and the Lebanese need to define what 
works best for Lebanon.  The Lebanese, Michel said, need to 
think creatively. 
 
QUESTIONS POSED TO GOL OFFICIALS 
REGARDING INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C)  Emphasizing that he was mostly in a "learning and 
listening" mode during his trip, Michel said that most of his 
discussions centered on the question in UNSCR 1644 of a 
tribunal, with only some comments on the part of UNSCR 1644 
asking the UNSYG to consult with the GOL on providing 
assistance in the investigation of the other terrorist 
attacks.  It was clear to him, Michel said, that no existing 
model -- Lockerbie, Cambodia, Sierre Leone, etc. -- is 
tailor-made for the Lebanese situation.  In terms of 
substance, Michel noted that he discussed the following 
issues with his interlocutors regarding a tribunal: 
 
--  Choice of law:  Will Lebanese law be applied?  Everyone 
he met, he said, was interested in ensuring that "the main 
points" of Lebanese law will be applied, but there are 
details to consider.  For example, some of the Lebanese 
advocated using a prosecutor system rather than the Lebanese 
process (based on the French) of having a juge d'instructions 
(presiding judge), because the prosecutor system is perceived 
to be a speedier process and could more readily pick up on 
the work by the UNIIIC.  Michel said that his perception that 
the Lebanese would try to adhere as closely to all details of 
Lebanese law and a Lebanese process were proven wrong during 
his meetings. 
 
--  Penalties:  Even though Lebanon has a death penalty, all 
Lebanese accepted that a UN-affiliated tribunal could only 
have a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.  Some 
interlocutors even welcomed this condition, Michel said, and 
thought it would be useful in securing cooperation from key 
figures. 
 
--  Legal instrument that creates the UNIIIC:  Michel said 
that, once the details of the tribunal are worked out, there 
are three options for legal establishment of the court. 
First, the Lebanese Parliament could pass a statute that 
creates the tribunal.  Second, the UN and GOL could sign an 
agreement together.  Third, the UNSC could pass a resolution 
creating the tribunal.  The first and second options, Michel 
said, are legally distinct but contain some of the same 
elements.  If the Lebanese Parliament would pass a statute, 
the UN would still need some kind of understanding with the 
GOL.  If the GOL entered into an agreement, per the second 
option, with the UN, the GOL would probably still need some 
kind of Parliamentary ratification. 
 
--  Question of jurisdiction:  In some international 
tribunals, Michel noted, decisions have to be made about 
whether to pursue charges of genocide, crimes against 
humanity or war crimes.  None of that applies to the Hariri 
assassination, making the jurisdiction questions simpler. 
But there still need to be decisions on whether the tribunal 
will try only suspects related to the Hariri assassination or 
will include other crimes as well.  There is also a question 
about whether the tribunal would try only the most senior 
suspects or everyone involved.  How this question is answered 
has consequences for resources and time frame for the 
tribunal, Michel reported.  He said that, in general, the 
Lebanese seem to want all suspects tried, no matter how minor 
their roles may have been. 
 
--  Organized structure:  Will the tribunal mirror the 
Lebanese system?  Will there be both a trial chamber and an 
appeal chamber?  What will the ratio of Lebanese judges to 
international figures be in each chamber?  Michel said that 
he advised the Lebanese not to consider the Cambodia model, 
which he said had two parallel figures -- an international 
figure and a Cambodian figure -- for each position.  Michel 
said that he considered the Cambodia model to be a "recipe 
for duplication, delay, and gridlock."  Michel said that his 
Lebanese interlocutors were all over the map on this 
question, although everyone agreed that the person in the 
prosecuting role must be non-Lebanese. 
 
--  Location:  The majority of his Lebanese interlocutors 
advocated that the tribunal must take place outside Lebanon, 
Michel noted.  But Speaker Berri and FM Salloukh "were not 
 
BEIRUT 00000268  003 OF 005 
 
 
convinced," reflecting Shia concerns.  Some discussed Cyprus, 
while others advocated a location where the UN already had a 
facility.  Some even mentioned Egypt, Michel said. 
 
--  Financing:  Michel said that he briefed the Lebanese on 
how financing has been done in other examples.  Ad hoc 
tribunals tend to have UNSC-assessed contributions, he said, 
whereas others operate with voluntary contributions.  Michel 
said that he strongly opposes the voluntary approach, as "you 
can't have the Secretariat looking around to ask for money." 
He noted that many people said that Lebanon could make a 
substantial contribution.  While some Lebanese mused that the 
Hariri family could pay for some if not all of the tribunal, 
Michel commented "that is obviously a bad idea." 
 
--  Interim measures:  People now in jail were arrested under 
Lebanese law, Michel said.  If decisions are taken about 
using a different set of laws for the actual tribunal, there 
will need to be some kind of interim steps, perhaps GOL 
decrees, to provide legal transition for witnesses, suspects, 
and even evidence collected so far. 
 
--  UNIIIC transition:  The UNIIIC will face expiry or 
another renewal on 6/15.  This reality injects a sense of 
urgency in the international tribunal question, Michel noted. 
 If the UNIIIC will be extended again, perhaps some 
adjustments in its mandate and role should be made, so that 
the UNIIIC shifts in accord with what is decided regarding 
the trial options. 
 
