VZCZCXRO8355
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #0096/01 0111249
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 111249Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8601
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 ADDIS ABABA 000096 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR G, DRL, S/P, R, AND AF 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ET
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA:  POST DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STRATEGY 
 
REF: STATE 191395 
 
Classified By: Charge Vicki Huddleston for reasons 1.4 (b, d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Ethiopia's May 2005 national elections 
delivered a shock to the country's nascent democratic system 
for which no one was prepared.  Opposition parties' 
unexpectedly strong showing frightened the GOE into rolling 
back some elements of what had been an unprecedented 
democratic opening during the campaign.  The results also 
emboldened the inexperienced CUD opposition leaders to issue 
a premature declaration of victory from which it proved 
impossible for them to walk back.  With most of the CUD 
leadership now in prison and the GOE struggling to control 
popular resentment in urban areas, the environment for 
promoting democracy has grown more challenging.  Nonetheless, 
the election results themselves and the process of political 
dialogue that post has promoted continue to offer 
opportunities.  Our key objectives include lowering tensions, 
improving human rights, broadening representation and 
participation in Parliament, boosting the credibility and 
capacity of the National Electoral Board, and increasing 
access to the media as well as the quality of public 
information.  Our strategy must be a mixture of cooperation 
and pressure with both the GOE and leading opposition 
organizations in order to overcome Ethiopia's culture of 
political confrontation and build one based on 
consensus-building through compromise.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Ethiopia is a country with 3,000 years of recorded 
history -- and practically no history of genuine democracy. 
Millennia of sometimes enlightened, sometimes bloody monarchy 
came to an end in 1974 when the Derg imposed a brutal, 
Marxist military government.  The DERG were in turn forced 
out of power after a 17-year armed struggle by the Tigrayan 
People's Liberation Front (TPLF).   The TPLF went on to form 
the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) 
coalition, along with affiliated parties the TPLF helped 
organize along ethnic lines.  The EPRDF and its principal 
leader, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, have ruled this 
geographically and ethnically diverse nation since 1991. 
While EPRDF leaders originally espoused a Marxist outlook, 
once in power the EPRDF begtan laying the foundations for 
multi-party democracy, along with an approach to governance 
known as ethnic federalism.  Under the latter arrangement, 
Ethiopia's provincial boundaries were redrawn to reflect 
ethnic majorities in each area, and a regional councils were 
given new additional authority for local decision-making. 
National elections in 1995 and 2000 failed to establish a 
true multi-party system however, as alleged EPRDF harassment 
and strong-arm tactics prompted most potential opposition 
parties and candidates to boycott the polls.  In early 2005, 
Ethiopia's 547-seat Lower House contained just 12 opposition 
MPs. 
 
¶3. (C) In late 2004, the campaign for 2005 national elections 
began in an atmosphere of unprecedented openness.  The GOE 
engaged in less harassment of opponents than in previous 
campaigns, and permitted a revolutionary series of candid 
debates on key issues that was broadcast live throughout the 
country.  Many disparate opposition parties came together in 
two large coalitions, the larger Coalition for Unity and 
Democracy (CUD) and the smaller United Ethiopian Democratic 
Front (UEDF), and both coalitions conducted energetic and 
effective campaigns.  GOE electoral authorities at the NEB 
worked closely with international technical experts and 
permitted international observers, including the Carter 
Center and European Union Observer Mission (EOM).  Polling 
day on May 15 was also largely free of major irregularities 
until initial returns began to show a surprisingly strong 
showing by the opposition.  At that point, international 
observers reported that significant irregularities began to 
occur in the counting process.  The opposition at first cried 
foul, then claimed victory, and finally launched a barrage of 
specific challenges to the announced results.  With the help 
of international mediation, the GOE established a new process 
for resolving electoral complaints whose results ultimately 
failed to satisfy either opposition supporters or 
international observers.  In August, after three months of 
political wrangling and demonstrations, the GOE announced 
final election results in which the opposition was awarded 
over 170 seats.  The major opposition coalitions continued to 
claim they had won the election; the Carter Center estimated 
privately that opposition parties may have been cheated out 
of 30-50 additional seats, still far short of a majority. 
 
