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Viewing cable 06BAGHDAD48, OIL SECTOR IN CENTER OF CONFLICT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BAGHDAD48 2006-01-06 14:41 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Baghdad
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 000048 
 
SIPDIS 
 
RELEASABLE TO MNF-I 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2016 
TAGS: ECON EPET ENRG PGOV KCOR PINR EFIN IZ PO TU
SUBJECT: OIL SECTOR IN CENTER OF CONFLICT 
 
REF: A. BAGHDAD 0013 
     B. EMAIL EXCHANGES WITH ANKARA 
        GOLDBERGER-YOUNG-KIMMEL 
     C. BAGHDAD 0020 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission David M. Satterfield for reasons 
 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C/REL MNF-I) SUMMARY: Deputy Prime Minister (DPM) 
Chalabi, who is now the acting Minister of both Oil and 
Finance, hosted a status review January 4 of energy 
infrastructure protection.  Fuel convoys were reported to be 
delivering fuel to Baghdad.  The convoys had been attacked 
multiple times with casualties, but still managed to deliver 
15 million liters (4 million gallons) of fuel to Baghdad. 
Most pipelines to and from Bayji remained interdicted as of 
January 4; however, DPM Chalabi is forming rapid repair teams 
for deployment from Ministry of Oil personnel.  Chalabi's 
priority energy issues for Iraq are to export oil and to 
deliver energy to the people of Iraq.  Chalabi told us the 
Kurds are withholding customs revenue and making contracts 
improperly for energy projects.  Chalabi acknowledged the USD 
800 million debt to Turkish fuel suppliers that may again 
slow product deliveries from Turkish sources.  Chalabi said 
he will travel to Poland.  END SUMMARY. 
 
---------------- 
MOVEMENT OF FUEL 
---------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) DPM Chalabi met the Steering Group for 
Infrastructure Security on January 4, 2006 to discuss the 
fuel crisis situation in Iraq.  The meeting was attended by 
the Acting Commander of MNF-I LTG Houghton, A/DCM, Deputy 
Commander of MNC-I, MNF-I STRATOPS, IRMO Director of 
Operations, and ECONOFF. 
 
3.  (C/REL MNF-I) Chalabi reported a 68-vehicle government 
fuel truck convoy moved from Bayji to Baghdad on January 4. 
The convoy had been attacked multiple times with casualties 
and a few trucks destroyed, but it still managed to deliver 
15 million liters (4 million gallons) of fuel to Baghdad.  35 
additional contract civilian fuel trucks were en route back 
to Bayji to load fuel and return to Baghdad, and 50 more 
contracted tanker trucks were expected to be dispatched by 
January 5.  Chalabi's intention is to lease 300 trucks, with 
an indemnification clause in the leases for damage to the 
vehicles, and run convoys of 100 trucks per day to and from 
Bayji until the 22-inch pipeline is repaired. (NOTE:  MNF-I 
reporting suggests these attacks are directly linked to the 
fuel price increases and the resulting loss of profit margins 
by organized criminal and terrorist elements that benefited 
from smuggling and black marketing operations of subsidized 
fuel.  END NOTE.) Chalabi stated the price rises had 
generated the 
attacks because the smugglers and terrorists now had to pay 5 
million Iraq Dinars (USD 3500) for a loaded truck of fuel and 
could only sell the load for 8 million Iraqi Dinars (USD 
5,500).  Given the cost of the bribes they had to pay along 
the way, profits were now minimal. (NOTE:  Our calculations 
are somewhat different, but our conclusion is the same.  END 
NOTE.) 
 
------------------------ 
REFINERIES AND PIPELINES 
------------------------ 
 
4.  (C/REL MNF-I) Chalabi informed us that intimidation and 
threat levels inside Bayji refinery are no longer an issue. 
He provided his personal assessment after flying to visit 
Bayji on January 3.  He opined that the impact of government 
and Iraqi Security Forces attention to Bayji had led to the 
improvement in the situation there.  Bayji Refinery has begun 
startup of one process train and will begin the remaining 
trains over the next few days.  January 8 was estimated to be 
the first operational day of production, as the fuel storage 
tanks should be available for new product and the refinery 
system would be brought on line.  The 22-inch product line 
from Bayji to Baghdad is still not repaired from a leak 
caused by old bullet holes in the pipeline, but he estimated 
that repairs would be finished soon.  Chalabi reported 
repairs were ongoing on the 26-inch pipeline between Kirkuk 
and Bayji, as well as on the 40-inch pipeline. (NOTE:  The 
26-inch line is reported to be operational as of January 5. 
END NOTE.)  The 18-inch crude oil supply pipeline to Daura 
was not yet repaired.  Chalabi has ordered crews from other 
regions to support these critical pipeline repairs. 
 