--  Witness protection program:  One needs to be established, 
Michel emphasized. 
 
EXPANSION OF UNIIIC MANDATE 
TO COVER OTHER ATTACKS 
--------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C)  While emphasizing again that this topic was of 
secondary attention in his meetings, Michel said that he also 
solicited people's views on whether the UNIIIC mandate should 
be extended to investigate other terrorist attacks since the 
10/1/04 car bomb attack against Marwan Hamadeh.  Michel said 
that he emphasized that UNSCR 1644 already authorized the 
UNIIIC to provide assistance at the request of the GOL, "and 
I urged everyone to make full use of these facilities." 
Brammertz interrupted to say that he has already set up a 
special liaison unit within the UNIIIC to provide such 
technical assistance and advice to Lebanese investigations. 
By keeping this unit isolated from the daily tasks of the 
Hariri assassination, Brammertz thought that he could provide 
services to the GOL without distracting attention away from 
the UNIIIC's central mission of the Hariri investigation. 
Nodding, Michel said that he strongly believed that it was 
premature to ask for formal expansion of the UNIIIC mandate 
to cover the other crimes.  Progress on the Hariri 
assassination and movement toward a trial might provide some 
guidance over whether such expansion is really needed, he 
said. 
 
NEXT STEPS:  GOL TO SEND 
TEAM TO UN HEADQUARTERS 
------------------------ 
 
¶6.  (C)  In terms of next steps, Michel said that he hoped 
the GOL would nominate a small team ("one or two persons") to 
come to UN headquarters to talk in more detail about the 
issues raised during these initial consultations.  Smiling, 
Michel said that he was aware that the nominations for such a 
team would cause controversy inside Lebanon, as there is 
likely to be competition over who gets to appoint the 
members.  Minister of Justice Charles Rizk (allied with 
President Lahoud) was very eager to make the nominations 
immediately, but PM Siniora might have other ideas.  Next, 
UN/OLA will send a team back to Lebanon for a longer period, 
during which time the team will also meet with a broad range 
of civil society in order to educate people about the meaning 
of an international tribunal. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Regarding timing, Michel quoted that UNSCR 1644 
requires UNSYG to report back "on a timely basis" on the 
question of an international tribunal.  In Michel's view, it 
would make sense for UNSYG Annan to provide an initial report 
to the Security Council before or by March 15, when the 
UNIIIC issues its next report.  And then it would make sense 
to have a more definitive report on UNSCR 1644 follow-up by 
the time the UNIIIC mandate is again debated, in June. 
 
 
BEIRUT 00000268  004 OF 005 
 
 
P-3 AMBASSADORS QUESTION 
GOL ABILITY TO MAKE DECISIONS 
----------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C)  Asked by the Ambassadors what points seemed most 
contentious to the Lebanese, Michel said that he sensed 
disagreements over the location and over the amount of 
Lebanese composition in judicial teams.  But neither of these 
seemed to be deal breakers, he said.  On the other hand, 
there seemed to be a huge disagreement over the legal 
instruments to be used to create the tribunal.  Speaker Berri 
said that another UNSCR would be red line that would destroy 
the Lebanese consensus for an international tribunal.  While 
noting that his rationale was different than Berri's, Michel 
said that he, too, did not like like the idea of UNSC action. 
 Instead, he favored some kind of GOL action, either a 
parliamentary statute or GOL agreement with the UN ratified 
by the parliament.  That would create Lebanese "ownership," 
and contribute to capacity building within Lebanon.  Berri, 
Michel said, had boasted that he could get all parliamentary 
action completed in less than two months, a considerable 
improvement over the eighteen months it took Sierra Leone's 
legislature to act. 
 
¶9.  (S)  The P-3 ambassadors cautioned Michel that Berri 
could not be trusted in accelerating a legislative calendar 
for controversial bills.  The P-3 ambassadors expressed 
considerable skepticsm that Michel's preference for 
parliamentary action was realistic.  French Ambassador Emie, 
endorsed by his P-3 colleagues, flatly rejected the notion 
that the Lebanese will be able to pass a law creating the 
tribunal.  Citing many examples when the Lebanese 
confessional structures led to gridlock, the ambassadors 
urged that Michel start thinking now about UNSC action 
instead.  Michel said that, unless there was UNSC unanimity 
in passing a resolution, the tribunal would be of 
questionable legitimacy.  How, he asked, do you get the 
Russians and Chinese to vote in favor of a resolution 
creating a tribunal, if there is no consensus inside Lebanon? 
 The ambassadors again noted that, whatever the difficulties 
in New York, forcing the Lebanese to act risks destabilizing 
the country.  "The Syrians have clearly decided to 
destabilize Lebanon," Emie insisted.  "They are using 
assassinations, and they are using Hizballah.  They will use 
any proposal that the parliament create the tribunal to make 
things worse."  Moreover, the ambassadors noted, a 
UNSC-created tribunal might have better luck getting Syrian 
cooperation than anything that came into being because of a 
Lebanese parliamentary act. 
 
