VZCZCXRO3131
RR RUEHPA
DE RUEHJL #0031/01 0171204
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 171204Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY BANJUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6316
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0253
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0084
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0081
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP
RUFGNOA/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 BANJUL 000031 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS EXIM, USTDA, OPIC, USTR, PEACE CORPS 
USDOC FOR ITA 
DAKAR PASS ODC, DAO 
LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINS PHUM KPKO EPET EINV ETRD
BEXP, EAID, MASS, KMCA, KPAO, GA 
SUBJECT: THE GAMBIA: PROSPECTS FOR THE BILATERAL 
RELATIONSHIP IN 2006 
 
REF: 05 BANJUL 36 
 
BANJUL 00000031  001.2 OF 006 
 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOSEPH STAFFORD, REASON 1.4 (B AND D) 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) Our assessment of prospects in 2006 for our overall 
Gambian relationship is guarded, as the recent slippage in 
the GOTG's record on human rights and democracy has 
reinforced President Jammeh's reputation for erratic behavior 
and overshadowed his government's achievements.  Given the 
importance of the 2006-7 national elections for The Gambia's 
democratic evolution, Embassy strongly recommends a robust 
contribution to donor assistance for election-related 
preparations and will submit an ESF proposal via septel. 
 
2.(C) Following The Gambia's selection for MCA eligibility, 
next steps in the MCA process are contingent on the GOTG's 
reversing the current negative human rights trend.  Our 
bilateral trade and investment links are likely to continue 
to register modest expansion in 2006, and the U.S. Trade and 
Development Agency is increasingly active here. The Gambia 
has yet to take much advantage of its AGOA eligibility. 
 
¶3. (S/NF) The GOTG's excellent cooperation in the Global War 
on Terrorism is underscored by our joint counter-terrorism 
operations targetting Al-Qaida, most recently in October 
¶2005. SIMO/DAKAR  continues to provide CT capacity-building 
assistance to the GOTG by, inter alia, training and equipping 
an elite CT unit.  Regarding military cooperation, the 
Gambian armed forces have an established record of effective 
service in foreign peacekeeping operations -- e.g., in 
Darfur. However, the small (company-level) size of their 
contingents has so far ruled out their inclusion in the ACOTA 
Partnership program; the GOTG has indicated willingness to 
expand its Darfur contingent to a battalion in 2007. 
 
¶4. (C) The Gambia, with its reservoir of pro-U.S. feeling, is 
fertile ground for the expanded public diplomacy outreach 
that the Embassy envisions in 2006.   Despite The Gambia's 
limited capacity to influence U.S.interests for good or ill, 
we see compelling reasons to maintain, indeed, expand, our 
level of engagement here.  At the same time, managing our 
Gambian relationship requires taking into account the 
rough-hewn Jammeh's penchant for erratic behavior and working 
to keep his expectations for the relationship realistic.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
OVERVIEW OF THE RELATIONSHIP 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5. (S) There has been considerable improvement in the 
U.S./Gambian relationship in recent years, following The 
Gambia's holding of Presidential and National Assembly 
elections in 2001-2 that were judged credible by the 
international community, including the U.S.  The  re-elected 
President, Yahya Jammeh, whose coup in 1994 had caused 
bilateral ties to nosedive, took various steps to reach out 
to the U.S.: concluding an Article 98 Agreement (the second 
African state to do so), sharply reducing links with a 
heretofore key patron, Libya, adopting a more moderate and 
pro-Western foreign policy generally, and ending The Gambia's 
role as a conduit in sub-regional  trafficking in  arms and 
"conflict diamonds."   He proved a useful partner in the 
Global War on Terrorism, as demonstrated in the GOTG's joint 
counter-terrorism operations with the U.S. 
 
¶6. (C) The U.S. responded to Jammeh's moves, lifting the "508 
Sanctions" imposed following the coup, granting AGOA 
eligibility, and restoring modest programs of military and 
economic assistance (the latter channeled largely through 
USAID's Acra-based West Africa Regional Program due to the 
 
BANJUL 00000031  002.2 OF 006 
 
 
mid-1990's closure of the bilateral USAID mission here). 
Meanwhile,  we continued assistance programs not affected by 
the "508 Sanctions," e.g. Peace Corps Program, food aid 
channeled through the UN's World Food program and a NGO, 
Catholic Relief Services, and USAID-funded programs in such 
areas as combatting HIV/AIDS and promoting respect for human 
rights and democratic norms.  Most recently, the Millenium 
Challenge Corporation's decision in November 2005 to grant 
The Gambia eligibility for the MCA program underscored the 
progress in restoring links. 
 
