This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000119 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958 DECL: 01/19/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREF PREL NI HOSTAGES
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH THE NSA EVENING OF 18 JANUARY 2005 
 
Classified by Ambassador John Campbell for Reasons 1.5 (B) 
and (D) 
 
¶1.  (S/NF) On January 18, 2006, Nigerian National Security 
Advisor (NSA) Aliyu Mohammed told the Ambassador that he 
expected a quick resolution of the Delta hostage crisis. 
He said he would be a candidate for the presidency in 2007 
if President Obasanjo steps down at the end of his second 
term and if Gen. Ibrahim Babangida (IBB) chooses not to 
run.  He also raised the possibility of a military coup 
should President Obasanjo manipulate the political process 
to stay in office after his term expires. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
Assessment of the Hostage Crisis and General Stability in 
the Niger Delta 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶2.  (S/NF) Aliyu Mohammed said that the Federal Government 
of Nigeria (FGN) had established a committee to resolve, 
through negotiation, the current hostage crisis in the 
Delta. The committee is chaired by Bayelsa State Governor 
Jonathan Goodluck, and includes his Deputy Governor, 
representatives from the state governments in the region, 
the Nigerian military, the State Security Service (SSS), 
and the National Police Force (NPF).  Aliyu said that while 
the committee had only just started its work, he believed 
the crisis would be over within the next 24-48 hours, with 
the hostages being released in return for unspecified FGN 
undertakings.  He raised the possibility that in lieu of 
responding to the hostage-taker demands that Ijaws Dokubo 
Azari and deposed governor of Bayelsa state Diepreye 
Alamieyeseigha be released, the state governors would 
undertake to increase the number of Ijaws in their 
governments.  However, in virtually the next breath, he 
said that the FGN and the committee still did not know 
which militia group was actually holding the hostages, and 
that the previous day, negotiations had been with the 
"wrong" militia group. 
 
¶3.  (S/NF) Aliyu said that the basic Niger Delta Region 
issues must be addressed, otherwise, the cycle of violent 
attacks against oil sector infrastructure and personnel 
will only continue.  He cited poverty and unemployment as 
the two key factors contributing most to the state of 
lawlessness and admitted the failure of the FGN, State, and 
Local governments to undertake and execute the reform 
programs necessary for development.  Aliyu also said that 
the local militias "outgunned" the military assets at the 
disposal of the FGN in the Delta. He said that there are 
two key issues where the FGN most needs our help: (1) 
strengthening the FGN's military and police capacity and 
(2) interdicting the oil bunkering, the profits of which 
fund the militias.  It is the profits from oil bunkering, 
he said, that enable the militias to purchase war materiel 
such as small assault weapons, rocket propelled grenades, 
and ammunition.  Aliyu claimed that the local state 
governors are responsible for "98 percent" of the oil 
bunkering.  Aliyu observed that the FGN hesitated to send 
in the Nigerian military to deal with the disparate 
militias (many of which have links to the governors) for 
fear that it would overreact, resulting in such 
humanitarian and political disasters as the Zaka Bian and 
Odi massacres, mentioning them by name.  Recalling previous 
suggestions of assistance by EUCOM to help improve security 
in the Niger Delta, he noted with regret the FGN's 
reluctance to accept outside help. 
 
¶4.  (S/NF) The Ambassador expressed concern over the loss 
of oil production.  He noted rapidly increasing world 
petroleum prices.  Aliyu responded by saying that 
production has not yet been drastically affected: Shell has 
only lost 130 - 150 k barrels per day (bpd) in production 
capability.  Aliyu also said that Shell has committed not 
to shut down production in fields unaffected by militia 
activity.  He noted that ExxonMobil has spoken to him 
regarding security threats, but he doubted they were 
sufficient to cause it to draw down in production.  The 
Ambassador asked whether he could confirm if Agip or Total 
had also suffered from attacks.  Aliyu said he had not 
heard of any.  The Ambassador then asked him for his frank 
assessment as to whether the current violence was, in 
essence, the declaration of war against the oil companies, 
which the militia group Movement for the Emancipation of 
the Niger Delta (MEND) makes it out to be.  Aliyu responded 
that the militia groups were simply increasing their level 
of rhetoric to force more oil company concessions, and that 
in another week or two, the region's stability would be 
restored. 
¶5.  (S/NF) The Ambassador asked Aliyu how he thought China 
and other South and East Asian countries would react to the 
violence in the Delta.  He replied that both China and 
India are primarily concerned with securing access to the 
natural resources they require and that they are undeterred 
by the real or perceived safety concerns of the Delta 
Region.  He also noted that former Minister of Defense 
Theophilus Y. Danjuma (a long-term Nigeria kingmaker) is 
currently negotiating oil contracts with China. 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
Assessment of President Obasanjo's Third Term Agenda 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶6.  (S/NF) Aliyu told the Ambassador that he would run for 
President in 2007 if Obasanjo and former Chief of State 
Ibrahim Babangida do not.  What the President intends to do 
is not clear.  Aliyu noted that when potential candidates 
express interest in running for the Presidency, Obasanjo 
"frowns" at them.  Aliyu said Obasanjo would like to change 
the constitution so that he can legally contest for a third 
term.  However, Obasanjo has not yet determined what his 
chances of success would be.  Aliyu said that he has 
discussed a possible Obasanjo third term with many in his 
"peer group," who feel as he does: no matter how good a job 
Obasanjo is doing, a constitution must not be changed for 
the benefit of one person.  Aliyu discussed two key 
challenges facing Obasanjo and his third term bid.  First, 
Obasanjo is deeply unpopular with the masses of Nigerians 
who are progressively impoverished, while the richest one 
percent of Nigerians, who are getting richer because of the 
economic reform program and higher oil prices, support his 
third term aspirations.  Second, Aliyu said that in light 
of the President's efforts to impose and support adherence 
to constitutions in other places in Africa, such as Togo, 
Obasanjo's manipulation of the political process in Nigeria 
would undercut his -- and Nigeria's -- international 
reputation. 
 