¶4. (C) Charge Huddleston and the EU Troika Ambassadors 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000096  002 OF 007 
 
 
facilitated a dialogue between the GOE and opposition leaders 
in late September and early October designed to address 
concerns about Ethiopia's democratic institutions and 
persuade reluctant opposition leaders to join the new 
Parliament and regional councils.  Major issues in the 
dialogue included the GOE's imposition of more restrictive 
rules for debate in Parliament following the elections, lack 
of opposition access to state media (the only broadcast 
media) and the NEB's alleged lack of independence.  The GOE 
made some promises in each area, but refused to allow 
discussion of changes to the NEB board.  The dialogue 
ultimately broke down over this issue.  UEDF leaders decided 
that enough progress had been made to justify entering 
Parliament, but CUD leaders chose to boycott Parliament as 
well as the Addis Ababa Regional Council, which they would 
have controlled.  The CUD decided in late October to continue 
pressing its reform agenda through civil disobedience, but 
the situation quickly deteriorated into violent protests that 
swept the country.  The GOE quelled the unrest, but killed at 
least 40 people and imprisoned over 20,000 people in the 
process.  Among those imprisoned were 25 senior officials of 
the CUD as well as other party leaders around the country. 
These incidents further increased political tensions and 
deepened popular animosity toward the GOE, particularly in 
urban areas. 
 
¶5. (C) Below are key elements of post's strategy for 
promoting democracy in Ethiopia, keyed to specific taskings 
in reftel. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
Democratic Deficits and Near-term Benchmarks for Improvement 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Identify the key areas of democratic deficit and the 
3-5 most important desired outcomes over the next 6-8 months: 
 
Most democratic institutions in Ethiopian are weak and 
subject to political manipulation, and therefore inspire 
little public confidence.  This lack of confidence in public 
institutions -- including the National Electoral Board, 
Parliament and the judicial system -- recently prompted key 
actors, from political parties to voters themselves, to look 
for solutions on the streets, rather than through the 
established political process.  Post urged opposition leaders 
to accept substantial gains made in the imperfect 2005 
electoral process and build on them, while at the same time 
taking their specific grievances to court.  Key party leaders 
and the majority of their constituents instead chose a 
strategy of confrontation with GOE authorities. 
 
Other areas of democratic deficit are the lack of private 
broadcast media, new (often informal) restrictions on private 
print media, restrictions on peaceful political activity and 
harassment of opposition political organizations, and 
inadequate respect for the rule of law as seen in arbitrary 
arrests and detention. 
 
Most important desired outcomes over the next 6-8 months: 
 
1) At least 80 percent of elected Coalition for Unity and 
Democracy MPs take seats in Parliament and the Addis Ababa 
Regional Council; 
 
2) Parliamentary rules revised to offer opposition parties 
more opportunities to participate in legislative debate; 
 
3) Appointment of a more independent National Electoral Board 
and more effective preparation for local elections in 2006/7; 
 
4) Revision of the media law, increased space for private 
media and opposition access to state media; 
 
5) Release of all those detained following November 2005 
demonstrations except in those cases where the GOE can 
credibly prove criminal acts. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Six-Month Strategy for Democracy Promotion 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶7. (C) What is post's six-month strategy for achieving the 
above outcomes? 
1) We will continue to promote political dialogue, compromise 
and reconciliation through diplomatic contacts and pressure 
on the GOE and key opposition leaders.  The dialogue will 
focus on specific steps to strengthen Ethiopian democratic 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000096  003 OF 007 
 
 
institutions and reinforce all parties' commitments to a 
successful multi-party system.  We will call on intervention 
by senior USG officials and other international leaders at 
appropriate times to advance the process, both through 
private contacts and public statements. 
 
2) We will also seek to build a vocal and powerful 
constituency for dialogue -- and opposition participation in 
the democratic process -- through contacts with civil society 
leaders as well as messages to the general public.  We have 
begun an initiative to involve influential, independent 
leaders from a variety of sectors in a focused dialogue to 
build national consensus on Ethiopia's medium- and long-term 
path to democracy and development that we are calling 
"Envisioning Ethiopia 2020." 
 
3) We will work with other donors in the Development 
Assistance Group (DAG) to introduce specific governance 
indicators in Ethiopia's next five-year sustainable 
development plan, known locally as the Plan for Accelerated 
and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP).  Such 
indicators, which will include human rights and democracy 
benchmarks, have not been incorporated previously in the 
donors' matrix for evaluating GOE performance.  Negotiating 
them will be difficult, but will they will assist us in 
applying steady, low-profile but effective pressure on the 
GOE for democratic opening. 
 
4) We will maintain calls for the release of CUD leaders, NGO 
leaders, journalists and others detained in connection with 
recent political violence.  We will work with other donor 
governments and technical organizations like the ICRC and 
Prison Fellowship to monitor both judicial procedures and 
detainee welfare. 
 
