This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ACCRA 000248 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: GH LI PREF PREL TO
SUBJECT: REFUGEES IN GHANA: STRENGTHENING UNHCR AND GOG 
COOPERATION 
 
REF: A. A) 05 STATE 230023 
 
     ¶B. B) 05 ACCRA 2585 
     ¶C. C) 05 ACCRA 2548 
     ¶D. D) 05 ACCRA 2311 
     ¶E. E) 05 ACCRA 2287 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY: In a January 23 meeting with Embassy 
officers, UNHCR Representative Luc Stevens welcomed USG 
support for his various refugee programs in 2006 and accepted 
our encouragement to work more closely with the GOG.  Beyond 
money and staffing, his primary concern was the GOG wild 
card:  Stevens was unsure how much longer the GOG would 
tolerate the presence of the Sudanese and Togolese (and other 
refugees) at Krisan Camp or the Togolese who arrived last 
year in the Volta Region.  Stevens admitted that UNHCR had 
made mistakes in the past at Krisan and he committed his 
organization to engage in closer dialogue with the refugees 
there and to hold monthly, tripartite meetings with Ref Coord 
and the GOG.  On January 26, the Ambassador hosted a 
tripartite lunch with UNHCR and senior GOG officials in which 
the Chief Director of the Ministry of Interior pledged 
Ghana's continued support as a host for refugees.  The GOG is 
still investigating alleged police excesses at Krisan camp, 
he said, while complaining that UNHCR had not responded to 
GOG correspondence on Sudanese refugees.  UNHCR and the GOG 
officials agreed to begin regular meetings to improve overall 
coordination and generate some sense of movement on Krisan 
refugee issues.  End Summary. 
 
-------------------- 
Doing Less with Less 
-------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) On January 23, Ref Coord, Polchief, and visiting 
PRM Program Officer Jennifer Christenson met with Acting 
UNHCR Representative Luc Stevens and Senior Protection 
Officer Jane Muigai to review refugee goals for the coming 
year.  Stevens volunteered at the onset that he expected 2006 
to be a difficult year because of the organization's 
financial situation.  It was possible that his budget would 
only be 80% of last year's.  Any increase in staffing was out 
of the question, although it was possible Stevens might find 
a UN volunteer to help with Krisan Camp. 
 
------------------------------- 
Krisan Camp:  Durable Solutions 
------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Emboffs asked about the situation in Krisan Camp, 
where some refugees rioted in November and where police 
repeatedly responded with excessive force.  Stevens conceded 
there were some police excesses at the camp but cautioned not 
to "overreact" to the Krisan events, noting that it was not 
in UNHCR's overall interest, given other concerns in Ghana, 
to make public statements or directly criticize the GOG on 
its handling of Krisan.  There is a need for a holistic 
approach to durable solutions for refugees at both Krisan and 
Budumburam Camps, including possibly integrating the Togolese 
at Krisan with the Togolese refugees in the Volta Region, 
adjoining Togo.  Some of the Krisan Togolese, who arrived in 
Ghana during the 1990's, could eventually be referred for 
resettlement, but the timing was not good now because it 
would be seen as rewarding those who rioted and send 
encouraging signals to the Volta Region Togolese that he was 
not prepared to deal with at this time, especially given 
their often very large, extended families.  (In the past, 
there had been cases of over 100 refugees linked to a single 
Togolese family.) Stevens was concerned that the GOG was not 
actively pursuing the 47 refugees supposedly wanted in 
connection with the violence and border demonstrations in 
November.  Eleven refugees had already been taken to court, 
but had been released on bail.  He thus had no assurances 
that the GOG would inflict any meaningful punishment on the 
perpetrators. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) On the Sudanese refugees in Krisan, UNHCR in Geneva 
is sending a letter to the Minister of the Interior 
indicating that, while UNHCR is not opposed to their 
resettlement, the timing for referral is not good so soon 
after the violence in the camp.  Stevens told us UNHCR would 
not support resettling the Sudanese in a third country (such 
as Chad) and he hoped to make the GOG understand that there 
will inevitably be some Sudanese refugees here who will not 
qualify for resettlement outside of Ghana. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Stevens noted that 1,600 refugees had shown up for 
the December food distribution, an indication that fewer camp 
residents -- about 200 -- were still hiding in the 
surrounding forests or elsewhere.  He planned to meet with 
refugees soon to discuss the possibility of another UNIDO 
income generation project.  Stevens added ruefully, "We now 
realize we didn't know enough about our refugee population in 
Krisan."  Stevens planned to conduct a socio-economic survey 
of the camp to better understand the camp dynamics and hoped 
to hire a UNV to strengthen the UNHCR presence on the ground. 
 However, UNHCR did not have the funds to rebuild everything 
it had before in the camp.  In the end, Stevens acknowledged 
that UNHCR's ultimate goal was to close the camp because it 
is too remote and has a volatile mix of nationalities living 
in close proximity to each other; however, closure would not 
occur until 2007 or later. 
 