¶7. S/NF) Aliyu said that Obasanjo is raising vast sums of 
money for a possible third term bid.  Obasanjo is working 
through a consortium called Transcorp, which is controlled 
by some of the country's richest elite, including Gbenga 
Obasanjo (the President's son) and Aliko Dangote, one of 
Nigeria's richest men.  (Transcorp recently purchased the 
Nicon Hilton Abuja, the largest hotel in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.)  Should Obasanjo try to amend the constitution, 
Aliyu continued, bribery and intimidation would be 
widespread if the effort were to succeed.  Aliyu said that 
likely bribes would be 130 million Naira for a National 
Assembly Senator, 75 million Naira for a member of the 
House of Representatives, and 30-35 million Naira for 
members of State Assemblies.  He also confirmed that 
Obasanjo is using the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission (EFCC) to attack his political enemies.  He 
cited EFCC investigation of the state governor of Enugu, 
formerly a very close friend of Obasanjo, once he expressed 
interest in the Presidency.  Aliyu observed that Obasanjo 
"would take a Sergeant from the Nigerian Army and make him 
President of Nigeria rather than hand over to Atiku," the 
current Vice President.  Aliyu noted that Obasanjo has 
successfully dismantled much of Atiku's political machinery 
and his financial base.  If Obasanjo succeeds in staying in 
power for a third term, Atiku will "be either in exile or 
in jail."  Aliyu said that Obasanjo's enmity toward his 
Vice President and erstwhile political ally is solely based 
on Atiku's presidential aspirations. 
 
¶8.  (S/NF) Turning to former Head of State, Ibrahim B. 
Babangida (IBB), Aliyu commented that IBB is not really 
interested in the Presidency, but rather in remaining a 
relevant player in Nigerian politics.  He said that there 
are those around IBB, however; whose livelihoods would be 
severely affected should the former chief of state be 
marginalized.  And, Aliyu continued, IBB's wife has 
ambitions to be First Lady.  Aliyu said he and IBB would be 
meeting with Obasanjo on January 19 to try to "smoke out" 
the President's real intention about 2007.  In any event, 
he continued, by March 2006, it should be clear whether or 
not Obasanjo will run for a third term. 
 
¶9.  (S/NF) Aliyu said that his assessment is, if Obasanjo 
contests for a third term, it will be a catalyst for 
instability in Nigeria.  Aliyu said that he is concerned 
over the potential for a military coup, undertaken by mid- 
ranking officers if their seniors hold back, such is the 
popular dissatisfaction with the status quo.  In effect, as 
in the past, "Nigeria would invite the army back to save 
the state."  The Chief Justice is already complaining that 
the Obasanjo government rides roughshod over rulings of the 
Supreme Court.  Instability in the Delta is undermining the 
security of the entire country, the North is marginalized 
and the people are ever more impoverished.  Thus, there may 
be already reason enough to call in the military.  Obasanjo 
remaining in power past 2007 could be the tipping point. 
And, if the military leadership did not move, then middle- 
rank officers would.  The result would be a resumption of 
Nigeria's "coup culture" - - but more violent and bloody 
than in the past. 
 
¶10. (S/NF) Comment: Aliyu contradicted himself on the 
current Delta crisis, saying in one breath that it will 
soon be over, and in the next, that the FGN lacks the 
military capacity to resolve the security issues - - 
thereby implying that the FGN will not be able to resolve 
the crises in the short term.  He says that there is now 
the political will to address such deep seated problems as 
lack of development and oil bunkering.  Aliyu showed 
confidence in the ability of Governor Goodluck's committee 
to resolve the immediate crisis. 
 
¶11.  (S/NF) Comment, continued.  More than the Delta, Aliyu 
wanted to talk about his own presidential aspirations and 
what Obasanjo is going to do.  At present, Aliyu thinks 
that Obasanjo will try for a third term -- and, if 
successful, will so destabilize the state that a military 
coup would be a distinct possibility.  Like many other 
"establishment" Nigerians, Aliyu is particularly frightened 
of a "mid-level" officer coup, with its potential for 
radicalism.  However, Aliyu, like Vice President Atiku, 
thinks that Obasanjo "may come to his senses" -- by the end 
of March.  Aliyu's open discussion of the possibility of a 
coup was chilling; he has been involved in most of them 
since the end of the Biafra war.  Aliyu badly wants the 
presidency, but, he will only actively seek it if both 
Obasanjo and Babangida step aside.  Aliyu appears to be 
close to breaking with Obasanjo, whom he has served for the 
past six years, and there are rumors of his impending 
resignation.  While Aliyu seemed to agree when the 
Ambassador talked about the importance of free and fair 
elections in Nigeria, he also appears remarkably sanguine 
about his ability to win, even though he is largely unknown 
to the Nigerian man in the street.  End comment. 
CAMPBELL