5.  (C/REL MNF-I) The Ministry of Oil (MOO) has developed a 
plan for emergency pipeline repairs.  The ministry will now 
provide five emergency repair crews which will be deployed to 
military camps.  These 20-man crews will have their own 
vehicles, equipment, security, and live at the military 
camps.  They will be paid 300 percent of their salaries as an 
incentive for manning of the crews.  MNC-I will coordinate 
with MOO for the deployment, hosting, and security of these 
crews.  The PJCC (Provincial Joint Coordination Center) will 
remain the focal point for all such coordination.   Chalabi 
complained that he could not expeditiously get his repair 
crews to the repair sites because of all the time delays at 
checkpoints, and he pointed out that the terrorists seemed to 
be able to rapidly move through those same checkpoints to 
destroy the pipelines.  His specific words were, "My repair 
crews cannot move through checkpoints, but terrorists can." 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
FUEL PRICE INCREASES AND A FUTURE MEDIA CAMPAIGN 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
6.  (C/REL MNF-I) Chalabi asserted there would be no more 
price increases for fuel for the next 6-7 months.  He said 
the government had increased gasoline fuel prices higher than 
was required by the IMF, and he did not expect more increases 
to be acceptable in the near future. (COMMENT: Chalabi 
claimed no IMF-mandated increases would be necessary during 
that period.  In fact, the IMF Stand By Agreement calls for 
further price hikes on March 31 and June 30, 2006.  The DPM 
may not be aware of those commitments, or he may be echoing 
the idea raised earlier by Finance Minister Allawi to combine 
the 1st and 2nd quarterly increases to avoid constantly 
revisiting the price hike issue.  END COMMENT.) 
 
7.  (SBU) There have been demonstrations across Iraq 
concerning fuel shortages, and these shortages are now linked 
in the public mind with the fuel price increases, due to the 
critical shortage of fuel at any price.  Chalabi concurred 
with our suggestion that the Iraqi Government should launch a 
media campaign to explain the reasons for the current price 
increases and noted he intended to take the following steps: 
1) Prepare a paper on subsidies for the press, 2) Publish the 
reasons for the price increases in the newspapers, 3) Inform 
the press of the level of imported fuel and the costs of 
these imports to the Iraqi government, 4) Inform the public 
about the reductions of oil exports and lost income, and the 
resulting impact of lowering the budget revenues for Iraq in 
2006.  We also suggested he take an opportunity to brief 
Western and Arab journalists on the fuel and subsidy 
situation, perhaps at a refinery, so they could assist in the 
education of both Iraqis and the rest of the world on the 
negative economic situation caused by fuel subsidies.  (See 
Ref C and also septel, An Iraqi Public-Education Strategy for 
Economic Reform.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
IMPORTS AND PRICE INCREASES HELPING TO SOLVE FUEL CRISIS 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
8.  (C/REL MNF-I) Chalabi told us the key survival mechanism 
for the current fuel crisis in Baghdad was the flow of 3 
million liters of imported fuel per day via pipeline from the 
port of Umm Qasr.  These imports supplement the limited 
production of fuel at the Daura refinery in Baghdad.  He also 
told us that the increases in prices had reduced demand for 
fuel in Baghdad from 10.5 million liters (2.7 million 
Gallons) per day to 6 million liters (1.5 million gallons) 
per day. 
 
------------------------------ 
HFO TO TURKEY AND DEBT PAYMENT 
------------------------------ 
 
9.  (C/REL MNF-I) Chalabi suggested that he would like to 
change the contracts of the Turkish firms which deliver 
refined fuel to Iraq, adding a requirement to accept Heavy 
Fuel Oil (HFO) from Bayji refinery to offset the price of the 
refined fuels and to reduce volume of HFO stored at the 
refinery.  The HFO fills much of the storage space at Bayji 
and needs to be exported or sent to be burned in power 
generation plants.  (Note: Interdictions of electrical lines 
from Bayji have reduced the power demand, thus lowering usage 
of HFO at the Bayji thermal units.  End Note.)  Chalabi 
opined this take-away of fuel oil would be a good method to 
get rid of the HFO from Bayji and perhaps make additional 
money through the process.  His goal was to move 4500 tons of 
HFO per day to Turkey.  At that volume of shipments, 15 days 
could clear out the backlog of HFO at Bayji refinery.  He 
acknowledged that the Iraqis would have to price the HFO at 
an attractive price level as an inducement to the trucking 
companies.  (NOTE:  It is not likely that fuel haulers will 
backhaul HFO to Turkey as it contaminates the tanks and they 
cannot haul clean fuel without extensive cleaning to remove 
the HFO from their tanks.  Use of rail, if available, would 
be preferred.  END NOTE.) 
 