------------- 
The Liberians 
------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) One of Stevens' top priorities was the repatriation 
of 12,500 Liberians during CY 2006.  A caucus of West African 
UNHCR Representatives had asked the HC last week in Geneva to 
approve the promotional phase of repatriation, during which 
UNHCR would act more aggressively (including the use of 
financial incentives) to encourage Liberian refugees to 
return home.  George Weah and some new Liberian ministers 
reportedly have plans to travel within the region to promote 
repatriation.  Liberia's new Minister of Defense is a former 
UNHCR staff member whom Stevens expects to be active on 
refugee issues.  Since Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf's inauguration, 
interest in repatriation had spiked among the 40,000 Liberian 
refugees resident in Ghana.  Already this year there had been 
about 1,000 repatriations from Ghana by three charter 
flights. Stevens believes more returns to Liberia would occur 
if UNHCR chartered a boat, which would allow refugee families 
to take more of their belongings with them. 
 
---------------- 
The Volta Region 
---------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Stevens was thankful that the 12,000 Togolese who 
fled Togo for Ghana in April and May of last year were living 
as part of Ghanaian communities, rather than corralled as 
dependents into camps.  Their number has decreased by 500 
(about 4%), suggesting that a small proportion had decided to 
return home to test the waters.  Stevens believed it was 
still too early to launch a tripartite repatriation agreement 
with the current GOT, which had not yet convinced most 
refugees it was safe for them to return.  Stevens and Cotonou 
UNHCR Representative Rafik Saidi have agreed to begin 
periodic meetings to coordinate strategy, adding that ECOWAS 
had offered to become involved in resolving the Togolese 
situation, though he did not know whether that organization's 
role would prove helpful.  More worrisome to him was the 
GOG's attitude toward refugees, which he thought reflected 
increasing compassion fatigue. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
UNHCR Concerns about the GOG and Refugees 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Stevens planned to meet with the GOG soon to 
ascertain the latter's position on Krisan, fearing that the 
recent violence and spate of refugee complaints broadcast to 
the international media would turn the GOG away from its 
traditional "open door" policy.  Stevens believed the GOG, to 
its disappointment, viewed the Krisan riot as a slap in the 
face by the Togolese in return for Ghana's long-term 
hospitality.  He knew the Minister of the Interior had a 
personal agenda in wanting refugees out of his home district, 
precisely at a time when inflows (mostly by third country 
nationals) at the Elubo border crossing with Cote d'Ivoire 
were increasing.  To the east, there was also mounting 
evidence that the large refugee presence in the Volta Region 
was becoming burdensome.  The Volta Regional Minister was 
vacillating between compassion and xenophobia, while some 
local residents had asked the Togolese to leave their 
properties and a few schoolmasters no longer wanted to admit 
Togolese refugee children.  Stevens also remarked that the 
Ghana Refugee Board is "a virtual thing" with no office or 
equipment. 
 
-------------------------- 
Building a Better Dialogue 
-------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) On January 26, Ambassador hosted a tripartite lunch 
including Stevens and Muigai of UNHCR, Ministry of Interior 
Chief Director Edwin Barnes, Ghana Refugee Board Secretary 
(and Acting Chairman) M.A. Bawumia, and Jennifer 
Christianson.  The Ambassador and Christianson thanked the 
GOG for its willingness to serve as a safe-haven for over 
60,000 refugees.  Barnes said that the GOG was still 
investigating reports of police excesses in Krisan camp and 
remained willing to continue hosting 12,000 Togolese refugees 
in the Volta Region.  (He dismissed the Volta Regional 
Minister's negative public statements as just political 
posturing.)  Barnes was clearly unhappy that UNHCR had not 
responded to the GOG's written request that UNHCR resettle 
the Sudanese in Krisan, saying that the lack of response left 
the impression the GOG's concerns were not taken seriously. 
He said the GOG has no problem with the presence in Krisan of 
refugees from southern Sudan but saw the Darfurians as a 
"security threat" (without going into details.)  Barnes said 
it was very important both to the GOG and to the refugees 
that the UNHCR be perceived as "doing something" by having a 
process of dialogue in place. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Stevens replied that he would be conducting a 
socio-economic survey at Krisan and formulating a holistic 
plan that included durable solutions for refugees in Krisan 
and Budumburam Camps.  He wanted to avoid special treatment 
for only one nationality in one location and appealed for 
more time, adding that Krisan needed a cooling down period 
and UNHCR urgently needed to come up with an "out of the box" 
strategy for the old Togolese caseload there.  He agreed that 
UNHCR had taken too long to pursue the possibility of local 
integration or resettlement of this group.  Stevens 
cautioned, though, that resettlement might not be the 
appropriate durable solution for all of the Sudanese, and 
that resettlement countries would probably not approve 100% 
of the refugees referred to them. Stevens and Barnes agreed 
to regular tripartite meetings involving the Embassy. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Stevens has shifted from an attitude of defiance 
on some refugee issues to a more collaborative approach. He 
has clearly done some serious thinking and has come up with a 
clearer vision for 2006.  While the GOG is impatient for 
resettlement to begin, it is understandable that UNHCR needs 
more time to evaluate the refugees, particularly the Togolese 
at Krisan, who have languished as refugees since the early 
1990's. Barnes told PoChief after the meeting that he was 
very pleased that this lunch opened a new atmosphere of 
dialogue with UNHCR.  UNHCR also appeared pleased with the 
beginning of better communication and hoped that the GOG 
gained a greater sense of realism about some of Ghana's and 
UNHCR's refugee challenges.  Liberian repatriation is clearly 
a priority for both of them.  We will continue to play an 
active role in bridging communication between the GOG and 
UNHCR. 
BRIDGEWATER