This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000005 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/02/2016 
TAGS: PGOV IR IZ
SUBJECT: SHIA POLITICO:  JA'AFARI HAS TO GO 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  In a meeting on December 31 with Qassim 
Daoud, a moderate liberal in the Shia Alliance, the 
Ambassador stated that, while the ultimate decision rested 
with the Iraqi people, the U.S. Government, as a partner in 
the new Iraq wished to make its concerns clear.  He laid out 
five main points: the need for a national unity government; a 
more efficiently run Prime Minister's office; nonpartisan and 
technocratic leadership of security ministries; no militia 
involvement in ministries; and the need for capable, 
qualified candidates, especially in key ministries like Oil, 
Finance, and Foreign Affairs.  Daoud agreed and called for 
the active mediation of the U.S. Government, particularly to 
convince current Prime Minister Ibrahim Ja'afari to step 
aside and to support the candidacy of SCIRI's Adil Abd 
al-Mahdi.  Daoud did admit to some reservations about Mahdi - 
namely that he was too close to Iran and giving away too much 
to the Kurds - but stressed that he was by far the only 
viable candidate for the position.  Daoud mentioned that his 
own name had been put forward to head the Ministry of 
Interior, and he suggested several names for the other key 
ministries.  Finally, in response to the Ambassador's query 
about Allawi's possible role in the new government, Daoud 
replied that Allawi's participation could only be through his 
Iraqiya List, since Allawi would never accept any post other 
than Prime Minister.  End Summary. 
 
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Need Competent Professionals to Head Ministries 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶2. (C) In a meeting on December 31 with Qassim Daoud, a 
moderate liberal in the Shia alliance, the Ambassador 
stressed the need for a national unity government staffed by 
competent technocrats.  The Ambassador stated that, while the 
ultimate decision rested with the Iraqi people, the U.S. 
Government, as a partner in the new Iraq wished to make its 
concerns clear.  He laid out five main points: 
 
- All main parties have expressed their support for a 
national unity government, although it is not clear that 
everyone shares the same definition of "national unity"; 
 
- The Prime Minister's office must be much better run in this 
new administration.  The new Iraqi government, whoever is 
chosen as the Prime Minister, must create and develop 
decision-making capacities at the working level; for example, 
a department for policy options that could present 
interagency-coordinated decision options for the Prime 
Minister's approval and a process for follow-up; 
 
- The security ministries are of top importance and will need 
strong leadership that is nonpartisan, is able to bring 
people together, and will gain the confidence of all citizens; 
 
- People affiliated with militias are not acceptable for 
senior positions.  While the final decision is up to the 
Iraqi people, if some of these are chosen the U.S. Government 
will not be able to cooperate with them; 
 
- Ministerial appointments should be awarded on the basis of 
technical expertise, not as political rewards.  Key 
ministries like Oil, Finance, and Foreign Affairs should be 
given careful consideration. 
 
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Yes, But Ja'afari Must Go 
------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Daoud agreed on the need for a national unity 
government and stated that he had told U.S. officials during 
his last trip to Washington in September that Iraq was 
severely polarized between the Shia and Sunni Arabs. 
American involvement is critical precisely because it is 
Iraq's partner, and if necessary the U.S. Government's 
refusal to cooperate with someone would be enough of a signal 
to Iraqi leaders.  The Shia Alliance was unified on one point 
- current Prime Minister Ibrahim Ja'afari must step aside. 
According to Daoud, in his meeting with British Ambassador 
William Patey on December 30, Patey stated his intention to 
inform Ja'afari that Coalition Forces would not support him. 
Daoud advised Patey to make sure that Ja'afari could not spin 
the meeting to his own advantage by also telling Jewad 
al-Maliki and Ali al-Adeeb of the Coalition's decision. 
(Comment:  We doubt that Ambassador Patey spoke for MNFI, but 
in our discussions with President Jalal Talabani and British 
Ambassador Patey, both emphasized to the Ambassador that 
Ja'afari's reappointment was unacceptable.  End Comment.) 
 
¶4. (C) Emphasizing his own close relationship with Ayatollah 
Ali al-Sistani, Daoud stated that Sistani was also concerned 
about the poor quality of the leadership in both the Prime 
Minister's office and the Transitional National Assembly 
(TNA).  Sistani reportedly told Daoud that current Prime 
Minister Ja'afari gave Sistani the impression that the U.S. 
supported his reappointment as Prime Minister.  Sistani 
expressed surprise at this since he felt Ja'afari had been a 
disappointment.  Daoud reassured Sistani that the U.S. had 
made no such overture to Ja'afari and indeed shared Sistani's 
criticism of Ja'afari's administration. 
 