5) We will measure Parliament using the Prime Minister's 
yardstick.  PM Meles said publicly and privately that the GOE 
would revise Parliamentary rules if it could be demonstrated 
that opposition parties faced a more restrictive environment 
than their counterparts did in developed democracies 
including Canada, the UK, Germany and India.  Post is 
cooperating with other donors on a study comparing Ethiopia's 
Parliamentary environment with those the PM indicated.  With 
the study in hand, we will seek to hold the PM to his word 
using a calibrated mix of private and public pressure. We 
will also cooperate with other donor governments in providing 
assistance to Parliament in partnership with a multi-party 
steering committee.  Such activities will include orientation 
for new members, training for women Parliamentarians and 
seminars designed to foster a more open, respectful and 
cooperative institutional culture.  Finally, we will also 
seek to increase public access to and confidence in 
Parliament through a series of targeted programs. 
 
6) We will similarly engage with the NEB, along with other 
donors, to address the organization's technical and political 
weaknesses.  The Carter Center report, and those of other 
international electoral observer missions, will provide 
useful analyses for this exercise.  We will seek to organize 
a high-profile seminar involving representatives from 
exemplary African or other electoral authorities.  We will 
also push the ruling and opposition parties toward a 
consultative process on the selection of a new, impartial NEB 
Board; the GOE says a new board will be chosen by May 2006. 
 
7) Through the above-mentioned political dialogues and at 
other opportunities, we will seek to create space for more 
independent, professional and ethical media as well as fair 
access for opposition parties and other non-government 
viewpoints on state media.  Achieving GOE approval for 
private broadcast media will be one key goal, as will 
supporting the GOE's stated objective of a code of conduct -- 
one that will still allow media organizations essential 
freedoms.  The GOE has already agreed to donor assistance in 
developing a new media law and code of conduct, which the GOE 
has promised will reflect international standards.  We will 
employ PD programming to train journalists and highlight best 
practices. 
 
8) We will encourage both the GOE and the outlawed Oromo 
Liberation Front (OLF) to resume discussions aimed at 
reincorporating the OLF in the legal, democratic system.  The 
OLF continues to enjoy significant support in the vast, 
populos region of Oromia.  Its participation in peaceful 
political activity and future elections would contribute to a 
more representative and legitimate democracy in Ethiopia. 
 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000096  004 OF 007 
 
 
9) Though Ethiopia has not yet come close to qualifying for 
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) resources, we will seek to 
engage the GOE in detailed discussions on this process that 
will make clear the potential rewards for a dramatic 
improvement in governance and development policies more 
generally. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Resources and Engagement from Washington 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Post's existing USAID budget for democracy and 
governance gives us some important tools to work with, as 
well as programs already in progress that we can adapt to our 
new circumstances.  We also cooperate closely with other 
large donor countries and institutions in the Development 
Assistance Group (DAG) as well as the Ambassadors' Donors 
Group.  Where we may need additional assistance, however, is 
in increasing resources available for public affairs 
programming. 
 
¶9. (C) High-level Department engagement will also be 
extremely valuable.  A visit from the Secretary, for example, 
would allow us to amplify our message and maximize our 
leverage.  (A visit to Addis would also allow the Secretary 
to engage with leaders at the African Union and showcase our 
extensive support to this important continental institution.) 
 The Secretary could recognize our long-standing and 
generally successful partnership with the GOE on fighting 
terrorism, poverty and HIV/AIDS, while at the same time 
pushing for progress on our democracy agenda.  Post plans to 
inaugurate an American Corner at Addis Ababa's brand new 
National Library and Archives on March 7, which would offer a 
visiting Department principal to speak to Ethiopians about 
the importance of the free flow of information and education 
for democracy and development. 
 
¶10. (C) We would also like to continue to count on periodic 
interventions from senior Department officials, including AF 
A/S Frazer and U/S Burns, to keep our political talks on 
course. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Major Impediments to Democratic Progress 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) The greatest obstacle to democratic progress in 
Ethiopia is probably the country's undemocratic history and 
political culture.  Though the enormous turnout in this 
year's national elections demonstrated a real thirst for 
democracy among this country's 75 million people, there is 
practically no tradition of consensus-building and compromise 
at the national level (though village elders have long 
practiced these skills at the local level.)  Political forces 
are either in power, or they are not.  Political changes has 
invariably come in violent waves, usually accompanied by 
killings and purges of previous authorities. 
 