10.  (SBU) We asked Chalabi about the GOI paying the imported 
fuel debts to Turkey (Ref B).  He said that the $800 million 
was over one-third of the total funds left in Iraqi accounts. 
 He did not say if he was going to pay the bill or not, but 
he indicated that the bill was very high. 
 
------------------------ 
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT KEY 
------------------------ 
 
11.  (C/REL MNF-I) Chalabi was concerned about the lack of 
viable intelligence on the saboteurs, terrorists and 
smugglers.  He said we needed to identify the people involved 
in the intimidation, smuggling, and other illegal activities, 
arrest them, and bring them before the court. He requested 
MNF-I support on intelligence.  He said he would set up a MOO 
intelligence unit to support protection of oil infrastructure 
and operations. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR SECURITY COORDINATION? 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
12.  (C/REL MNF-I) Chalabi said he was uncertain who is 
responsible for coordination among the various security 
forces.  He explained that during his Bayji visit he had 
deliberately asked that the Salah Ad Din Police, the Oil 
Protection Forces, and the 4th Iraqi Army all be present, to 
support the Bayji refinery security problem and to provide 
protection for the fuel convoys to Baghdad.  He said it 
became evident that no one present knew who was in charge. 
There needed to be a better system for national coordination. 
 MNF-I responded that it was responsible for the coordination 
of security for infrastructure, but that the Iraqi ministries 
were responsible for the fixed installation security at their 
facilities, such as power plants and refineries.  Chalabi 
said that the Ministry of Electricity could not provide 
security for the electrical lines and the Ministry of Oil 
could not provide security for the oil pipelines or for fuel 
convoys.  Chalabi added that Ministry of Interior (MOI) could 
not support infrastructure security effectively at the 
present time. Chalabi then concluded that his priority for 
protection was oil exports and oil products, then electricity 
distribution.  He argued that government-provided electricity 
was important, but, as long as fuel was available, the public 
could provide its own electricity from generators if the grid 
were down.  Chalabi observed the highest threat to the energy 
infrastructure is the vulnerability of linear infrastructure, 
as the fixed facilities were well protected. 
 
----------------------------- 
ENERGY CHALLENGES FOR CHALABI 
----------------------------- 
 
13.  (C/REL MNF-I)  Chalabi informed the steering group that 
his priority issues were 1) to export oil, and 2) to deliver 
energy to the people of Iraq.  He said refined products were 
in shortage across the country.  The electricity crisis was 
part of the fuel crisis.  He said "we cannot use all of our 
new gas turbines because we do not produce enough gas, the 
thermal plants are outmoded, decrepit and inefficient, and we 
cannot even fix them properly because of the security 
issues."  He also alluded to a few corruption issues in the 
Ministry of Electricity involving construction contracts. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
CUSTOMS AND LEGAL PROBLEMS IN KURDISTAN 
--------------------------------------- 
 
14.  (C/REL MNF-I) Chalabi related that there was an added 
problem in Kurdistan with the regional government.  He said 
the PUK/KRG were collecting customs moneys on the border with 
Turkey and not giving them to the government of Iraq. He said 
this was a huge loss of over USD 700 million from the Iraqi 
national budget.  He also related that the Kurds were signing 
BOO (Build, Own, Operate) contracts for electrical generation 
plants in Irbil and Sulamaniyah.  His concern was that there 
might be implicit legal obligations of the national 
government to support these contracts, signed by a regional 
Iraqi entity without coordination with the national 
government. 
 
--------------------------- 
UPCOMING TRAVEL FOR CHALABI 
--------------------------- 
 
15.  (C/REL MNF-I) DPM Chalabi said he would be leaving in a 
few days to go to Poland.  Chalabi referred to Polish 
interest in participating in the Iraqi oil industry and 
discussions on the prior purchase of old military equipment 
from Poland by the Ministry of Defense. 
KHALILZAD