This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 000316 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
FOR NEA A/S WELCH AND PM A/S HILLEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2016 
TAGS: MARR MASS PREL AE
SUBJECT: TAKING ANOTHER LOOK AT THE UAE DCA 
 
REF: A. 04 ABU DHABI 3615 
     ¶B. 04 ABU DHABI 4062 
     ¶C. 05 ABU DHABI 72 
     ¶D. 05 ABU DHABI 406 
     ¶E. 04 ABU DHABI 4335 
 
Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR MICHELE J. SISON, REASONS 1.4 ( 
B) AND (D). 
 
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Embassy wishes to raise with the 
Department a proposed way forward to address longstanding 
concerns over the UAE Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) 
(refs A-D).  We recommend reviving regular meetings of the 
U.S.-UAE Joint Committee on the DCA.  That committee has not 
convened since May 2001, but under terms of the DCA, the 
Joint Committee is supposed to meet frequently to resolve 
differences.  If that does not work, we recommend that the 
Department explore with DoD the possibility/advisability of 
reviewing C-175 negotiating authority for a DCA, although we 
know that could be a difficult and lengthy process. 
 
 
¶2. (S/NF) The UAE maintains the DCA cannot be implemented 
because it was never ratified by each of the seven emirates. 
There is also disagreement on jurisdiction over DoD 
personnel, as well as which U.S. personnel are covered under 
the DCA.  Several incidents involving DoD personnel in recent 
years have underscored the need to resolve these differences. 
 While we have relied to date on ad hoc in-country diplomatic 
intervention to ensure that DoD personnel were not subjected 
to UAE legal jurisdiction, thousands of DoD personnel are 
potentially at risk.  More recently, our hosts also have 
indicated that they are unwilling to proceed with CENTAF and 
NAVCENT,s crucial expansion efforts at key UAE installations 
without a formal basing agreement governing our activities. 
In the past, basing discussions have crossed U.S. DCA 
red-lines (specifically, criminal jurisdiction of U.S. 
military personnel).  These unresolved issues could have 
negative ramifications for CENTCOM's future plans in the UAE 
under the proposed Integrated Global Posture and Basing 
Strategy. 
 
¶3. (S/NF) Summary continued: Embassy has been in periodic 
contact with CENTCOM and OSD on this matter; it has been a 
"watch out for" on many scenesetters we have sent senior 
military visitors.  CENTCOM and OSD/Policy staffs are also 
considering options; a possible Joint Military Commission 
meeting in Washington in May (date not yet confirmed by OSD) 
may provide the next opportunity to address this issue with 
the UAE.  Our political-military relationship with the UAE 
remains one of the Embassy's highest priorities.  The UAE has 
continued its excellent support of the war on terror and it 
has cooperated with us in OIF, as well as providing active 
combatants in Afghanistan for OEF.  The UAE continues to 
provide basing and overflight for U.S. reconnaissance and 
refueling assets, and naval logistical support.  The 
steady-state number of DoD personnel in the UAE remains at 
approximately 1500, with as many as an additional 70,000 
transients (mostly US Navy personnel on liberty) per year. 
However, for the cooperation to expand and stabilize, we need 
a functioning DCA.  End Summary. 
 
Background: 
---------- 
 
¶4. (S/NF) The DCA was signed by both parties on July 23, 
¶1994.  Article IX of the DCA establishes that the agreement 
entered into force upon signature, has an initial period of 
12 years (until July 2006), and thereafter remains in force 
in perpetuity, unless terminated by either party on one 
year's notice.  The UAE, however, has refused to recognize 
that the DCA is in effect. 
 
¶5. (S/NF) Over the years, the UAE has posited several reasons 
for its position.  Most recently, the UAE has stated that the 
DCA will not be in force until ratified by all seven 
emirates.  The UAE has taken no efforts to ratify the DCA. 
The current language of the DCA states that the U.S. retains 
criminal jurisdiction over all DoD personnel and that U.S. 
personnel on temporary assignment to the UAE may enter the 
country, with notification, on an ID card and orders.  This 
language is consistent with other U.S.-Gulf country 
agreements.  The UAE seeks criminal jurisdiction over DoD 
personnel in the UAE and, more recently, has stated all DoD 
personnel entering the UAE are required to possess a valid 
passport and visa.  In a January 2001 DCA review meeting, the 
UAE requested renegotiation of the criminal jurisdiction 
provisions as a precondition to ratification. 
 