¶12. (C) Many voters in rural areas, unfamiliar with disputed 
elections or power-sharing, reportedly concluded from 
vociferous opposition attacks during the 2005 electoral 
campaign that the GOE was seriously weakened.  Post-election 
euphoria only reinforced these hopes and created unreasonable 
expectations, which in turn prompted CUD leaders to pursue a 
maximalist, confrontational strategy to force immediate, 
dramatic changes in the GOE.  The EPRDF, on the other hand, 
was caught off-guard by the strength of anti-government 
sentiment and was utterly unprepared for giving up power. 
The Meles government's response was to clamp down suddenly 
and harshly on the democratic opening it had begun.  The 
EPRDF now faces a scenario in which its popular support has 
likely dwindled further following killings and mass arrests, 
so any step towards a more open political system may be seen 
by its hard-core supporters as a step toward an exit from 
power. 
 
¶13. (C) Growing ethnic tensions also pose a serious obstacle 
to reforming democratic institutions.  The EPRDF regime has 
long-standing alliances with ethnically-based parties in 
nearly all of Ethiopia's diverse regions, but few of these 
political organizations formed by the EPRDF enjoy genuine 
majority support in their home areas.  After 15 years in 
power, the EPRDF depends more than ever on a cadre of 
Tigrayan officials and supporters that it has deployed 
throughout the national and regional governments, as well as 
in the Armed Forces.  This reliance on a narrow ethnic base 
for most sensitive positions has alienated many members of 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000096  005 OF 007 
 
 
other large ethnic groups like Amharas and Oromos, and has 
created the impression among many that a democratic transfer 
of power could lead to the settling of scores against 
Tigrayans.  This perception is likely to make the current 
government less willing to loosen controls over electoral or 
political systems, and more likely to use dirty tricks to 
undermine serious rivals for power. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
Other Influential Actors: EU, World Bank, African Union 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶14. (C) PM Meles has told the Charge and others on several 
occasions that Ethiopia's march toward democracy must take 
place on its own terms -- and will not be dictated by 
foreigners.  The EU Observation Mission's report and other 
international criticism since the May 2005 election have only 
hardened this posture.  Nevertheless, PM Meles remains 
sensitive to the deterioration of his government's formerly 
positive international reputation, particularly in Europe, 
the U.S. and, to a lesser extent, within Africa.  In 
addition, Ethiopia remains highly dependent on external 
assistance to pursue its development strategy and to manage 
chronic balance of payments and budget deficits.  While the 
GOE (probably rightly) believes it will escape large-scale 
cuts in humanitarian assistance, PM Meles and his cabinet are 
likely to be concerned about reductions in other assistance 
flows, particularly those received in the form of direct 
budget support (DBS).  The World Bank, Britain, and the EU 
are the largest sources of DBS and therefore wield 
significant influence over the GOE. 
 
¶15. (C) The African Union can also exercise some moral 
suasion over the GOE, particularly given that the 
organization makes its home in Addis.  The AU has so far gone 
relatively easy on the EPRDF government in public, though AU 
Chairman Konare has reportedly been tougher in private.  Some 
rumors have suggested that the AU might abandon Addis if 
there is a significant deterioration in the democratic 
climate, though this would be a dramatic and difficult step. 
 
¶16. (C) Russia and China are both major players in Ethiopia; 
the former supplies large quantities of military equipment 
and training, while the latter has helped Ethiopia through 
aid and assistance to build up the country's infrastructure. 
Neither Russia nor China look likely to apply pressure or 
offer inducements for greater democratization, however. 
Indeed, some have speculated that China might make up some of 
the difference in reduced aid levels if Western donors assume 
a more critical position on Ethiopia. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Democracy Promotion the Government Supports 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶17. (C) To its credit, the EPRDF government put in place a 
constitution and many other institutional underpinnings of 
modern democracy during its 14 years in power.  During this 
year's national election campaign, the GOE allowed 
unprecedented freedom for political activity, including a 
series of lively debates transmitted live on radio and 
television.  Most observers believe that the EPRDF expected 
the opposition to win far fewer seats than it did in 
Parliament; some have suggested that the ruling party would 
never have embarked on this democratic opening if they 
believed they could lose power.  Post continues to believe, 
however, that PM Meles is genuinely committed to deepening 
Ethiopian democracy but was unprepared for the speed with 
which change came.  The PM has indicated to the Charge that 
he wishes to resume and accelerate democratic reforms, but 
clearly wishes to control the velocity and the direction of 
democratic change. 
 
¶18. (C) The GOE has accepted some key elements of 
democratization while opposing others.  Performance in many 
areas has been mixed.  For example: 
 
-- Independent political parties have been allowed to operate 
and claimed substantial numbers of seats in national and 
regional assemblies, but GOE security forces and ruling party 
militia have engaged in systematic harassment of opposition 
parties. 
 
