This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000074 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2016 
TAGS: PNAT PTER PHUM IZ
SUBJECT: AMB URGES SUNNI POLITICAL LEADERS TO DENOUNCE 
VIOLENCE, HELP END THE INSURGENCY 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador Khalilzad met on January 5 with 
key leaders from the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) and on January 
6 with the Iraqi National Dialogue Council (INDC) to review 
their concerns about the December 15 parliamentary elections 
and to solicit their views on the formation of a national 
unity government.  He also expressed deep concern about the 
increase in violence and asked that the leaders issue 
statements calling for calm.  The leaders all expounded 
unrealistic expectations that the ongoing international 
review of the elections would result in specific changes to 
the outcome.  However, none of them threatened to boycott the 
new parliament or negotiations over a unity government if the 
election results remain unchanged.  Instead, they said they 
are talking to the Kurds about the shape of that government. 
They are developing lists of potential candidates and are 
engaged in discussions about potential power-sharing 
arrangements in a national unity government.  The leaders 
were far less forthcoming regarding statements condemning the 
recent upsurge in violence, claiming that the violence was a 
response to GOI repression and killings of their political 
operatives after the election as well as to provocative 
statements by some Shia leaders linking all Sunni Arabs with 
the insurgency.  The Ambassador told the Sunni leaders that 
they are not credible political partners if they defend the 
insurgency, which, with the formation of a widely 
representative government, could no longer be justified and 
would have to be termed terrorism.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Key Issues - Election, Government Formation, Violence 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Ambassador Khalilzad met on January 5 with Tariq 
Hashimi and Ayad Samarrai, key leaders in the Iraqi Islamic 
Party (IIP).  On January 6, he met with the Iraqi National 
Dialogue Council (INDC) chairman Sheykh Khalif Al-Ayan, 
accompanied by Mahmood Mashadani and Abd Nasir Al-Janabi. 
The IIP and the INDC are two of the three parties in the 
Al-Tawaffuq Front, the Sunni Arab coalition that, according 
to preliminary results, won 43 seats in the December 15 
elections. 
 
¶3. (C) The Ambassador told the leaders that the International 
Mission for Iraqi Elections (IMIE) is conducting a review of 
election complaints and IECI audits and will issue its 
preliminary findings before January 18.  The US will support 
the recommendations in the report, but it is unreasonable to 
expect that the election will be rerun, the Ambassador told 
the Sunni Arab leaders. 
 
¶4. (C) The USG is encouraging a national unity government, 
said Ambassador Khalilzad.  He noted that the Kurd, Sunni, 
and secular parties together have more votes than the Shia 
Alliance and that, if they joined together, they could 
negotiate with the Shia on an equal footing to form the new 
government.  The USG has no specific names to propose for any 
positions but proposed ministers should be competent and the 
key security agencies (Defense, Interior and Intelligence) 
led by people who are non-sectarian, with no ties to 
militias, and who enjoy broad political support.  Otherwise, 
the USG would have difficulty in cooperating with the 
ministries. 
 
¶5. (C) The Ambassador expressed deep concern about the 
upsurge in violence and asked the leaders to issue statements 
for an immediate suspension of violence during the government 
formation process.  He noted that statements by some groups 
unhappy with the provisional election results suggested 
support for the insurgency.  This is a mistake that makes the 
formation of a unity government more difficult, he noted. 
Parties cannot have one foot in the insurgency and another in 
the government.  He also cautioned that political parties 
should not defend as legitimate violence against a government 
that is the outgrowth of a representative process; such 
violence must be condemned as terrorism. 
 
Unrealistic Expectations for Electoral Review 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) IIP leader Tariq Hashimi asserted that the Sunni Arab 
complaints about the election are very important and that 
their supporters expect concrete remedies; otherwise there 
will be "trouble".  The Tawaffuq Front is being condemned as 
being too soft by some parties, especially former INDC 
spokesman Saleh Mutleq (whose competing Sunni Arab Iraqi 
Unified Front slate won 11 seats).  Tawaffuq hard-liner Abd 
Nasir Al-Janabi was more direct, demanding that his bloc be 
awarded 12 extra seats to compensate for alleged unfair seat 
allocation in the new Council of Representatives (CR).  He 
claimed that Sunni Arabs represent 35-40% of Iraq's 
population, the same as the Shia Arabs.  The Ambassador 
replied that there is nothing the USG could do about the 12 
seats -- any revision in seat allocation will be decided by 
the next CR (perhaps aided by the census planned for 2007). 
The allocation of the 45 compensatory seats is distributed 
according to the electoral law and cannot be simply awarded. 
 