¶6. (S/NF) We have been told by OSD/General Counsel that 
surrendering criminal jurisdiction of U.S. personnel to the 
UAE is not acceptable.  Such a move would likely impact other 
regional bilateral agreements.  More importantly, UAE law 
does not meet U.S. standards of fairness and due process: 
 
-- there is no legal requirement that Miranda-type warnings 
be provided to a suspect, nor to provide counsel to suspects 
at early stages of proceedings, such as during the taking of 
statements. 
 
-- there is no clear constitutional or penal code provision 
addressing the burden of proof in criminal trials. 
 
-- criminal cases involving non-Muslims may be referred to 
Sharia courts. 
 
-- there is no jury system in the UAE. 
 
Incidents Highlight Need for Functioning DCA 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (S/NF) With the large number of U.S. personnel in UAE, we 
are at risk of a serious incident where a U.S. service member 
may be subjected to local law, Emirati due process, and, in 
some cases, Sharia law.  There have been incidents involving 
U.S. military personnel that emphasize the risk posed by 
Emirati denial of the signed DCA.  The issues of legal status 
and jurisdiction remain the sticking points.  The following 
incidents highlight the need for a functioning DCA: 
 
-- In April 1996, a traffic accident involving a U.S. sailor 
resulted in the death of an Emirati child and injury to four 
other UAE residents.  The American was jailed without formal 
charges.  The U.S. claimed jurisdiction, but the UAE 
maintained custody until a court found him guilty of wrongful 
death.  After extensive interventions by the Embassy, 
involvement of a special OSD negotiating team, and the 
dispatch of the senior U.S. Navy international lawyer and 
ultimately the Judge Advocate himself, the American's prison 
sentence was suspended and he was released into U.S. custody 
in June. 
 
-- In September 2004, four USAF airmen were involved in a 
single-vehicle accident in Abu Dhabi.  Two of them were 
injured and manacled to their hospital beds, pending 
investigation of liability for the accident.  It took six 
days for the UAE military and Abu Dhabi police to agree on 
jurisdiction and return the Americans to U.S. custody. 
 
-- In June 2005, a Filipino national reported to the U.S. 
Navy and Naval Criminal Investigative Service that she had 
been raped by a U.S. sailor.  She declined to report the 
incident to the Fujairah police or seek local medical 
attention out of fear that she would be arrested and 
deported.  Had this incident been reported to local 
authorities, the sailor would have been placed in custody by 
local authorities and required to stay in country until his 
trial.  The sailor was administratively transferred to the 
Naval Support Activity in Bahrain and is now awaiting 
courts-martial in Norfolk, Virginia. 
 
-- With nearly 600 ship visits per year to the UAE, we 
periodically have had to request Dubai authorities release 
U.S. personnel to the Navy, following their detention by the 
local authorities for minor infractions. 
 
¶8. (S/NF) In the more serious cases in which U.S. personnel 
were taken into custody by Emirati authorities, we have 
obtained their release after extensive interventions by the 
USG (except for the 1996 case, all cases were handled 
in-country).  Our ad hoc arrangements have worked for the 
most part.  But they are labor intensive and they may not 
suffice in the future if there is a serious accident or crime 
against UAE citizens.  On this count, our Emirati 
interlocutors have been most clear:  in cases of the rape or 
murder (including vehicular wrongful death determinations, as 
above) of an Emirati citizen, U.S. servicemembers will not be 
remanded to U.S. custody, but will be tried and punished 
under the UAE justice system.  The individual emirates have 
recently instituted a policy where magistrates are physically 
located at each police station, thereby making the criminal 
arraignment process swifter.  Our ability to perform any ad 
hoc diplomacy and settle issues financially before the 
servicemember is placed in custody is greatly lessened. 
 