-- Until the November 2005 demonstrations, Ethiopia boasted 
an impressive array of independent -- and generally 
pro-opposition -- newspapers.  Many of the newspapers urged 
opposition leaders to take a hard line with the GOE and 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000096  006 OF 007 
 
 
supported public demonstrations.  Several editors have now 
been charged with treason and their papers blocked from 
publishing.  Nonetheless, several independent papers continue 
to publish.  The GOE has promised in principle to approve 
licenses for independent broadcast media, but has not 
approved any as yet.  State media allowed opposition parties 
limited access during the election, but have reverted to 
government propaganda in the wake of the disputed election 
results. 
 
-- The GOE has permitted many civil society organizations 
(CSOs) to operate, but has selectively cracked down on some. 
Leaders of two such organization are now under arrest in 
connection with the November 2005 demonstrations.  Others, 
including some independent human rights organizations 
continue to operate.  The GOE allowed international election 
observer missions from the U.S., EU and AU to monitor the May 
2005 polls, but initially denied domestic observer missions 
the same privilege.  The GOE also expelled National 
Democratic Institute (NDI) and International Republican 
Institute (IRI) personnel during this year's election 
campaign.  Building the capacity of political parties or NGOs 
will thus be very difficult for outside actors. 
 
-- Freedom of expression, particularly, through public 
demonstrations, has been especially controversial in recent 
months.  Hundreds of thousands of opposition supporters were 
permitted to gather in Addis Ababa's main square prior to the 
May elections.  Since that time, however, fearing that such 
gatherings would get out of control, the GOE has equated 
large public demonstrations with subversion.  Demonstrations 
in June and November 2005 did indeed cost at least 40 lives 
each and led to thousands of arrests. 
 
-- The GOE has agreed to accept capacity-building assistance 
from international donors including the U.S. to strengthen 
the capacity of Parliament, the media and the NEB.  Some 
activities have already begun.  The challenge will be to 
deliver such assistance so that it has a real impact and 
takes into account the needs of opposition parties as well as 
the GOE. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Consequences of Making Democracy a Priority 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶19. (C) The USG has a broad and strategic relationship with 
Ethiopia.  Our growing intelligence relationship with the GOE 
contributes to our efforts to monitor Islamic extremist 
activity in Somalia and Somali regions of Ethiopia.  A 
cut-off or serious reduction in military assistance and sales 
would almost certainly have an impact on this valuable 
relationship.  How serious that impact would be would depend 
on how definitely our relationship with the EPRDF government 
is severed.  The GOE might simply cease sharing information 
for a time if it hopes the problem will blow over, or might 
take action against the longer-term U.S. intelligence 
presence in Ethiopia. 
 
¶20. (C) The USG has also enjoyed a cooperative and relatively 
successful relationship with the GOE on food security issues, 
working together to provide humanitarian aid to millions of 
Ethiopians vulnerable to drought and famine and to improve 
their long-term ability to maintain their livelihoods.  We 
have a similarly positive working relationship with the GOE 
on treating and stopping the spread of HIV/AIDS.  In a region 
of characterized by weak and failed states, the GOE has 
demonstrated the ability to plan and implement development 
policies (though not always optimal) in partnership with 
international donors, maintain law and order effectively in 
most areas and generally serve as a stabilizing influence on 
the region.  To the extent that tougher USG criticism or 
reductions in assistance weaken the EPRDF politically, there 
is a risk that public order could deteriorate, yield to civil 
conflict and/or eventual fragmentation of the country.  Of 
course, there is also the possibility that the EPRDF 
government would be replaced by a strong but more enlightened 
regime composed of elements of the current opposition. 
 
¶21. (C) Though PM Meles and his government have made clear 
commitments to democratization and have taken a number of 
important steps along this road, the GOE is likely to resent 
and resist aggressive USG efforts to deepen democracy.  Much 
will depend, of course, on how we pursue our democratic 
agenda.  If the USG continues to approach democratization in 
Ethiopia resolutely, but within the context of our valuable 
overall relationship, tensions should be manageable.  In the 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000096  007 OF 007 
 
 
end, GOE officials need us even more than we need them, so 
they are likely to burn bridges with the USG only if their 
political survival demands it. 
 
¶22. (C) What are our prospects for promoting democracy in 
Ethiopia?  The EPRDF has reached an important crossroads. 
The current slippage in the ruling coalition's popular 
support may convince many in the EPRDF that deepening 
democracy and creating impartial institutions will spell doom 
for their government.  If the dominant group in EPRDF reaches 
that conclusion, there is likely little that the U.S. or 
broader international community can do to change their 
approach.  If, however, PM Meles' remains genuinely committed 
to democracy -- whatever its outcome -- then a mixture of 
engagement and assistance with calibrated international 
pressure could help keep Ethiopia moving along the right 
path. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HUDDLESTON