This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 000355 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
JAKARTA FOR AMBASSADOR CRUMPTON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL PTER TH PSI BURMA HUMAN RIGHTS
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: AMBASSADOR CRUMPTON'S VISIT TO 
THAILAND 
 
Classified By: CHARGE ALEX ARVIZU.  REASON: 1.4 (D) 
 
¶1.  (C)  Bilateral relations with Thailand have been 
generally excellent.  Thailand is a security treaty ally and 
has been firmly supportive of the Global War on Terror. 
American businesses have over $20 billion in direct 
investment in Thailand, the second largest investor after 
Japan. Thailand and the U.S. have long enjoyed a close 
security relationship.  Thailand is a Major Non-Nato Ally 
(MNNA) of the United States.  For years, Thailand has hosted 
the Cobra Gold annual exercise, our largest multilateral 
exercise in Asia.  Over time, that exercise has transformed 
from a bilateral event designed to thwart a Vietnamese 
invasion of Thailand to a multilateral exercise to train for 
peace keeping and disaster relief preparations.  Recent 
exercises have allowed American and Thai troops to train with 
militaries from Singapore, Japan, the Philippines and others. 
 We are now planning for Cobra Gold 2006 which will include 
possible participation by Indonesia in addition to Singapore 
and Japan.  We are convinced that we and the Thai can work 
with other militaries to support key U.S. objectives in Asia 
such as improving responses to terrorism, enhancing peace 
keeping, promoting interoperability with U.S. forces, and 
improving maritime security -- while continuing to provide us 
a vital platform in the region from which to respond to 
future contingencies.  In 2004-5, thanks to years of working 
with the Thai military, the United States was able to quickly 
deploy over one thousand American soldiers, marines, sailors 
and airmen to Utapao Naval Air Base and set up a regional 
relief operation.  Thai cooperation in the Global War on 
Terrorism is excellent.  The capture of the JI terrorist 
Hambali in 2003 highlighted the willingness of Thailand to 
work against international terrorism 
 
THE SOUTH AND TERRORISM 
 
¶2.  (C)  The most pressing security concern for the Thai 
remains the unrest in Thailand's deep south provinces 
bordering Malaysia.  The violence continues to occur almost 
daily with over one thousand persons reported killed over the 
past two years either by militants or government actions. 
The ongoing violence has historic roots going back a century 
and is based on local grievances from poor treatment by the 
government and a desire to separate the region from the Thai 
state.  There still is not any direct evidence of operational 
links between Thai separatists and outside terrorist. 
Incidents such as Tak Bai (in which some 80 Muslim men died 
in security forces' custody following an October, 2004 
demonstration), Thaksin's harsh rhetoric and often ham-fisted 
police tactics, as well as a serious lack of coordination and 
information sharing between security agencies have probably 
exacerbated the violence and public alienation in the region. 
 
¶3.  (C)  The  National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), 
appointed by Thaksin last year and led by former PM Anand 
Panyarachun, one of the most respected leaders in Thailand, 
is expected to announce a set of policy recommendations 
policy recommendations in March.  Critics of Thaksin maintain 
that he is likely to pay lip service to the NRC's 
recommendations while still tending to some of his more 
authoritarian tendencies in his approach to the south. 
Nonetheless, Thaksin has committed his government to 
implementing education and economic reforms to benefit 
southerners -- a move we encourage -- and we urge him to 
listen seriously to the suggestions of the NRC.  The Thai 
government does not seek a U.S. presence in the south and is 
sensitive over rumors of U.S. involvement in the violence. 
Nonetheless, we have worked closely to find areas where we 
can help.  We have stepped up our human rights training of 
Thai troops rotating into the south to improve their ability 
to control crowds and conduct other operations in a way that 
complies with international norms.  We are also working with 
the Thai to improve their intelligence sharing and gathering 
capabilities. 
 
PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE 
 
¶4.  (C)  Despite our efforts since 2003, the RTG has not yet 
formally endorsed the PSI Statement of Principles.  Prime 
Minister Thaksin has told senior USG officials that another 
"Muslim" ASEAN nation (read Malaysia or Indonesia) should 
endorse PSI first or concurrently with Thailand, so as to 
avoid the appearance that Thailand is getting too far in 
front of its neighbors and because of concern over how 
endorsement might be perceived vis-a-vis the situation in the 
South. 
 
OUTSTANDING ISSUES 
 
¶5.  (C)  For most of the Thaksin administration, we have been 
at odds over our respective approaches to Burma -- 
essentially agreeing to disagree.  The RTG under Thaksin has 
claimed that though it agrees that the regime must show 
progress in bringing out national reconciliation, Bangkok 
must stay engaged with the SPDC in order to keep a dialogue 
open on issues that directly affect Thailand such as illegal 
immigration from Burma and narcotics smuggling.  We have 
maintained that Thailand has appeared to go beyond this to 
the appoint of being perceived as an apologist for the 
regime.  Lately, at our urging, the Thai have begun to move 
closer to regional and international opinion, by publicly 
criticizing the SPDC on its continued detention of Aung San 
Suu Kyi and resistance to national reconciliation. 
 
¶6.  (C)  We have also criticized the RTG for some of its 
human rights practices.  A bloody crackdown on alleged drug 
vendors during a "war on drugs campaign" in 2003 and actions 
by security forces in the south, notably the aforementioned 
incident at Tak Bai, have been publicly raised by us in our 
annual human rights reports and in public fora, as well as in 
our private conversations with Thai officials. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Your meetings with Thai officials, as well as your 
dinner with academic and press observers of the south, will 
give you an opportunity to thank the Thai for their 
cooperation with us in the Global War On Terrorism, most 
notably their deployments of troops to Afghanistan and Iraq, 
their capture of Hambali in Ayudhaya in 2003 and their role 
in promoting regional cooperation in fighting international 
terrorism.  It will also be a chance for you to urge the Thai 
to sign on to the PSI Statement Of Principles and to 
underscore Thailand's commitment to fully join the 
international community to combat the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction and their precursors. 
ARVIZU