Sunnis Developing Candidate Lists 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Both Hashimi and another Tawaffuq Front leader, Khalif 
Al-Ayan, confirmed that the Tawaffuq is developing a list of 
candidates for senior government positions and will provide 
Embassy with the list when internal consensus is reached. 
Hashimi stated that the Sunni Arabs need to see fundamental 
changes in the makeup of the government - they will balk at 
the same names in top positions.  He argued that a Sunni Arab 
in a top symbolic position, like the President, would be an 
important sign that things have changed.  PolCouns urged the 
Sunni Arab leaders to weigh carefully their options.  They 
need to consider whether it is more useful to gain the 
Presidency when, under the new constitution, a Deputy 
President has nearly as much authority and the Sunni Arabs 
might secure more ministerial jobs by accepting a Deputy 
President position.  Hashimi and al-Janabi understood the 
logic but appeared unconvinced. 
 
Increase in Violence 
-------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Both groups of party leaders were markedly cool to the 
Ambassador's call for public statements to end the violence. 
Hashimi was especially harsh in rejecting the call to condemn 
the recent kidnapping of MOI Jabr's sister saying, "We have 
no sympathy for Jabr and view him bitterly."  Expressing 
sympathy for the victim, he noted that the kidnapping 
occurred near the IIP office and that IIP bodyguards shot at 
the kidnappers in an unsuccessful attempt to intervene. 
Hashimi said that violence is a two-sided problem and that 
the recent upsurge in insurgent activity is a response to 
government violence against Sunni Arabs after the election. 
Tawaffuq Front official Mahmoud Mashadani asserted the 
violence was in response to the SCIRI leader Hakim's and 
Da'wa leader Jawad Al-Maliki's recent harsh statements 
linking all Sunnis with the insurgency.  Ayan claimed that 
the GOI is assassinating Sunni Arab election observers and 
confiscating homes and fields in Anbar, with families being 
"thrown into the wilderness".  He asserted that 58 Tawaffuq 
observers were detained by the IP the day after the election 
and that 38 of them were killed.  He claimed that the GOI, 
along with Iran, supports Zarqawi, whose terrorism primarily 
affects Sunni Arabs.  Mashadani charged that the GOI is 
increasing terrorism against Arab Sunnis and the USG is not 
intervening. 
 
¶9. (C) Ambassador pushed back, stating that Zarqawi wants to 
provoke a civil war and that the USG will not cease 
operations against him.  Shia leaders publicly complain that 
the USG is restraining the GOI from responding to terror and 
that that is the reason there is an increase in violence. 
The Ambassador emphasized that the Sunni Arab political 
parties must come out firmly against violence or their 
credibility as a government partner will suffer.  In 
response, Mashadani said that the political leaders can reach 
the "resistance" and the Ba'athists to affect their behavior. 
 Al-Janabi asked that the USG be patient with the Sunni Arab 
political groups. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶10. (C) COMMENT: Hashimi underlined the importance of the 
international monitoring group looking seriously into fraud 
allegations and making changes to the results as necessary. 
That said, in neither meeting with these Tawaffuq Front 
leaders did anyone mention boycotting the new parliament or 
abstaining from negotiations about a unity government. 
Internally they must decide what they want - symbolic 
leadership in a Presidency or real power through control of 
key ministries.  They are clearly focused on problems 
relating to the security ministries as a matter of immediate 
concern.  The key for the next weeks will be to convince them 
that, without a definitive public break from the insurgency, 
their ability to convince the Kurds and Shia to accept them 
as serious partners in government will be limited, even with 
our support.  END COMMENT. 
KHALILZAD