PROSPECTS FOR 2006: FOCUS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶7. (C) In our 2005 forecast (reftel), we judged prospects for 
maintaining the overall positive trend in the U.S./Gambian 
relationship as good.  Our forecast for 2006 is more guarded; 
continued expansion of bilateral ties cannot be taken for 
granted.  The reason: promotion of respect for human rights 
and democratic norms remains the top U.S. interest in The 
Gambia, but there has been slippage of late in the GOTG's 
performance in this area.  In November, Jammeh had three 
prominent opposition politicians detained on what appear to 
be trumped-up charges. The trio was subsequently released on 
bail, but still face prosecution, as a rumored 
behind-the-scenes arrangement for the dropping of the charges 
has yet to materialize.  Meanwhile, the relationship between 
the GOTG and the media remains strained, as Jammeh makes 
little secret of his distaste for the country's several 
private journals and their frequent attacks on him and his 
government. 
 
¶8. (C)  The current malaise in The Gambia's human rights and 
political arenas has reinforced the Gambian leader's 
reputation for erratic behavior and overshadowed his 
government's achievements in promoting stability and 
socio-economic reform and development.  Among these 
achievements, Jammeh actively supported the National 
Assembly's passage in June 2005 of the progressive 
"Children's Act."  In this predominantly Muslim country, the 
President has fostered harmony with the Christian and animist 
minorities and made clear that propagation of radical Islamic 
views will not be tolerated.   The GOTG, concerned at its 
relegation to the Category Two Watchlist in our 2005 TIP 
report, has markedly expanded its efforts to combat TIP in 
past months.  The Gambia's status as a country on the path of 
reform and development seemed borne out in the relatively 
high rankings that it received in the MCA eligibility review 
process last fall in the "Investing in People" and 
"Encouraging Economic Freedom" categories.  (NOTE: The 
Gambia's relatively positive 2005 rankings in the "Ruling 
Justly" category are at considerable risk of sharp decline 
unless the current slippage in the GOTG's human 
rights/democracy record is halted. END NOTE.) 
 
¶9. (C) The Presidential and National Assembly elections 
scheduled for 2006-7 are potentially crucial milestones in 
The Gambia's still-fragile democratization process. These 
contests will serve as an important test of Jammeh's 
professed commitment to democratic values; his actions of 
late against the opposition have generated new doubts about 
the depth of that commitment.  On a positive note, 
representatives of the respected NGO, International 
Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), observed The 
Gambia's National Assembly by-elections in September 2005 and 
judged them to be credible.  Given our interest in promoting 
good elections in 2006-7 here, Embassy strongly recommends a 
robust U.S. contribution to donor assistance for 
election-related preparations and will submit an ESF proposal 
via septel; our proposal will be based on that submitted to 
us by IFES, which has indicated interest in assisting in The 
Gambia's election preparations. 
 
 
BANJUL 00000031  003.2 OF 006 
 
 
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE: MCA AND OTHER PROGRAMS 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶10. (C) The Millenium Challenge Corporation's (MCC) selection 
of The Gambia for MCA eligibility in November 2005 raised the 
prospect of a major expansion of our efforts on behalf of 
another key U.S.objective in The Gambia: promoting economic 
growth and development. At present, though, next steps in the 
MCA process -- in particular, an  initial visit by a senior 
MCC delegation -- are on hold, because of the slippage in the 
GOTG's record on human rights and democracy.  We will 
continue to use MCA eligibility as leverage with the 
Gambians, stressing that progress toward a MCA compact as 
well as retention of MCA eligibility itself are contingent on 
efforts by the GOTG to reverse the current negative human 
rights trend. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Meanwhile, the Peace Corps program, involving 100 
volunteers deployed throughout the country, remains a key 
component of U.S. grassroots-level development and 
humanitarian assistance to The Gambia.  Other efforts range 
from the Ambassador's funds for Self-Help projects and 
combating  HIV/AIDS to a program fostering girls' school 
enrollment (Ambassadors' Girls Scholarship program) to DOD's 
Humanitarian Assistance and HIV/AIDS programs.  In the past, 
the U.S. was a major donor of food aid, channelled through 
the World Food Program and a prominent, U.S.-based NGO, 
Catholic Relief Services; over the past year or so, our food 
aid has virtually ended due to growing emergency aid needs in 
other countries.  A major British medical research 
institution, the Medical Research Center, is the beneficiary 
of a multi-year, two-million dollar grant from the The 
National Institutes of Health (NIH).  Apart from  the NIH 
grant, our bilateral assistance totals dols 1.5 million to 2 
million annually, about half of which represents the cost of 
our Peace Corps program. 
 
