This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000079 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PNAT PREL IR IZ KRG
SUBJECT: FM ZEBARI: SHIA FAR FROM DECISION ON PM CANDIDATE, 
NEW GOVERNMENT FORMATION ALSO DISTANT 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 05 4975 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., David M. Satterfield for reason 
s 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari told 
Ambassador on January 9 that the Kurdish Alliance has reached 
agreement on supporting Talabani for President in the new 
Iraqi government.  The Shia UIA alliance is, in his view, 
deeply divided over whether to support current PM Ja'afari or 
current Deputy President Mahdi for the PM slot, with Ja'afari 
currently in the lead.  It will take some time to resolve 
this impasse with the decision resting on the views of 
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Intelligence Corps Chief 
Soleimani and Grand Ayatollah Sistani.  Per Zebari, 
negotiations on the rest of the government will begin in 
earnest only after the PM candidate is chosen.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) Foreign Minister and top Kurdistan Democratic Party 
(KDP) official Hoshyar Zebari told the Ambassador January 9 
that the Kurds have gone through a very difficult internal 
process of negotiating the government positions to be sought 
by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the KDP.  Each 
of the other political alliances (the Shia UIA, the Sunni 
Arab Tuwaffuq, and Allawi's moderate group), according to 
Zebari, also will have to make internal decisions before 
government formation can begin.  Zebari stated that the Kurds 
have decided they will support Jalal Talabani again for 
president of Iraq while Masoud Barzani will remain president 
of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).  The region, he 
noted, will have one Prime Minister.  With Talabani as 
President, Zebari stated, the KDP will expect to get the bulk 
of any ministerial slots allocated to the Kurds in the Iraqi 
government. 
 
¶3. (C) Zebari said that Talabani has dropped his opposition 
to Ibrahim Ja'afari continuing as prime minister.  This 
follows a visit from Ja'afari, who, according to Zebari, is 
doing a much better job of lobbying for the PM position than 
Deputy PM Adil Abd al-Mahdi.  However, Zebari stated, a 
repeat of Ja'afari in the PM role is a red flag for SCIRI's 
Abdul Aziz Hakim, who views Ja'afari's tenure as a failure. 
Zebari added that Hakim would like to reach agreement on the 
UIA PM nomination -- which the UIA views as its right because 
it won the most votes in the election -- before it comes to 
an internal vote.  Zebari opined that Ja'afari would win if 
an internal UIA vote on the position was conducted at this 
moment.  Given internal UIA disagreements, Zebari said he 
doubts there will be a quick agreement on the composition of 
the new government.  Zebari believes that ultimately Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard Corps Intelligence chief Soleimani and 
Sistani will decide the UIA PM nominee.  Sistani's 
influential son, Mohammed Ridha, supports Ja'afari, with 
whom, according to Zebari, he has some type of family 
relation.  Zebari recommended that the Ambassador not weigh 
in at this point except perhaps to outline the qualities that 
the USG would like to see in a prime minister. 
 
¶4. (C) Zebari cautioned against attempting to form a Sunni 
Arab-Kurd-Allawi block to negotiate with the Shia.  Doing so, 
he said, would cause the UIA to dig in its heels.  Rather, 
Zebari explained, the Sunni Arabs, along with the other 
political groups, must form a small negotiating team to 
negotiate after the Shia PM nominee is decided.  The Sunni 
Arab-Kurd-Allawi bloc, he stated, can be formed later in the 
Council of Representatives to oppose UIA initiatives there. 
Allawi must be kept in the country and engaged in the 
process, Zebari added.  However, Zebari noted, Allawi is a 
difficult man to control and now is the center of gravity in 
the election rejectionist camp.  Only the U.S. can influence 
Allawi, Zebari commented. 
 
¶5. (C) The Ambassador and Zebari discussed the rumors of a 
possible Shia Sadr-Da'wa and Sunni Arab Tawaffuq nationalist 
Arab bloc being formed, isolating the pro-Iranian SCIRI and 
the Kurds.  Such a bloc could get the backing of the Arab 
countries, Zebari stated.  Saudi Arabia, Zebari added, views 
Sadr as a counterweight to both Iranian and U.S. influence in 
Iraq. 
 
¶6. (C) COMMENT: Talabani's much-documented problem of trying 
to be "all things to all people" appears again with his 
recent declaration of reconciliation with Ja'afari, despite 
his long-standing support for Mahdi's candidacy.  Last week 
the Embassy heard that Talabani again declared his support 
for Mahdi as being the most qualified candidate.  We continue 
to monitor Iran's continuing attempts to influence the Kurds 
through their shuttle diplomacy between Irbil and 
Sulaimaniyah; they appear to have had more open success in 
influencing Talabani (see reftel).  END COMMENT. 
KHALILZAD