This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ALMATY 000211 
 
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DEPT FOR E:U/S SHINER; EB/ESC; EUR/SNEC (MANN); EUR/CACEN 
(MUDGE) 
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOR SECRETARY JOHANNS 
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY FOR UNDERSECRETARY ADAMS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2015 
TAGS: ENRG EPET GA KZ OVIP POLITICAL
SUBJECT: SECRETARY JOHANNS' JANUARY 11, 2006 MEETING WITH 
GEORGIAN PRESIDENT SAAKASHVILI 
 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN ORDWAY FOR REASONS 1.4(B) and (D) 
 
 ¶1. (U) Participants in the January 11, 2006 meeting in 
Astana, Kazakhstan: 
 
U.S. 
Secretary Mike Johanns 
 
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Mrs. Stephanie Johanns 
Ambassador John Ordway 
Undersecretary of State for Economic, Business and 
Agricultural Affairs, Josette Shiner 
Undersecretary of Treasury for International Affairs, Timothy 
Adams 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian 
Affairs, Matthew Bryza 
Jim Loveland (Embassy Notetaker) 
 
GEORGIA 
President Mikhail Saakashvili 
Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili 
 
¶2. (C) Summary:  Agriculture Secretary Johanns met with 
Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili on January 11 in 
Astana, hours after attending the inauguration of Kazakhstani 
President Nazarbayev.  Secretary Johanns expressed U.S. 
appreciation for the bilateral relationship and Saakashvili's 
efforts on behalf of democracy.  Saakashvili identified 
energy as an urgent issue in the region.  Reflecting on the 
recent Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict, Saakashvili opined 
that Russia had hoped Europe would blame Ukraine; thanks to 
the forceful U.S. reaction, Putin's strategy had failed. 
Saakashvili and the U.S. delegation agreed on the urgency of 
dissuading President Niyazov from committing Turkmenistan's 
gas supplies to Russia.  In the longer run, new gas and oil 
sources and transportation routes were needed to lessen 
Western dependency on Russia.  Saakashvili told the Secretary 
that Georgia and Ukraine were spearheading an effort to issue 
a seven-country "Energy Declaration" criticizing Russia's 
non-market behavior and calling for a new "energy corridor." 
Saakashvili asked the U.S. to use its G8 leverage to induce 
Russia to seek peace in South Ossetia, and described a 
well-funded Russian propaganda campaign to "discredit 
democracy" in Georgia and Ukraine.  The U.S. delegation 
voiced support for the idea of an "Energy Declaration" and 
agreed on the importance of diversifying European gas 
supplies away from Gazprom's monopoly control. End summary. 
 
Expressions of Mutual Appreciation 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Secretary Johanns opened the meeting by telling 
Saakashvili that the U.S. appreciated its partnership and 
"open, candid bilateral relationship" with Georgia.  He 
complimented Saakashvili on his January 9 editorial in the 
Washington Post, calling it "a very thoughtful approach to 
your future."  Secretary Johanns also commended Saakashvili 
for his government's "diplomatic approach" to Georgia's 
conflict issues.  For his part, Saakashvili told the 
Secretary that "it was important to Nazarbayev" that 
 
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Secretary Johanns had come to the inauguration.  He then 
 
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contrasted U.S. and Russian approaches to the region, telling 
the Secretary that, with the U.S., "you get 'soft power.'" In 
his visit to Georgia, President Bush had demonstrated a 
"sophisticated knowledge of local issues...and had even 
addressed the public in Georgian."  Russia, by contrast, 
"thought that being a superpower meant pushing someone." 
Russia sees other countries in black and white, Saakashvili 
continued, and divides the world into "their friends and 
'America's stooges.'"  He then laughed:  "And we are the most 
outspoken American stooges." 
 
Reflecting on the Ukrainian-Russian Gas Dispute 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶4. (C) "Energy," Saakashvili began, "is THE issue in the 
region," and the political dynamics of the area were best 
seen as a conflict of interest between "energy deficit 
countries and a country that wants to regain its superpower 
status" -- by exercising its monopoly power over energy 
supplies.  Russia's recent doubling of Georgian gas prices 
was one example of Russia's "outrageous behavior," 
Saakashvili explained, and just one aspect of the pressure 
Russia was bringing to bear on Georgia for its democratic and 
Western leanings. 
 
¶5. (C) Asked by U/S Shiner whether he thought Putin had been 
personally involved in the decision to cut off gas supplies 
to Ukraine, Saakashvili replied that he was "100% percent 
sure the decision had been made at the highest level." 
Putin, he said, "thought Russia had enough leverage over the 
Europeans to get them to blame Ukraine" for the disruption of 
gas supplies.  Given European "passivity," Putin might have 
succeeded -- had it not been for the U.S.  "Thanks to the 
U.S. reaction, Putin got the opposite effect."  Putin, 
Saakashvili said, had been "taken aback by U.S. toughness." 
While it was fair to say that Putin "miscalculated," Putin 
"always does this.  He doesn't have his own brakes...he can 
only go back when he feels resistance."  The U.S. reaction, 
Saakashvili continued, had been "important" to Yushchenko. 
"He felt flattered by the U.S. reaction." 
 
¶6. (C) The Secretary asked Saakashvili to assess the 
aftermath of the gas dispute: how much ill will had the 
Russian's created?  "The damage was huge," Saakashvili said. 
"The Europeans are panicked.  For the first time, they saw 
the danger.  Now, they are physically afraid." 
 