COMMERCIAL LINKS 
---------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) The modest growth in bilateral trade and investment 
links in recent years is likely to continue this year. In 
2005 there were new U.S. investments here estimated at 
several million dollars, one project involving the kickoff of 
the Seaboard company's construction of a flour mill.  U.S. 
investors also started work on a hotel and casino complex and 
finalized arrangements to take over a local fishing company. 
Another U.S. company, the Maryland-based BTI Construction and 
Supply, in partnership with the GOTG's Social Security and 
Housing Finance Corporation, recently broke ground on the 
first phase of a project to construct over 200 pre-fabricated 
houses in The Gambia.  Indicative of The growing USG effort 
to promote commercial links, 2005 witnessed the U.S. Trade 
and Development Agency's (USTDA) signing of its first 
agreement in The Gambia, involving funding of almost dols 
400,000 for a feasability study for a petroleum storage 
facility.  While prospects for implementation of the 
agreement are fading, due to other commitments of the U.S. 
firm contracted to do the study, USTDA  recently signed a 
second agreement for a feasibility study, covering a Gambian 
entrepreneur's proposal for construction of a coal-fired 
power plant.  Following the GOTG's December 2005 signing of a 
preliminary agreement with a Canadian firm for oil 
exploration, the Gambians indicate that they remain keen to 
elicit the interest of American firms as well.  However, U.S. 
oil companies have so far been reluctant to pursue an 
exploration license due to uncertainty as to whether The 
Gambia's oil deposits are sufficent to make production 
commercially viable. 
 
¶13. (SBU) The Gambia has yet to take much advantage of its 
AGOA eligibility (renewed for 2006); the annual value of its 
AGOA-qualified exports to the U.S. remains under dols 
 
BANJUL 00000031  004.2 OF 006 
 
 
100,000. The Embassy will continue to seek Department and 
USAID support to organize seminars for the Gambian government 
and business community on AGOA's "rules of the road" and 
prospects for increasing exports to the U.S.  We will also 
continue to assist the GOTG in obtaining the AGOA-related 
"textile visa."  The current lack of direct air and sea 
transport links between the two countries hampers the 
expansion of trade, but there are  reports of several 
airlines' possible interest in establishing direct flights. 
The Gambian Civil Aviation Authority's (GCAA) progress to 
date in  meeting relevant FAA requirements raises the 
possibility  of Gambian-registered aircraft being authorized 
for direct flights to the U.S. in 2006. 
 
COUNTER-TERRORISM 
----------------- 
 
¶14. (S/NF)  The global war on terrorism (GWOT) is an area in 
which bilateral cooperation is particularly strong and is 
likely to continue.  Jammeh takes a close personal interest 
in this dossier and personally authorized the two 
counter-terrorism (CT) operations jointly conducted with the 
U.S. in recent years.   Both operations, one in 2002 and the 
other in October 2005, involved the Gambian authorities 
detaining and questioning Al-Qaida-linked elements at U.S. 
behest.  The GOTG has been equally responsive in other 
CT-related activities; Gambian intelligence and security 
officials show no hesitancy in sharing even the most 
sensitive information with us and have indicated openness to 
whatever forms of cooperation we wish to pursue with them. 
(NOTE: Following the joint CT operation in 2005, we have no 
evidence that Al-Qaida or other terrorist elements are 
currently active in The Gambia, although such elements may 
well be present but maintaining a low profile.  While the 
country's Lebanese community includes sympathizers of 
Hizballah,there is no sign of their actual involvement in 
terrorist operations here, although, as elsewhere in Africa, 
they are presumably engaged in such activities as 
fund-raising on Hizballah's behalf. END NOTE.) 
 
¶15. (S/NF) The head of the GOTG's National Intelligence 
Agency (NIA), Daba Marena, is a confidant of Jammeh, whose 
in-depth knowledge of the liaison activities involving NIA 
and SIMO/DAKAR testifies to the Gambian President's abiding 
interest in those activities.  SIMO/DAKAR continues to assume 
the lead role in the USG's CT-related cooperation with the 
Gambians; its initiatives include, inter alia, assisting the 
NIA in the training and equipping of an elite CT unit -- a 
personal priority of Jammeh. 
 