MUSING ABOUT AN ICC OPTION 
-------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (S)  Saying that he knew very well what the U.S. 
reaction would be, Michel said that there was another option, 
perhaps the simplest option, were it not for probable 
political objections.  The Treaty of Rome creating the 
International Criminal Court could be amended, adding crimes 
related to terrorism as another part of the ICCC 
jurisdiction.  Emie noted that the outgoing UNIIIC 
Commissioner Mehlis had mused about the same approach. 
Ambassador Feltman emphasized that the USG would not support 
moving in this direction. 
 
WATT SAYS UK OFFERS UP CYPRUS 
(BUT WITHOUT INFORMING CYPRIOTS) 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (S)  Referring to the question of the location of the 
trial, UK Ambassador James Watt revealed that, during Jack 
Straw's visit to Lebanon in early January, Straw had offered 
the Lebanese the use of UK airbases in Cyprus as a location 
for an international tribunal.  Flights from Lebanon or Syria 
could go, for security reasons, directly to the airbase 
rather than via Lanarca Airport.  Watt cautioned that the UK 
has not yet discussed this option with the Cypriots 
themselves, so he asked that the information be closely held. 
 Michel noted that several Lebanese had made reference to 
Straw's offer and appeared to be interested in pursuing it. 
 
BRAMMERTZ SEEKS CLARITY, ORDER, SYSTEMS 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C)  On the margins of the P-3 briefing, newly arrived 
UNIIIC Commissioner Brammertz and Ambassador Feltman spoke 
briefly and agreed to meet in the coming days (time TBD). 
Brammertz said that he is eager for some of the questions 
 
BEIRUT 00000268  005 OF 005 
 
 
regarding the international tribunal to be answered, as the 
UNIIIC needs to adjust how it collects and dispenses with 
evidence in accordance to the laws and procedures to be 
applied in any trials.  For example, Brammertz said, the 
assumption in UNSCR 1595 and subsequent resolutions has been 
that the UNIIIC is, essentially, helping the GOL prepare for 
an eventual Lebanese trial.  Thus, Brammertz said, his 
predecessor, Detlev Mehlis, had periodically turned over all 
evidence to the Lebanese presiding judge.  If an 
international tribunal will be trying the case instead, 
perhaps the UNIIIC should have different procedures for 
preserving the evidence. 
 
¶13.  (C)  Asked about his own approach, Brammertz generously 
praised the work of Mehlis, saying that he would build on 
Mehlis' own analysis and work.  But, Brammertz said, the 
environment has changed, and the UNIIIC needs to adjust. 
When Mehlis arrived, he thought the UNIIIC would be around 
for only three months and be required merely to submit a 
report to the UNSC.  He then got a six-week extension, 
followed by another ten-week extension, followed by an 
agreement to stay on a few additional weeks awaiting 
Brammertz' appointment and arrival.  All of this meant that 
the UNIIIC remained a rather ad hoc institution, Brammertz 
said.  Now, besides continuing to pursue leads, the UNIIIC 
need to increase its own legal and technical capacities. 
Brammertz reported that he was setting up new units within 
the UNIIIC to deal exclusively with preparing files to make 
them up to international standards.  Asked by the Ambassador 
about competing priorities, he insisted that this 
"standardization" would not come at the expense of the actual 
investigation but was absolutely critical to the UNIIIC's 
ability to understand and present what it had.  There were 
some technical leads, too, that Mehlis never pursued because 
he lacked the technical expertise.  Now is the time to build 
up the in-house technical expertise.  Brammertz also said 
that the UNIIIC was having to do more of the trial 
preparatory work than had originally been envisioned, since 
the GOL has proven politically incapable of taking this on. 
This, again, suggeseted that the UNIIIC had to move into a 
more institutionalized phase. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶14.  (C)  Before the arrival of the UN/OLA team, rumors 
circulated around Beirut that the UN was foot-dragging on the 
follow-up to UNSCR 1644.  Battered by these rumors, people 
had resigned themselves to thinking that Michel's visit would 
be a box-checking exercise meant to postpone any real 
discussion of an international tribunal.  Yet if there is a 
lack of enthusiasm in UN headquarters for the UNSCR 1644 
issues, Michel did not reveal it in his P-3 briefing.  We've 
talked with some of the Lebanese whom Michel met, and their 
assessment was that Michel was intensely focused on coming up 
with the answers needed to decide how best to pursue UNSCR 
1644's requests to UNSYG Annan.  We, too, were impressed by 
the clarity of his analysis.  Separately, UNSYG's Personal 
Representative for Lebanon Geir Pedersen told us that he did 
not detect any sense of unease or unhappiness on the part of 
Michel for his mission here.  Given the ongoing cabinet 
crisis provoked by the question of an international tribunal, 
it is encouraging news for Lebanon's political majority that 
the UN Secretariat seems to be taking UNSCR 1644 seriously. 
We hope that Michel's apparent commitment to pursuing UNSCR 
1644 follow-up will be matched by a Lebanese commitment to 
choose quickly the small team Michel wants to travel to New 
York.  In the course of our discussions with Lebanese 
political leaders, we will certainly raise this issue. 
FELTMAN