Saving Turkmen Gas from the Russian Monopoly 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Saakashvili said that it was "very important" to 
reduce Russia's monopoly control of oil and gas supplies. 
Urgent action was needed with regard to Turkmenistan:  having 
failed to "blackmail Ukraine," Saakashvili warned, Putin was 
now focused on getting Turkmenistan to commit its entire gas 
reserves to the Gazprom network.  "The Ukrainians are trying 
to reach Niyazov today," Saakashvili told the delegation, in 
order to dissuade him from concluding a deal with Russia. 
Georgia, in turn, was trying to "convince the Ukrainians to 
make Turkmenistan a good offer."  DAS Bryza responded by 
telling Shaakashvili that, while engaging Niyazov was 
"difficult for us diplomatically," he was going to see 
Niyazov on January 12 on this issue and at Georgian Prime 
Minister Noghaideli's request. 
 
Developing Supply and Transportation Alternatives 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶8. (C) In the medium term, Saakashvili continued, Georgia 
needed to work with the U.S., its regional partners, and with 
the Europeans, to develop alternate supply sources and routes 
to get gas and oil to Europe.  "We need to think about using 
Turkmen and Azeri gas to enhance European security, and to 
secure the independence of the new democracies -- Georgia and 
Ukraine."  Saakashvili suggested that the U.S. could help by 
"inducing the Europeans to think of other options besides 
Russia."  Further, the U.S. should continue to facilitate 
negotiations to ship Kazakhstani oil by means of the BTC 
pipeline:  "Nazarbayev has problems with the Azeris," 
Saakashvili said, "and the Azeris perceive Kazakhstan as a 
competitor.  But both will listen to you."  Finally, 
Saakashvili remarked that Nazarbayev had recently reiterated 
Kazakhstan's interest in a "Caspian sea-bed pipeline." 
(Note: Saakashvili did not specify whether Nazarbayev was 
talking about an oil or gas pipeline. End note.) 
 
Negotiating a Seven-Country "Energy Declaration" 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶9. (C) Saakashvili informed Secretary Johanns that Georgia 
was working with Ukraine and five other regional states 
(Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Moldova, plus one 
unspecified) on an "Energy Declaration," which would 
criticize Russian behavior during the gas crisis and promote 
the idea of "a new energy corridor." "Kazakhstan won't sign 
at this stage," Saakashvili admitted, "but maybe later, after 
others have agreed."  Saakashvili said he was optimistic that 
the Azeris would sign, but the "key" was Turkmenistan.  "We 
need to talk about prices, and what benefits this would bring 
everyone," he concluded.  Saakashvili added that he hoped the 
declaration would be published "soon," ideally before a 
February Energy Conference in Georgia brought together 
representatives from GUAM, the EU, Turkey, the U.S., think 
tanks, and oil corporations. 
 
¶10. (C) Commenting on the initiative to develop a new "energy 
corridor," Secretary Johanns told Saakashvili that "the 
Seven-Country Declaration is positive.  We will work with 
you."  U/S Shiner told Saakashvili that "Secretary Rice feels 
that it is important that Europe focus attention on this 
strategy."  DAS Bryza noted that the issuance of the 
Seven-Country Declaration could help the U.S. in its 
discussions with Niyazov. 
 
South Ossetia 
------------- 
 
¶11. (C) U/S Shiner asked Saakashvili how the U.S. should use 
its G8 leverage on Russia.  "Push them to do something on 
South Ossetia," Saakashvili replied.  "Russia holds the key. 
They don't need South Ossetia -- only as a bargaining chip. 
This is the last chance for Putin to look like a peacemaker." 
 Earlier, Saakashvili had explained that Russian actions were 
undermining peace in the region:  "South Ossetia gets gas for 
free from Russia.  Why would they be interested in peace?" 
Furthermore, whereas Russia had recently banned imports of 
"basically all food products" from Georgia, and precisely 
during their harvest to inflict maximal harm, the ban did not 
apply to South Ossetia.  Finally, Saakashvili complained that 
Georgia's border with Russia was "a smuggling paradise," and 
Russian banks operating in South Ossetia laundered money and 
otherwise abetted criminal behavior.  "Even the most criminal 
countries in the world don't act this openly," he complained. 
 
 
Uzbekistan 
---------- 
 
¶12. (C) U/S Shiner asked Saakashvili for his thoughts on how 
to moderate Uzbekistan.  Saakashvili replied that Karimov was 
afraid, and thus was clinging to his personal and political 
relationship with Putin.  "Putin and Karimov talked all the 
time at the inauguration," he observed.  Saakashvili noted 
that Karimov's children were "wanted by the New Jersey 
courts" and were safe only in Russia.  In terms of 
Uzbekistan's development, "I think we will see a hardening of 
the regime...there are many Islamic extremists, and they are 
not afraid to die." 
 
 
Russian Propaganda to Discredit Democratization 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶13. (C) Saakashvili told Secretary Johanns that Russia was 
using propaganda in both Georgia and Russia in an attempt to 
"discredit democracy."  In Georgia, he said, the Russians 
were using the hike in gas prices to label his administration 
as "incompetent on energy."  Thanks in part to Kazakhstan's 
intervention to help with gas distribution, however, the plan 
was "backfiring."  Russia, however, was also financing a 
"huge propaganda campaign" against his government, 
bankrolling internal opposition groups, including NGOs and 
journalists.  It was ironic, Saakashvili noted, that Russia 
was using the same propaganda techniques that it accused the 
West of using to instigate the "Rose Revolution." 
 
¶14. (C) The Secretary concluded the meeting by reiterating 
U.S. appreciation of Saakashvili's efforts on behalf of 
democracy.  Saakashvili responded by telling the Secretary 
that the Georgians appreciated U.S. support.  "America has 
very committed friends in this region," he said. 
 
¶15. (U) Secretary Johanns did not have the opportunity to 
clear this cable. 
ASQUINO