¶5. (C) The main priority for the Shia Alliance, Daoud 
continued, was to choose a Prime Minister from among its 
ranks.  In Daoud's opinion, the only viable candidate was 
Adil Abd al-Mahdi.  There are only two types of politicians 
in Iraq, Daoud stated, the dilettantes, who collect 
ministerial postings, and the statesmen.  Mahdi was one of 
the few statesmen in Iraqi politics: he has good strategic 
vision, is a capable negotiator, and always seeks to work as 
part of a team.  There are two concerns about Mahdi, however, 
confided Daoud: 
 
- Mahdi is too close to Iran.  Before Mahdi went to 
Washington, he called Daoud two days before to ask for his 
passport.  When he told Daoud it was for an Iranian visa 
application, Daoud refused to go to Tehran with Mahdi.  He 
told Madhi that he had no wish to appear to be under Tehran's 
guidance.  He advised Mahdi, however, to arrange for a short 
visit to Ankara as well to appear as though Mahdi was 
concerned about all of Iraq's neighbors, advice which Mahdi 
reportedly heeded.  Daoud noted that, while he was personally 
not anti-Iranian, he shared many of Washington's fears about 
Iran trying to control Iraq through their shared Shia 
religion and about Iran's nuclear program.  Stopping Iran's 
nuclear aspirations would also benefit Iraq's regional 
security, noted Daoud. 
 
- Daoud was also concerned that Mahdi was giving too much to 
the Kurds.  National unity, in Daoud's opinion, did not only 
mean an arrangement with the Kurds.  Currently, the Shia 
Alliance had two delegations negotiating with the Kurds and 
the other parties.  This should shortly be merged into one 
delegation, and a trilateral meeting of the Kurds, Tawaffuq, 
and the Shia Alliance should be held to hammer out the 
details jointly.  This meeting should not be closed, however, 
but open to other groups as well, including former Prime 
Minister and leader of the Iraqiya List Ayad Allawi and the 
Sunni Arab National Dialog Group leader Saleh al-Mutlak. 
Daoud reported that Mutlak had told him he wanted to join 
forces with the Shia Alliance. 
 
¶6. (C) The Ambassador noted that other names were also being 
floated as candidates for Prime Minister --  Fadilah's Nadim 
Jabiri, for example.  Daoud dismissed as "not serious" all 
candidates other than Ja'afari and Mahdi and stated that 
reports of TNA Deputy Speaker Hussein al-Shahristani's 
positioning for the role had reached even Sistani's ears. 
According to Daoud, Sistani had merely laughed at the idea of 
Shahristani as Prime Minister.  Ja'afari has been alienating 
everyone with his recent behavior, Daoud claimed.  "Ja'afari 
believes he has a 'religious responsibility' to be Prime 
Minister - this language is reminiscent of Saddam," stated 
Daoud. 
 
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Potential Candidates? 
--------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) The Ambassador then asked Daoud whom, in his opinion, 
the Shia Alliance might put forward as ministerial 
candidates.  Daoud stated that Sistani's office, Abd al-Aziz 
al Hakim, and Patey had urged him to accept the Minister of 
Interior (MOI) position, a job Daoud was loath to take. 
Daoud noted that he preferred an interagency coordinator 
position.  (Comment: Daoud has told Embassy officers in the 
past that he wanted a position similar to that of the U.S. 
Secretary of Homeland Security. End Comment.)  If he were 
 
SIPDIS 
forced to take the MOI, however, Daoud told Hakim he would do 
it only under one condition - that he be given free rein, 
without interference from anyone, especially Badr Corps 
elements.  This was all contingent on Ja'afari not continuing 
as Prime Minister, however.  If the Kurds balked, the MOI 
position could be offered to Kosrat Rasoul Ali.  (Comment: 
Daoud mentioned several times how unwilling he was to accept 
the MOI position; when pressed by the Ambassador for a plan, 
all he could say was that he would assess the situation. End 
Comment.) 
 
¶8. (C) As for the other ministries, Daoud's recommendations 
were: 
 
- Ministry of Oil: Thamir al-Ghadhban, the former Minister of 
Oil during the Allawi government.  According to Daoud, 
al-Ghadhban is a first-rate technocrat, manager, and 
strategic planner. 
 
- Ministry of Finance: Muhammad Ali al-Hakim.  He is a 
secular man, despite his family, said Daoud.  He also worked 
for the Allawi government as Minister of Communications and 
in the Ministry of Finance; he is currently Mahdi's advisor. 
Mahdi felt, however, that al-Hakim's family ties would 
preclude him from getting this position.  Daoud then 
speculated that a Sunni Arab might be in line for Finance, 
although that person would have to be a technocrat and have a 
good working relationship with whoever is Prime Minister. 
 
- Ministry of Defense: The Sunni Arabs should submit names 
for this position.  As far as Daoud is concerned, the current 
Minister of Defense, Sa'adun al-Dulaymi, would be acceptable. 
 Ayad al-Sammara'i would also be a good choice, or even 
Mahmoud al-Mashhadani.  Al-Mashhadani is a Salafist, but a 
man of compromise.  Usama al-Tikriti could also be a 
possibility. 
 
- Minister of State for Ministerial Affairs: Muhammad Ali 
al-Hakim would fit in this role, said Daoud, if he were 
rejected for the Finance position. 
 
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A Role for Allawi? 
------------------ 
 
¶9. (C) When asked whether he envisioned a role for Allawi in 
the new government, Daoud stated that it could only be 
through his Iraqiya List.  "Allawi will never consent to be 
anything other than the Prime Minister," stated Daoud. 
KHALILZAD