MILITARY COOPERATION 
-------------------- 
 
¶16. (C) 2005 witnessed some growth in our modest military 
cooperation programs, which consist chiefly of IMET, 
military-to-military contacts in areas ranging from combating 
HIV/AIDS to riverine operations, and ACSS activities.  Of the 
military's small officer corps, many -- including Jammeh 
himself -- have participated in IMET training programs  in 
the U.S., and the Gambians have expressed appreciation for 
the increased IMET funding in 2005-6.  Jammeh himself has 
repeatedly appealed for expeditious action on the U.S. Navy's 
long-standing project, using  unspent FMF funds, to provide 
technical assistance for the refurbishment of a U.S-supplied 
patrol boat. (NOTE: The Gambia's miniscule navy consists 
largely of several non-operational patrol boats.  END NOTE.) 
 
 
 
¶17. (C)  Jammeh and his military aides make clear their 
desire for further expansion of our military cooperation, 
viewing the U.S. as an indispensable partner in their efforts 
to expand the capabilities of their tiny, 1,000-man army, 
 
BANJUL 00000031  005.2 OF 006 
 
 
particularly in the area of international peacekeeping.  When 
Jammeh contributed a company of troops to the AMIS operation 
in Darfur in December 2004, he criticized our perceived 
failure to adequately support the deployment by providing 
APC's, asserting -- erroneously -- that there was a U.S. 
commitment to do so.   We continue to impress upon the GOTG 
leadership that U.S. policy remains to channel assistance to 
troop contributing countries through the AU, in coordination 
with other donors.  The Gambian military has an established 
record of effective service in an array of international and 
regional peacekeeping operations, but the small 
(company-level) size of its peacekeeping contingents has so 
far ruled out its inclusion in the ACOTA Partnership program. 
 GOTG officials have indicated a willingness to increase 
their Darfur contingent to a battalion in 2007. (NOTE: We are 
told that furnishing a battalion is not feasible in 2006 due 
to the armed forces' domestic security duties, in support of 
the country's police force, during the year -- AU summit in 
July, Presidential election in fall. END NOTE.) 
 
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: PRO-U.S. ENVIRONMENT 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶18. (SBU) The Gambia is fertile ground for the expanded 
public  diplomacy outreach that the Embassy envisions in 
¶2006.  It is a moderate Muslim country in a turbulent region, 
and there is a discernible pro-U.S. feeling in the society 
that is striking -- and notably warmer than that vis-a-vis 
the former colonial power, Britain.  Gambians from all walks 
of life, both elites and the public at large, make no secret 
of their admiration of America's democracy, its economic and 
technological prowess, and its culture of openness and 
change.  While the country's free-wheeling press does not 
shrink from criticizing U.S. policies (e.g.,occasional 
editorials taking issue with our Mideast policies), Gambians' 
overall view of the U.S. is favorable. 
 
¶19. (SBU) Moreover, for a country so small, a remarkably 
large number of Gambians have extensive experience in the 
U.S. Numerous senior GOTG officials have pursued university 
studies in the U.S.  As noted above, the military is replete 
with officers that received training in the U.S. under IMET. 
The upshot is that, for many Gambians, positive views of the 
U.S. are based, not on a distant, utopian image, but on the 
reality of daily life in America.  As for Gambians without 
experience in the U.S., they routinely express eagerness to 
know more about American society and to visit  -- an 
eagerness that accounts in part for the high demand for 
visas, relative to other countries in  the sub-region. (NOTE: 
Of course, as elsewhere, there is also a widespread desire 
among Gambians, especially youths, to escape poverty through 
immigration, legally or otherwise, to the U.S. END NOTE.) 
 
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
----------------------- 
 
¶20. (C) With its population of 1.5 million, annual per capita 
income of $350, and severely resource-strapped government, 
The Gambia has limited capability to influence U.S. 
interests, for good or ill. At the same time, we see various 
compelling reasons to maintain -- indeed, expand -- our 
engagement with this country. One is the USG's universal 
commitment to foster democracy and human rights, promote 
sustainable development, and provide humanitarian assistance. 
Another reason centers on the U.S.-led Global War on 
Terrorism; despite its exceedingly meager resources, the GOTG 
has shown that it is capable of serving as an effective 
partner in that War.  A third reason relates to the key U.S. 
interest in promoting regional peace and stability; the GOTG 
helps advance that interest by contributing to peacekeeping 
operations, most recently, sending troops to Darfur and prior 
to that, Liberia.  As a fourth reason, there is the reservoir 
of pro-U.S. feeling here -- a resource to draw upon in our 
 
BANJUL 00000031  006.2 OF 006 
 
 
efforts to build popular support for our initiatives 
targetting African and Muslim audiences.  To be sure, 
managing our Gambian relationship requires taking into 
account Jammeh's rough-hewn, erratic character -- and working 
to keep his expectations for our bilateral ties realistic. 
STAFFORD