Raising DCA with the UAE 
------------------------ 
 
¶9. (S/NF) The Embassy's preferred approach would be to revive 
the DCA Joint Committee that has not convened since May 2001. 
 Members from the U.S. include the U.S. Embassy, United 
States Liaison Office, and U.S. Central Command, and 
appropriate representation from the UAE.  Under the terms of 
the DCA, the Joint Committee is supposed to hold regular 
meetings in the UAE (the text says monthly, or more 
frequently if required).  This way forward does not require 
C-175 negotiating authority, which a renegotiation of the DCA 
would.  In the past, OSD has not been amenable to 
renegotiation of the DCA, but we understand that they are 
currently exploring options. 
 
¶10. (S/NF) In addition, there may be several other 
opportunities in the coming months for the USG to raise the 
DCA with the UAEG: 
 
-- We understand from CENTCOM that the second JMC may be 
scheduled for early May 2006 in Washington.  As we approach 
that meeting, we will try to ascertain their position.  At 
the first JMC in January 2005, UAE Armed Forces Chief of 
Staff, Lt. Gen. Hamad Thani, asked us to place DCA on the 
agenda, only to inform A/S Rodman during the meeting that he 
was not prepared to discuss it (refs C,D).  Instead, he said 
he would follow up with a letter to the Embassy.  We have yet 
to receive any correspondence from GHQ regarding DCA. 
 
-- Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) is 
planning a visit to Washington in May 2006 (not related to 
the JMC).  He has already expressed his government's 
commitment to hosting U.S. forces on UAE soil.  However, 
during a November 2004 meeting with General Abizaid, Sheikh 
Mohammed stated that the U.S. and the UAE need to negotiate a 
basing agreement.  General Abizaid responded that the 
U.S.-UAE relationship, built on mutual trust and respect, was 
one of the most important relationships in his AOR.  He 
undertook to follow up on the basing issue with Defense 
Secretary Rumsfeld (ref E). 
 
SIPDIS 
 
-- We would welcome a visit from senior Department 
representatives to Abu Dhabi during which time they could 
discuss DCA and other military cooperation issues with MbZ 
and others. 
 
Effect on Cooperation 
--------------------- 
 
¶11. (S/NF) The UAE has continued its excellent support of the 
war on terror and it has cooperated with us in OIF and OEF. 
The UAE continues to accommodate our military presence on 
their soil, provide overflight for U.S. reconnaissance and 
refueling aircraft, and provide naval logistical support. 
However, the UAE's insistence on negotiating a 
government-to-government agreement formalizing our joint use 
of UAE military bases, infrastructure, and associated 
services, is having an effect on CENTAF and NAVCENT's crucial 
expansion plans at key UAE installations.  Al-Dhafra Air Base 
is a key component of our relationship with the UAE, and 
plays a role in the ability of CENTCOM and CENTAF to project 
combat power in the AOR.  Al-Dhafra is home to the 380th Air 
Expeditionary Wing, with more than 1400 CENTAF personnel, 
operating 14 KC-135 and four KC-10 air refueling tankers, as 
well as five U-2 surveillance aircraft and two Global Hawk 
remotely piloted vehicle.  Al-Dhafra also hosts the UAE Air 
Warfare Center.  The ports at Jebel Ali on the Arabian Gulf, 
and Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman, are also crucial to CENTCOM 
access and power projection in the region. Over 600 U.S. Navy 
ships visit the ports annually.  State and DoD agree that 
continued access to UAE military facilities is vital to our 
strategic objectives in the region. 
 
Comment: 
------- 
 
¶12. (C) Embassy welcomes the Department's thoughts on a 
possible way forward with the DCA.  Perhaps there are 
comparable situations elsewhere in the region that could be 
instructive.  The first step is to revive the Joint 
Committee.  If that does not work, we recommend that the 
Department explore with DoD the possibility/advisability of 
reviewing C-175 negotiating authority for a DCA, although we 
know that could be a difficult and lengthy process. 
SISON